Consequentialism vs Deontology: a new approach

Dear gentle thinkers!

Consequentialism and Deontology (Deontological Ethics) are two contrasting categories of Normative Ethics, the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental principles that determine the morality of human actions (or non-actions). Their supposed difference is that while Consequentialism determines if an action is morally right or wrong by examining its consequences, Deontology focuses on the action itself, regardless of its consequences.
To the hypothetical question “Should I do this man a little injustice, if by this I could save the whole of humanity from torture and demise?”, the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a pure deontologist (absolutist) answers: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus” (Do justice even if the whole world would perish).
Superficially, it seems that a decent deontologist doesn’t care about consequences whatsoever. His/her one and only duty is to invariably obey to pre-existing, universal moral rules without exceptions: “do not kill”, “do not lie”, “do not use another human as a means to an end”, and so on.
At this point I would like to present my thesis on this subject. The central idea here is that deontological ethics only appears to be indifferent to the consequences of an action. In fact, it is only these very consequences that determine what our moral rules and ethical duties should be. For example, the moral law “do not kill”, has its origin in the dire consequences that the killing of another human being brings about; for the victim (death), the perpetrator (often imprisonment or death) and for the whole humanity (collapse of society and civilization).
Let us discuss the well-worn thought experiment of the mad axeman asking a mother where her young children are, so he can kill them. We suppose that the mother knows with 100% certainty that she can mislead him by lying and she can save her children from certain death (once again: supposing that she surely knows that she can save her children ONLY by lying, not by telling the truth or by avoiding answering). In this thought experiment the hard deontologist would insist that it is immoral to lie, even if that would lead to horrible consequences. But, I assert that this deontological inflexibility is not only inhuman and unethical, it is also outright hypocritical. Because if the mother knows that her children are going to be killed if she tells the truth (or does not answer) and they are going to be saved if she tells a harmless lie, then by telling the truth she disobeys the moral law “do not kill/do not cause the death of an innocent”, which is much worse than the moral rule “do not lie”. The fact that she does not kill her children with her own hands is completely irrelevant. She could have saved them without harming another human, yet she chose not to. So the absolutist deontologist chooses actively to disobey a much more important moral law, only because she is not the immediate cause, but a cause via a medium (the crazy axeman in this particular thought experiment).
So here are the two important conclusions: Firstly, Deontology in normative ethics is in reality a “masked consequentialism”, because the origin of a moral law is to be found in its consequences e.g. stealing is generally morally wrong, because by stealing, someone is deprived of his property that may be crucial for his survival or prosperity. Thus, the Deontology–Consequentialism dichotomy is a false one.
And secondly, the fact that we are not the immediate “vessel” by which a moral rule is broken, but we nevertheless create or sustain a “chain of events” that will almost certainly lead to the breaking of a moral law, does surely not absolve us and does not give us the right to choose the worst outcome. Mister Immanuel Kant would avoid doing an innocent man an injustice, yet he would choose to lead billions of innocent people to agonizing death.
— Giannis Delimitsos

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To the first point, would you say there is no difference between deontology and rule utilitarianism? I agree that what you describe is the most defensible version of deontology, but I don’t think deontologists would accept it (though I’m not sure where the moral rules of deontology come from if not consequences).

To your second point, I don’t think deontologists would see it that way. The axeman does a moral wrong in murdering, and you are not guilty of murder when you tell him where to find his victims. You have only told the truth, and telling the truth is morally good. In consequentialism you are responsible for the foreseeable consequences of your acts, but in deontology that doesn’t follow. Maybe, following your first point, it’s important to make deontological rules that tend to account for foreseeable consequences, but once the rules exist, it is always moral to follow the rules.

I think Kant would say something like: to lie to the axeman would be to treat him as an object rather than a subject – to treat him as though he isn’t a moral agent, to deny his personhood. Because the axeman is a person, he is responsible for his actions and you are not, you are only responsible for your own actions, and it is right to tell the truth and wrong to lie.

A consequentialist defense of that deontological position is that people are actually really bad at determining when they should make exceptions to the moral rules, and they will end up excusing their moral trespasses when it’s convenient. While we’ve constructed the axeman scenario to exclude uncertainty, in the real world that will rarely be the case, and so we should err on the side of following moral rules.

A life without exceptions would be the cruel life of a beast or an automaton…

And what would a deontologist say about the hideous murder of the two innocent children, who the “deontological mommy- Medea” uses as a means (offers them to the madman) in order to continue being “perfectly moral”?
There is so much cruelty, arrogance and narcissism in deontological ethics: “my only concern is not to be called a liar; what the lunatic does with the kids is his own business…”.

The other framing is one of humility: “I can’t see the future, so I don’t know what the outcome of my actions will be. I can only do what is right and live by my principles. I don’t know what this person will do, and I don’t control their actions. This may end badly, but I don’t know that. What I do know is that it’s wrong to lie.”

To be clear, I’m playing devil’s advocate, I’m ultimately a consequentialist. But I think there is some merit to that way of thinking. Outside of philosophy hypotheticals, we aren’t faced with axemen-like problems: we are much less certain about who people are and how they will act, and we have options besides lying and telling one specific truth – deontology wouldn’t prevent someone honestly saying, “I’m not going to tell you where the kids are because I think you’ll hurt them if I do”.

So when we force ourselves into this kind of hypothetical, a rule that says “never ever lie for any reason” produces absurd outcomes. But that doesn’t mean the rule is absurd if it isn’t meant for a world like the one in the hypothetical, but for a much messier and more uncertain world.

Another way to interpret deontology through a consequentialist lens is to say that following the rules is a kind of end-in-itself, and should be part of the consequentialist calculations – even if we sometimes break the rules, we should count breaking them as a cost in tallying up the outcome. Maybe the benefits outweigh that cost, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t a cost. If we lie, we should be sad about lying, even if on net it’s worth it. (This is similar to a point you make in the OP, weighing larger and smaller moral wrongs.)