In reading philosophical forums, I see arguments for what ought to be, ethical ideals, and other arguments centered on what actually is, usually from a pragmatic or even existential perspective, but not much dialogue between the two. Is it just me?
Between the two what, exactly?
It seems to me that one is either discussing ideals which may not be practicable, or one is doing piecemeal pragmatic solutions, but I don’t read much about using practicable piecemeal or step solutions toward an agreed upon ideal (with the understanding that with each step, things can and will change).
For example, many of the religious discussions involve ideals which are light years away from practicable in today’s world, and I sometimes wonder if there are many religious pragmatists around. It’s easy to come up with ideal solutions if you don’t have to worry about implementing them in the real world of today.
I personally fall heavily into the piecemeal pragmatist camp, but would be happier if sometimes we headed in the direction of some agreed upon ideal that is within reach, realistically. We can win wars, but are lousy at handling the peace. Yet when we look to the ethical ideals camps for assistance, their solutions often seem too fantastic to the practical minded.
Existentialism reduced ideals into a phenomenological accommodation. The modern significance of this process, is the use of signs. Hermenautism shows meaning to be sealed, in fact, retaining the essence of its ideal meaning, salvaging it from the misinterpretation that brought havoc into the world. This misinterpretation between the ideal and the pragmatic real, shows the danger of ideological complacency in times when ideologies are under pressure from changing pressures.
Ideals can not be denied, since they will re occur. Values as meaning cannot be effectively changed by
visual, propaganda, they will result in towing the line
Pragmatic accommodation, feeds the confusion, by literally and figuratively inflating public confidence and social identity.
The only external solution to this suspense (suspending) is the existential reduction, the reduction of the social(ideological) significance of the understanding,to the phenomenon, the signifier.
The pragmatic accommodation is an externalisation of it’s own internal dynamic, of accommodating changing values, and how it can connect with a phenomenally reduced ontology, is not yet clear, especially in an age when again, change of values on a world stage, overtly tries to balance internal substantial values with retained ideological-hermenautical values.
The undetermined variables are the hidden hermetic signifiers, as opposed to the determined -democratic ones.
Pragmatic idealism has a problem that as it is pragmatic, it’s effect is uncertain, hit and miss, and open to attac as to its source of authority.
I’m not entirely clear (what else is new). Could you apply the above thinking to a comprehensive ideology like Marxism which incorporated practical steps which didn’t work?
I’m afraid you need to come with some solid quotes on this, as it sounds like you see the world through a calendescope.
I don’t see why quotes are needed to describe the difference in utopian visions of society and piecemeal pragmatic social engineering. I am asking about philosophies or discourses in which these two are woven together, as it seems to me they could successfully compliment each other.
What if ‘ethics’ is a function of the ‘pragmatics’ of consciousness? What if consciousness holds itself together, coheres itself, as reason, as thought and language, by way of “ethical” experiences and ideas? Is the “moral self” the more or less “center” of the subject?
Is the inability to implement or “test” something, for instance an ethical ideal or a rational construction explaining some aspect of human experience or consciousness in a novel manner, evidence for its invalidity or untruth?
Is there a difference between the “power” of pragmatic engagement with the world and the “power” of philosophy? How would you articulate the nature of the difference between these spheres? This question must be addressed before any attempt to “translate” from one to the other may really be attempted.
Because I’m here to do philosophy, what you want doesn’t seem to go along the lines of logic and reason which should result in wisdom.
What I’m chiefly lacking is knowledge of enough philosophical writings to, off the top of my head, come up with some which address both of these differing perspectives. I’m hoping that some of the better-read philosophers here can provide directions to that material. Also I’d hoped that some of the philosophers here might, as a few have done, address the issue as if they were writing an analysis of the question; there are certainly people here who are learned enough to do so.
If that fails, then I’ll grab examples of the two perspectives and start working with them myself. But if someone else has already done it, undoubtedly better than I could (I’m not a good philosopher), I’d like to read their analyses first.
If you have philosophical talent and knowledge, I’d appreciate your analysis of how these opposing perspectives might successfully be synthesized, perhaps with specific examples, say, for example Plato’s Utopian Republic with Karl Popper’s piecemeal social engineering. Now there’s a challenge for anyone!
Melonkali:::my description covers the WW 2 period as it was the result of failed ideological conflict as Marxism, fascism and democratic/capitalistic ideologies clashed in an nihilistic era. That was the background which I should have spelled out. The existential reduction was for the most part the result of the failure of a synthetic solution to the clash of ideologies. The framework of nihilism in which transvaluation took place, especially in Germany, but elsewhere in Europe, led to a line to be drawn from Nietzsche's effort-to the existential reduction---which structurally resurrected Hegel--dressed in material terms. Meaning, Nietzsche's anti Hegelianism seemed to have left a structural void in ontology, and the period called for something to take up the slack in that nihilistic void. Nietzsche's ideals were closed in a hermenautic circle, so it could not become politically representative(as pure ideology-qua representation). Hence marx, resurrected Hegel, in the same spirit, with the same hidden ideology in mind, and applied it to the coming ideological-economic conflict, which late industrialisation brought about. It was very politically correct, and easy to understand. The idealism of Hegel coupled with the political confusion of Europe at the time. Marx system had teeth, but it could not bite, because, the dialectic, although seemingly a perfect theoretical tool, had the human element to contend with. That is, the ideological inconsistencies did not match up with the substantial factors in production, incentives, greed, and the social determination of identity. Communism destroyed the marxism in adding features which became humanly counterproductive.
