I ran a search, and didn’t find it mentioned. But I will assume some of you are familiar with a site inexpressible.com/
I am not here to advertize the place, but if, for those of you unfamiliar with it, you go there you will see that they are running several contests based around philosophical arguments (and the presidential election… go figure.)
Anyway, contest #1 found here inexpressible.com/claim.html
has been going on a while now and has generated quite alot of heated debate. Often sections of the site detailing some of the various arguments are down, so that I havent been able to see an argument or counter-argument similar to the one I am fixing to post here.
The thing is this… I am hoping that, after I publish my argument here, someone will be willing or able to rip it to shreds, or to perfect it (and take credit, I don’t care) just so long as this particular contest is concluded.
Some of the replies from the site admin (or the group of folks defending the original proposition) have been, well, a mess. It seems that they will contradict themselves to save the proposition. (Hell, the proposition itself is a contradiction, but they say the phrase “more reasonably” makes it preferrable to any other proposition given so far.
So maybe it is a scam, or maybe I am should switch majors, but I believe I have come up with a better proposition refuting the original proposition.
So feel free to tear mine to shreds, or like I said, make a better one. Hell, perhaps as a group effort everyone involved can just list ilovephilosophy.com as the author… whatever it takes to save the potiental for true knowledge, I am all for it.
Here is my argument against the original proposition as shown on the site mentioned above.
Original Proposition: “We cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.”
Note: â€Who we are†will be considered the universe (domain of discourse) for the argument and as my argument.
My Proposition: I submit that who we are is that which exists, and that we can (more reasonably) truly know that who we are is that which exists, in part or in whole, and be that which exists at the same time.
The original proposition assumes that there is more to know beyond that we exist, and that such knowledge is incompatible with our existence. By claiming that all we know is that we exist, I refute the original proposition as it is stated (I claim my proposition as being more reasonable). The original proposition also seems to assume that there is more to human beings beyond that we exist ( otherwise why the assumption that we cannot truly know who we are?) I submit that particular individuals may believe that there is more beyond the fact that we exist, but that such thinking, even if true, is true subjectively. The only objective truth is that in order to truly know that we exist, we must exist. I do not claim that objective truth may or may not contradict individual subjective truth, only that the most reasonable inference from our existence is knowing that we exist.
I also submit that there are two forms of truth as corresponding to two inter-related things. Subjective truth applies to individuals. I state the word truth, but this is meant to be fashioned more as belief. This is employed to denote individual difference in terms of belief as to the nature of “who we areâ€. It is my contention that out of all possible individual truths, the one listed in my proposition can be accepted as an objective truth. Objective truth, in this sense, means to apply to all that fall into the category of “who we areâ€. I submit that this truth “who we are is that which exists†can apply to every human being that exists regardless of whether they accept it or not. My contention in making this difference is this: while individuals may hold that there are truths greater then “who we are is that which exists†I make no claim against them per se, merely that there is a more basic truth ( or argument that is much simpler and more reasonable) that argument is my proposition.
Proving that all we truly know is that we exist (who we are) requires only the consideration that we cannot exist (be who we are) and not know that we do not exist.
I make no claims as to the mechanisms involved in the knowledge of existence, save that we knowing that we exist requires that we exist, as we could not truly know we exist if we did not exist to know it. This seems more reasonable then the original proposition, and avoids complete and infinite knowledge of all things, because possessing infinite knowledge would not alter that, in order to truly know that we exist (again, who we are), we must exist.
Removing the insistence that truly knowing who we are requires knowledge beyond truly knowing that we exist is not an infinite loop that requires further true knowledge of existence if “who we are†is the domain of discourse. The universe is complete in what we know, and in knowing we affirm our existence, and it requires no further knowledge to prove that we exist, because any additional knowledge can only affirm that we exist, as we must exist to gain further knowledge. Any argument made that we do not exist is self-contradictory. An argument is given to prove a point. If no one existed ( or merely one person) there would either be no need to make such an argument, or any means to convince that which does not exist that it does not exist.
