I don’t have much time, so if anybody can add to this quick definition (or contend that it’s wrong), it would be very much appreciated.
In order to answer the question, “How do we know what we perceive to be there is what is actually there?” a number of different answers have been formulated. A Realist contends that our descriptions correspond to that reality insomuch as they are true. Unfortunately, they run around in circles, so the Idealist argues, because there is no way to get out of our minds and check if, in fact, our descriptions do correspond to reality. Kant, pretty much the paradigmatic idealist, posits a phenomenal world and noumenal world. The phenomenal world is the world we describe, but that that is never the thing-in-itself, the noumenal world, because, in a nutshell, we can’t get there from here. The reason we can describe the phenomenal world is because we place a kind of template on the noumenal world, we project order (our belief in space and time) on reality in order to understand it.
Realists think that pragmatists are idealists and idealists thing pragmatists are realists because they don’t think that asking the question is worth the time.
So given what we call a chicken we have three responses:
Realist: It’s a chicken, idiot. If you don’t believe that’s a chicken, then you have a severe nueroses and your pecker is too small.
Idealist: Fool, how do you know it’s a chicken? Sure, we describe it as a chicken, but how do you know it’s really a chicken, and not something else. How do you really know? See, you can’t answer this question without falling back on the very assumption that we already know what it is that is true. We’ve been wrong before, why can’t we be wrong now? And your too much of a chicken to face up to the real situation.
to claim one can know everything about a chicken is utopian. many ideologies tend to be that way, that humans can do what they can’t. A realist would be someone who realised the limitations of our abilities, basically that what’s essential can’t be given any precise description, in contrast to an idealist. One who is pragmatic may believe in either the utopian or realist thing but nevertheless adapts to how things are here and now.
Well, a realist can certainly accept the idea that we have limits to our knowledge (Heisenberg and whatnot), the question I suppose might be better phrased, “Do our concepts describe the universe correctly or do our concepts determine how we describe the universe?”
A pragmatist doesn’t care what we can or can’t do (as determined by either empirical limitations or transcendental deductions), a pragmatist says, “Let’s find out if we can do this,” but this is always predicated on a specfic goal, a human goal, “We want to do this so let’s see if we can.”
You make a good point, however, concerning essentialism. I do tend to define a realist and idealist as essentialist doctrines – pragmatism as anti-essentialist. So, I have a hard time trying to understand realist philosophers who maintain the realist rhetoric, “There is a world and there is a way that it is” and “There is a way to discover the truth and, while were not there yet, we are getting there,” and, at the same time, claim that they are also anti-essentialist.
At another forum, I am often criticized for running together our “knowledge of truth” with “truth”. I usually respond with how can you tell the difference? I haven’t received a clear response yet. To be honest, I am not sure what to make of that curious silence.
In order to answer the question, “How do we know what we perceive to be there is what is actually there?” a number of different answers have been formulated. A Realist contends that our descriptions correspond to that reality insomuch as they are true. Unfortunately, they run around in circles, so the Idealist argues, because there is no way to get out of our minds and check if, in fact, our descriptions do correspond to reality. Kant, pretty much the paradigmatic idealist, posits a phenomenal world and noumenal world. The phenomenal world is the world we describe, but that that is never the thing-in-itself, the noumenal world, because, in a nutshell, we can’t get there from here. The reason we can describe the phenomenal world is because we place a kind of template on the noumenal world, we project order (our belief in space and time) on reality in order to understand it.
At another forum, I am often criticized for running together our “knowledge of truth” with “truth”. I usually respond with how can you tell the difference? I haven’t received a clear response yet. To be honest, I am not sure what to make of that curious silence
“How can you tell the difference?” I don’t understand what difference you would like. It seems to me so obvious that it does not bear repeating that we know more than we did 50 or 100 years ago, so that there were truths 50 or 100 years ago that we did not know, but that we now know. So there is a difference between what we knew and what we did not know, but we know now. Can that be what you mean? Perhaps you are asking this: at this very moment, how can I tell the difference between what is true and what I know is true. Well, I can tell the difference now, between what might be true, but I don’t know is true, and what I do know is true.
For instance, it might be true that the number of stars in the universe is an odd number (and, of course, it might be that the number is even). What I do know now is that the number is either odd or it is even, but I don’t know which it is (and I don’t think anyone knows which it is). So, here I am presenting a case of a one possible truth (that the number of stars is even) and of another truth (the the number of stars is odd), although I don’t know either of them.
