Existence is only “certainly” subjective.
Here, one must understand that the term: “certainty” is borrowed from David J. Chalmer’s use of the term within his online paper: “The Content And Epistemology Of Phenomenal Belief”.
“Certainty” in this sense means: knowledge beyond skepticism—or one’s possession of an epistemic status that allows one to rule out all other skeptical counterpossibilites. For example, direct experience allows one to possess “certain knowledge” (as Chalmers explains). In this sense, one’s direct experience allows one to rule out all other skeptical beliefs that insist the opposite of that which one has witnessed “with one’s own eyes”.
One can argue that knowledge of reality is only certainly the subjective experiences of a conscious observer (such that knowledge of reality is only certainly solipsistic),if one applies David Chalmer’s definition of “certainty” (above) as a property of human knowledge or “knowing”.
All other “knowledge” concerning reality falls short of this type of certainty, and must rely upon “lesser” cognitive states such as “belief”, “intuition”, “common sense” and “reason”.
One can argue, however, that “belief”, “intuition”, and “reason”, etc. supplies only a causal coherence between one’s notions of “knowing for sure” and the appearance and behavior of the virtual reality simulation that is our perception of reality.
(That is, one can argue that our “reason” and “logic” are what they are as a consequence of the appearance and behavior of the information gained by the senses)
Given this,one can produce the general assertion that we have good reason to believe that a mind-independent objective reality exists, and that it is represented as a relative facsimile within certain aspects of our conscious experience.
An opponent can counter this assertion, through the conceptual observation that we must take it on “faith” that the brain “just happens” to be structured the way that it is (in terms of shape, size, physical appearance, spatial relationships between different parts of the brain, and chemical substrate), and that it “just happens” to electronically function in the way that it does that this physical object (pictured below)…
…“happens” to produce electrical flow within it’s physical structure, and this somehow causes it to become a “telescope” that is believed to peer into the external world existing beyond the virtual reality of human experience.
Must external reality possess appearance, structure, and intrinsic dynamic in such a way that it must exist as an objective facsimile of the virtual reality of human perception? Might there exist alternative causal connections between the external world and the virtual reality of human existence, in terms of an external world that is appartionally and behaviorally distinct from human perception (Brain-In-A-Vat, The Matrix, etc.)?
For the opponent of this facsimile physicalism, a skepticism of process reliabilism might work. Process reliabilism is the view that the brain is structured the way that it is, and functions the way that it does, such that it yields a reliably accurate perception of the world.
Human “logic” and “reason” is produced when there is electrical activity within certain parts of the neocortex, and these cognitive “revelators” cause the subject to feel “degrees of certainty” (x “feels” or “seems” true, while y does not) concerning reality that are argued to be so reliable that they are regarded to be unquestionably true.
However, one can question the “reliability” of process reliabilism when it comes to it’s production of a belief in the truth of facsimile physicalism. Yet this skepticism exists as a double-edge sword, as the believer in facsimile realism can turn the sword around, expressing skepticism of the brain’s process reliabilism in it’s production of skepticism of facsimile physicalism (!)
At the end of the day, both views might agree upon a truce, reaching a non-empirical standoff (as the existence of a mind-independent physical reality and it’s nonexistence or alternative appearance [from facsimile] cannot be proven or disproven to be true or false through use of empirical knowledge).
Opposing views can finally accept that there is an aspect of David Chalmer’s notion of “certainty” that exists alongside the “certainty” of direct experience itself-----the notion that certain states of affairs can be objectively true despite the prejudice of reason and logic concerning non-empirical concepts and states of affairs.
Our logic and reason is derived only from internal experience within the virtual reality (of human experience), and not from that which (presumably) lies beyond it.
Jay M. Brewer
superchristianity.com
blog.myspace.com/superchristianity