Necessitarianism?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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Does everything that exists exist the way it does by necessity? It seems obvious to me that it does, but that meets with a lot of contention. Of course we can think of things as being different, but it only seems possible in light of our ignorance of the other necessary conditions for that to be the case. If we live in a causal universe, and I would assert that we do(that there is consitency in the events of the universe such that events are not isolated, and are in fact quite regular), then the requirements of some seemingly mundane difference (such as the location of a piece of paper on a table being 4 inches north of its actual position) would stretch back as far as the causal chain (whatever we take that to mean).
Spinoza makes the argument in the first part of his Ethics, by appealing to God’s nature (But Spinoza’s god is so impersonal that, despite constant appeals to God, he has been called an atheist). In order for the world to be different, “God’s nature”, i.e. the nature of the world, would have to be different. But since God is necessarily the way it is, this would be absurd.
I would take a different approach and say that the current conditions of the universe and our knowledge of the regularities of the universe are enough to show that things couldn’t be otherwise, simply because it doesn’t make sense to assert that they could be otherwise: in what sense could I be sitting on the other side of the room? Logically it seems possible, and may even be logically possible given our present knowledge of all the varibles that resulted in me sitting where I do. But With full knowledge, there was no other way that it could have been otherwise (even ad hocs like positing the existence of parallel worlds does not change the fact that the world in which I am typing this, sat here as I am, must be the way that it is). Probability, as we perceive it, is also a result of our ignorance: were we to know all the variables on a die, we could predict with certainty its result.

Obviously, this idea is difficult to express, and very difficult to support. But I think it is evidently true, and that refutations of it must appeal to our ignorance. But ultimately, something must be the case, and we have good reason to believe that that something happens for a reason. As we learn more of the variables involved, and the reasons behind them, we can better predict outcomes. As knowledge of these tends towards completeness, accuracy of prediction tends towards 1.

And if we accept necessitarianism, then every aspect of existence is in some sense the ultimate truth of the world, and attempts to find out an ultimate truth are really just attempts to find patterns or consistencies in the ultimate truth.

Any thoughts?

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one question…

if man is the measure, i.e. it is humans who quantify and describe, label and categorize, differentiate and such, how do we know that it isn’t our facility for judgment and measuring that is suspect? does the universe exist the way it does, because the universe actually exists that way? or do we judge the universe to exist the way it does because we can judge it in no other way? this gets back to the problem with the cartesian judgment of that which is sensed (the groundwork for kant’s thing in itself).

if one makes the distinction, what is the basis for that leap of faith?

-Imp

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Tell me how you are looking and I’ll tell you what you’ll find - Wittgenstein

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Obviously not. Consider the QWERTY phenomenon, that has become the standard for our keyboards. Some things are just historical happenstances, not necessity. What you are proposing is actualism, and it is completely seperate from the determinism/indeterminism arguement. Even if determinism is true(which I am inclined to believe) does not mean that such things as the colour of the american flag are necessity’s, or that given another run around we would hit upon the same configuration.

Don’t confuse necessary with sufficient conditions. Kripke’s possible worlds is a strong tool for any philosopher, and I’ll submit to you my opinion that if you truely do except actualism, then you might as well turn your intellectual energies to smoking crack, and watching re-runs of day’s of our lives.

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If determinism is true and the universe started again under identical circumstances, everything would unfold in entirely the same way, because the entire world presumably works in a predictable (pre-determinable), perfectly orderly way. But then I’m inclined to believe determinism isn’t true.

In fact, I don’t think I understand how this (necessitarianism) is different from determinism: What exactly do you mean by ‘necessity’? Is it more along the lines of determinism, but with an idea of purpose or motivation as well?

What if that which we are ignorant of is that there truly is no order? I’m not saying that I support the idea, but you’re looking at the universe, seeing patterns, and assuming they’re real without knowing them in their entirety. As I see it, all philosophy appeals to our ignorance, or rather our desire to be reconciled with it.

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But we are part of the universe. I suppose I should make explicit that I’m working within a scientific worldview, and as such humans are but complicated machines. So if the universe can only be the way it is, so too can we only judge it to be in the way that we judge it to be. The way we experience the universe is part of the causal chain.

As AA said, if the universe is deterministic, identical starting conditions should produce identical results, right down to “QWERTY phenomenon”. They seem trivial, but I suppose that’s the impact of what I’m trying to support: that stupid things like the pattern of the leaves outside right now is the only way it could be right now.

