In the early 1900s, Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein originated an idea called “logical atomism”. Briefly, the idea claims that in logic, there are irreducable concepts, or “atoms”.
Any opinions? What consequences would this theory have if it were true or false?
Did they give examples of such concepts?
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_atomism
even wittgenstein changed his mind about this…
language deconstructs itself…
-Imp
Because Russell and Wittgenstein disagreed about the nature of these atoms, there isn’t a universally accepted example. But you can imagine it working loosely like this.
If I say “the movie was good, and the popcorn was cheap”, you can reasonably say that the sentence can be broken down into “the movie was good” together with “the popcorn was cheap”. But you can’t break down those sentences in the same way; so maybe “the movie is good” is a logical atom.
That’s an imprecise example, of course, but you get the general idea.
Imp:
It’s true that Wittgenstein eventually rejected the idea, but that doesn’t at all mean that it’s not true. Russell, after all, embraced it, and philosophers still analyze the subject today.
What do you think of Langford’s work on analysis, Twif? I assume you don’t accept the paradox in Moore’s thinking?
Langford’s work - are you talking about conjoining 3-dimensionalism and counterpart theory? Or occasional identity? I think counterpart theory is a bullshit way to avoid making a precise definition of identity, and just increases the confusion inherent in the discussion; but I think (although Stone makes a reasonable case against this) you can still make a good case for 3-Dism being compatible with CT, especially if you appeal to occasional identity, which itself seems more like a practically defensible position rather than a fundamentally correct one. At any rate, I have no idea if this is the work on analysis that you were talking about, or not.
I certainly don’t accept Moore’s paradox. Do you? If you say “it’s raining outside but I don’t believe it’s raining”, then if you make the very natural assumption that me saying “it’s raining” implies that I believe it’s raining, you get a contradiction. It’s an inconsistent statement, if you accept that natural implication. But it’s easy for people to utter inconsistent statements. “I am fat and I am not fat.” I don’t think the issue goes beyond the fact that people can utter inconsistent statements. The question of to what extent (if any) people can believe directly inconsistent statements is another question altogether, and a much more interesting one, I think.
Thoughts? Opinions?
No, on both accounts - im referring to Langfords work on the Notion of analysis in Moore’s Philosophy and then the paradox of analysis, as identified by langford in Moore’s work.
If you want some considered thoughts on this subject I would be happy to send you a paper I wrote on the role of conceptual analysis in philosophy. It’s specific, dull, and dry but might be interesting.