Cause and its effect, the making of symbols

112

[i]Cause and Effect. We say it is "explanation "; but it is only in “description” that we are in advance of the older stages of knowledge and science. We describe better, we explain just as little as our predecessors. We have discovered a manifold succession where the naive man and investigator of older cultures saw only two things, “cause” and "effect,“as it was said; we have perfected the conception of becoming, but have not got a knowledge of what is above and behind the conception. The series of “causes” stands before us much more complete in every case; we conclude that this and that must first precede in order that that other may follow - but we have not grasped anything thereby. The peculiarity, for example, in every chemical process seems a "miracle,” the same as before, just like all locomotion; nobody has “explained” impulse. How could we ever explain? We operate only with things which do not exist, with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces - how can explanation ever be possible when we first make everything a conception, our conception? It is sufficient to regard science as the exactest humanizing of things that is possible; we always learn to describe ourselves more accurately by describing things and their successions. Cause and effect: there is probably never any such duality; in fact there is a continuum before us, from which we isolate a few portions - just as we always observe a motion as isolated points, and therefore do not properly see it, but infer it. The abruptness with which many effects take place leads us into error; it is however only an abruptness for us. There is an infinite multitude of processes in that abrupt moment which escape us. An intellect which could see cause and effect as a continuum, which could see the flux of events not according to our mode of perception, as things arbitrarily separated and broken - would throw aside the conception of cause and effect, and would deny all conditionality.

The Gay Science[/i]

Perhaps one the most perplexing, and opaque of all philosophical questions is the nature of the “cause” and its relation to its “effect”. Nietzsche here evokes the thought of Leibniz’ seemingly unassailable truism “nature makes no leaps”. The breaking of the whole event into two “halves”, the cause and its effect seems to me to mirror the ancient Greek concept/device of the “súmbolon” - originally a vertebrae bone broken in half by two who take each half as a sign of recognition and proof of their identities and their relationship - the word from which we get our English word “symbol”. The Greek is a compound of “súm” meaning “with, together” and “bólos” meaning “to throw, to cast”, that is “cast together” or “cast with”. So under this metaphor the cast-together whole of an event is broken, as a sign of social contract, into its cause and its effect, which when coherently “re-joined” produce a rational and contractual universe, which can be shared. There is a strong arbitrary element in this metaphor, for instance the particular shape of the two halves of a broken bone marks out the uniqueness of that event, that no two bones could fit together as such, not to mention the propensity to use joint bones as dice in games of gambling. Also meaningful to a symbolon is the very fact of its material, the calcified residue of life, the most resilient, most telling (augury) remains of what has been lived. So in the marriage of the randomly affected yet most material of existence, a symbol is made and exchanged, that constructs the rational reality which then can be held in common, the “cause” and its “effect”. How much of our understanding of cause and effect is merely symbolic, and method and means for our economy of meanings, the establishment of identities, the mortar between “object” bricks, neither of which actually exist beyond our negotiation with and through them as such.

súmbolon:

A. tally, i.e. each of two halves or corresponding pieces of an astrágalos[joint bones] or other object, which two xénoi [friends], or any two contracting parties, broke between them, each party keeping one piece, in order to have proof of the identity of the presenter of the other

[astrágalos:
A. one of the vertebrae, esp. of the neck
II. ball of the ankle joint. well-turned, a complement
III. wrist
IV. knucklebones used as dice or a game played with dice
]

[súmbolon cont.]
b. of other devices having the same purpose, e.g. a seal-impression on wax; an extant bronze hand is inscribed
2. any token serving as proof of identity
3. guarantee
4. token, esp. of goodwill,
5. identity-token given to Athenian dicasts on entering the courts, entitling them to vote, and on presenting which they received another w ., in exchange for which they received their fee to a donation of corn or money

II. of written documents,

  1. passport or the seal thereon
  2. passenger-list
  3. pl., treaty
  4. contract between individuals
  5. receipt
    b. fee for making out a receipt
  6. unilateral undertaking in writing, guarantee
  7. warrant entitling the holder to draw allowances over a period
  8. warrant or commission from the Emperor, by which officers held their posts,

III. more generally, token
2. omen, portent
3. Medic., symptom.
4. prearranged signal
5. secret code, allegory
6. religious creed

IV. pl., standard weights

V. a small coin

Dunamis

very humean actually…

"10

The harmlessness of metaphysics in the future.— As soon as the origins of religion, art, and morality have been described, so that one can explain them fully without resorting to the use of metaphysical intervention at the beginning and along the way, then one no longer has as strong an interest in the purely theoretical problem of the “thing-in-itself” and “appearance.” For however the case may be, religion, art, and morality do not enable us to touch the “essence of the world in itself.” We are in the realm of idea, no “intuition” can carry us further. With complete calm we will let physiology and the ontogeny of organisms and concepts determine how our image of the world can be so very different from the disclosed essence of the world.