To clarify: The original proposition is stated as thus, “We cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.”
My proposition is that who we are is that which exists ( in other words, we exist) (not necessarily all that exists, merely that “we†exist, I make no claim as to the existence or lack thereof for any other thing). Furthermore I propose that we can, and often do truly and quite reasonably know that we are that which exists ( that we exist). I propose that knowledge of our existence is a result of our existence if only from the fact that to know that we exist on some level requires that we exist on some level. I also propose that once an individual ceases to exist, only then can he or she truly not know who we are (that we/they exist). Thus, we cannot truly know who we are and be anything other than who we are, which is, I believe, a more reasonable claim than the original proposition. Again, to restate, who we are is that which exists. Anything other then we are that which exists can also imply a lack of existence. We cannot truly know that we exist if we do not exist. It could be argued that we do not exist, and we can never truly know that. Such an argument does not appear reasonable to me. It could also be argued that we can exist and not truly know that we exist. This argument appears equally unreasonable to me. It could also be argued that there is more to human existence then just knowing that we exist. I do not dispute that this might be true, but whether there is more to “who we are†does not prohibit that “we are that which existsâ€. It could also be argued that there is more to truly knowing who we are beyond that we are that which exists. I submit that the burden of proof for this is not on me, as such an argument might or might not prohibit my claim that we truly know that we are that which exists.
In addition, I anticipate arguments dealing with altered states of consciousness, such as deep sleep, drugs, hypnosis, brain damage, etc. These arguments center on individuals impacted individually. This also goes towards potential arguments dealing with individuals who might profess a belief or true knowledge that we do not exist. My proposition is that, human beings collectively, in total, are comprised of individuals who may believe or know or dream any manner of things. I submit that they are that which exists, and that at some level, they truly know that they exist. This is not to say that I necessarily infer that you exist, merely that I admit that which I accept in “who we are†exists. I will also submit that my proposition is strengthened a great deal if one holds that truly knowing we exist is a result of being that which exists. That we exist is a reasonable proposition. That we should, at some level, truly know this is also reasonable, however I admit that it need not absolutely follow. Merely, that it is more reasonable to assume my proposition as based on existence, when opposed to the original proposition that involves a greater number of assumptions. Some of these assumptions are as follows: That our nature prohibits true self- knowledge. That complete knowledge is an unreasonable assumption. That our nature conforms to a mold that would prohibit the possibility of any individual gaining true self- knowledge. That true knowledge is a static entity/construct resting at the end of an infinite chain, or that true knowledge is a static entity/construct in itself. Conversely, one could infer from the original proposition that true knowledge might be ever changing, and exists as such as to deny being. That true knowledge concerning ourselves has not already been found, or that it has been found but that learning it changes us in some fundamental way so as to alter “who we are.†Another assumption is that we could even possibly truly know ourselves in such a way that we know ourselves. This is the assumption that knowledge is conscious thought, or the active pursuit of identifiable facts. This could be so, but is not necessarily so.
What follows is a series of counter arguments against the arguments given to support the original proposition.
- Representational knowledge
Conscious knowledge is apparently based on interaction at sensorial, biochemical, and neurological levels, or any other levels, and therefore we can only know via representation. (i.e. we do not know directly from the external world in a Aristotelian fashion, whereby external knowledge somehow enters directly into our minds. We know through representation based on interaction, whether it be the interaction of neuron cells or the interaction of sensory receptors with external stimulus. One way around this position is to assert that some conscious knowledge is created ex nihilo (“out of nothing”). However, the concept of ex nihilo is less reasonable from our comparative perspective than something coming from something else ad infinitum (infinite causality), because we can only know by imputing (infinite) causality onto things.
The representative nature of conscious knowledge is important, in the context of Competition 1, because it refutes the notion of true knowledge viz., representative knowledge cannot truly be what it represents, because then it would not be representational.
