I read Russells problems of philosophy
In one chapter he means that we never know physical objects in themselves, we know physical objects by description. The description in turn includes universal terms, with which we always are aquainted.
But also, he means that the objects of our direct apprehensions are simple qualities like shape, colour and temperature. Later on, he talks about universals such as brotherhood and justice.
But does he then mean that we directly apprehend “brotherhood”? He says that we know objects (persons for example) only through the percepts of our senses, which consist merely of simple sense data. But “brotherhood” is not a simple sense datum.
I don’t understand him here. What exactly is it we are aquainted with in sense perception?
Simple sensations or concepts such as “brotherhood”?
Impious
August 22, 2007, 11:06am
2
goosehenry:
I read Russells problems of philosophy
In one chapter he means that we never know physical objects in themselves, we know physical objects by description. The description in turn includes universal terms, with which we always are aquainted.
But also, he means that the objects of our direct apprehensions are simple qualities like shape, colour and temperature. Later on, he talks about universals such as brotherhood and justice.
But does he then mean that we directly apprehend “brotherhood”? He says that we know objects (persons for example) only through the percepts of our senses, which consist merely of simple sense data. But “brotherhood” is not a simple sense datum.
I don’t understand him here. What exactly is it we are aquainted with in sense perception?
Simple sensations or concepts such as “brotherhood”?
This smells a little too much of German idealism for my liking.
Quantum uncertainty is the limit of knowledge, and even that is a matter of calculable probability.
Impenitent
August 22, 2007, 11:16am
3
goosehenry:
I read Russells problems of philosophy
In one chapter he means that we never know physical objects in themselves, we know physical objects by description. The description in turn includes universal terms, with which we always are aquainted.
But also, he means that the objects of our direct apprehensions are simple qualities like shape, colour and temperature. Later on, he talks about universals such as brotherhood and justice.
But does he then mean that we directly apprehend “brotherhood”? He says that we know objects (persons for example) only through the percepts of our senses, which consist merely of simple sense data. But “brotherhood” is not a simple sense datum.
I don’t understand him here. What exactly is it we are aquainted with in sense perception?
Simple sensations or concepts such as “brotherhood”?
simple sensations are the only thing to which we have access… from which (simple sensations) we (illogically) create universals…
brotherhood is a universal in the sense that all monks have head coverings sewn into their garments… (empirically justified e.g. all ravens are black)
yet brotherhood (unsensed) would be a state in which all brothers find themselves (by definition)…
-Imp
Impious
August 22, 2007, 11:18am
4
Simple sensations are all that we need…
Impenitent
August 22, 2007, 11:29am
5
all that we need for what?
-Imp
goosehenry
August 22, 2007, 11:31am
6
Thanks Imp
simple sensations are the only thing to which we have access… from which (simple sensations) we (illogically) create universals…
brotherhood is a universal in the sense that all monks have head coverings sewn into their garments… (empirically justified e.g. all ravens are black)
yet brotherhood (unsensed) would be a state in which all brothers find themselves (by definition)…
But this is not what Russell means, i think. He means that we become aquainted with universals through sense experience.
He says we are aquainted with the properties through the sense data. But “brotherhood” is no sense datum. I have problems with this.
In practice, would my perception of a table go something like this:
I directly apprehend a rectangular shape, brown, smooth etc.
I become aquainted with the universal “table”
Therefore i percieve that this rectangular, brown shape in front of me is a table?
Or do we never know the property of “being a table” but define table as that we know through sense experience - ie. bronwness, hardness, smoothness…?
Just trying to find out what Russell means.
Impious
August 22, 2007, 11:35am
7
You suggest that simple sensations are inadequate in some respect. I’m simply saying that they’re not.
