I make an active, admittedly imperfect, effort to avoid dogma. I believe that all beliefs should be tentative and malleable to new information and assessment. However, that doesn’t mean that one shouldn’t take a tentative stand on certain issues. It also doesn’t mean that we can’t hold some tentative matters to be more or less solidly supported.
So, I decided to take a look at what positions I held that I assess as “most supported”. This would be the closest thing to dogma that I personally hold. In other words, the matters I am most reluctant to change, and which would require the most significant of information to convince me otherwise. And they are…
[i]1) There is one Truth.
No one knows Truth with perfection.
There are superior and inferior ways to approximate Truth.
Empirical evidence is a superior way to approximate Truth, mysticism inferior.
We are all interconnected - our happiness one.
To seek happiness is wise.
To confuse happiness with pleasure is unwise.
Pleasure and pain result from our focus, not our circumstance.
Empirical evidence is a superior way to approximate Truth, mysticism inferior."
What is your basis for #4? It seems to contradict #1 in that there is no empirical evidence that would cause you to conclude “There is one Truth”, at least as far as I know.
Let’s just jump to right where we know this leads: how do we know we’re not all brains in jars.
True, there is no single bit of empirical evidence that can tell us that the entire game isn’t an illusion to begine with. But, an ultimate and independent truth is one primal thing that I think we must accept as an axiom.
First, there is a consistency of experience under controlled conditions that all support the notion very strongly. So, if it is an illusion, then it’s a VERY well crafted one.
Secondly, we are forced from sheer practicality to accept #1 as an axiom. In other words, show me a nihilist who ever applied that philosophy to the creation of an invention that empowered us to do something practical in the world. Saying that we’re all brains in jars (or some equivalent) doesn’t leave us anywhere to go after that. This is why I consider these notions more akin to “brain boggling what if’s” that stoners tell each other while sharing a joint, rather than serious or useful philosophy.
Now, one might then point out how my #1 isn’t produced through empirical evidence, since this primal axiom cannot, even in principle, ever be proven in that way. This would seem to be at odds with #4, but let me point out that #4 doesn’t say that “empirical evidence is the one and only means by which we must ever accept anything philosophically”. It merely states that empirical evidence is “a superior means” of approximating Truth. Therefore, the logic of #4 does not require every other axiom to flow strictly from empirical evidence.
Having said that, I should like to make two caveats…
When conducting strict science, empirical evidence is a must, but philosophy (including the philosophy of science) is more broad, and necessarily must include things like my first axiom.
Even though I leave a window open for the primal axiom, in my view it is only open that much. In other words, we HAVE to take #1 out of sheer practicality, without direct empirical evidence, but preferrably no more than that.
Except for the absolute truth of ones own perceptions. The perceptions themselves, not what they represent.
Yes there are, and the best aproximate is the one that lead to the best results.
Sound logic, and empirical evidence as a significant part of that, seem to be the superior way.
That depends on what you are trying to say. There are no absolute connections between the happiness of one person and the next (that we know of, anyway). However, souround yourself with happy people, and you are more likely to be happy yourself. This is no absolute rule, just a general psychological phenomenon.
Happiness is pleasure, and I’m not confused. It’s only when you define pleasure to only contain, for instance, direct physical pleasure, that you can make this kind of distinction. If you define happiness as lasting and pleasure as for the moment, I can understand and agree with what you say. Lasting pleasure is what we should aim for – but that’s no reason not to enjoy the moment as well.
This statement is far to general to be an axiom. There are many circumstances that would provide you with immense physical pain, no matter what your focus would be. But I agree that focus is important, as a billionaire can live a misserable life while the poor man down the street may enjoy every second. However, with a sound philosophy, I would say that the rich man has a distinct advantage in the pursuit of pleasure.
“To seek happiness is wise”, “virtue and wisdom are synonomous”, “virtue results in happiness”. What you are essentially saying is that the search for happiness results in happiness and that the search for happiness is what virtue is. I would replace “happiness” with “pleasure”, as that to me is the more general term, and I would readily agree with you. That is unless you define “virtue” as something more, something externally defined and absolute – something I have yet to see any real good arguments for.