11

Language as putative science.— The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates he has appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things; language is, in fact, the first stage of the occupation with science. Here, too, it is the belief that the truth has been found out of which the mightiest sources of energy have flowed. Very much subsequently—only now—it dawns on men that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous error. Happily, it is too late for the evolution of reason, which depends on this belief, to be again put back.— Logic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real world corresponds, for example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at different points of time: but this science came into existence through the opposite belief (that such conditions do obtain in the real world). It is the same with mathematics, which would certainly not have come into existence if one had known from the beginning that there was in nature no exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute magnitude."

human all too human- Nietzsche

it is ironic to see such from a philologist…

“Alas, I fear we still believe in God because we still believe in grammar”

Twilight of the Idols- Nietzsche

-Imp

Imp.,

“With complete calm we will let physiology and the ontogeny of organisms and concepts determine how our image of the world can be so very different from the disclosed essence of the world.”

I am very interested in this trope. What do you think it means? Here “concepts” are treated as if “organisms”, and there seems to be an imagination that the ideational constructs of biology are somehow more true, more revealing than others. There seems to be a fundamental contradiction here, in that science is also the most exact humanization. What do you imagine that Nietzsche is trying to say here in this metaphor? Are these ontogenies lived or analyzed?

Dunamis

-Imp

Imp.,

that the meaning of concepts grow and change, mature, as organisms do…

If the meaning is of concepts that “grow and change” as such, then there would be no need to call one to understand them as ontogenic, because organisms and concepts would continue to grow despite the awareness of them as such. Nietzsche seems to be conflating a description “concepts are ontogentic” with a mode of analysis, “we should treat concepts ontogentically”, and apply biological metaphor of understanding to them. This conflation seems like a bit of a rhetorical move.

“science” for nietzsche is just another value system…

But he specifically says, “we will let physiology and the ontogeny of organisms and concepts determine”. Does this mean that we will just let our concepts evolve, as they have always evolved, “determined” by their physiology – in other words concepts will follow their own pattern and we will just let them do so, even though we have no power to stop them from doing so anyways. Or does he mean that the tools of ontogenetic analysis will prove correct and powerful tools?

“so that one can explain them fully without resorting to the use of metaphysical intervention at the beginning and along the way, then one no longer has as strong an interest in the purely theoretical problem of the “thing-in-itself” and "appearance."”

If concepts are ontogenetic physiologies, so to must be the “strong interest in the purely theoretical” be a physiology of an ontogeneity. If truly he is simply suggesting that we recline calmly amid the physiology of concepts, he must also accept the concepts of which he does not approve. It seems to me that Nietzsche is moving in two dimensions here, attempting a critique, but not applying his critique to his own project. If his ideas are just another phenotype along side other phenotypes, what does it mean to “let” our concepts be “determined” by the very forces that already determine them?

Dunamis

-Imp

Imp.,

Thank you for all your thoughtful responses…

and for nietzsche there is no “correct” tool only powerful ones…

So in what way do you imagine that visualizing concepts as organisms is “powerful”, if it does not entail the nature of concepts at all?

but that’s the thing… nietzsche’s view is that language is determined by an imaginary metaphysic of god and heaven not in the “empirical sciences” at all…

But of course, following his analysis, the “imaginary metaphysic of god and heaven” is an organism, a concept with a real physiology with real consequences, apart from transcendent values. This seems like something that Nietzsche finds rather unpalatable, but nonetheless a consequence of his reasoning.

the meaning of good, evil, bad, right ect. all must change dramatically with the loss of metaphysical meaning… but this event is far from being realized…

Yet following his thinking, there is no reason for the loss of that particular organism, the loss of that particular physiology to be “realized” at all. In fact that phenotype has proven over time to be a rather potent lifeform-concept.

but nietzsche also understands that the “new god” of scientific standards will be exactly as nihilistic as the previous god…

what is interesting is that within this metaphor of competing and evolving physiologies, these do not occur within a vacuum, but hypothetically at least within an environment, and the victor of such becomes a reflection not only the superiority of that physiology, but of that physiology in the context of that environment. So to a degree, there is a transcendental value in the victory of a particular truth in that it reflects the determination of circumstances. While the values purported with the sphere of the understanding are not correspondent to an external state, they are bodily an expression of that state in that they have proved sufficient within it, by the mere fact of their survival and reproduction. I am unsure if this results in Nihilism, because values “prove true” by power.