To return to my first point, that there were truths in the past that I did not know, but which I do now know, seems to me decisive evidence that there are now truths which I do not know. And, if you want to know how I know that I do not know, for instance that the number of stars in the universe is odd (even) then my answer is that I do not have any evidence that it is odd (even) and that to know anything I require sufficient evidence.
And if you are asking (as I suspect you are) how do I know that the number of stars is odd (even) is true, when at the same time I don’t know it is true, the answer is, of course I cannot know something is true when I don’t know that it is true, but would you expect that I could know something is true when I don’t know it is true? I hope not!
In other words, I think that when you suggest that no one can answer the question, how can you tell the difference between knowing a proposition is true, and that proposition being true, you are saying that no one can, at the same time know, that a proposition is true, but not know it is true.
And, of course, you are right about that. But no one should be surprised or mystified by that either.
Addendum:
After all, how can I tell you something that is true, that I, now. don’t know is true? For when I tell you that some proposition is true, I imply that I believe or know it is true, and the ex hypothesi, I am not supposed to do that. But that is a fact of conversation, and does not show that there is no difference between truths I know (or believe) and truths I do not know or believe.
In any case, the issue is not whether I can tell the difference, but whether there is a difference. And there is, since although knowledge implies truth, truth does not imply knowledge.
It just seems to me that you are mixing up epistemology with metaphysics-(once again)
our concepts determine how we describe the universe. The phonetic alphabet itself incorporates a certain way of thinking, colliding with reality, according to some people. A realist would, according to some people, be aware of that. We can’t describe everything truthfully even within 1 billion written pages or all the internet pages of the world. Something will always be left out. Western society has been focused on material distribution and thus left out something. The idea of autonomic humans derived from the use of phonetic alphabet and the subduement of all senses but the eyes has led to an egoistic, isolated approach to things. One takes for granted that there are concrete causes to what one perceives as effects. This leads to isolating causes and effects or take them out of reality. This has been useful to achieve an effective society when it comes to material production through the analytic abilities developed. But it has always included the isolation of everything from humans to things through the need for categorsation required for the system to not collapse due to indecision. So, reality is transformed into symbols that we try to fit into the system developed through the phonetic alphabet. Reality is thus constantly ignored as we subordinate reality developed paradigms. As soon as we try to claim something about reality, paradigms are developed, because a profound description of reality we are incapable of. Subjective, unprovable judgements will always be there… No human ideologies incorporate the complexity of reality.
If you want to count up the number of things we know as opposed to fifty or hundred years ago, be my guest. However, it has absolutely nothing to do with the truth. But hey, I enjoy Trivial Pursuit as much as the next guy.
Rather tedious to simply ignore the question, don’t you think? Curious if you include brown dwarfs, nuetron stars, and black holes in your definition by the way.
But I’m not the only one who has noticed this problem:
–Thomas Grey, “Freestanding Legal Pragmatism”, The Revival of Pragmatism, p. 263.
You assert quite confidently:
Now, if you want to take the Quinean route and declare truth transcendent, I’m fine with that, and accept the latter point, but the former is a claim that can no longer mean much unless one makes the mistake of confusing metaphysics and epistemology as you’ve claimed I’ve done.
And slogans like “trancendental truth” don’t subsitute for argument either, although I suppose you would like them to do so.
Look, let’s either have a philosophical discussion about this or forget it. Present your arguments, and I’ll respond. But this nutty way you think you do philosophy is getting more and more annoying. It is either pseudo-Socratic, or sloganizing. Can you argue simply without these devices? You know, like premises and conclusions. So, either argue in good faith and stop trying to score points, or we’ll just forget it.
Since you don’t know what we are talking about, I agree. Realism, by definition, is foundationalist. If you want to have it both ways, that’s your problem, not mine. By the way, you could get your formatting a little better.
I think the problem is that you didn’t understand my argument in the first place (fair enough, probably my fault). You still pretend that what we know now is metaphysical (unquestionable). And you use an historical argument to do so? C’mon, give me a break. If you want to use logic, use it, don’t pretend this argument is somehow logical.
Again, you are the one who misunderstands the logic.
But like I said before, I see no reason to discuss this with you. As a true metaphysician, you’ve already made up your mind.