Thanks for the comments. You’re absolutely right in pointing out that the definitions of how I’m using these words depend greatly on their truth and applicability. So, each one of these could really be explained and debated with a great deal of detail.
In most of them, however, I’m using the words about how you might guess I am. For example, you’re pretty much onto what I’m distinguishing between when using the words happiness and pleasure, although I agree that some definitions of these two words overlap.
On the happiness being one, what I’m generally saying is that if you think you can be happy by pissing everyone around you off, then that’s going to come back and bite you in the ass. Not because of some mystic Karma, but simply because of how things work out when you’re living among other people.
Lastly, perhaps I use the word axiom losely here, but I’m not saying that each of these statements are true in every case, under every definition of the words they contain. Some of them are always true if one uses the definition I use, and others are true in a general overall sense. “Principles” might have been a better word.
It’s good we were able to reach an agreement as quickly as we were. I find that much philosophical disagreement is really just over terms and their definitions. I guess we lack a language precise enough to express ourselves concerning philosophical matters, without having to provide long definitions of the terms we use.
True. I think that analytical philosophy provides a valuable service in “getting down to the nitty gritty” so to speak. But sometimes it’s helpful to make some basic statements (just so long as we remember that the basic nature of them necessarily involved a level of crudity, and some presumption of intent is needed).
Without knowing what you mean by “Truth,” it’s hard to address your axioms.
By saying there is “one Truth,” are you saying there is but one universe? Or are you saying that there is one basic rule that determines what happens in the universe? Or are you saying that there is one set of propositions which perfectly describe all that exists? Or did you mean something else entirely?
If you could clarify what your first axiom means, I would appreciate it.
Depending on your answer, you may find some conflicts with your third axiom.
Your answer will also affect how we view your fourth axiom, as only then will it be clear what you mean when you say that empirical methods and mysticism are both methods capable of approximating the Truth, and that the former is more superior than the latter.
As for the fifth axiom, it seems to imply many notions which may be internally inconsistent. For, what is the relationship between the one and the whole of humanity? How is the happiness of the whole measured, and what role does the happiness of the individual play in such measurements?
Lastly, I have a slight issue with your eighth axiom. You say pleasure and pain are the result of focus, and not circumstance. I take it that you are not talking about instinctive responses, and that we might say you are talking about suffering and joy or, perhaps more abstractly, optimism and pessimism. Do you deny that there are circumstantial factors which influence our ability to be optimistic or pessimistic?
Depression is regarded as a pathological condition, and not simply a matter of focusing on sorrow or negativity. Furthermore, people with certain neurological conditions are simply unable to control their feelings. So, one’s feelings may very well not be above or beyond circumstantial factors. We might even say that focus is but one factor that influences our feelings, and that our feelings can also influence how and on what we focus. In this view, circumstance has a lot to say about our focus as well as our feelings.
It seems unwise to postulate an axiom which prematurely denies the validity of this perspective. This is especially so since it is not clear at all what your philosophical perspective gains by postulating such an axiom.
Hi Pragmatist, thanks for the response. I’m basically making an assertion of an objective reality independent of our perceptions (as opposed to pure post modernism/relativism). In other words, there REALLY is a moon and it REALLY has x mass, x volume, etc.
Yep, those are good questions worth addressing.
True. I’m not talking about physical instinctive pain, like being burned by fire, etc. But even here, I suppose one could control pain with enough willpower. Still, I’ll take that thought back so as to not detract from my main point, which is regarding suffering/joy etc.
There are circumstances which make maintaining our focus more or less challenging. But it would still be the case, that focus (regardless of how challenging it was to maintain it) is the ultimate matter as to suffering. Which would be the whole reason for trying hard to maintain focus in challenging circumstances something to strive for in the first place.
