Do Truths Exist in a Hierarchy?

In the meantime I remembered more of this, and it’s a little bit different:

“One seeks the view [Bild, “image”] of the world in the philosophy with which we get in the freest mood; i.e., with which our most powerful drive feels free for its activity. So will things also stand with me!” (Nietzsche, workbook Summer 1883 8 [24] whole, my translation.)

So the difference is that Nietzsche recognizes his most powerful drive and seeks the view of the world as that drive: the world as will to power. And of course he traces back all drives to the will to power (e.g., in BGE 36).

It seems to me that to engage properly with Nietzsche’s will to power would be to treat it largely as a psychological explanation and to respond to it with an awareness of contemporary psychology (as well as metaphysics).

Rather than regarding philosophy to be based on psychology or biology, I regard psychology as a social science and science to be based on philosophy of science and philosophy of science to be based on logic, epistemology, metaphilosophy and metaphysics. This is a conceptual hierarchy more than a practical one.

I haven’t studied all of these topics in depth. It follows that I’m not in a position to respond to Nietzsche.

When he says things like “there are no absolute truths” and “there are no facts”, I have to somewhat lamely reply “well then, that’s not an absolute truth, and that’s not a fact”.

I can take from him an emphasis on instinct and power, but I cannot do so dogmatically.

To me at this time, his most thought-provoking statement is this one: “The demand for logical certainty is a religious one.”

That one gives me a lot of food for thought…

Well, yes, his will to power is in the first place a psychological explanation. But psychology, for him, is the foremost science: “queen of the sciences”, he calls it in BGE 23 (“queen”, not “king”, because the word Psychologie is feminine).

“[E]very natural science accepts nature in the sense in which nature is intended by natural science, as given, as ‘being in itself’. The same of course is true of psychology which is based on the science of physical nature. Hence naturalism is completely blind to the riddles inherent in the ‘givenness’ of nature. It is constitutionally incapable of a radical critique of experience as such.” (Leo Strauss, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy”, paragraph 14.)

‘In the final sentence of the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche says that “psychology is now again the path to the fundamental problems.” By this he does not mean naturalistic psychology but rather a kind of phenomenology; it is not “based on the science of physical nature” (paragraph 14), it does not “begin with the roof” but with “the foundation” (paragraph 5). There is however something paradoxical about Husserl’s terms “roof” and “foundation”. “The roof” here ultimately means the most basic elements natural science might posit; “the foundation” here means the highest phenomenon, the human psyche in general and the philosopher’s psyche in particular. Starting from his own psychical phenomena, Nietzsche works down or “up” to the whole “so-called mechanistic (or ‘material’) world” (aph. 36 of Beyond Good and Evil). The psychical phenomenon “will” cannot be explained in terms of the physical concept “force”; the latter must be explained in terms of the former (cf. e.g. Will to Power nr. 619).’ (Yours truly, “Note on the First Chapter of Leo Strauss’s Final Work”, paragraph 4 whole.)

It may help not to phrase it negatively, but positively. For example, Nietzsche does not leave it at the negative formulation “there are no facts,” but immediately adds: “only interpretations.” So instead of saying, “then that’s not a fact”, we may say: “then that’s (only) an interpretation”.

‘In his discussion of aphorism 36, Strauss says: “Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact” (paragraph 8 of the central chapter of the work).’ (op.cit., paragraph 5.)

Nietzsche’s interpretation of interpretation, made explicit by Strauss, is as an act of the will to power. So when Nietzsche says things like “truth is will to power”, then yes, he invites you to counter, “well then, that ‘truth’, too, is (only) will to power”:

“If the aforesaid is correct, the doctrine of the will to power cannot claim to reveal what is, the fact, the fundamental fact but is ‘only’ one interpretation, presumably the best interpretation, among many. Nietzsche regards this apparent objection as a confirmation of his proposition (aph. 22 end).” (Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”, paragraph 7 end.)

I highly recommend reading chapters 1-3 of Laurence Lampert’s Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche alongside Bacon’s New Atlantis

Thanks for the recommendation.

I decided to re-read Bertrand Russell’s chapter on Nietzsche from A History of Western Philosophy (1945), and Anthony Kenny’s chapter on him from An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy (2006). I don’t feel like Russell addressed the philosophy in that much detail, and Kenny’s chapter is short - but both are quite critical.