By necessity, I mean to say that everything that is now is exactly the only way that it can be at this instant. I think it is different from determinism in that determinism is a theory that is limited to mind, while necessitarianism extends to everything.

This line of argument simply destroys too much. We end up as isolated minds, hardly even sure that we exist at all, and discussion stops. I can’t deny this kind of scenario, because I don’t think I can prove undoubtedly anything that I believe; these apocalypse scenarios are just that, and they kill all possible discourse on any matter, including any discourse that could lead to a solution to them. As such, I can’t act at all unless I ignore them. And once I do that, I do seem justified. The universe does seem to have patterns. A certain logic does seem to hold. So while I’ll grant your point, in doing so I’ll be ignoring it completely, and if you accept my concession you’ll be doing the same, and the world will make some sort of sense to both of us, and we’ll continue to consider whether the world could be otherwise.
I still don’t think it could.

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within a “scientific” world view? the one that relies on the faith that the future will resemble the past? and which causal chain would that be? the one with no beginning?

being “part of the universe” grants our judging facilities no special priviledge…

and I think you missed the point of the question… we only have access to the judgment of the experience… we don’t have the external “object” of experience itself…

-Imp

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Imp,

Since I’m in a nit picking mood I’ll point at that if we’re being really strict you should have said that we have no idea whether or not we have the external object of experience. It is of course possible that the judgement of the experience and the object of the experience are identical, but we’d never know that as it happened, or at least cannot demonstrate it…

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fair enough…

now please leave my nits alone

:smiley:

-Imp

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:smiley:

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Carleas,

I’m sorry, I was intending to post something of greater value, but I find that it is impossible for me to do so, being the confused little mind that I am.

I have read your two posts several times through, and I still cannot detach the strong point that gives your exposition a direction and holds the arguments together. In other words, I cannot imagine what you’re trying to get at - your final conclusion, your quod erat demonstrandum, so that I may be able to retrace your line of thoughts and get a good grasp on your idea. Is it because of my lack of insight or your loose formulation ? We’ll let others be the judge of that.

First of all, your view of ‘necessitarianism’.

To put my self in your shoes, I would have to believe that all phenomena that take place have sense only in the light that they are necessarily occurring within a known or, at least, established set of laws. That is to say that every thing taking place at any given time is so because it was required for it to be just as it is and in no other way. Why, the mere occurence of a phenomenon is proof that there was no other option in store for it at that time, and the universe itself stands clear of any doubt regarding its possible identities. Furthermore, you affirm that every effect has a cause inherent to it (“If we live in a causal universe, and I would assert that we do”), and that similar causes would produce similar effects.

So far, so good. Nothing new here. What ails me, in fact, is the distinction you make between ‘determinism’ and ‘necessitarianism’. What’s the point here ? Do you come with something new ?

Hold on a bit there. Determinism limited to mind ? And necessitarianism not ? Am I missing out on something ?

Help me read between the lines here. You are assuming that determinism deals only with phenomena, things as objects of our experience, while necessitarianism admits the world as it is in itself, in order to assume its existence at a time being as result of necessity ? Do you assume that the human mind can know more than it is offered to it from experience ? If not, what exactly is the difference between necessitarianism and determinism ?

Moving on, you believe that a Laplace’s demon type of creature could predict the future of any fact taking place in the universe with practically no error margin. I agree, but with the mention that this is possible, again, only in the case of the world as object of possible experience. I hope you are are aware that with his logical apparatus, man can very well prove that the series of antinomies concerning the possibility of free decisions or the existence of a necessary being among the string of causes can be equally valid among themselves, thus requiring a more critical approach on the very faculty of knowing and judging things, rather than the continual grinding of contrasting oppinions.

My question stands whether your necessitarianism is in any way distinct from determinism, because I, personally, cannot think it in no other way. Somewhere else, you ascribe behavioural traits to the same necessity of causes, which takes you one step closer to fatalism. So, might I add, do you refute any trace of freedom in individual actions ? Does the knowledge of the world that you extoll imply no inevitable remainder whatsoever?

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Hi Carleas

I agree with your view of necessity. In fact building on it, I believe that Creation itself was an act of necessity. Determinism or what is determined within creation is also necessary. Creation then is a machine initiated by consciousness providing the results through the lawful interaction of the universal laws of determination in response to what is necessary.