Dunamis

-Imp

Imp.,

I’ll let him field this one with his most famous passage…

As you know I hate argument by quotation, because it contains no living articulation. The passage quoted of course does not answer my question at all, other than to say that those vital metaphysical physiology concepts must die because Nietzsche says so, but this is in defiance of his very own analogy of physiologies, organisms and concepts.

no, it results in the opposite… the creative spirit (Nietzsche’s term) molds and creates as a diamond…

Again rhetorical trope. A diamond has no intrinsic value apart from the value placed upon it by man, and the purposes it is put to. Nietzsche cheats here. A diamond, a piece of coal. It depends on how cold it is outside.

the “proving true” of values is one of those questions of conscious… for whom is the key…

What is significant is that there is no absolute Nihilism, because in the presence of power, the “truth” becomes its own valuation, its own right of representation of the “beyond”. The intravalue measurment of course is disengaged, unless a larger field of meaning can be established. “For whom” is actually inconsequential, because the whom is implicit in the power. As Spinoza would equate right=power.

the ultimately nihilistic underlayment of the “external world” is merely the “tabula rasa” on which the ubermensch makes his (if ultimately meaningless) mark…

Nice double speak. If you keep talking like that Nick A. will accuse you of having transcended the ego structure and may very well start taking notes of all you say. :slight_smile: It is not tabula rasa because it is not arbitrary what physiologies can live and very well thrive upon that “blank slate”. Rather the presence and indeed persistence of a physiology of thinking testifies to the power, and therefore the knowledge –if only partial- of that slate. If the ubermensch makes his mark it is because his mark is more vital, more knowing/powerful than the untermensch. As painful as it may be to Nietzsche - and other self-styled would be superiors -, if the untermensch makes his mark instead, it is by plain consequence of his victory, that he is actually “uber”.

Dunamis

-Imp

imp, what would you say is the watershed between the ubermensch and the herd?

there could be several… the primary of course is the will to create, and secondly, the power…

then again, it is possible for the ubermensch to repeatedly “go under”…

-Imp

Decadence no?

This is the main backup behind your rejection of Dunamis claim no? If so, I reject this backup, because it’s quite possible for the untermensch to create, to long for creation - Jesus, Wagner… - decedants, lastmen. But I’m not with Dunamis either. So I still ask: what is the watershed?

Imp.,

no, not because he says so, but because they are at base, nothing…

No. At base, under this analogy, they are a physiology. The “content” of their reference is irrelevant. There is no exterior position from which to gauge the value of that content.

no, again, the diamond is nietzsche’s allusion to the ubermensch

No. the Ubermensche is nothing if not for the values that are presupposed to give him valuation. The diamond and the ubermensch is nothing apart from valuation. There is no inherent value to either. A diamond is just another rock. An ubermensche just another mensch, until put into relations.

no, nihilism itself is an absolute, the beginning… in the presence of power, specifically ~nihilism, one creates against the nihilistic background… the whom implicit in the power is not implicit because the power must be directed to have meaning…

I can’t really read through your anacoluthic method of expression. Are the elisions meant to be instructive? What is “the beginning”? What is the “background of Nihilism”? All contests of power are conducted within material limits, - not dreamed up in abstraction, but performed in the world - and so the victory of one is not only an expression of individual capacities, but those capacities are in reference to their context. The power may have to be directed, but the “whom” is implied by the agent who does the directing, i.e. he who is served.

but it is completely arbitrary… there is at base, nothing. what physiologies?

Are you not following Nietzsche’s metaphor that I had hoped we were exploring here? The conceptual physiologies are those referred to by Nietzsche.

what interpretation of physiology shall one posit?

That’s the point. There can be no interpretation of a physiology under this form, and for that reason no valuation of it as well. One can only let the physiologies of concepts fight it out on the terrain of the world. As Tina Turner said, “Two men enter, one man leaves”. The only interpretation/valuation is in the persistence of the man/concept/organism.

the things described are ultimately fleeting, the descriptions are the colors on the pallette…

Not under this particular metaphor of Nietzsche’s. Concepts are like organisms, not random jots on a blank canvas. They have genetic histories which speak to the “truth” of their persistence in the power of their persistence. The body plans of their physiologies have continuity in time, specific histories that attest to their power.

your assumption that only particular physiologies can exist in the void is based on?