Here are some excerpts from Russell:

“He admires certain qualities which he believes (perhaps rightly) to be only possible for an aristocratic minority; the majority, in his opinion, should be only means to the excellence of the few, and should not be regarded as having any independent claim to happiness or well-being. He alludes habitually to ordinary human beings as the “bungled and botched,” and sees no objection to their suffering if it is necessary for the production of a great man.”

“He regards compassion as a weakness to be combated. “The object is to attain that enormous energy of greatness which can model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which can yet avoid going to ruin at the sight of the suffering created thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.””

“He is a passionate individualist, a believer in the hero. The misery of a whole nation, he says, is of less importance than the suffering of a great individual: “The misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty men.””

“He wants an international ruling race, who are to be the lords of the earth: “a new vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years.””

"“What is it that we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves–until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example.”

In place of the Christian saint Nietzsche wishes to see what he calls the “noble” man, by no means as a universal type, but as a governing aristocrat. The “noble” man will be capable of cruelty, and, on occasion, of what is vulgarly regarded as crime; he will recognize duties only to equals. He will protect artists and poets and all who happen to be masters of some skill, but he will do so as himself a member of a higher order than those who only know how to do something. From the example of warriors he will learn to associate death with the interests for which he is fighting; to sacrifice numbers, and take his cause sufficiently seriously not to spare men; to practise inexorable discipline; and to allow himself violence and cunning in war. He will recognize the part played by cruelty in aristocratic excellence: “almost everything that we call ‘higher culture’ is based upon the spiritualizing and intensifying of cruelty.” The “noble” man is essentially the incarnate will to power."

“It is obvious that in his day-dreams he is a warrior, not a professor; all the men he admires were military.”

“It does not occur to Nietzsche as possible that a man should genuinely feel universal love…”

“…he is so full of fear and hatred that spontaneous love of mankind seems to him impossible. He has never conceived of the man who, with all the fearlessness and stubborn pride of the superman, nevertheless does not inflict pain because he has no wish to do so.”

“Aristocracies of birth are nowadays discredited; the only practicable form of aristocracy is an organization like the Fascist or the Nazi party. Such an organization rouses opposition, and is likely to be defeated in war; but if it is not defeated it must, before long, become nothing but a police State, where the rulers live in terror of assassination, and the heroes are in concentration camps. In such a community faith and honour are sapped by delation, and the would-be aristocracy of supermen degenerates into a clique of trembling poltroons.”

"The question is: If Buddha and Nietzsche were confronted, could either produce any
argument that ought to appeal to the impartial listener?

Buddha would open the argument by speaking of the lepers, outcast and miserable; the poor, toiling with aching limbs and barely kept alive by scanty nourishment; the wounded in battle, dying in slow agony; the orphans, ill-treated by cruel guardians; and even the most successful haunted by the thought of failure and death. From all this load of sorrow, he would say, a way of salvation must be found, and salvation can only come through love.

Nietzsche, whom only Omnipotence could restrain from interrupting, would burst out when his turn came: “Good heavens, man, you must learn to be of tougher fibre. Why go about snivelling because trivial people suffer? Or, for that matter, because great men suffer? Trivial people suffer trivially, great men suffer greatly, and great sufferings are not to be regretted, because they are noble.”"

“I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men whom he most admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die.”

Here are some excerpts from Kenny:

“The revolt of the slaves, begun by the Jews, has now, Nietzsche said, achieved victory. Jewish hatred has triumphed under the mask of the Christian gospel of love… Modern man, as a result, is a mere dwarf, who has lost the will to be truly human.”

“Nietzsche quite fails to give any consistent presentation of the moral viewpoint
from which he criticizes conventional morality.”

“…it is not easy to feel much pity for one who regarded pity as the most despicable of all emotions.”

“The misery of a whole nation, he says, is of less importance than the suffering of a great individual: “The misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty men”

He was the only one i ever saw, say this. And when he did, he became my bestie. Fritz knows the secret handshake.

What is the difference between an irrefutable interpretation and a fact?

Why is Archimedes’ discovery that his bathwater rose with the same volume as the volume of his body as he sat down in the bath, not discovery of a fact?

We have fixed up for ourselves a world with rising bathwater proportionate to the volume of its greek occupant, but this article of faith is just that… and the world does not have to conform to it.

