But does that make it objective, or only intersubjective? At most we could say it’s an objective fact that, to subjects of type X, this and this is ugly. (Note though that the whole “type” thing is already a simplification: thus we could paraphrase Stirner as saying “I am my own type” (and not just “species”).)
Well, Merriam-Webster defines “obese” simply as “having excessive body fat”.
But fat reserves are not excessive (or the excess that they are is itself not excessive). So again it depends on the environment. What’s obese on the Riviera may not be obese in Siberia.
Well, N defined fear as the feeling of a lack of power. So if every thing of power is a sight to behold, every thing of fear is surely unsightly.
No. Being those things deserves none of these things. What “matters” is our response to those things.
‘Only freedom confers dignity—or, as Nietzsche implies later, labour in the service of freedom […]
But how is the genius (i.e., in this context, the Apollinian genius) free? Free from the (semi-)Schopenhauerian ‘will’? The answer is: “Only apparently; not actually” […]
The—Apollinian—genius is the beautiful world of the primordial will; his artistic creations are the supreme pleasure-goal of that will. The primordial will, the Primordial One Itself, then, is successfully deluded by such genius. And if even the Primordial One is deluded, what relevant distinction can there then be left between this delusion and the truth? For this reason, the seeming freedom of the Apollinian genius confers actual dignity on all who work in his service.’