God without Evidence - an alternative approach to Theism.

Three separate philosophers have inspired this post, all of whom wrote during the last century. These are Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James and Alvin Plantinga.

All three of these philosophers took the view one did not necessarily have to look for evidence for God’s existence in order to be justified in believing in him. Here I want to briefly sketch out another way of treating religious belief - one which does not reduce the religious person to a mere superstitious fool (perhaps arguing that they are violating Occam’s Razor…), as the evidentialist arguments against them would seem to suppose.

How can this be, though, some you may ask? If I believed that the moon was made of cheese despite the evidence, I would justifiedly be held to be an idiot. Why is God suddenly exempt from this? Surely this is an ad hoc attempt to save themselves by the theists.

To understand this position we must look at what other types of belief do not need evidence, and yet which we consider ourselves to be justified. “Moore-type” beliefs these are sometimes called, which are the type of beliefs that Wittgenstein explores in On Certainty. They are known as Basic Beliefs in foundationalism and reformed epistemology (nb. Plantinga was a reformed epistemologist). James claims that the “belief in truth itself is a manifestation of our willing nature.” What does this all mean? They are the sorts of belief that lie at the bottom of our justification. Our belief in an external world, our belief that things exist outside of ourselves, is the primary one. Belief in cause and effect, and not just constant correlation (as Hume suggests). They are, in short, the beliefs that are necessary to posess before one can even begin to think about justification. They seem to us to be this way, and the very idea of justifying them seems absurd. Finally, they are what provides the grounds for explanation. Whether these beliefs are held or not will ultimately determine for us what counts as an explanation of something.

I’m sure you can see where I’m going with this. The thought is, then, that belief in God is one of these beliefs - that it is basic, that we are certain of it, we can have no grounds for justifying it, and so we can rationally hold to it despite the fact we have no evidence. Indeed, as Wittgenstein points out, even to ask for evidence for it would be nonsense - in Lectures and Conversations Wittgenstein claims that people who hold religious belief on the basis of evidence are merely superstitious.

Let us explore belief in God to see if it could count as one of these beliefs.

“They are, in short, the beliefs that are necessary to posess…”

William James calls this type of belief a “Forced Belief”. There are only two options - belief in God, or not. We cannot go without making a judgement (if it never occurs to us, it is prejudged as one or the other) on this matter. Like basic beliefs, this belief must be settled it cannot be avoided.

“…before one can even begin to think about justification.” “They are the sorts of belief that lie at the bottom of our justification.”

Does belief in God behave this way? Surely it does. Through out scholastic and greek philosophy, you will find a form of argument that has all but left our thoughts altogether with the rise of secularism - this is the idea of a teleological explanation of events, a whole world designed for a purpose. This notion of purposiveness no longer makes sense to us, as it requires a God before any thing can have an innate purpose. Thus, belief in God allows (or lack of belief excludes) teleological explanations of events and the universe, just as belief in causation allows causal explanation, belief in external objects allows external explanations and not purely mental ones.

“They seem to us to be this way, and the very idea of justifying them seems absurd.”

What would a justification of the belief that God exists really look like? Some have tried to proove his existence… most of us know just how inneffectual such classical theistic “proofs” have been. What if he came down and showed himself to us? Would that proove his existence? I think not… we could never grasp him fully, being finite ourselves, so at best we’d grasp a finite part of him. But all that would be needed for this is a being greater than we are… it would not have to be God. Proof in his existence is, I think, impossible. Justification for believing he “exists”, in the sense we usually use it, is nonsensical. Justification for belief IN god is another matter (and this confusing statement is the heart of this short post).

“Finally, they are what provides the grounds for explanation.”

What more can I say? If he exists, we can explain why things are. If not, we cannot. Furthermore what counts for justifcation is related to what counts to explanation, they are very closely linked and provide similar paths for us to take.

So it seems God could be a basic belief, and so we could be justified in believing in him without and justification.

I have more thoughts on this matter, but would like to hear yours before I continue. What do you make of the idea that belief in God is comparable to our belief in external objects? Where do you think Philosophy of Religion can go from here, or is it now stuck as both sides are totally incommensurable (remember: what counts as an explanation changes according to this belief, so both sides would be using different ways of explaining things which may seem similar. In this way they are incommensurable.)

I am kind of experimenting with writing style here. The “you” I will be using is not really directed at you personally J, since I don’t really know what you personally think or believe. It is a generic “you” directed at an arbitrary reader.


“Justification” by itself is merely the approval stamp of some robed and wigged figure you have set on a pedestal in a courtroom. But when you step out of the artificial world of the courtroom, what does the wide world care about your judge and his pronouncement that your belief in God is “justified”?

