Mitigated Skepticism & Working Hypotheses

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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Classic skeptics arrived at the conclusion that, for nearly every belief held by a people, there are people elsewhere who believe the opposite. Furthermore, the arguments in affirmation of those respective beliefs are generally just as good/valid on both sides. So, as believed by Pyrrho, the best an individual can do is go by things as they appear to him. However, one must also keep in mind that appearances are often deceptive, so one should never assume the truth of one explanation over another. That kind of complicated the view of ‘truth’ and ‘certainty’ held by philosophers from that point in history on. Thus, skeptics focused on going with the flow, so to speak, of the customs and practices which prevail in their most immediate circumstances.

This eventually led to the ever-so-popular view (which became most widely acknowledged in modern times) that certainty could never be truly available to us, especially at the level of argument, demonstration, and/or proof. All a valid argument can really prove is that its conclusions follow from its premises, which is not necessarily the same as proving that the conclusions are actually true to reality. This was taken yet even further with the conclusion that every ‘proof’ rests on unproven premises. Every proof begins with an “if” statement, which essentially begs the question, as its premise is assumed.

That is to say, for example, that given the argument – If P is true then Q must be true – the question of whether P is actually true or not is left wide open.

This is not to say that some beliefs cannot be determined to have better, or more solid, grounds than others, but proving such can be a tricky endeavor.

My argumentt here is that not all premises must, necessarily, beg the question of their own truth. That is, more specifically, in cases in which the premise is formulated from very basic experience, or sensory perception. For instance, I can say that if nourishment of the body is necessary for persistance, then it must be true that animals need food and water to stay alive. Although this premise does beg the question to some degree, the answer to that question seems obvious. One can go anywhere, or observe the habits of any animal, to find the truth in this premise. Therefore, to me, it seems as though the only self-affirming premise is one of basic sensory perception. Something that one can observe and deduce in natural reality without effort. The only pitfall, as far as I can tell, is an instance in which the senses of an observer are impaired; making a naturally effortless observation something far more difficult to explain. So, a skeptic must still remain skeptical by the same merit, given the chance of a deviation from the norm.

This is kind of where Hume comes in and refines the idea of the skeptic by asserting that, in order to live, we all remain in a perpetual state of decision making that forces us to form judgements about the way things are, whether we like/acknowledge it or not. Being that we have already concluded certainty to be unavailable, or elusive at the very least, Hume went on to agree that we must make the best assessments we can of the immediate realities we face, respectively. Thus, on an individual level, absolute, or “equal opportunity”, skepticism cannot exist. And, furthermore, such a view of skepticism is impractical. Therefore, as Hume put it, our skepticism must be mitigated. In other words, as our beliefs pertain to reality, our skepticism must remain at a middle ground between demanding a degree of certainty that we can never attain and treating all possibilities as if they were equally true.

This focus on one’s immediate circumstances, or reality, in conjunction with Hume’s mitigated skepticism, seems to me the initial grounds for forming a “woking hypothesis” by which an individual can live. In other words, some basic assumptions must be made in order for us to reach any further conclusions about reality–

  1. Our beliefs pertaining to reality must have a greater focus on our immediate circumstances, or direct experiences, rather than an attempted overall grasp of all possibilities.

  2. Perception will simply not allow all possible alternatives to be regarded with equal skepticism.

  3. Logic does not necessarily communicate truth, but, rather, systematically analyzes that which we already consider truth.

  4. The most basic foundation, or proof, of truth is direct experience, whereas the most basic foundation of logic is the assumption that certain experiences hold true regardless of circumstances.

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What effect would it have if we accepted the present imposed reality as the only one true reality and we looked for ultimate happiness and certainty therein?

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Certainty is available to all of us, and practised by all of us. There’s no watertight justification of certainty, though. But what is justification, in the philosophical sense? It’s the method by which we ensure we’re certain that a given stance is applicable. So you end up in a vicious circle of escalating metacertainties - since “certain of X” is not identical in meaning if recursive, you go off on a wild goose chase.