Counter Argument: My original proposition, to be more reasonable, requires only that what we truly know is that we are that which exists. This knowledge is not created ex nihilo, but is merely a result of our existence. Whether such knowledge must come from the interaction of neurons or a lifetime of contemplation is an unnecessary extension of the fact that we exist. Our truly knowing that we exist, and that who we are is that which truly exists, is all that is needed to satisfy my proposition.
- Epistemology of knowledge (human invention)
Conscious knowledge is apparently derived from human invention. (i.e. we invent conscious knowledge from interactional based information.)
Since we are the ones behind the invention of conscious knowledge, we cannot invent true knowledge of ourselves and be ourselves. In other words, we cannot be the basis for invention and at the same time the product of invention.
Counter Argument: The only true knowledge needed to overcome the original proposition as it is stated is that we truly know that we exist and that that knowledge accords with our being (that which exists). Whether we are conscious of this or not does not change the fact that we exist, and that our true knowledge of this is a necessary product of existence. Beyond that, I make no assumptions as to the nature of human consciousness, only that we truly know that we exist and that we are that which exists.
- Internalism and externalism
Since we are the knowers trying to be the known at the same time, we need to get outside of ourselves, otherwise we would have no space to know who we are. Yet by getting outside of ourselves, without considering its probability, we cease to be ourselves; and by ceasing to be ourselves we have no grounds to know who we are because there is no who we are to know. Hence, whether as ourselves (internalism) or outside of ourselves (externalism), we cannot truly know who we are.
Counter Argument: The domain of discourse (the universe) is limited to the fact that we truly know that we exist and that we are that which exists. In order to get “out of ourselves†in this case would require us to cease to exist, which would lead to us no longer know that we exist. But, in order to do this it is more reasonable to say that we would cease to exist rather than argue that what we are is something else now, or that knowledge consisting of the fact that we exist somehow carries over after we cease to exist.
- Temporal lag
Conscious knowledge is apparently defined by temporality, and therefore as soon as we think we know who we are, we cease to know who we are because what we know is past knowledge of who we are. (If we deny the notion of time, we also deny the notion of thought, which then self-defeats the denial of time.)
Counter Argument: I make no temporal claims, save that for all the time that we truly know we exist requires that we actually exist. This continues to the very moment we cease to exist, at which point we can no longer truly know we exist regardless of temporal lag.
- Comparative nature of reason (reliance on past knowledge)
Reason is apparently defined by comparison of conscious meaning, and therefore what we reason and thereby know is based on what we previously know, which means that we can only know in the context of past knowledge.
Counter Argument: I truly know that I exist at this moment, because I exist at this moment. Every moment, in the present that I continue to exist I will truly know that I exist. It could be that I could be incapacitated in such a way that I might exist and not know that I exist. Individually this is true. Collectively, it would require mass hypnosis on a global scale or something akin to a rash outbreak of sudden comas. And even then, it is still possible that I exist and truly know that I exist. As an individual it could be that I can exist and not know it, but it is more reasonable to hold “we†will continue to know that we exist so long as we are that which exists.
- Incomplete empirical knowledge
Empirical knowledge of who we are whether of our biological or conscious make-up, cannot completely capture ourselves in entirety due to the complexity of our make-up. Laon explains this position in Entry 296, in which he says,
“… truly know who we are’ must at least involve complete physical knowledge, for example of all our bodily systems, endocrine, muscular, central nervous, digestive, and many other systems, plus their complex interactions; and yet that relatively observable knowledge is beyond the capacity of any doctor, or indeed of the whole of medical science. Then add the necessity, to attain the standard implied by ‘truly’, to also know every aspect of our own personalities, all our memories, all our intellectual capacities, all of our hopes and fears and shames and secrets and drives and so on, including - which is surely a contradiction and therefore impossible - knowing the mental events and capacities we are not conscious of. If that is not impossible enough for you (and its impossibility is quite clear to me), then remember that ‘truly knowing’ ourselves must also involve knowing those extraordinary and crucially important things that the particles we are made of at the sub-atomic level.”
