Knowledge by description&Knowledge by aquaintance

I read Russells problems of philosophy

In one chapter he means that we never know physical objects in themselves, we know physical objects by description. The description in turn includes universal terms, with which we always are aquainted.

But also, he means that the objects of our direct apprehensions are simple qualities like shape, colour and temperature. Later on, he talks about universals such as brotherhood and justice.

But does he then mean that we directly apprehend “brotherhood”? He says that we know objects (persons for example) only through the percepts of our senses, which consist merely of simple sense data. But “brotherhood” is not a simple sense datum.

I don’t understand him here. What exactly is it we are aquainted with in sense perception?

Simple sensations or concepts such as “brotherhood”?

This smells a little too much of German idealism for my liking.

Quantum uncertainty is the limit of knowledge, and even that is a matter of calculable probability.

simple sensations are the only thing to which we have access… from which (simple sensations) we (illogically) create universals…

brotherhood is a universal in the sense that all monks have head coverings sewn into their garments… (empirically justified e.g. all ravens are black)

yet brotherhood (unsensed) would be a state in which all brothers find themselves (by definition)…

-Imp

Simple sensations are all that we need…

all that we need for what?

-Imp

Thanks Imp

But this is not what Russell means, i think. He means that we become aquainted with universals through sense experience.

He says we are aquainted with the properties through the sense data. But “brotherhood” is no sense datum. I have problems with this.

In practice, would my perception of a table go something like this:

  1. I directly apprehend a rectangular shape, brown, smooth etc.
  2. I become aquainted with the universal “table”
  3. Therefore i percieve that this rectangular, brown shape in front of me is a table?

Or do we never know the property of “being a table” but define table as that we know through sense experience - ie. bronwness, hardness, smoothness…?

Just trying to find out what Russell means.

You suggest that simple sensations are inadequate in some respect. I’m simply saying that they’re not.

This is Russell Means:

-Imp

extrapolating universals from a few instances is inadequate…

stereotyping or science… both make the same mistake…

-Imp

Then what, according to Russell (realism), is it that i am aquainted with? Browness and squareness?

Yep, but i guess Russell takes the realist position. I don’t know, however, what it is exactly that i am aquainted with, according to him.

If i can know what brotherhood is, must i not be aquainted with it? Otherwise, it would seem i would know that to by description.

:slight_smile:

-Imp

Again, simple sensations are adequate (to develop knowledge of a thing).

But then we run into the problems mentioned… perceptual relativism…

What then justifies my perception that i am seeing for example a table?

How can i know any physical object at all?

Yes, i know that 1+1=2 and that modus ponens is necessarily true. Experience “awakened” me to the truths of maths and logic. The alternative to not knowing those are absolute skepticism.

but how could one be skeptical of there being absolutely no absolutes?

-Imp

We’ll just have to disagree on that point then.

Then logic and maths are contingent, according to you. Thus there are no necessarily true/false arguments.

You intuitively grasp the truths of logic from certain experiences. However, additional experience does not serve to further validate them.

Why not? Logic is contingent, it seems.

-GH

logic is a game of definitions never appearing in the empirical world, nothing more…

-Imp

Maybe the later Russell, but not the earlier.

However, additional experience does not serve to further validate them.

  1. Logic cannot be demonstrated without using logic
  2. Since there is no absolute logic anyway, i cannot demonstrate anything
  3. If you deny that logic is self-evident, nothing i can do to convince yo otherwise

Well, then it is possible to be absolutely sure that there are no absolutes.

absolutely :slight_smile:

-Imp

About logic…

they are never validated

I thought about this. Consider the following experiment. Let’s say i believe that if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C then A must necessarily be bigger than C.

Then i try it out. I put three rocks of differing size next to each other and realize that the formula applies to reality! Voila. logic validated!

Well, we then see these patterns everywhere and realize that they must apply to reality, othewise everything would be absurd.

Solved :slight_smile:

Does this have something to do with the de re/de dicto distinction? I think I read something about that once…