Paper I wrote for Greek Philosophy…like 2.5 years ago.
Dialogue as a Philosophy of Philosophy
I
Rich: Ever wonder what the inventors of philosophy thought they were doing?
Jack: (laughs) What?
Rich: Seriously, what made Plato believe that his work was valuable? I mean, in what way did he think his writings actually corresponded to reality?
Megan: Rich, you slept too much in Greek Philosophy.
Rich: (laughs) I came away from that class with more questions than answers. One of the things that hit me, actually, in studying that stuff was the sense that Plato had a totally different view on what philosophy should be.
Jack: What does that mean?
Rich: Think about it. Plato conveys his ideas in these long dialogues where things are left unresolved, and characters are dissatisfied with the answers. The contradictions between the dialogues seem to suggest that Plato never had a solid grasp on his own ideas.
Megan: Whoa! What do you mean by that?
Rich: His system was incomplete. He didn’t always see the implications of his ideas.
Jack: But he understood what it meant for, say, the slave boy in the Meno to solve a geometry problem through recollecting forgotten truths.
Rich: You think he really understood how recollection is supposed to work?
Jack: Ah! That’s different. You see, you’re equating Plato’s understanding of the concept itself with his understanding of its out-workings - of its cosmology. But even there, who knows? He certainly thought through the implications of the theory. He probably couldn’t give a scientific analysis of recollection, but the concept itself was clear in his own mind.
Megan: But what’s the difference between concepts and their implications?
Jack: Well, in the Meno, Plato presents his idea that the soul knows, but does not recollect, geometry. But this concept suggests a supreme source of information in the universe - some fixed object of knowledge beyond the shifting, finite phenomena of the physical world. So in the Phaedo he comes up with the forms.
Megan: Couldn’t you see Plato’s different topics on some kind of continuum, though? You know, some sort of melding of ideas? I mean, in the Meno Socrates says that innate knowledge is of geometric shapes. In the Phaedo he extends it to things like “the Equal.” And from that arises the question, “what is a thing in itself?” Which gets us to the forms.
Jack: Now wait a minute. In the Phaedo, Socrates constructs the theory of the forms in response to Anaxagoras, not just as an extension of the theory of recollection.
Megan: Yeah, but Anaxagoras is brought up as a new component to the concepts already under discussion.
Jack: Well, you can still connect the two concepts through understanding them distinctly. You can analyze each idea thoroughly, work through its implications, and draw your own conclusions.
Megan: But I’m interested in Plato’s conclusions.
Jack: Think about it, though. Once you’ve thought through, say, the theory of the forms, you can scrutinize Plato’s deductions.
Megan: The thing is, Plato’s deductions aren’t easy to get a hold of.
Jack: Sure they are. In the Phaedo, Socrates refutes the token upstart interlocutors and schools everyone on recollection, the forms, and the soul. As usual he is the clear winner of the debate.
Megan: Oh c’mon! It’s a little less certain than that. Socrates doesn’t think he wins the debate in the end. He only says that he hopes the soul to be immortal - that “it is fitting for a man to risk the belief.” Yes, Socrates is obviously deified in that dialogue, but Plato makes little attempt to make the arguments complete. And even if he did clearly define the ideas, we can’t just assume that they were his personal beliefs.
Jack: What else would you infer? Plato’s a philosopher. He wants to understand and argue for a conception of reality. His medium is dialogue, and the dialogues certainly suggest that there’s…
Megan: Right! The dialogues make suggestions - whole hosts of suggestions. Even contradictory suggestions. At the end of the Euthyphro, for instance, the interlocutor defines piety after having thrown out previous, absurd definitions. Socrates tells him that his reasoning is circular, but not without asking the question, “will you accuse me of being Daedalus who makes [your arguments] move?” Then he engages in a gross equivocation of Euthyphro’s terms. Of course, Euthyphro’s had his fill at that point and just runs away - making Socrates appear the winner. And yet on examination the reader sees that Socrates has indeed “made the arguments move” - redefining his opponent’s terms and attacking the straw man. So what is Plato saying?
Jack: The end of the Euthyphro may just be Plato’s goof. I’m more interested in the dialogues in which Socrates ends up being the insightful teacher - where we see clearly which view is the superior one.
Megan: I don’t know that you ever see that, though. At times you may be left with the impression that Socrates’ beliefs are the winning viewpoints. But nowhere do the views attributed to Socrates become a monopoly on the truth.
Jack: The Republic doesn’t strike you as definite and matter-of-fact?
