Kant said that the in-itself was not perceivable, but did he say it was conceivable? I mean, in it’s true form? If so, what form are we to understand a rock or a tree to take apart from the sensory features we experience them to have?
what the difference between perception/sensation and conception?(memory)
perception/sensation is a sensory(bodily) reaction to the external world. conceptions are our rationalization of what we experiance. when thinking about a tree do you think about the visual image or the other properties?i’d say the initial conceptualization is a visual one, similar to regular experiance if your looking at something from far away.
No. We can only know things through time and in space - two things which are foreign to the thing-in-itself. If the thing-in-itself were brought into consciousness, then the process would convert it into a phenomenol form, so the thing being known wouldn’t be the thing-in-itself proper. I wouldn’t be surprised if it were impossible in principle for any knowing subject to know the thing-in-itself.
This isn’t to say that we should leave off metaphysics; there’s lots of stuff we can do in the periphery.
its like that berkely guy asked; when we imagine a tree do we imagine the tree itself or our perception of the tree?(aka we imagine it from the viewers perspective)
its like that berkely guy asked; when we think of a tree do we think of the tree itself or our perception of the tree? i’d say imagination is dependent on physical experiance/perception for conceptualizing external objects.
yah i think he said think of , not imagine.
Well it depends how far you want to go into phenomenalism, surely. Berkeley maintained that there is no “in-itself” as we are only apprehending sense-data that belies the true nature of the universe, which he decided was God. Hume reduced this to stating that ALL we can deduce from the sense-data we apprehend when we perceive, say, a tree is that sense-data, and so there is no way of ever knowing whether or not the tree exists in any greater sense than its sense-data, let alone the very nature of whatever this “in-itself” is. I agree with Hume on this one, and say that any conjecture into the “in-itself” is pointless.
Now is this straight from Kant’s mouth (paraphrased as it is, of course), or is this your personal take?
The reason I want to know what Kant specifically thought is because I’m writing a paper in which I make reference to Kant’s thing-in-itself, and I’m saying that Kant believed there was no way to have any kind of grasp on the form the thing-in-itself takes, whether that’s in a sensory form or an abstract conceptual form. I just want to make sure I’m saying the right things about Kant.
Yes, it pretty much is Kant’s take on it, fed to me via Schopenhauer, and I find it convincing. What can know about it is something I’m still thinking on.
I didn’t know there was a difference untill I had a comparison.