Determinism as we know it is unconscious reaction in that its effects are mechanical. This raises the interesting question of consciousness as it relates to determinism. The amount of mechanical laws of determinism can be lessened through a gradual consciousness of them. The greater the consciousness, the less amount of deterministic laws a person is governed by. Through consciousness then, determinism exists but at a different and higher level of quality reflecting the inner freedom and purposeful norm responsive to necessity of a more conscious being within the relative scale of “being” itself that separates absolute unity and complete diversity or the aspects of God and God.

From this perspective,the objective goal of Man is to become conscious.

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That still seems to be determinism to me, although there are certainly different views that fall under that heading. My understanding of determinism is that it postulates that humans are just as much a part of the causal chain as stars and leaves; free will, in the sense of being able to choose on the basis of awareness that is separate from the environment, does not fit into determinism, because ‘choices’ are dependent on mechanical, causal relationships, so there is not an entity that really makes the choice. Perhaps it is for this reason that I do not believe in determinism–I do think that a good deal of the universe fits into a causal chain, just not all of it.

I think the term for what I base purpose on is best described as ‘permanence,’ and even if everything within the universe depended on predeterminable relationships, those relationships themselves would have to be permanent. But something that is permanent cannot have a basis–there would have been nothing in the causal chain to initiate it–and so determinism cannot apply to the whole of the universe, and contradicts itself, because the rules that would make the universe determinable would exist outside the causal chain.

My point certainly wasn’t to push you to accept a complete absence of purpose, but quite to the contrary, it was to display that an irrational direction based in ignorance is, in fact, the most logical foundation for a conclusion about the nature of everything. To do otherwise would be to assert that there wasn’t a purpose, an assertion which, by its very nature, has no purpose.

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My point was that this is no point. Regardless of the status of external objects and their relation to our mind, my argument is that they could not be otherwise. Even if we are some sort of deceived brains-in-vats, the experiences we are being fed could not be fed otherwise. As I see it, this depends as little as an argument can on external observation. To push its independence further would be to go to far, and, as I said in my response to AA, to end discours entirely. I don’t deny the option, but rather its usefulness.

My understanding of determinism is that it is a response to free will, or an argument in that specific debate. The confusion stems, I think, from the fact that determinism is within the umbrella of necessitarianism. Necessitarianism is just the extreme view of determinism.
Let me try a different tack. People often refer to other worlds and contrapositives both in philosophy and daily life. My point is that these claims are always either true, in that they are impossible(because because in logic, anything follows from a contradiction: if I take (A & ~A) to be true, I can truly conclude anything.). “If I weren’t enrolled in college, I would have a day job.” My argument is that the context necessary for this contrapositive to be true would change the universe down to its core, down to something that is so true that to suggest otherwise would be contradictory. Because of the relation between this necessary truth and the world as we experience it, to suggest that the world could be otherwise is also to make a contradiction. I think this is a stronger claim than determinism.

Whether or not this is a problem for determinism, it is exactly what necessitarianism would indicate. In this there is a fundamental, unalterably true thing that governs the causal chain. Because a difference in the causal chain would require a difference in something that is fundamentally true and unalterable, it is impossible that something could be different from the way it is.
I think this is my best exposition of what I’m trying to say.

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I agree. Although what you believe those unifying, permanent principles are can fundamentaly effect what your philosophy is.

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Yes, you are both right of course. In a narrow, hard determinism view, then if the universe started out at the exact same configuration then, everything would unfold the exactly the same way.

My compatabolist colours shined through here, where I didn’t even attempt to explain myself. I simply believe that a view of hard determinism isn’t worth much. I’ll give you all that if hard determinism is true you are right, yet we can never prove such a thing, and pseudorandomness is just as good, as actual randomness. We can’t tell the difference.

Some things are a necessity, such as the laws of physics. Some things are historical happenstances, they could just go either way. Was it necessary for Turing to have created his thought experiment in order for us to create the computer? OR was it merely sufficient, and if Turing had not been around may some one else have sparked the computer age?

I used to think very much along the lines of a hard determinist, for many years, until I read Dennett’s freedom evolves, I was then persuaded otherwise.
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I agree that we experience the world as though we were free (I think that’s why the idea of freedom of the will exists), but I also think we can deduce that hard determinism holds and that historical happen stance only seems to be happenstance because we are largely ignorant to the variables involved. I don’t see a conflict between compatiblism and hard determinism.