“Explanation” by itself is merely a just-so story told for entertainment. You may amuse children by the fireplace with your teleological explanations of the world, but what else are they good for?

To me, justification and explanation are only worthwhile if they confer power. Like the power to predict and foresee future events, as given by the sciences. Or the power to change those events, to secure our own safety and happiness and that of those we love, as given by the study of technology, politics, history, etc. So instead of messing about with justification or explanation, I would ask: does belief in God confer such power? Certainly many people have thought so. Yet the evidence is mixed. Sometimes religious belief seems to make people happy, advance morality and learning, and sometimes the opposite. Many people seem to get by pretty well without religion. I never met anybody who got by without some sort of belief in an external world.

If religion were so all-pervasive in your psyche that it lives on the ground floor of your knowledge tower along with belief in an outside world, then I’d say fine, roll with that. But that’d be a lot more credible if you weren’t asking the justification judge to stamp his approval on it. If you must hold belief in God among your ‘basic beliefs’, hold it quixotically. Boldly, fearlessly, and steadfastly despite any and all contradiction. That is what basic belief is about. External objects are external because they could not be anywhere else. Windmills are giants because they could not be anything else. God is because it could not be any other way.

If you find yourself really able to doubt the belief, and to live without it, it is not basic. And religions would not have had to set up hells for unbelievers if belief were incorrigible and life-essential.

Interesting stuff. A lot of your thoughts are along the lines of William James’ (although he’s more certain that your life will be much better if you believe in God).

I wish to clear something up that I think could have been misleading. It may have seemed like I was saying that because belief in God is a basic belief we all SHOULD believe in God. This is not so. It is belief in God OR belief that there is no God that is basic. Neither belief can have evidence for them. Either belief can have the charge of “accepting on Faith” laid at their feet equally so claiming that there is not enough evidence FOR God’s existence is to accept a double standard (and vice versa if the theist attempts to lay this claim at the atheists feet).

My lecturer leveled the same criticism at me when I proposed relating Wittgenstein’s religious views (Lectures + Conversations and Culture + Value) to On Certainty. Think of it, however, from a solipsist’s point of view. However I would like to relate this to what Wittgenstein calls the “incommensurability” of religious belief.

Sure, we (who presumably all believe in the external world) think that the solipsist cannot live a full life. They are missing something, they are intellectually defunct. Does the solipsist think this? Obviously not… They think that, if they did believe in external objects, they would be somehow deluded. Maybe they think that they would be happier if external objects exist, but it would be an “ignorance is bliss” kind of happiness. They would merely be tricking themselves. They are without recourse to external explanation… but for them, there is no thing, so they do not think they are missing out. We, who use it for most of our beliefs, do think so. It is only from OUR perspective that the solipsist is defunct. This is related to the idea that what counts as justification and explanation stems from what basic beliefs we hold. From our perspective, every other explanation that comes from things that COULD qualify as basic beliefs seems superflous. Without the belief in God, teleological explanations seem to be mere fairy tales to cheer up children. Without belief in the external world, explanations of physical objects seem to be mere stories to make ourselves feel better. We are always going to view a person who attempts to get by without something we hold as basic as lacking in some way, to view someone who needs additional explanation to be telling themselves stories. Religious and non religious views are totally incommensurable from the point of view of eachother.

As for justification and explanation… I usually want to stic to an internalist account of justification. Beliefs are (or are not) justified based on what is available to the agent - external forces are irrelevant (one can be justified and still be very very wrong). Explanation would be how we explain events… I see it as intrinisically linked with and inseperable from experience of them. A solipsist looks at the world and sees his mind. An ancienct greek looks at the sky at sees fire burning through holes in a dome. We look at the sky and see burning balls of gas (or: we see objects called “stars”). The religious person sees purpose in the world. The naturalist does not. Your belief that one type of explanation is, or is not, useful is because of your already settled belief in the existence or non existence of God.

As to your externalist account saying that justification and explanation must cause power… surely this is beyond your reckoning unless you have direct experience of the world? How can you know you will not have power beyond what you already have if your belief in God changes? It should be notided that religious belief and what what has happened due to a particular religion (catholicism springs to mind) are drastically different. Relgions as a whole have sometimes made the world worse. I do not hold with externalist accounts… we need some form of directly experience the world to compare our justification to, and that is just impossible. All we have are the oppinions and beliefs that we have already settled upon. The whole notion of justification falls apart. For internalist accounts, justification and explanation are all we really have direct access to, and so are what this post is concerned with.