To put what Laon Shelley says in context, Steve Burwen in Entry 209 states that “a single human brain [alone] contains [approximately] 12 trillion neurons, which are connected to anywhere from 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons.”) Hence, due to the sheer complexity of the human brain, it is inconceivable within the bounds of probability how all the neurons themselves of a single human brain could be known.
Counter Argument: We truly know that we exist, and we are that which exists. The number of neurons needed to be aware that we exist may be quite high or may be quite low. Existence and true knowledge of existence might possibly involve no brain activity at all. I make no assumptions as to whether it does or does not, I simply know that I exist and that knowing that I exist is a result of my existence. This is not cogito ergo sum, but sum ergo sum. I am what…that which exists.
In addition, it is not necessary that I have any knowledge of my internal organs, how they function etc, and know that I exist. It is possible, that I may be deprived of all sensory input and still know that I exist. It is an assumption, not entirely reasonable, to think that knowledge of bodily function is required for me, or anyone, to still exist and truly know that they exist. I submit that I exist at this very moment and have no true knowledge of anything, save that I exist. That I exist, is true despite what I may or may not know and will continue to be true up to the moment I cease to exist.
- Recursive reflexivity (infinite regress)
Apparently all conscious knowledge if it is asserted with absolute truth-value succumbs to infinite regress, whereby we reach an end link in our chain of reasoning which infinitely repeats because we never come to an absolute endpoint. Or, we face “recursive reflexivity” whereby each addition of knowledge of who we are changes who we are so that we never attain true knowledge of who we are, or as Laon Shelley in Entry 296 says,
“… additional self-knowledge adds to what the circle is: it means the circle is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. If it knows that, then to truly know itself it now has to know that it is a sentient single-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. This cycle goes on forever, to infinity, in what Gödel calls ‘recursive reflexivity’. The knowledge never includes the whole system, because the knowledge expands the nature of the system it tries to know.”
Counter Argument: That we are that which exists is not an absolute proposition in that it continues for infinity. Once we cease to exist (be who we are) we also cease to truly know that we exist. This is very reasonable. It does not require an infinite chain of existence, an Absolute being, or complete knowledge of all things. The domain of discourse is “who we are†coupled with true knowledge thereof. Who we are is that which exists, and we can exist while truly knowing that we are that which exists. This is still quite reasonable.
- Precedence of possibility
Since possibility is necessary for the existence of impossibility, and impossibility is not necessary for the existence of possibility, it follows that possibility precedes impossibility. This axiom defends the competition from the standpoint that it cannot be claimed with validity that it is impossible to truly know who we are, and therefore, the proposition is impossible to overcome.
Also, since the proposition is asserted from a limited perspective, it is consistent with the precedence of possibility, and in particular the possibility of truly knowing who we are.
Counter Argument: Obviously #8 is not an issue for my proposition. Not only is it possible to truly know that we exist, but we must exist at some level to claim that we exist, and that who we are, very very possibly, is that which exists. If we are that which exists, and we know that we exist as a result of that existence, then I am not claiming that it is impossible to truly know who we are, I merely claim that who we are is that which exists, and that my claim is more reasonable then the original proposition.
- Limited perspective
By asserting the proposition with limited truth-value, we avoid the skeptical contradiction of claiming to not know anything from a position of knowing, or in the context of the proposition, claiming to not truly know who we are from a position of truly knowing who we are. Also, the criticism that the proposition has limited truth-value, thereby is uncertain, is cancelled out because apparently all propositions from our perspective have limited truth-value, and as mentioned, if the proposition did not have limited truth-value, it would be contradictory.
Counter Argument: I claim that who we are is that which exists, and that we can truly know that we are that which exists and be that which exists at the same time. This seems to contain no contradictions and is, by my thinking, extremely reasonable.