Megan: The Republic is a huge array of concepts. Yes, it has less uncertainty - and a much broader scope - than most of the other dialogues. But in that book, Plato seems to be engaged in grand, almost artistic hypothesizing. The political theory in the book has a definite quality, I’ll grant that. But I don’t know about the metaphysics. Just think about the cave analogy. It’s a beautiful description, but not a static picture of reality. I wonder how Plato would’ve described things after writing The Sophist. I can assure you the analogy would have been different.
Jack: Well, studying the concepts as they appear in the dialogues enables us to give a clear, logical analysis of Plato.
Megan: But the difference between Plato and, say, Aristotle is that in Plato you have a blurring of distinctions between philosophical issues. With Aristotle it’s a lot clearer where the concepts are distinct.
Jack: But Plato’s system doesn’t all run together. There are distinct themes and theories that arise in specific dialogues. The Symposium is about love, and the Euthyphro is about piety.
Rich: Yeah, but there’s a good deal of “groping” that seems to be happening in many of the dialogues. Like in the Parmenides.
Jack: Maybe.
Rich: In that dialogue, Socrates is portrayed as a young seeker of truth. Parmenides has years of experience in metaphysics on Socrates, and Plato uses Parmenides to voice the “winning” theories of the dialogue. To the unsuspecting reader’s surprise, Parmenides begins with a critique of Plato’s own theory of the forms!
Jack: But then what happens? Parmenides shows the rest of us how philosophy’s “supposed” to be done. And he does an awful job. The theory of the forms may have problems, but Plato couldn’t have missed the absurdities in Parmenides’ subsequent inquiry.
Rich: How do you know? Maybe the dialogue is Plato’s honest attempt to explore monism.
Megan: Well, wait. Is the theory of the forms really Plato’s personal belief to begin with?
Rich: Yeah, of course it is.
Megan: You sure? Do you think he held onto it with any kind of consistency? It seems to me that the theory of the forms was an experiment conducted within a limited number of dialogues - and never directly. Plato never says, “Hi, I’m Plato; this is way things are.”
Rich: Well, no.
Megan: Since all his ideas are communicated through fictional or semi-historical characters, how do we know what he really thought?
Jack: Fair enough. The arguments are still present in the text, and those can be analyzed on their own merits. It’s the ideas that count. Not the guy’s actual beliefs.
Megan: Can you have a valid interpretation of a text without reference to the author’s intent, though?
Rich: No.
Megan: And can you extract Plato’s intent from his dialogues?
Rich: Not always.
Megan: You can’t have a valid interpretation without knowing the author’s intent, and you can’t always discern Plato’s intent. Therefore, you can’t have always have a valid interpretation of Plato.
Rich: So it seems, Megan.
Megan: And if you can’t have a valid interpretation of a text, can you have knowledge of the text’s meaning?
Rich: No, you can’t.
Megan: Could we say that, especially in the discipline of philosophy, a text’s meaning is what determines its importance and relevance?
Rich: Certainly.
Megan: And we cannot always determine Plato’s meaning?
Rich: No we cannot.
Megan: So must it then be the case that especially for the discipline of philosophy, Plato does not always have importance or relevance?
Rich: It must be.
Jack: Oh, stop it!
Megan: And would you say that Plato’s dialogues are chiefly concerned with the subject of philosophy?
Rich: Yes.
Megan: But the dialogues do not always have importance or relevance for philosophy?
Rich: No. We have said they don’t.
Megan: Thus, we could say that Plato’s dialogues do not always have importance or relevance for the subject with which they are chiefly concerned?
Rich: Apparently, Megan.
Megan: And if the theory of the forms were Plato’s own doctrine - held, as some would say, like a religious conviction - then it would certainly be the concern of all the dialogues; for the theory of the forms esteems the good above all else. And, Socrates says, “the objects of knowledge owe their being to the good.” So then, the forms, and ultimately the good, would have to be the basis for all knowledge in all dialogues, if Plato were to be consistent.
Rich: Undoubtedly.
Megan: And also the principle concern of the dialogues.
Rich: Yes.
Megan: However, Plato’s dialogues do not always have relevance for the subject with which they are principally concerned.
Rich: Certainly not.
Megan: And so Plato’s dialogues do not always have relevance to the good.
Rich: They do not.
Megan: But they must have relevance if Plato were consistent in his commitment to the theory of the good.
Rich: They must.
Megan: Therefore Plato was not consistent.
Jack: That’s quite enough!