What void? All physiologies exist within material parameters. Fish live, breath and compete within the sea. Birds live, breath and compete on the earth and in the air. The “truth” of any particular “physiology” is only its sufficiency within its environment. The “evolution” of physiologies attest not to persistence amid “the void”, - “the void” an entirely postulated “concept” with its own ontogenic history, a concept not arisen amid “the void”, i.e. not transcendent, but within the material contexts of its own development – but attest to persistence amid the material conditions in which they have thrived. You are missing the physicality of the idea, which specifically Nietzsche is turning to here by equating the concept to an organism.

the future resembling the past?

What do you imagine the ontogeny of organisms and concepts means?

the “presence and persistence” is of the power not the background…

But the persistence of organisms (and concepts) is done is context of the background, a background that cannot be considered neutral or blank under this metaphor.

the ubermensch makes his mark regardless of the untermensch…

He makes his mark only if he has the power to make his mark. If he has no such power, he is nothing. The power to mark is the only power.

the ubermensch exists necessarily outside that circle…

Because values are entirely relative to the physiologies of concepts, to be inside or outside the circle is also meaningless beyond that particular physiology. This is another rhetorical trope, just like the diamond. If the conceptual is only the competition of the physiologies of organisms, the value of being inside or outside the circle, being a diamond, being “over” is meaningless except through the manifestation of power.

Dunamis

Dunamis hi

I’m approaching the same way as you do regarding the distinction between the two menschen. But I’d like to ask you to clarify your ideas first: how do you define “mark” in this context?

And what would this “physiology concept” be - “mark”? What is the ring of this “circle”? The diamond rock is itself powerless, no more power than a gold that it instores, it doesn’t move either while the other rocks being still, but yet it shines - I believe this is Nietzsche’s meaning - earthly power is irrelavent to the being of ubermensch. My question remains: what is the watershed? If you insist that it’s power - in your meaning - the power of leaving some “mark”, then I ask you to specify what is this “mark” thing that you are refering to. Earthly power? Then I reject your idea on this because there are plenty powerful untermensch.

Un.,

how do you define “mark” in this context?

I take the term from Imp. I only extend the appropriate power-derived conclusions due to any analogous action.

And what would this “physiology concept” be - “mark”?

We are exploring the Nietzsche metaphor:

“With complete calm we will let physiology and the ontogeny of organisms and concepts determine how our image of the world can be so very different from the disclosed essence of the world.”

[the full quote is higher up, posted by Imp]

That is the question. What would this “physiology and ontogeny of organisms and concepts” be? What are its implications?

what is the watershed? If you insist that it’s power - in your meaning - the power of leaving some “mark”, then I ask you to specify what is this “mark” thing that you are refering to. Earthly power? Then I reject your idea on this because there are plenty powerful untermensch.

I’m not really interested in the ubermensch and the watershed here, because I am hopefully exploring the metaphor of the ontogeny and physiology of concepts, which I imagine undermines Nietzsche on a several levels.

Dunamis

when one decides what one is…

-Imp

The ubermensch is without a doubt a central concept of Nietzsche, which you are not interested, yet you imagine that “physiology of concepts” undermines it, and you say “on several levels”. Your critism to the ubermensch lies in its distinction to untermensch - it’s from their you launched the attack - you basically said that it’s more or less sef-contradictory. I’m just trying to argue that this attack by you is not well-based, for what reason I just briefly explained in my last post. If the ubermensch holds strong, without any flaw being correctly established, then I’m afraid Nietzsche remains un-undermined.

Un.,

“The ubermensch is without a doubt a central concept of Nietzsche, which you are not interested”

Thanks for the reading lesson in Nietzsche. The problem is that I take this particular trope of Nietzsche’s to be a very powerful one, and his ubermensch as inherently flawed and self-contradictory. Unlike you, I do not worship at the Nietzsche alter. Therefore I am able to consider individual statements of his on their individual merit, and not on how well they support and are consistent his “doctrine” as you understand it. :slight_smile: You are famous for ignoring passages of his when they do not fit within your understanding.

Open a thread on the “ubermensch” if you would like.

Dunamis

I’m aware of the “going down” lines at the begining part of volume 1, but I regard pity as a sign of being too-human and would evetually lead to decadence. And I regard decadence as the only way for one to go down the line, from the loss of ubermensch power to the loss of untermensch power and eventually to the no power - the lastman defined by zarathustra - the ultimate bottom consequence of decadence.

What are you saying - that Wagner created nothing at all? The will to creat… that sounds rather unfamiliar to my nietzschean ears, could you give some quote that’s strictly related to defining ubermensch? Because I thought that umbermensch signifies mainly the overcoming of all-too-humaness and nihilism.