I don’t think that anything is unquestionable. And I would agree that it is possible that what we think we know, we do not know. (But then, equally, it is also possible to think we know, and be right, and, in fact, know. You can’t have it the one way, and not have it the other.) It is always possible for anyone to believe he knows something, and not know that thing. But what is not possible is for someone to know some proposition and for that proposition to be false. That is because to know some proposition is to know it is true. And you have to distinguish between the true possiblity that we can believe we know something, and be mistaken about that, and the impossiblity that we know and are mistaken about what we think we know. In symbols: P(BKp and ~Kp) and I(Kp and ~p) where P=possible that; I=impossible that; B=believes; K=knows; and p= the proposition known. (And of course, ~ is the negation sign)
So, it is possible that we don’t know any more than we did 50 or 100 years ago, although we think we do. That is, however, the kind of Cartesian doubt I thought that you postmodernists rejected. However, even if it is barely, which is to say, logically possible, that we know no more than we did 100 years ago, that is no reason to say that, in fact, we do not. That it is logically possible that something is not true is no reason to think that it is not true.
So, I begin with the premise that we know more than we did 100 years ago. (And, of course, if you have any reason to doubt that, aside, that is, from the logical possiblity that it might be false, please present that reason) The argument that is logically possible that it might be false, therefore it is not known is just fallacious) for example, that the universe is expanding. And, barring some change in natural law over the last 100 years, it follows from that there have been truths that we did not know (although we know them now.) And, hence, there is a distinction between truth and knowing the true. Of course, to repeat, you can refuse to concede the premise. But then, don’t you need some reason to suppose it is false, I mean some reason other than your conviction that the conclusion I draw from it is true? If you have such a reason (I don’t mean this vague stuff about foundationalism and transcendental truth, and the like which are not reasons, but slogans, please let me know.) One day, to do philosophy, you will have to think in detail. For instance, what the difference is between belief and knowledge, and the reason that the possiblity that you are mistaken does not show you do not know, but the actuality of mistake does. Philosophizing is not like finger painting with broad sweeps of the fingers.
By the way, “metaphysician” and “metaphysics” are not four letter words. But there is bad metaphysics and good metaphysics.
Finally, you can’t simply say I misunderstand logic, and leave it at that. What exactly is the mistake you think I have made? And how is this a misunderstanding of logic. You really have to learn how to argue?
And, back to another post: how is Realism foundationalism “by definition.” Is it really a part of the definition of “Realism” that it is foundational? Why cannot a Realist reject foundationalism? Quine was a Realist, and he rejects foundationalism. In fact he says some place that he holds the correspondence theory of truth (which is, I suppose a Realism) and a coherence theory of knowledge. Is Quine, do you suppose, contradicting himself?
I agree with all of this. I think all of this is very useful. It just has nothing to do with what I’ve said here.
Again, I agree, we know more about many things. But the point is vacuous unless we are talking about something. My response was to ask, “So?” But my point was not to say that ‘more’ is right or wrong (depending on the situation, it can be both), but that to equate that statement with something like, “Getting closer to the truth,” is wrong in any general sense. It is my contention that Realists jump from perfectly good examples of what we know, to general and vacuous statement that signify nothing. Insomuch as you want to call yourself a Realist then that’s what I think you do. You’ve accused me of making general and vacuous statements, but that’s exactly what I’m criticizing the Realist of doing. It’s kind of funny because everything you’ve accused me of seems to be something you do.
I’ve described three general views, I am not really trying to make an argument so much as I am trying to describe three types of philosophers. If you want to offer a description of a Realist, be my guest, – I have made no attempt to hide my bias towards Pragmatism – but it is my contention that Realists make a big deal about something that is, well, trivial. When I first started writing this, I had very specific people in mind.
Realist: Searle
Idealist: Kant
Pragmatist: Rorty
If you want to make a corrective here, please do so, but it does me no good to talk of confusing truth with knowledge when what I was trying to do was show that these three types of philosophers revolve around precisely that relationship.
But when did I ever doubt it? Again, I don’t think it’s a big deal. If you want to count little bits of knowledge (however chopped up) and compare, please do so.
I agree.
How does it follow from the fact that the universe is expanding, that “there have been truths that we did not know (although we know them now)”?
Hence? How is this distinction derived from the above? I accept the distinction but not from anything you’ve said here.
