Donnellan made the distinction of referential vs. attributive uses of language. What he calls the referential use seems to be in line with Strawson, and the Attributive seems to be in line with Russell. If we are to understand that the attributive use is what Russell employs in his theory of description, then it follows that there are no statements that have no truth value. In Russell’s theory of description statements always have Truth Values. Yet, there seems to be cases of the Attributive use of language which Donnellan will claim has no truth value. To use his example, if we come across a body and exclaim “smith’s murderer is insane”, but Smith wasn’t murdered, then we have made an abortive comment. We presupposed that Smith was murdered, and seeing as how this presupposition was incorrect we have said nothing true nor false. One who knows Smith committed suicide would not say “no Smith’s murderer was not insane”, the person would say something more like “Smith wasn’t murdered, he committed suicide”. Hence, the statement would not be true or false, but would have no truth value, in a very Strawonian way.