At a certain point, it makes no sense to ask for further justification, though. If I can’t say for definite that two plus two equals four, or that I am holding my hand in front of my face, what possible justification could there be that is more believable and valid than the bare fact?

You still only have inductive evidence for it, you’re vulnerable to black swans. Some organisms go without food and water; depending on your definition, some go without food or water. How basic and raw do we have to describe our sensory perceptions? We can hear a bell ringing off to our right, and we certainly hear that, but there may not be a bell; having placed the sound and location, though, our concepts are formed. You can say “I see a red ball” where what you see is a red circle in each eye that your brain resolves to a ball; there needn’t be a ball there. Stereoscopic images make our brains think we see all sorts of 3-D objects when we’re looking at flat pictures. Optical illusions can cast doubt on our certainty. Our perceptions are processed before we conceptualise and “perceive” them mentally, there is no given. So, I disagree that sensory perception per se is a raw, certain source of information about the world - we fit it into constructs.

Having said that, for some perceptions, the ones that tell us about ourselves rather than the world around us, it can be so. We can be certain we feel pain - it doesn’t make sense to say “I’m not sure if I’m in agony or not”. How do you tell? Then again, proprioception tells us about ourselves and can mislead us. Difficult.

Then we could not talk anyone out of a delusion by appealing to common sense or reality, yet this can happen. Truth is already abstracted from sensory perception - truth is applied to statements, not qualia. Statements fit inside a constructed world of shared assumptions; this is the working hypothesis - for language, part personal, part social and cultural. Just like all mathematics relies on unproven axioms as a working hypothesis, a starting point.

I don’t think there is anything wrong with axioms, as long as they are open to challenge and change. We don’t need a deeper certainty than that about which we are content to be certain; we can’t have a deeper certainty than that which we are prepared to accept as justification.

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Here’s an interesting toe-in-the-water of another very important psychological factor of certainty: our self identity.

http://www.slate.com/id/2255105/

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Humean,

Thanks for the reply. You were actually one of the folks I was hoping would take the time to read and respond, so I appreciate the feedback.

I’m not sure I would define justification, in a philosophical sense, as a verification of certainty. I look at it as more of a compelling piece of evidence than anything, but that may just be my subjective take. So, by the same token, I wouldn’t say certainty is available to us, so much as it is created by us. However, I would agree that it is practiced by us for practical purposes. That is to say, I think we accept particulars as if certain for some practical purpose, or practice.

This is what I was getting at actually. Even if not absolutely “certain”, beyond any doubt, it is in your best interest to make a judgment call based on your circumstances and experiences. So, for example, if I believe I am competent in discerning where my hands are, and my ability to perceive my hand is not being hindered, I’d think it a safe bet to accept my hand in front of my face as fact. I’m just not sure that there exist any absolute, universal “bare facts”. But trusting my perception in such a case would be far more practical than me doubting myself into madness.

To be clear, I’m not attempting to claim sensory perception is raw, certain information by any means. The senses themselves are often deceptive or illusory. I was just using sensory perception, in the context of direct experience, as an example of a provable premise. Though, the means by which a premise may seem self-affirming to one may be useless to another. That is why I mentioned that impairment of the senses, for example, can keep the skeptic skeptical – there is always a standard deviation. I think that is similar to the “black swan” idea you mentioned (honestly not sure what that means). My point was that some perceived practices are perceptible without conscious effort, by a majority. So, in terms of practicality, I think some premises can be rightfully assumed. That is, some premises need no further dissection because a majority perceive and/or experience them frequently and effortlessly, yet likely also realize there can be exceptions. I think my example may have derailed my point because I used “animals” where I should have used “human beings”.

For example, I can say the following: If shoes protect feet, I can use them to reduce damage caused by walking.

Shoes protect feet, that is what they do. This seems obvious enough to me that I need not question it any further, yet I understand that there could likely be some exceptions (ex. shoes wouldn’t make much difference if I were wading in lava).