My point is that logic may seem to prescribe events but if experiment doesn’t show these events, the logic fails. By ‘power’ here I simply mean validity in reality.

See how quantum mechanicians defeated existing logics by experiment.

That’s good.

My question is whether that is not just another form of ethics.
A form that a poststructuralist may rebel against as being ‘patriarchal’ for example.

It is a bit tedious to press this point but I disagree - the commandment to be logically consistent is an ought. With gain of knowledge as the signifying value

General ethics are muddier, but they too are generally aimed at certain results.
To answer thew question ‘what is good behavior’ you need to generally have a goal for that behavior in mind. ‘Minimize suffering’ is a general goal, from which, in different contexts, different behaviors are best suited.

I think you still have to have some axioms - or concretes of some sort, or values.
But Im not sure. Can you explain?

So far in this discussion, power and value/validity as pertaining seem to be the most fundamental as pertaining to truth.

Not as in will to power as interpretation so much as in the power to apply, to be valid in reality.

I mean it in the first sense. Power of mind, of interpretation, exerted over the observed phenomenon of relation.

“Hegel conceives the ‘Nation State’ as an absolutely sovereign body upon which the sovereignty of other sates depends” (google)

His logic would be interesting but difficult to follow. I read some Hegel, which was in fact illuminating, but never read his magnum opus.

We definitely don’t need Hegel or Marx to follow Plato’s arguments.

It only swallows it in its own paradigm, it leaves the other paradigm untouched.
The other paradigm (“there is definite knowledge”) simply designates “equal legitimacy of all interpretation” as error.

When someone thinks everyone is right (preferably except the person who says only he is right, ‘the patriarch’), and the other person thinks only he is right, is the second perspective subsumed by the first?

If someone says the earth is round, but it is also a cube, and it is also all other forms, does his perspective swallow the perspective that the Earth is only round?

Our concepts seem to have evolved along with our experiences. The idea that such ideas as that men have more physical strength have been arbitrarily constructed and are mere phantasies of power, is I would say, a phantasy. It seems easy enough to verify that men do have more physical strength. But many people nowadays nonetheless think this is an arbitrary interpretation. I don’t think there is any way to convince them otherwise.

Show me a world where the bathwater lowers when a man gets in, and I will agree that there are no facts.

2 Likes

I think that such laws as Archimedes demonstrated are superior in the truth-hierarchy to the law of identity.
And I don’t need to law of identity to tell me the bathwater equals the bathwater, and Archimedes equals Archimedes, in order for the experiment to convey a reality.
As Archimedes does not equal Archimedes from one moment to the next, nor does the bathwater of one moment equal the bathwater of the next. Yet still the mechanism applies.

You need the law of identity to extrapolate the real life observation of the mechanism at work to apply to volumes in general, for it to get from true fact to general truth. So - observation of mechanism prior to thought - or does the observation of one body separate of another body require abstraction? In that case base animal behavior is thought as well.

This is right in that experiment can push back on logical rules and demonstrate they fail to apply. The perfect example of this was non-Euclidean geometry being used in relativity. Euclid’s parallel postulate was assumed as self-evident for thousands of years, but apparently doesn’t apply to our spacetime.

We can’t throw out the entire set of logical rules this way, however, otherwise we would have no framework for conducting experiments or interpreting their results. Maybe you can challenge the law of identity as dogmatically given, but something analogous enough to the law of identity must hold that we can identify objects and differentiate one object from another.

Just like you say here:

Granted, but that also holds for empirical investigation. It needs some axioms as well. We might consider different sets of axioms, but with no axioms we are nowhere and can conclude nothing.

Facts of direct experience may be prior to thought. But this is not of the form “The bathwater rises with the same volume as my body”. This is not even of the form “I am looking at a table”. These are both inferences from experience, complex statements built from a mix of sense-data and thought. The direct experience would be something like “There are warm sensations” or “There is a brown appearance”.