Impenitent
August 22, 2007, 11:54am
9
extrapolating universals from a few instances is inadequate…
stereotyping or science… both make the same mistake…
-Imp
goosehenry
August 22, 2007, 12:04pm
10
no, you percieve a rectangular brown shape. you name it “table”. all you have is the perception and the artificial category to which you place the perception. the category “table” is never sensed… nor is brotherhood… other rectangular brown shapes can be categorized as plywood, plank, bookcase ect… these categories are not sensed either…
Then what, according to Russell (realism), is it that i am aquainted with? Browness and squareness?
Yep, but i guess Russell takes the realist position. I don’t know, however, what it is exactly that i am aquainted with, according to him.
If i can know what brotherhood is, must i not be aquainted with it? Otherwise, it would seem i would know that to by description.
This is Russell Means:
-Imp
Impious
August 22, 2007, 12:20pm
12
Again, simple sensations are adequate (to develop knowledge of a thing).
goosehenry
August 22, 2007, 5:37pm
13
But then we run into the problems mentioned… perceptual relativism…
What then justifies my perception that i am seeing for example a table?
How can i know any physical object at all?
Yes, i know that 1+1=2 and that modus ponens is necessarily true. Experience “awakened” me to the truths of maths and logic. The alternative to not knowing those are absolute skepticism.
Impenitent
August 22, 2007, 5:43pm
14
goosehenry:
But then we run into the problems mentioned… perceptual relativism…
What then justifies my perception that i am seeing for example a table?
you do. “justification” is a loaded term…
How can i know any physical object at all?
you can’t. you can hold the impression (sensation) and that’s all…
Yes, i know that 1+1=2 and that modus ponens is necessarily true.
necessarily? only because you adopt the convention, the definition. they do not exist outside of language…
Experience “awakened” me to the truths of maths and logic.
experience of math? experience of logic? neither of these have ever been experienced…
The alternative to not knowing those are absolute skepticism.
but how could one be skeptical of there being absolutely no absolutes?
-Imp
goosehenry
August 22, 2007, 7:51pm
15
We’ll just have to disagree on that point then.
Yes, i know that 1+1=2 and that modus ponens is necessarily true.
necessarily? only because you adopt the convention, the definition. they do not exist outside of language…
Then logic and maths are contingent, according to you. Thus there are no necessarily true/false arguments.
You intuitively grasp the truths of logic from certain experiences. However, additional experience does not serve to further validate them.
Why not? Logic is contingent, it seems.
-GH
Impenitent
August 22, 2007, 9:05pm
16
goosehenry:
We’ll just have to disagree on that point then.
that’s fine. and you disagree with russell as well…
Yes, i know that 1+1=2 and that modus ponens is necessarily true.
necessarily? only because you adopt the convention, the definition. they do not exist outside of language…
Then logic and maths are contingent, according to you. Thus there are no necessarily true/false arguments.
correct
You intuitively grasp the truths of logic from certain experiences.
what experience?
However, additional experience does not serve to further validate them.
it never validates them in the first place. the burden of demonstration falls to you for making the claim
Why not? Logic is contingent, it seems.
-GH
logic is a game of definitions never appearing in the empirical world, nothing more…
-Imp
goosehenry
August 23, 2007, 5:15am
17
Maybe the later Russell, but not the earlier.
However, additional experience does not serve to further validate them.
Logic cannot be demonstrated without using logic
Since there is no absolute logic anyway, i cannot demonstrate anything
If you deny that logic is self-evident, nothing i can do to convince yo otherwise
Well, then it is possible to be absolutely sure that there are no absolutes.
goosehenry
September 2, 2007, 7:41pm
19
About logic…
they are never validated
I thought about this. Consider the following experiment. Let’s say i believe that if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C then A must necessarily be bigger than C.
Then i try it out. I put three rocks of differing size next to each other and realize that the formula applies to reality! Voila. logic validated!
Well, we then see these patterns everywhere and realize that they must apply to reality, othewise everything would be absurd.
Solved
Does this have something to do with the de re/de dicto distinction? I think I read something about that once…
