In my view the only way agency or free will such that it coherently warrants basic moral desert can exist is with solipsism, because it’s the only possible situation where natural law or physicalist law is subsumed by subjective law, with regard to a “belief that free will such that it justifies basic desert, is true” is sufficient to functionally and literally make it true, in the only sense that matters to the subject.
Solipsism can’t be proven or disproven, even by the phenomenon that we feel like we learn things we didn’t know prior. But, the loophole there is that solipsism can be proven in and only in solipsism.
Scientific realism can’t be proven or disproven either, but given the potential for it to be true, there may be a moral imperative to behave as if it is, on the chance that others actually exist. This would be a moral imperative only if you for whatever reason came into existence with this value out of the box, so to speak, which I have.
I believe in suffering and wellbeing because I experience both directly, thus since these sensations are possible for an other, I feel morally compelled to reduce suffering in the universe as a whole, as a form of categorical imperative or moral instinct.
Thus I commit to externality for moral reasons; and in doing so I rule out a simultaneous commitment to agency or free will such that it warrants basic desert, because in a physicalist world with an arrow of time, or what I broadly refer to as scientific realism, choices don’t emerge ex nihilo nor are choices chosen, because there is no physicalist’s place to stand outside of the causal chain.
Thus, Gamer’s Law: Determinismus, realitas; liberum arbitrium, solipsismus. ONE OR THE OTHER.
For me, belief in free will would be inherently immoral. If one does not “out of the box” value the avoidance of the potential suffering of others, free will is not inherently immoral, because in this case, solipsism would represent no moral compromise. Without the presence of a moral compromise, solipsism is the stronger position.
This theory demonstrates how a belief in free will that justifies basic desert can only exist in a realm that is immoral and solipsistic.
Another fairly indulgent way to describe this is that free will can only (and must) exist in Hell, a place that is immoral and solipsistic, and a kind of free will nihilism can only (and must) exist in Heaven, a place where you associate suffering with a moral obligation, otherwise known as love or empathic regard for the other, out of the box.