The more you object the more subtle the point gets. I agree entirely that the commandment to be logically consistent is an ought. I am saying the mere existence of logical consistency does not necessarily imply such a commandment. Imagine we discover some rules of validity, and we consider them dispassionately, and we really do not care whether we follow them. Maybe we even actively try to break them, and that’s our motive for discovering them. That’s okay as far as the structure of logic is concerned. The nature of logical consistency does not in itself demand that we obey its rules to build our knowledge-base. It is our human agenda that leads us to use the facts of the structure of logic in order to seek knowledge, consistency, validity. Ethics tries to prescribe whether, or when, it is good or bad to do so, if at all. And it does so within a logical framework of its own.

All this is to say that logic is conceptually prior to ethics, even if in the practical realm, we cannot conceive of how to do anything without a goal in mind. This point has some consequences for me because I am putting logic, mathematics, epistemology, metaphilosophy, phenomenology, metaphysics, some philosophy of religion, all before ethics. I can’t make sense of an ethics that’s not grounded in logic, or metaphysics, etc.

It does not, but this is not a precise analogy. The Left is said to hold that every interpretation has equal legitimacy. If this is literally true then interpretations that not every interpretation has equal legitimacy, as interpretations, have equal legitimacy. From extreme perspectivism, relativism, skepticism, everything follows. And from basic logic, what do we know everything follows from? A falsehood…

If trying to build true beliefs about the world is patriarchal, I guess I am patriarchal. I can make no real apologies about that at this stage. :melting_face:

And this transforms the entire basis of logic, what it means for things to be self-identical.
Self-identity only applies within context.

Indeed it is of use - but to distinguish one object from another is something insects do.
Do they think? Do they apply the law of identity?
Just inquiring, I have no idea what Aristotle would say.

Yes, Im suggesting that logical investigations must in one sense or another, be empirical. And also that it is empiricism which gave rise to logic, that “If =>then” is primarily experiential.

That such an interval exists, that cause isn’t effect but merely equals it in measure, that consciousness isn’t a singularity, is a problem for logic.

But “brown” and “warm” are identities too. As are all distinct sensations. So this argument leads to the idea that the law of identity is required for the actions of base animal instincts.

It is a virtue though. “Consistency” itself is a virtue.

Yes. Disregarding some laws of validity may lead to unveiling others.
Do you agree then that the striving for logical consistency and epistemic validity is an ethics?

A causal framework in any case. I think logic derives from exposure to causality. Some argue that causality is a fiction, of course, which brings back the idea of singularity.

I think some ethics are actually more related to aesthetics than to logic. Ethics for their own sake. Still, the aim would be a sense of power in the broad sense. As beauty is power. Beauty and logic…

What if behavior is consistently grounded in affect? Or even in love? Or hate?
Can not such things directly give rise to ethical structures without these ethics being abstract commandments?

Yes, but not superior legitimacy, which is what the other claims.
The “right” here is not satisfied with being equally legitimate. That’s what I meant with ‘the earth is only round’. The “right” in Parodites’ text makes claim to exclusivity. The “left” denies exclusivity. Thus they can not be merged in the lefts position.

Which falsehood?

You mentioned somewhere that you cant conceive of an action without an aim. According to Zeroeth Nature, if I am correct, Nietzsche’s Will to Power conception is strictly about discharge, and aims/values are set only according to the degree of force/discharge - and ultimately the only true aim is neutrality. Like a charged cloud structure seeks an opposite charge (a value/aim) to neutralize itself through lightning.

This is you affirming the law of identity. Tell me how you could’ve said/believed any of this without affirming the law of identity.

By mechanism, do you mean the properties of the contingent universe which cause certain results in certain situations? It is at least the same universe throughout the entire experiment, yes? But what if we’re living in a creative simulation of being… and the programmer running the simulation decides to pause the mechanism in the middle of the experiment? What is more fundamental now (and if now, then always)? Is there a mechanism more fundamental than the mechanism which leads bathwater to rise when a person enters the bath?

Why do you assume different moments lead to different identities?

I’m not actually ready for this conversation so I’m gonna exit.

However, these are related:
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/t/harmonic-taxonomy/81233?u=ichthus77

Prolly other stuff scattered elsewhere.

I suppose they apply it but don’t understand it. Even non-living things react in one way to objects of type A and a different way to objects of type B.

I would call this sense the practical sense. Something I think about is that even in order to do a deductive proof, you need to rely on your own memory and cognition. And even to understand and use language, a prerequisite for logic, we must be in a community. You could just as well say logical investigation is social.