I accept the premise so I don’t have to do much here do I? But, wait, I think I see the problem here. Are you talking to me or Postmodern? I had assumed you were talking to me, but maybe I’m wrong. Our positions are different however.
A useless, vacuous slogan.
Spoken like a true Pragmatist.
I don’t really have a problem with metaphysics of the speculative sort, though I think a lot of it is uninteresting.
I agree. Thank God, I didn’t say that.
You’ve committed a Red Herring. Oh, and the non-sequiter above.
I don’t know what this is trying to get at.
It’s a tricky call because it’s hard for me to tell whether we should take some of his comments about truth as seriously as some do. But Quine’s talk about ontological relativity, indeterminacy of translation, and deconstruction of the analytic/synthetic strike me as Pragmatic. When he talks about Realism, I think he’s asserting an article of faith.
Look. I am replying to what you said about knowledge of the truth and knowledge. You said that you cannot tell the difference between them. I gave an argument to show that there is a difference between them. The argument is that there are truths which we did not know, but which we know now. Therefore, there is a difference between truth and knowledge of the truth. (This has nothing to do with “getting closer to the truth” or any of those red herrings.) Let’s just stick to the claim you made and my objection to it. What is the mistake (if any) in my objection. No slogans; no abstract generalizations. Just make the particular objection. If you cannot, say so, and we’ll drop the matter. In the meantime, I consider you refuted.
I don’t care whether I am a Realist or a Unitarian, for that matter. These terms mean as little as “Conservative” and “Liberal” mean in politics. Again, philosophy is not finger painting. You will have to learn that, sooner or later.
So, tell me what is wrong with my argument to show there is the difference between knowledge and truth, and don’t sloganize. If you think the argument is irrelevant, tell me exactly (without slogans) why.
Otherwise, you have been refuted. And, for heaven’s sake, no philosophical labels, or hand-waving. Don’t let labels and slogans do your thinking for you. Just give me a rational objection to my argument that there were truths we did not know, and that we now know, so there is a dlifference between knowledge and truth. Is the argument invalid? Why?
Is the premise false? Why?
P.S.
You write:
How does it follow from the fact that the universe is expanding, that “there have been truths that we did not know (although we know them now)”?
It follows because that is one example of a truth we did not know 100 years ago, but we do know now. (I should have thought that was obvious)
From the premise, the universe is expanding is a truth we did not know 100 years ago, and now know, it follows that there is some truth that we did not know 100 years ago, and now know. (By existential generalization)
Just as it follows from the premise:
(1)George W. Bush is president of the United State,
that therefore (2) Someone is president of the United States.
I know you won’t find the inference rule of existential generalization in anything by Derrida, but look at any good elementary logic book that has a chapter on quantification, and you will find it. And learn something too.
C’mon, Jon, just clean up that first sentence, and I’ll respond as philosophically and as rigorously and as clearly as I can. But I can tell you already, you ain’t gonna like it.
We know the Universe expands. (or substitute any other knowledge you like.)
100 years ago we did not know that the Universe expands.
It was true 100 years ago that the Universe expands. (No cosmic catastrophe has happened in the last 100 years)
Therefore, there is at least one truth we did not know 100 years ago, but we know today.
Therefore, there is a difference between the truth and knowing the truth. (By existential generalization-see my last post.)
If your reply is that there is no knowledge, then don’t bother. I don’t want to discuss skepticism, or any other red herring you come up with.
And if your reply is that there is no truth without knowledge of the truth, don’t bother. That begs the question, for that is exactly the issue.
Just tell me which premise(s) you reject, or tell me why you think the argument is not valid (which is to say, why you believe that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.) No slogans, no stuff about absolute truth, or inabsolute truth. No waving or flailing. No pseudo-Socratics. Only the argument. Philosophical maturity.
Okay, I just finished a long post and lost it all. Let me try to recapture some of it quickly:
First part:
I did not say “There is no difference between knowledge of truth and truth.” I said, “How can you tell the difference?”
I’ll come back to this later, but let’s get to the refutation:
Assume someone has said, “There is no difference between knowledge of truth and truth”:
Does this argument prove him wrong:
Simply put, I don’t think so. Let’s look at it more closely:
I accept this.
This is misleading. It implies that people a hundred years ago had some kind of gap in their knowledge that was filled in later. This is false. People a hundred years ago believed the universe was in a steady state.