II
I took the above risk for three main reasons. The first reason is purely aesthetic - I like the creative freedom, the seemingly limitless possibilities, available in the construction of a dialogue. The second is ethical - what right would I have to critique Plato’s method if I had not attempted to explore dialogue as a valid philosophical medium (though I won’t pretend my imitation does him justice)? The third is practical - I wanted to experience for myself the benefits and limitations of the dialogue form. I have used one format to voice my questions, my problems. This second format will provide analysis of those problems.
If I have become convinced of anything during the past semester, it has been that “Platonism” as a coherent system does not exist. Perhaps Neo-Platonists can be identified. Renaissance Platonism might also be defined - as well as Cambridge Platonism. It is even possible that we could talk successfully of Platonic ethical or political philosophy. But “Platonism” in general, or “Plato’s system,” seems to me utterly unidentifiable. Plato, of course, articulated some of philosophy’s most important problems - and, in my opinion, gave birth to some of the grandest mistakes in the history of Western thought. However, if there is to be consistency in Plato, it is found not in a conceptual system but in a method of inquiry. For him questions themselves seem to have been the substantial components of Philosophy. For him it does not matter as much that these questions are answered as it does that they are asked. And for him, dialogue presents a practical medium through which the deeper questions can be framed.
The founding “philosophers of philosophy” are, I think, Plato and Aristotle. Our understanding of their ideas cannot be divorced from the two different literary mediums through which we read them. Dialogue and treatise, as literary forms used in philosophy, both have merits and detractions. However, dialogue is an imitation (a copy of live conversation), while prose seems better able to utilize the tools of writing to arrive at sound conclusions.
Plato entered the marketplace of Greek ideas at a point in time when philosophy was young enough to still need definition and old enough to be a definable pursuit. The Greek practice of philosophizing was incredibly popular, but it did not have clear guidelines. In the Gorgias, we see Plato (through Socrates) search for a definition of true philosophy - as set against empty rhetoric, its insidious rival.
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates speculates that the life of the philosopher should be one, not only of commitment to rational inquiry but also of virtuous living. In fact, Socrates does not draw a distinction between moral virtue and intellectual honesty. It is “being good that a man should take care of more than anything” (527b). And: “after we’ve practiced [excellence] together - we’ll turn to politics, or then we’ll deliberate about whatever subject we please” (527d).
The dialogue is, as I attempted to illustrate above, a framework for asking questions and formulating ideas - for, in a sense, brainstorming. My characters are all creations of my imagination, and their theories should be separated from the text itself. I clearly make Megan the dominant, most “together” of my amateur philosophers. She seems to win the debates. But does that mean her theories are my own? Not really. She articulates some of my questions (as they all do) - my points, my counter-points and my concept of logical responses to fabricated theories. She also makes certain claims that are simply false - like, “I don’t know if you ever see [Socrates’ viewpoint as the superior one].” This radical deconstruction of the dialogues is not my idea. It is hers. Thus I am absolved. In the same way, Plato is absolved in the Euthyphro.
In the end my interlocutors engage in some really horrible sophistry - a caricature of Socratic elenchos designed to illustrate the limitations and pitfalls of this approach to philosophy. One of the most frequent fallacies committed by the questioner in Plato’s dialogues seems to be equivocation. In my dialogue, Megan points this out with respect to the Euthyphro, but she falls into the same trap at the end of the dialogue. She spuriously equates “the good” with “the principle concern of the dialogues” - which had also been unquestioningly equated with philosophy itself. What amazed me in writing this piece was how easily the fallacies incorporated themselves into the dialogue - almost escaping my notice. And in the act of creation the slave-like response to every assertion - the author’s wishful self-affirmation - is easily produced: “certainly”, “undoubtedly”, “of course.”
While dialogue is useful in asking questions, it is almost impossible to make assertions through it. Dialogue incorporates the dialectical advantages of conversation - of the multitude of perspectives - into a single text. However, without the benefit of real humans with real second opinions, the author can create for him or herself a cacophony of unrealistic and illogical opinions that serve only to muddy the issue at hand.
It seems that for Plato, the question - the honest search into the nature of reality - is the true essence of philosophy. Solving the problem is not unimportant for him (otherwise philosophy would have no goal), but it is not the central project. The philosopher’s true virtue lies in never ceasing to wonder. And in that aim, Plato appears successful.
Bibliography
Diskin, Clay. Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
Gonzalez, Francisco, ed. The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies.
Cooper, John M. & Hutchinson, D.S., eds. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.