Is free will a lost battle for materialism?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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This is my first post in the forum and I have not studied philosophy, so I would like to apologize if my language is not according to the modern philosophical norms. Even If it is obvious, I want also to emphasize that I express personal ideas and I do not expect people to agree with me.

Having said that, let’s start with the topic: A lot of people believe that the scientific discoveries lead necessarily to some sort of determinism (everything linked through causality), removing thus the possibility of free actions from the individuals. I will try here to make a case for some kind of free will compatible with materialistic worldview. My proposition is inspired by Epicurean physics (very misunderstood in my opinion).

The basic premise is close to what the poet Lucretius and assumes for reality. The fundamental parts of nature have various properties. One property is the swerve (arbitrary movement at unpredictable times) and another is related to the forces that interact on them, bringing causality. In modern terms, swerve is the random movement of particles that can be only studied through probabilities and the forces could be seen as the interactions between particles (strong, weak interaction, electromagnetic etc). Diogenes of Oenoanda calls the swerve “free motion”, thus at the fundamental level we have free action and causality co-existing. In my proposition, causality is responsible for the creation, while swerve gives the diversity in the creation.

Having defined the above proposition for reality, one can assert that reality is not only causal or only random. There is no endless chain of causality and randomness does not lead to general chaos. I can provide examples from the level of atoms or even from everyday life if necessary, but I will try to keep this post as concise as possible. Now, to connect with humans, I will use Epicurus observation: all events related to us can be attributed to three factors: necessity (i.e. causality), chance (i.e. randomness) and ourselves. Necessity and randomness outside of us are out of our control. However, our own self is not governed by an endless causal chain — that is the determinist view — nor, of course, by any divine intervention, which materialism explicitly rejects. Our own input on the events, thus, makes us responsible for our actions.

Since we establish human responsibility for our actions, the question is if this constitutes free will. From my point of view, the answer to that is unclear. Will is related to conscious choices, which are clearly more causal and not related to randomness. Yet, the absence of strict causality makes our will responsible for our conscious actions.

This is my position, any argument is welcome. Thank you.

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Everyone knows you’re lying already with that first line.

I really enjoyed reading that.

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Thanks for the response.

To address the comment: I just subscribed to the forum and the moderators can confirm if it is my first post or not. With regard to studying, I mean official degree of philosophy from a University. This I do not have it. Studying as an amateur, yes, and especially Epicurean philosophy. I hope this clarifies the first line, and I apologize for any misunderstanding.

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Where did you get that impression, or did you mean former? I have heard a lot of people called occasionalists who wouldn’t agree with the label, and heard Descartes referred to as a materialist recently (could’ve been a snarky joke). (Maybe they meant what he meant by spiritual material?) We gotta get our terms straight.

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My understanding from what I read is that the majority of materialists do not believe in religions and do not consider that God or Gods (if they exist) interfere in human affairs. Marx is a primary example.

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So you think conventional materialists believe in a self-determining will able to influence rather than only being influenced by the chain of causality (which is possible due to … what some see as randomness, or wiggle room in the chain)? Are you sure they identify as materialists?

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I guess that I did not express myself clearly in that sentence.

The term latter was referring to God’s intervention. The materialists do not consider God interfering in human affairs. The former, i.e. the endless chain of causality, is position of determinists. There are materialists that are non-determinists. Sartre was non-determinist (he was existentialist, which can be viewed close to materialists). Epicurus is another example from antiquity.

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This is Copilot’s way of helping me understand what you meant: However, our own self is not governed by an endless causal chain — that is the determinist view — nor, of course, by any divine intervention, which materialism explicitly rejects.

How’s that?

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Excellent, thanks. Is it possible to add this correction to m’y original post? Is there a “modify text” function?

PS: I found it and corrected it. Thanks again

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I have a very different view of free will, probably because I have a very different view of causality. First, consciousness is a set of actions. It’s not an entity in its own right but an attribute of an entity. Actions are performed by entities, and the kind of actions an entity can perform is determined by its nature. The cause of free will is man’s nature as a rational being, rationality being a choice, and starting with the choice to focus one’s mind or not. Free will consists of man’s ability to choose to think or not. Its cause is our nature as rational beings. So it is determined, by our nature, and free.