- Precedence of human consciousness
Based on the premise that we cannot (more reasonably) get outside of our minds and know that we are (i.e. mind in box), and the conclusion that we can only know what we know, it follows within the limits of what we know that the nature of what we know (i.e. the nature of human consciousness) precedes what we know. So any conception whether metaphysical or scientific will be primarily defined by the nature of our consciousness, and since human consciousness is apparently comparative and incomplete in nature (Arguments 1-7), comparative incompleteness will define, within limits, any knowledge of who we are.
Counter Argument: My proposition requires only that we know that we are that which exists and that, basically, we exist. It makes no inference as to the nature of that existence. I make no claims of scientific proof or even of a human mind, per se. Consciousness may, in fact, have nothing to do with what we truly know. I am not arguing that point either way, I only claim that we are that which exists on some level sufficient to truly know that who we are is that which exists. While it may be possible that a human being can exist in such a way as to not truly know they exist, that applies only to those individual human beings in particular, and for them, can stand as a subjective truth. Collectively, or as all individuals in total, we are that which exists, and we can know, quite reasonably, that we are that which exists.
Note: Again, it may be that there is more that can truly be known, or there could be more then we just exist. To argue such requires more assumptions then simply stating that “we can truly be who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same exact moment as who we are is that which exists and we know that we exist.â€
This seems to refute the original proposition as it is stated and seems equally if not more reasonable.
In Anticipation of further arguments:
- Again, it may be that we truly know much more or are capable of truly knowing much more than what I proposed. My proposition does not disqualify future knowledge, “truthâ€, or even fundamental changes in being. It merely holds that so long as who we are is that which exists, we can truly know who we are at the same time.
- No doubt my argument for subjective and objective truth will be attacked. Note that the nature of it is such that one does not necessarily deny the other, it serves to explain possible discrepancies among individuals while still maintaining that my proposition is the most reasonable one. The author(s) of the original proposition may accept as truth, "We cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time,†this does not mean that it is more reasonable then my proposition however. Thus, subjective and objective truth can be jettisoned as an argument and the proposition can still hold.
- I have been careful to avoid a cogito ergo sum type argument per se. There may be many lines of thought for or against my proposition, but understand it was crafted in the framework of the original proposition. One could say that we must know something, to which I would reply, “yes, we know we exist.†Beyond that, I make no claims as to what we truly know.
- It may be that I have put undue stress on “can†and “cannot†while formulating my proposition. Even if this is the case, I still hold my proposition to be more reasonable in comparison. As the multitude of challenges has shown, there can be quite a large number of inferences made from the original proposition. My proposition, on the other hand, only affirms that who we are is that which exists and that we can truly know this at the same time. It denies the possibility of very little, save arguments such as the original proposition.
- It is my belief that my proposition refutes the original proposition, or, is equally reasonable. Taking this into account, I submit that the idea behind it is sound, however the execution of the argument for it may be very flawed. I ask, if it can be done, that my proposition itself also be refuted as it is stated if this is possible. Or, if not outright refuted, please demonstrate how the original proposition is more reasonable still. This is in addition to whatever additional refutations may come to my argument as a whole or in part.
- Finally, from the “who we are†page:
“ Our primary claim is that we ourselves must exist at some level, otherwise there would be no conscious awareness of thoughts/utterances/appearances. In other words, we must exist at some level in order to be aware of thoughts, even if there is something controlling our existence. (i.e. to say that we do not exist at any level, then it does not follow how we can be aware of thoughts, or to say that something else exists and not ourselves, then it does not follow how we can know that something else exists.)
The primary claim that we must exist at some level, acts as the foundation for the claim that we cannot truly know who we are in part or in whole and be who we are at the same time.
In the context of the Competition, there are no restrictions on the actual composition of who we are. The only requirement is to more reasonably show complete knowledge of who we are, whether in part or in whole.â€
I believe that my proposition reasonably shows complete knowledge of who we are, in part, that we are that which exists. Or even, in whole, that we are that which exists, and that we can truly know that we are that which exists at the same time. Any knowledge beyond that may consist of assumptions that are not necessarily fact.
Thank you in advance.