I am a moral subjectivist. To me, values concern peoples’ feelings (desire, pleasure, displeasure, liking and disliking, etc.) toward the object of evaluation.
I believe that science can solve the “objective vs. subjective values†debate. The nature of values can be determined by scientifically investigating the conditions under which these values arise in childhood. If, as I believe, values arise in childhood as a result of the internalization of successive associations between certain value terms, certain behaviours and certain emotions, then values are necessarily subjective. Under this hypothesis, there are other methods to develop (or to come to realize) one’s values, such as verifying the consistency of one’s values (where “consistency†is considered a value), but this latter method must rely on the subjective nature of values and the “value foundations†created by internalization. Thus, moral discourse must not give the illusion that values are objective. Does anyone know of any scientific research done on the issue of the origins of values?
This hypothesis aside, I will argue my case by presenting the distinction between “belief†and “desireâ€.
To make a value judgement is to make a choice (or at least the illusion of a choice), to commit to that choice, to be happy when one or others live(s) up to that commitment and to feel sad when one or others fail(s) to live up to that commitment. This warrants calling value judgements desires.
Beliefs are of another nature, such as when I say “567+678=1245”, In no way do I want 567+678 to be 1245. I just accept it because it “makes senseâ€. If someone told me that 567+678=1243, or if I said this, and realized the error, I wouldn’t be mad or sad, I would simply correct the person or myself.
Values and beliefs interact: "In a supermarket, If you pick two apples, then you go to pay for those apples and the cashier charges you for three apples, your belief that you have picked two apples will make you disapprove of the price charged by the cashier.
However, one can’t infer from the description or explanation of a phenomenon, that the phenomenon in question is “good†or “badâ€. To continue using the above example: it’s only because you want to pay for what you buy (in this case 2 apples), that you will disapprove of the price charged, for I can imagine someone who would want, for some reason or another, to pay for more apples than he or she has actually picked. The belief that 1+1=2 can’t, in itself, account for your disapproval of the cashier’s behaviour. Nor can a brute fact like “250 million Amerindians died because of colonisation”, wholly account for your disapproval or approval of it.
In another order of ideas, I would like to mention some inconsistencies in the objectivist approach. I find it strange that the objectivist position requires that moral values such as “Killing is wrong” have no exceptions. Why not make such a statement impervious to exceptions by inserting it in a precise context. How would that undermine the objectivity of the more precise statement? Why struggle to follow a general rule like lying is wrong, instead of following more “realistic†context dependant rules. Since, the objectivist position seems routed in the “impression” (by analogy with the axioms of science) that moral values have on him (whether they are universally accepted or not is irrelevant to him for what goes for him goes for everyone), he must be honest with himself. Indeed, I see no necessary reason to restrict objectivity to general statements latent with obvious exceptions for a person. If someone who wants to kill your brother, asks you if he is in your home (and he is), would you tell him the truth? If you had to torture someone who planted a huge bomb in the centre of Manhattan, in order to find the bomb and diffuse it, would you refrain from doing so? If you had to kill a person in order to stop him from pushing a button that would set off that bomb, would you do so? I’m not saying that I am an objectivist, merely that a moral objectivist, since his or her position seems based on “intuitiveness” or “self-evidence”, can’t be consistent if he or she insists on claiming that general rules are objective, while at the same time being disatisfied, or struggling with these rules in some cases. If one responds that the objectivist position is based on general consensus, not individual impressions, I would reply that the “intuitive” consensus would seem to favor “context dependant rules”.
Are you a moral subjectivist or a moral objectivist? Why? Discuss.