Agreed to a certain extent. I agree in that it is most practical to simply make the judgment call yourself – if you feel angry, chances are you might be angry. However, certainty is elusive in a psychological context. For example, your feelings of hate toward your girlfriends ex may be more accurately described as jealousy that manifests as anger and hate. In such a case you may feel certain that you hate the guy, but realize you have no reason to. Perhaps you don’t have any reason to be angry with him at all, you are just jealous that he has experienced the same level of intimacy with your girlfriend that you value so highly. If that were the case, it would make just as much sense to be equally as angry with your girlfriend, but that is not how these things often manifest. I’m just trying to clarify, so I hope I am not digging myself any deeper with faulty examples…

I’m not sure I follow you here. If I am convinced that I experienced my pet’s death, my stance could easily be swayed by someone showing me that same pet still alive. I said experience is the most basic foundation for truth, not the only influential factor in an overall truth. I agree with everything you say here except the first sentence. The constructed world you refer to is one built of shared assumptions based on shared experience. Beyond that, I think we are in agreement.

This is an excellent statement my friend. I agree completely. In fact, I am sort of confused as to why you think our opinions differ here.

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I can think of two possible outcomes worth mentioning–

  1. You might just find them, or realize they cannot be found.

  2. You will be sorely disappointed and confused upon realizing change is inevitable.

I’m not saying to accept the present imposed reality as your blueprint for the rest of your life, I’m saying that one should focus on his present circumstances so long as they are present and applicable.

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I think we agree; justification of certainty is simply giving criteria for what we call certain. But it’s begging the question; are we really certain that these criteria are watertight enough for absolute certainty? It’s a practical solution.

To be more explicit, I think the Cartesian certainty that (principally rationalist) philosophers seek is a pipe dream, confusing tautology for solid knowledge.

Until Europeans reached Australia, all swans were white. People were certain of it, there was no evidence to the contrary. While we’re still learning new things, we can only be certain of facts in very closed domains - say, tautologies, where we make the definitions that we then compare. What we assume is in most cases useful; as long as we remember it’s an assumption, rather than claim its eternal truth - as you say.

These are all useful thoughts, and self-analysis is important, but in the first case you are angry. Not reasonably certain you’re angry - if you feel angry, you’re angry. What’s the difference? How you deal with that anger, at least one way, is to examine the reasons behind it.

Shared experience, yes.

I’m not sure I do, I think I was agreeing and clarifying my point :slight_smile:

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Hume (skepticism) → Popper (falsifiability) → Putnam (predictive power).

The progression of science from a skeptical endeavor (Humean skepticism) to an instrumentalist (anti-skeptical) one is worth observing. As history has progressed, science has also become increasingly predictive. A lesson worth pondering.

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There’s no perception if there’s no perceiver. The so called perceiver comes into being as a projector of knowledge onto an object. The knowledge of the object creates the perceiver. So, where did the knowledge come from? If the knowledge was not originated by the perceiver, but rather the perceiver was created by an imposed reality to maintain the way things presently are, then who exactly is it that is trusting and doubting?

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Excellent. You were another that I was hoping would chime in…

That is actually a pretty interesting thought. I’ve recognized this kind of evolution in Science, but never really made the connection with skepticism like that. I suppose I just figured that the more scientific “laws” and “facts” we conjure up, the less room there is for skepticism. That’s one of the reasons I like Popper so much; he remained a skeptic when/where it was no longer the trend. Do you think this increasing predictability is a product of all the scientific conclusions we have gathered over history, or is it more due to a few big discoveries that were really onto something?

Great. But there is a perceiver in this case.

People perceive far before they have any knowledge to project. Infants perceive things for the first time, knowledge of that which is being perceived is not a requisite.

The ability to perceive creates the perceiver. Not sure what you’re trying to say here…

Perception. Experience.

…what?

Me.