I think this should be changed to:
People a hundred years ago believed that the universe was in a steady state.
I accept this.
This runs the distinction you want to prove together. We have two propositions here competing for truth status. “The universe is expanding” is not in the truth category, it is in our knowledge of truth category. When we thought that the universe was in a steady state, it was also in our knowledge of truth category.
4 should state:
“The universe is expanding” is true; “The universe is in a steady state” is false.
Existential generalization doesn’t apply here. This doesn’t make 5 wrong, but that the difference between truth and knowing the truth wasn’t shown here. The difference still applies to both respective of when we (or they) considered either true.
Now let’s take a look at your Bush example:
and let’s put into the form of your argument above:
We know that George W. Bush is president.
People in the hills of Tibet do not know that George W. Bush is president.
We live in the same time and the same world.
Therefore, we know one truth that the people in the hills of Tibet don’t know.
Therefore, someone is president.
–5 isn’t wrong, it just adds nothing to the argument.
Or try it a different way:
We know that George W. Bush is president.
The people in the hills of Tibet think Bill Clinton is president.
We live in the same time and the same world.
“Bill Clinton is president” is false; “George W. Bush is president” is true.
Therefore, someone is president.
In either case, someone is still president, it’s just that one proposition is false and one true.
This is misleading. It implies that people a hundred years ago had some kind of gap in their knowledge that was filled in later. This is false. People a hundred years ago believed the universe was in a steady state.
There is no distinction, except for a stylistic one between “having a gap in knowledge” and “not knowing something.” What people a hundred years did not know was that the universe was expanding. (They also did not know that George W. Bush would be president of the United States in a hundred years, and that was also a gap in their knowledge) The expression “gap in knowledge” does, perhaps suggest that something ought to have been known that was not known. But this is a matter of conversation in a particular context. It is still true that those people did not know that there was an expanding universe. I read you as saying, then, that it is not true that these people did not know that there was an expanding universe. That is clearly, false. They did not know it. Hence they did not know something that was true. Hence, we do know something that is true that they did not know. Hence, there is a difference between knowing the truth and the truth. Q.E.D.
I don’t think that that is particularly important for my objection. I did not say that, “They did not know that the universe is expanding” was wrong, I said, “That it wasn’t wrong as such.” The problem is that it can mean either they had a proposition that they said they knew to be true but was false (The result being, for example, Einstein’s cosmological constant)and they had no proposition at all.
If it is the former, the difference between truth and our knowledge of truth is already clear. You need go no further. If it is the latter, then it is false for they did have a proposition. But neither point shows that ‘the universe is expanding’ is “one truth” rather than our knowledge of truth.
If we look at ‘The universe is expanding’ a little bit, we have a similar problem today. Ten years ago, we said that we know it is true that the universe is expanding and slowing down. A few years ago, many came to the conclusion that the universe is expanding and speeding up (and which, some have argued, give a new life to Einstein’s cosmological constant, we just call it dark energy).
This latter proposition is still somewhat controversial but that’s where the distinction becomes important. The distinction between truth and knowledge of truth allows any particular proposition to be up for grabs at any particular time, but not all at the same time. Even if it is only a logical possibility (and therefore, I agree, not particularly interesting), it is this very distinction that allows us to question any particular proposition.
But my main objection is that you run together the very distinction in 4 and claim that the distinction itself follows from that running together. This doesn’t invalidate the conclusion, but it certainly doesn’t prove it.
Again, if George W. Bush is president, it follows that someone is president. If Tibetans think that Bill Clinton is president or if they have no concept of presidency at all (logically possible but not probable), it doesn’t follow that noone is President. It simply doesn’t matter if people in Tibet know that George Bush is president or are mistaken in whom is president for someone to be president.
I have other objections but I think they revolve more around the idea that we know more than people a hundred years ago. Sure we do but we also no less. We also know more than Tibetans and less. But this is the same problem as I see in 2. The founding premise that we know more than others is too vague to be useful.
The fact remains that we know more than we did one hundred years ago. Whether people claimed to have known something, but did not know it because they were mistaken, or whether they made no claim about the expansion of the universe at all, because they did not know about it, is a distinction, of course, but , in either case, it is still true that we know something they did not know.
Therefore, there is a truth they did not know and we do know.
Therefore, there is a distinction between truth and knowing the truth.