Obe -
Thanks for that most helpful clarification. I’m more historian than philosopher, and “between the wars” just happens to be one of my stronger periods. So between your analysis and my knowledge of the history involved, I’ve finally got a solid starting point from which I can examine this issue. Thanks again, rebecca
GiP, you and I have differing concepts of “consciousness” to judge by my reading of your post. I think yours is nearer the traditional definition which I am constantly reminded that I desecrate. 
I think I can still respond to your post though.
One of the areas my studies lead me to is the response to experience which, for sentient beings, involves the possibility of willful and intentional response. This can be simplified by the following process diagram:
- I experience - the objects and events within an instant of time.
- I am motivated to act - or not to act.
- I examine my possible responses - within the context of time available for response.
- I may respond in an habitual manner - based upon an established pattern of responses to similar experiences (OR)
- I may respond uniquely to the experience - based upon my needs and interests of the moment.
- My soul, or character, is a hidden set of values that define my personality and my typical responses to experiences.
- I respond to my experience in a manner consistent with my character and my needs of the moment.
- I convert my response choice into action.
- My action leads me into the experience of the next instant of time.
Is this somewhat like your reference of the first paragraph of your post?
Samm
Yes, nice breakdown.
1-4 or 1-5 are fairly unconscious, routine, involving little input from self-consciousness, from the “end” of the consciously-productive processes, from reflective self-understanding. Even acting with respect to hidden values, as you say, tends to be an unconscious act, although these leave more of an imprint and effect upon self-consciousness. These as 6 are the shortest route into the subject.
2 is the subject’s “will” in its initial, first-tier state. We can see how will is, despite what many of the philosophers have told us, not essentially connected with the rational-understanding self-consciousness.
7 involves the circular self-expressing nature of consciousness. This can be augmented by expanding 3 (introduction of reason, distance, into “routine consciousness”).
8 involves a translation from the internal to the external, from idea or impulse to body. This is by its very nature only an approximation, at best, and partial; it also creates a cascading excess of errors, which must be “psychologized”.
Ideally 1 and 9 are deeped and widened enough to become united, to form a circle, or spiral of processing. This would reflect the increasing power and self-meaningful character of consciousness, its greater awareness and responsiveness to its own condition and to the conditions around it. The ability to respond and the ability to perceive are two ‘ends’ and expressions of the same thing.
Indeed, wherever this dichotomy exists, philosophy is quite pointless. “What actually is” would always determine “what ought to be”, but man, due to his nature as a particularly constituted and located perspective, a entity with certain attributes and resulting values and resulting perceptive powers, is not likely to come to an objective knowledge of what actually is.
Man can ultimately only come to know “what actually is to himself”. For this he must become aware what he, himself, is - something that holds certain values. He must wonder: “what is it in me that grants me the power to value?” This will move him in the direction of a “what actually is” in terms that he can fully understand, and do justice to.
Some of us here have been ‘tearing at the veil’ between ontology and ethics for a while now and this has resulted in a branch of philosophy whereby ontology is rooted in the principle of value-attribution (thereby merging at once with epistemology and ethics). This particular post seems to resonate with your questioning.
Epistemology begins with defined concepts that are chosen by their relevance (“value”) to the definer - “us”.
And yes, ontology can only be constructed after the epistemology has been constructed… from defined concepts.
How do we know that the defined concepts are true or real?
Because we are the ones defining them. A concept has no obligation to conform to nature.
But if the defined concepts do not in the long run, build into a useful, rational, relevant ontology, they are of no value.
That ontology, in order to have value, must conform to our real use of it and need.
When that happens, we declare the reality of each of the concepts within.
Thus we begin with definitions of concepts to form an epistemology. We then construct a coherent relationship between the concepts. Then we compare that construct, the ontology, to what we observe as our situation of need. If it all matches, especially if it matches perfectly, we declare the Truth of the ontology… because it works to serve our need.
Interesting site you linked to. I’m going to cruise around there and try to add it all up.
James, the epistemic subject is not grounded in our definitions, our definitions are grounded in the epistemic subject. Episteme is “immanent” to subjectivity, as its structure. This structure is a “pure logic” of real relations. From this structure emerge specific definitions and languages (all languages are rooted in certain kinds of definitional logic). These definitions and languages are that from which then emerge our ontologies, the systems of ideas and cognized objects that constitute “consciousness”.
I disagree.
How can you have any logic or relations until you define what it is that you are talking or thinking about?
Even when you say, “A=A”, you have already defined “A” as a variable place holder, label for “something else”. In other words, “A” is defined as “whatever we are talking about”. Without that definition, even"A=A" would be meaningless.
Your entire neurological system has inherently defined concepts that allow it to build the notion that a stimulus source is located to the right rather than the left. And it does that long before it identifies what the source might be. It inherently presumes that an impulse is a stimulus effect. It defines “impulse = contact”.
Yes, it is possible to view the epistomological/ontological spite in terms of the above without reference to historical(structural content) vis: the reference of specific to general terms, but it’s contestable, whether an ethical centered epistological-ontology would not save the same problem as does the figurative model of the analogy of the circular to the cylindrical?
This is a problem that language may not be able to overcome.my guess is ontology retains its central role. I am trying essentially to become a philosopher with problems of referientiality, (to reference to of arguability,(of value) without recourse to the naturalistic fallacy. Thanks guys for having me on.