That’s a good point about neurological conditions, clinical depression, and the like. I’d qualify my line there by saying that, “assuming the brain is mechanically functioning normally…” Or perhaps, “…not our circumstances, unless those circumstances affect normal brain function.” In short, the advice is meant for regular people, not lunatics or madmen.
Hmm, ask Zeno of Citium, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurellius. Seems useful enough to me, despite the qualifications and details (something, by the way, which you are correct for pointing out are needed for deeper thought on these things).
I just want to comment that im so proud of celox… Good god, I know ive said this a bunch of times, but I love it that whenever I read celox’s posts I feel like im looking into a mirror. DT, you know me. Celox summed up all of my points. Great job celox!
In that case, my only qualm is that this notion prematurely dismisses the possibility that there are no definite states in nature. I would say, yes, there really is a moon, and it really has mass and volume. However, I would also say that what can be known about the moon is indefinite, and its mass, volume, location, etc., can only be defined approximately. Thus, it cannot be said to have an absolute existence. Knowledge of the world is probabilistic, and it always refers to future possibilities.
Perhaps it is your contention that this state of affairs is the result of limitations in human beings, and that the world really is definite, static and whatnot. You may be right, but I don’t think you are. Entities exist in so far as they interact, and they interact in so far as they change. The regularity we call “the moon” is real, yet it is composed of a constantly changing set of processes. What “the moon” is at any given moment in time depends on the frame of reference of whoever is observing it. The very notion of “time” depends on a frame of reference. Since there is no foundational, or essential, state of “the moon,” and since there is no single “correct” frame of reference, we cannot rightly say that the moon has a definite anything.
For this reason, I think your first axiom may unnecessarily limit your philosophy.
I basically agree with the rest of your response to my post. I want to address your fourth axiom, though, now that you’ve clarified the meaning of your first.
I agree that empirical science is quite valuable as far as approximating “the truth,” in the sense that we can use science to make approximate calculations and predictions about entities in the universe. What I wonder, though, is why you imply that mysticism offers an inferior method of approximation. I wouldn’t say that mysticism offers any explanatory or predictive powers. Perhaps I’m reading too much into your words. Perhaps you didn’t mean to credit mysticism with any unique explanatory or predictive powers. Can you explain?
See my #2 & #3, and compare bold words above and below…
How do you move from “we can only approximate truth” to “thus it cannot be said to have an absolute existence”??
It’s true that there is the possibility of an elaborate delusion of some sort, which ultimately foils all of our empirical observation. But Occam’s Razor and general common sense would suggest that this is not a possibility to be seriously entertained. For one, we could never know one way or the other, even in principle. Secondly, it leaves us with no practical avenues of action from there. So, out of practicality and just good sense, #1 is an appropriate and necessary axiom. The alternative is not real philosophy in my view - more like entertaining party conversation, not to be taken seriously – just an amusing “brain teaser†on par with debating who would win in a battle between Superman and Darth Vader.
This is a big problem with much of philosophy in my view, and one reason why it has moved from useful application in our lives to dusty book shelves in the backs of libraries: the tendency to get so entangled in linguistics, and analytics that one is rendered completely impotent to render useful or meaningful conceptions of the world.
It’s true that the word “moon†refers not to an exact and unchanging collection of phenomena. But what you are talking about here is merely the shortcomings of language. It should be understood that when I say “the moon” I am not talking about “that English word known as ‘moon’”, but rather a basic, simple, reference to the moon itself, with the assumed and mutually understood acceptance of the fact that there is a bit of a haze when one delves microscopically to the horizon of the definition. Any inaccuracies which would derive from the language would be understood and assumed, but that doesn’t change the fact that there are real physical phenomena and it is actually doing objective things, despite the imprecision of language. What you refer to here is nothing more than a word game.
I understand that many people enjoy tinkering with the peculiarities of language and symbolism, and what that means to our conceptions. This desire may lead them to think of these things as reflective of reality itself, and be emotionally resistant to a suggestion otherwise. But despite enthusiasm for these sorts of puzzles for many in philosophy, I think it still just boils down to word games. Philosophy is the love of wisdom (and by proclamation, knowledge) - not the love of linguistics alone.
