Three separate philosophers have inspired this post, all of whom wrote during the last century. These are Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James and Alvin Plantinga.
All three of these philosophers took the view one did not necessarily have to look for evidence for God’s existence in order to be justified in believing in him. Here I want to briefly sketch out another way of treating religious belief - one which does not reduce the religious person to a mere superstitious fool (perhaps arguing that they are violating Occam’s Razor…), as the evidentialist arguments against them would seem to suppose.
How can this be, though, some you may ask? If I believed that the moon was made of cheese despite the evidence, I would justifiedly be held to be an idiot. Why is God suddenly exempt from this? Surely this is an ad hoc attempt to save themselves by the theists.
To understand this position we must look at what other types of belief do not need evidence, and yet which we consider ourselves to be justified. “Moore-type” beliefs these are sometimes called, which are the type of beliefs that Wittgenstein explores in On Certainty. They are known as Basic Beliefs in foundationalism and reformed epistemology (nb. Plantinga was a reformed epistemologist). James claims that the “belief in truth itself is a manifestation of our willing nature.” What does this all mean? They are the sorts of belief that lie at the bottom of our justification. Our belief in an external world, our belief that things exist outside of ourselves, is the primary one. Belief in cause and effect, and not just constant correlation (as Hume suggests). They are, in short, the beliefs that are necessary to posess before one can even begin to think about justification. They seem to us to be this way, and the very idea of justifying them seems absurd. Finally, they are what provides the grounds for explanation. Whether these beliefs are held or not will ultimately determine for us what counts as an explanation of something.
I’m sure you can see where I’m going with this. The thought is, then, that belief in God is one of these beliefs - that it is basic, that we are certain of it, we can have no grounds for justifying it, and so we can rationally hold to it despite the fact we have no evidence. Indeed, as Wittgenstein points out, even to ask for evidence for it would be nonsense - in Lectures and Conversations Wittgenstein claims that people who hold religious belief on the basis of evidence are merely superstitious.
Let us explore belief in God to see if it could count as one of these beliefs.
“They are, in short, the beliefs that are necessary to posess…”
William James calls this type of belief a “Forced Belief”. There are only two options - belief in God, or not. We cannot go without making a judgement (if it never occurs to us, it is prejudged as one or the other) on this matter. Like basic beliefs, this belief must be settled it cannot be avoided.
“…before one can even begin to think about justification.” “They are the sorts of belief that lie at the bottom of our justification.”
Does belief in God behave this way? Surely it does. Through out scholastic and greek philosophy, you will find a form of argument that has all but left our thoughts altogether with the rise of secularism - this is the idea of a teleological explanation of events, a whole world designed for a purpose. This notion of purposiveness no longer makes sense to us, as it requires a God before any thing can have an innate purpose. Thus, belief in God allows (or lack of belief excludes) teleological explanations of events and the universe, just as belief in causation allows causal explanation, belief in external objects allows external explanations and not purely mental ones.
“They seem to us to be this way, and the very idea of justifying them seems absurd.”
What would a justification of the belief that God exists really look like? Some have tried to proove his existence… most of us know just how inneffectual such classical theistic “proofs” have been. What if he came down and showed himself to us? Would that proove his existence? I think not… we could never grasp him fully, being finite ourselves, so at best we’d grasp a finite part of him. But all that would be needed for this is a being greater than we are… it would not have to be God. Proof in his existence is, I think, impossible. Justification for believing he “exists”, in the sense we usually use it, is nonsensical. Justification for belief IN god is another matter (and this confusing statement is the heart of this short post).
“Finally, they are what provides the grounds for explanation.”
What more can I say? If he exists, we can explain why things are. If not, we cannot. Furthermore what counts for justifcation is related to what counts to explanation, they are very closely linked and provide similar paths for us to take.
So it seems God could be a basic belief, and so we could be justified in believing in him without and justification.
I have more thoughts on this matter, but would like to hear yours before I continue. What do you make of the idea that belief in God is comparable to our belief in external objects? Where do you think Philosophy of Religion can go from here, or is it now stuck as both sides are totally incommensurable (remember: what counts as an explanation changes according to this belief, so both sides would be using different ways of explaining things which may seem similar. In this way they are incommensurable.)