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I think I get your point. You have a more straight up approach, linking the free will directly to the human nature through your interpretation of consciousness. Thus, you can positively conclude that our will is free, independent of the cosmos we live in (deterministic or non-deterministic).

The approach I follow is in the form of build-up, from the bottom (fundamental parts of nature) all the way to humans. The disadvantage of mine is that I have to define “freedom” in a non-conventional way, without connecting it to choice.

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The problem im having with my view on the subject of freedom, will , and consciousness, is that both freedom and consciousness can be represented as linked to will, but will may not equal freedom, because will usually is self determinative, and not constructed without representation.

I am admittedly a novice on the subject, but the idea is paradoxically indeterminate, thereby.

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You have a valid point. Usually the will is constructed through representation from past experiences (for instance, I prefer this food instead of that after tasting both), and sometimes is formed by external factors/information (I do not want to eat pork because my religion forbids me, or because I read that it is bad for health etc.). Thus, it becomes uncertain how free this process is.

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I couldn’t have said it better, and just imagine such reconstruction consisting within an iota of difference out of unsaid parity, and decidedly going with instinct which could be the most probable choice.

Well that proves the fragility of the saying: so near yet so far.

However a decision to follow the forked sign is a necessary required part of proceeding.

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I wouldn’t say our will is independent of the cosmos, since our consciousness is part of it. I say that our ability to focus our minds is part of our identity and, therefore, an instance of causality, not an exception to it. That might not sound like much, being able to focus, but it’s the thing that gives us the ability to make music, art, skyscrapers, electric motors, airplanes, and solve scientific puzzles. So it’s really a lot.

But it’s also the cause of all the evil in the world. Because if we can choose to act in alignment with reality we can also choose to act against reality, which is what evil is.

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Sorry, I did not express myself correctly. I meant independent if the cosmos is deterministic or not. Of course we are part of cosmos, we are influenced by it and both our will and consciousness are developed inside it.

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I see. So many have the idea that free will is not free if it is influenced by factors outside itself. I thought you were expressing that notion.

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For me the problem is how someone identify free will.

In your version, you gave a definition that permits free will even if we live in a deterministic universe.

I, on the other hand, have identified free act as an act which originates by a source and is independent of external factors. This act appears as random because it is uncontrolable and thus unpredictable. I am referring to the quantum level randomness, which is a fundamental property of the cosmos. I do not call this causal, but it is part of the cosmos.

Due to my definition of “free act”, I cannot conclude that the will is free, because it is not formed randomly. It may though be impacted by random events, and whatever I do motivated by it may impact myself or my environment in non-determined ways. This is why I insist on the responsibility. If my actions can create a “new” future, not bound by universal causality, then these actions can make a difference. The will that drives my actions can be essential.

In any case, I agree that my will depends on the cosmos. A definition like yours could fit in my view, as long as we distinguish the free act, related to randomness, and the free will, which as you mentioned is the ability to choose to think.

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If every act or moment is distinct from every other moment, and yet sewn together because they influence each other within an act that unifies the sequence (timeline), then every moment is new/first and old/eternal at the same time. In other words, the future is as done as the past (now is the connection between them—and the now of the actor who unifies the sequence connects every now) but also every moment/now is alive and inclusive of our choices (in the moments we inhabit). If that is not the case, we are not free to contribute to any moment.

On the impossibility of knowing a true tenseless fact without omnitemporality
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I am not so sure about that. Let’s see the following example:

I drive my car and I park it at the bottom of the hill. A few minutes later an earthquake erupts, causing a rock to roll from the top of the hill. The outcome is unique – my car is destroyed. Yet, I fail to see which act unifies my decision to park at that spot and the earthquake. How the earthquake is influenced by my decision? Unless I envoke superstitious explanations, I do not see connection between the two.