Kant holds that the cosmological argument whittles down to the ontological argument. Here is his argument:
The cosmological argument is divided into two parts:
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The proof of the existence of a necessary being from the fact of some existence.
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The identification of this necessary being with a perfect being.
Kant seems not to criticize too much the first part. He seems to grant that the fact that something exists can prove that a necessary being exists (if further he does not grant that anymore, his refusal rests upon shaky grounds).
But he contends that the identification of the necessary being is problematical.
How can one prove that:
“A necessary being is perfect”?
For Kant, the “proof” of this statement would consist of taking its converse:
“Some perfect being is necessary”
Then we generalize from some to each, on the ground that there is nothing which could distinguish perfect beings (in other words, there cannot be more than one perfect being).
Therefore we obtain:
“Each perfect being is necessary”.
That which amounts to:
“A perfect being is necessary”.
But this last statement is exactly what the ontological argument held.
Therefore, for Kant, the proof of the second part of the cosmological argument rests upon the validity of the ontological argument. Kant goes one step further saying that the whole cosmological argument rests upon the ontological argument.
Is this criticism sound?
Not necessarily. Kant assumes that there is only one way to prove that a necessary being is perfect, but there can be other ways. The thomists can prove the perfection of God by showing that God is simple. But if God had only limited perfections, he would be made of two principles: the perfection that he has, and the principle which limits the realization of that perfection to a certain level. And he would be no more simple. Therefore, God must be absolutely perfect.
But Kant is right in holding that the mere existence of a necessary being is not enough for proving God and that the theist has more work to do.
As for the teleological argument, God is far less strong than Hume. He says only that the argument can only prove, at best, the existence of an architect, but not the existence of a creator.