In other words, to communicate anything meaningfully between persons, there comes a time where you have to just admit “you know what I meanâ€.
In my view, if philosophy is ever to be more than the playful contest of I.Q. between the scholarly elite, and made popular and applicable to real people’s lives as it once was, it must be rescued from this sort of convolution and overly elaborate linguistic gymnastics, and directed towards applicable matters of pragmatic reality again.
Actually, it is the lack of this axiom that would be limiting in my view. I know of no practical courses of action, ways of life, or inventions which have ever come out of post-modernist thinking. As I mentioned, it seems to me that once you abandon objective reality, you’re left with no practical place to go except to say, “far out dude” – quite limiting. It is the acceptance of the ultimate objectivity of nature which allows us to proceed in a fruitful manner, both scientifically and philosophically. And, what’s more, it is something even the relativists do despite their proclamations, as evident from their day to day behavior - another reason to not take subjectivism seriously.
Sure. I agree with you. It doesn’t seem to offer any valuable data at all, which is why I call it inferior. But I see your point. It’s like the difference between saying something is “bad art†and saying it isn’t art at all. However, I say it in this manner because people have indeed employed Mysticism as a means of gaining information about their surroundings (even though this is a complete mistake). And, to some degree they have succeeded only by coincidence. Therefore, it is within the subset of “methods used to gather information about the worldâ€. It is simply a very poor method with no effectiveness whatsoever, apart from blind luck.
This is just one of many ways of categorizing these things, and I can see how other manners may be more useful.
Thanks again – I think you make some really fascinating points worth thinking about, and I hope my dismissal of certain lines of thought isn’t taken as a dismissal of you or your comments personally. I may of course be wrong, and am open to any other responses you have.
“It’s true that there is the possibility of an elaborate delusion of some sort, which ultimately foils all of our empirical observation. But Occam’s Razor and general common sense would suggest that this is not a possibility to be seriously entertained.”
This is really a common misuse of “Ockham’s Razor” for he used his razor to establish two realms, that of reason and that of faith. Empirical observation, by Ockham, has nothing to do with the realm of faith. As a religious mystic, Ockham would also have disagreed with your axiom #4. The “mystical”, or what some philosophies have called the intuitional, would be key to understanding the absolute truth which you posit.
That’s interesting Dunamis. However, I happen to think that parsimony is a good sense principle in general reasoning overall, not just in the strict realm of science, even if that’s not what Occam thought.
" However, I happen to think that parsimony is a good sense principle in general reasoning overall"
Besides just thinking something is so for no reason at all, there is a bit of “truth” hidden in Ockham’s Razor. When looking into the relative problems of Empiricism, empirical data must rest on some kind of Faith, whether that be the “faith” of Hume’s habit and custom, or the faith of al-Ghazahi’s cause-enacting God, or the holism of Quine’s investigations. Given your axioms, Ockham’s razor leaves you with half missing. The intuition of wholeness that lies behind empirical fragmentation is that half. It wasn’t that Ockham didn’t cut enough categories out because he wasn’t insightful enough. The two dimensions persist to this day in philosophy.
I am not questioning the existence of reality. I am just providing a view of reality that is informed by the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. It’s not that the moon doesn’t exist apart from us; rather, it’s that the moon exists indefinitely–and this is so with or without us there to observe it. This has nothing to do with the shortcomings of language, except perhaps in so far as it may help us understand why language has shortcomings in the first place. In pointing this out I am not merely referring to a word game.
Also, I wouldn’t get too caught up in Dunamis’ notion of “faith.” His goal, apparently, is to blur the distinction between rational and irrational belief, and place religion and science on an equal epistemological footing. I’m sure his heart’s in the right place. I just can’t see the sense in claiming that one needs faith to have science. Sure, one needs to make assumptions. But there’s a difference between, on the one hand, making assumptions in an attempt to learn more about nature, and, on the other hand, maintaining a set of irrational beliefs.