What you wrilte is interesting for the sociology of knowledge, and may have some implications for epistemology too, but it does not touch the main issue.
And sure we know less than the Tibetans. For instance, the Tibetans knew what they generally ate for breakfast (Yak milk?). And I suppose you would call it a “gap in our knowledge” or, what comes to the same, something about the Tibetans we do not know, but they knew. We do not know what the Tibetans generally ate for breakfast. For that is a case of a truth that we do not know, but the Tibetans did know. Therefore, there is a distinction between truth and knowledge if the truth-which, let us remember, you denied, and is the issue we have been discussing. (I am afraid you let the issue get lost in your wanderings)
The sociology of knowledge holds some interest, but ever since Kuhn confused it with epistemology, it has become more and more obscure.
And, of course, after Rorty got hold of it…well, don’t ask!
Finally:
"But my main objection is that you run together the very distinction in 4 and claim that the distinction itself follows from that running together. This doesn’t invalidate the conclusion, but it certainly doesn’t prove it. "
I don’t know what you are referring to. You have lots of “4’s”
“The founding premise that we know more than others is too vague to be useful.”
I don’t find it vague at all. It seems to me both true and clear. (I cannot refrain from remarking that I find it somewhat ironic, not to say, amusing, that you should criticize something for being vague, but let that go.)
Whether it a a useful truth would partly depend on whether someone you are communicating it to does not seem to realize it is true, and by communicating it you are teaching him something he needs to know.
But, whether it is vague, or it is useless, or shocking, or joyous, entrancing, delectable, or beautiful, the question remains (the same old question,and let me remind you what is was, and still is: whether there is a difference between truth and the knowledge of truth) whether that proposition is true or not.
(Saying of a person that she is fat may, under many circumstances, be too vague to be useful. Although in other circumstances, it may be exactly the thing to say. And, it may also be insulting, or distressing, etc. But, true it still may be.) After we settle that the proposition at issue is true, namely (let me remind you once more, the proposition that there is a difference between knowing the truth and truth) we can then, if you like, take up the question of whether or not that proposition has all or some of those other properties I have just listed above.
The work of philosophy is (often) the assemblage of reminders for a particular purpose.-Wittgenstein.
And the fact remains that we know less than a hundred years ago. So? I suspect what you want to talk about is significance, not knowledge.
This is simply false. You are confusing, again, the distinction between falsity and truth with knowledge and truth.
I’ll take that as a compliment. Hey, not everything I say is silly, no?
Why would I do that? The point of calling something a gap was to tell you that you don’t understand people a hundred years ago. If you asked Einstein in 1903 if the universe was expanding, it’s not that he wouldn’t understand the question, he would tell you you were wrong.
Actually, the problem is that I never wrote what you thought I wrote. I never said there is no distinction. I said, “How do you know the difference?” Italisization in writing, as far as I know, is generally considered to mean stress. When you stess a pronoun, it almost always mean the person you talk to. The only way you could see what I wrote differently is not to read what I wrote or alter what I wrote. I don’t mind the fact that you misunderstood me (Such things happen). I don’t like the fact that you just don’t understand the conventions of writing.
Useless.
And so is the fact that we know less than people a hundred years ago. So?
But what you tried to communicate is simply wrong. Your proof holds no water:
This is wrong.
You confuse truth and falsity with truth and knowledge of truth.
That’s not my fault, it’s yours.
And how many times can I remind you that I never said that. It is you, again and again, who doesn’t seem to know how to read. But one more time:
The truth is the truth.
What we claim to be true is true or false or indeterminate.
The trick is to realize the difference. Actually, though, I want to take one thing back (not that you care but hey, it’s still a thread I started), I said it was only a logical possibility that the universe doesn’t expand. It’s not. It’s quite probable that we have drawn the incorrect inference from the red light shift.
What is a logical possibility is that we are wrong about the red light shift when light moves away from us.
Give up. You are simply wrong. (I do resent your appending your own private meanings to what you say, and then after my comment, you explain what you meant by what you say) For instance, “a gap in your knowledge” means, “there is something you don’t know.” At least in English it does. It does not mean “there is something you don’t understand.” The expression “there is something you don’t understand.” means that. Or maybe, “there is a gap in your understanding” means that.
Well, anyway, return to Rorty and Derrida, and leave the Enlightenment.