This sounds like a deep cognitive science question. I suspect we don’t exactly need A = A, but we at least need a way of distinguishing rough similarity and difference. A could represent a cluster of things, B could represent a different cluster, and they may overlap to some extent. I don’t know, I’m well out of my depth on this one.

I could assert that consistency is not a virtue, and I could make an argument to support that claim, using consistency. I could argue that nothing is a virtue, in a way that uses consistency. That consistency is a virtue makes sense within one part of logic, but not the whole of logic. It does not make sense within moral nihilism, but moral nihilism can be asserted with consistency. The point here is that “is a virtue” is a predication of moral worth onto the concept “consistency”, and this predication can be coherently resisted.

I could say I want to strive for validity and knowledge, and that’s why I do so, without making any claims about morality. In fact, that’s more or less what I am doing at the moment. Something only becomes an ethic once we introduce the concept of good and bad, right and wrong, should and ought. A goal does not have to be a moral goal if you make no claim that it is good or bad. So it is possible to get outside and around the concept of ethics, even though our behaviour relies on it.

I suppose if the world were utterly chaotic and disordered we could not have logic. This brings back one of the Nietzsche quotes: “Logic is the attempt to understand the actual world according to a scheme of being and permanence.”

Can you expand on this? I don’t really follow this. In fact, I tend to see aesthetics as a side-issue. Maybe that’s the despicable Apollonian in me, as Nietzsche would have it. But everything that is good for its own sake, is defined in ethics, specifically normative ethics.

If that were the case, we would still need a language and a formal structure in which to talk about it. My project is essentially rationalist, which means if you can’t argue for something, there is no need to accept it. That could well have its limits though.

Statements like Nietzsche’s “There are no facts”, “There is no absolute truth”, and Parodites’ “every interpretation is equally legitimate”, are the kind of statements that are self-refuting if you try to assign a truth-value to them. They resist being classified as absolutely true. So one must either give up the notion of absolute truth, or classify these statements as false.

The phrase is “irrefutable errors [or interpretations, that’s fine with me,] of man” (my emphasis). In other words, humanly irrefutable errors or interpretations. So, sure, this is a discovery of a human fact (and not just a human discovery of a fact):

::

Base human animal behaviour is indeed thought as well, and so probably/arguably is base non-human animal behaviour, yes. (And of course even “human” is an abstraction, a generalization, from “our” concrete particularity.)

every eradiation of force” (emphasis reversed)

I hope some theory like this can be validated. I’m a bit worried about the likely scenario that we’re soon going to have intelligent AIs trying to convince us they’re conscious and we won’t have a way of knowing whether they are or not.

Yes.

I mean virtue more in the sense of positive capacity, ‘a trait of excellence’ without moral connotations. But, I’ve pressed this point far enough.

But then you could argue good and bad are functions of what we want. You want something because it is good for you. But of course I get your point.

Question I meant to activate was whether awareness of causality derives of logic, or vice versa. In any case logic is implied in awareness of causality.

Samurai ethics for example. I mean aesthetics in a broad sense. What is in itself pleasing. Yes, that is ethics, but not logical behavior in the sense of teleology, as much as for example the golden rule is. Honor in general has to do with aesthetics as I understand the term. Of course there is still logic to it, but it is not as linearly goal oriented and the goal is less nakedly pragmatic.

I feel I need to clarify that that is not Parodites’ position… he describes the lefts position. Parodites himself is as far removed from relativism as anyone Ive ever read, yet as far removed from the idea that truth is simply given… he does not believe that truth is accessible to every mind.

This is a fragment that easily comes up:

1 Like

I find the theory quite plausible. And it precludes the possibility of consciousness on classical computers. Quantum computers, I don’t know. But in any case, many people will be fooled and probably are already being fooled by AI. And people are certainly already being encouraged to address AIs like people, because this supposedly tends to get better responses from them.

By the way, I only recently started to use ChatGPT and the like, but soon I accidentally induced it to generate dubious content:

(Its response, which it self-censored as soon as it had completed it, began with the exclamation “You are absolutely right!”)

“AIs trying to convince us they’re conscious and we won’t have a way of knowing whether they are or not”

This is only a problem if human’s mistake their own consciousness for a property rather than an activity, calling it a ‘self’, something computers can’t have.

If there is no ‘self’, then whether or not a computer is one is a non-problem.