Also, I strongly question his decision to limit the legitimate usage of the phrase “Ockam’s Razor” to specific references to Ockam’s philosophy. The Razor was not Ockam’s to begin with, and its use as a tool is not defined by the specifics of his philosophy. The Razor simply states that one must not multiply entities beyond necessity. One need not study Ockam’s own philosophy to understand and properly use this tool.
If you, or anyone else, would like take up Pragmatist’s arguments, I’d be glad to discuss them. It is only that I have experienced the persona of Pragmatist himself to have an unrealistic grip upon his own rationality. Never fruitful is any in depth discussion with him.
Ah, now that you bring QM into it, I think I know what you’re getting at. If we can similarly say that a “particle” exists indefinitely, that’s ok with me. And since matter is also a wave function, then we might say the same for the moon (although the indefiniteness of it is considerably shorter). I’m ok with this sort of notion, but then the “indefinite wave function, operating in a definite way” would be the Truth I refer to. Maybe I mistake you though.
Yes, I’ve seen this tactic before. When we say “faith” this is usually a word with several meanings. Therefore I like to differentiate between “confidence” (belief because of the evidence), and “faith” (belief without or despite the evidence).
I would also note the example of a robot. Suppose you build a robot that can scan its environment, create an internal map, and then construct movement directions according to that map. Would this robot operate on faith when it turned at a wall? To call this faith seems quite silly to me and blurs the definition to a degree that renders it meaningless. All “belief” is not faith, but rather, faith is a subset - one type of belief (or means of reaching a belief), which I suspect you’d agree.
But then we have the issue of the base assumption that we are not victims of a grand deceiver’s elaborate “matrix”. As I’ve pointed out to Dunamis, this is the one primal assumption we must make in order to operate in the world. Of course, by definition, this primal assumption cannot be proven or disproven empirically. So, by my distinction between “faith” and “confidence” above, it would indeed seem to be an article of faith. Even if so, I would say this is the one and only rational instance where faith would be called for.
However, even this is dubious, for it seems misleading to consider this faith. It is not really a belief of conviction, but rather a belief we are forced into by circumstance. Let’s say I hold a gun to your head and say, “I have a quarter in my pocket. It is either in my left or right. Tell me now which pocket it’s in and if you’re wrong I’ll blow your brains out.” Now, having no information, we’re forced into just picking left or right. When we say we’ll go with “left”, is this a statement of faith or simply a position taken out of necessity? I would say that the primal assumption of objectivity is along these lines.
Perhaps a better analogy would be this…
We come to a fork in a tunnel. We know for a fact that the righthand path will lead to a dragon. But we don’t know what’s down the left. We must proceed forward either direction because the cave is collapsing behind us. So, obviously we choose the path to our left.
So is this an act of faith? Implicit in our selection of the path was the notion that it was more favorable than a dragon. But we have no evidence of this at all. The left path could very well lead to five dragons and a hellish demon! But when we know that the path to the right results in death, then it’s best to take our chances with the left path. This is not faith because it’s not like we have a definite conviction that the left path is better, but rather, it is taking the only rational option available.
Similarly, when we have the option of assuming everything is an illusion and the option of assuming it is objective, there is no way to have empirical evidence on the matter. But we can see that the former would not allow us any means of moving forward or accomplishing anything. We would wallow around aimlessly, and eventually suffer for our outlook, even if the suffering were mere illusion. So we choose to accept objectivity out of practicality. This, like the cave example, is not faith if the word is to have any real meaning to it. I would guess you agree with this, but I’m really writing to everyone here.
So uncertainty is better than certainly. That is how I read it, but I suspect that was not your intention.
Whenever we choose to live, then we choose to accept uncertainty. If we travelers in the cave stop making choices then the collapsing cave will certainly kill us. Likewise if we more towards certain danger we will certainly perish. Only by accepting uncertainty can we experience more life and more choices. The only thing that is 100% certain is death.
