Nietzsche Studies:

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1

“WHO is it really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this “Will to Truth” in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will— until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?” -Nietzsche, Friedrich (2014-08-26). Beyond Good and Evil (Illustrated) (p. 5). . Kindle Edition.

This can be seen as being at the foundation of one the most telling points of the Deleuze’s Image of Thought: this notion that humans (or human thought (naturally seeks “the truth”. But all one need do is look at the weird, random, and repetitive nature of thought to recognize it as these kind of bodily expressions, the grunts and silences in the meat of the brain translated into words and images, and the evolutionary product of the body’s engagement with its environment. Nietzsche later goes on to connect Deleuze’s agenda with that of Rorty’s pragmatism:

“As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is “being-conscious” OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life.”

Then:

“The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely IMAGINED world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live— that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life.”

Here we see the convenience of taking on the materialist perspective (that is while not being committed to it: it says nothing about the possibility of free will or rather participation (for the sake of an agenda that I believe both Deleuze and Rorty share: that of seeing ourselves as nodes in a vast and complex system of exchange: discourse (an exchange of energy without the blockages of dogma.

2

What is that which is directing though? If not us and something out there is driving everything, then we should be able to deduce a purpose, and yet there is none, there is nothing else out there making effect which would be measurable. This leaves us only with randomness as opposed to some imagined ‘force’ acting upon everything. The will to power is nothing in us and nothing outside of us, unless we can state what that something is, which we cannot. Its a self defeating argument imho.

3

The will to power consists mainly of unconscious or instinctive material, the accumulation of millions of years of learning, which for the most part have become auto-reflexive and mechanistic.

4

Sure, but it has no basis ~ there isn’t anything there guiding it as like the supposed Nietzschean ‘force’. Evolution has no design nor purpose behind it, it just happens at random and adapts to environments. instincts therefore are ultimately valueless.

5

But Amorphos , can not such purposeless forces be channelled and directed by the same will?

6

“As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is “being-conscious” OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life.” –from Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil

Here we see the role that resonance and seduction plays in philosophy. Of course, those of a more analytic persuasion (those who lean towards the more scientific side of the science/literature no-man’s land that philosophy inhabits), would scoff at this. They would boldly claim that they have found a method that shuts out the human/subjective element. Yet, for all their claims to objectivity, the anal retentive disposition that led them to seek such a mathematical and orderly precision appears to be a complete blind-spot to them. They act as if, in their desire to be “above the common fray”, they somehow started out neutral, then checked out all the facts before deciding what intellectual process to pursue. And if they are lying to themselves, how can we take their word for it?

It is this supposed above-the-common-fray fancy that underlies the so-called political independent in America. We have to ask: what exactly does it mean to be an independent? You don’t know what policies you support? Or do you not know what party furthers those policies? I can only think here of an interview with Bill O’Reilly during an election in which he claimed to “have not made up his mind yet”. Of course, anyone that knows O’Reilly (including himself) knows perfectly well that he would not even think of voting for a democrat.

What Nietzsche was prying under was common doxa: socially programmed responses to socially programmed cues. We are indoctrinated, from the moment we find ourselves being absorbed into the symbolic order, with the idea that all thought can only find its worth in the higher principles imposed upon it by the elite: those who represent the best and brightest of civilization and the technology it has blessed us with. And this we can trace back to Plato who was born at a time when mankind was just crawling out of the muck. This led to the assumption: nature bad; civilization good. Hence the hierarchy that put the body at bottom and the mind at top. Hence that which put the true and authentic (such bold words!) over the copy. Hence that which put the technology of logic and science over basic human experience.

But we know better. For all their bold claims, we know perfectly well that by the time we (all of us) enter the intellectual process (commit our lives to it) our biases (our wiring even) are pretty much established. Beyond that, all there is is what we do to back it and our fumbling attempts to assimilate those who don’t think like us.

7

orbie

If there were such ‘forces’ perhaps, but they are either external or internal, and i don’t see how you can change external forces, you can only modify your thoughts and behaviours relative to them [thus they not the force driving the [internal] instincts]. If internal then there is no such force, if external then its not a force you possess ~ will to power is not yours to command.

I am not entirely adverse to the idea of the force, in that eternity is always there and its presence would i think be having a >global< and unmeasurable ‘effect’. Yet it contains no particulars which for me is better, ~ rather than being driven by the force, it is completely open, it takes no gives direction. Ergo isn’t really a force. For me its the seat of our subjectivity and that is where we truly have freedom to choose input. I find that idea far more freeing than that of a force directing the will via instincts.

_

8

Me: Here we see the convenience of taking on the materialist perspective (that is while not being committed to it: it says nothing about the possibility of free will or rather participation (for the sake of an agenda that I believe both Deleuze and Rorty share: that of seeing ourselves as nodes in a vast and complex system of exchange: discourse (an exchange of energy without the blockages of dogma.

Amorphos: What is that which is directing though? If not us and something out there is driving everything, then we should be able to deduce a purpose, and yet there is none, there is nothing else out there making effect which would be measurable. This leaves us only with randomness as opposed to some imagined ‘force’ acting upon everything. The will to power is nothing in us and nothing outside of us, unless we can state what that something is, which we cannot. Its a self defeating argument imho.

Me: Why does anything need to direct? Why can’t it just be a cumulative effect? And what other purpose would we need than just to see what happens? And does our not having deduced a purpose necessarily mean there is nothing out there (or in here (driving everything? What if we just haven’t figured it out yet? And why did you automatically assume that because I was writing about Nietzsche, I was talking about The Will to Power?

Orbie: The will to power consists mainly of unconscious or instinctive material, the accumulation of millions of years of learning, which for the most part have become auto-reflexive and mechanistic.

Me: True, Orbie. But I would attribute that to the competitive model from which we started. You have to consider the process by which we evolved from simple life forms to the conscious beings we are today. We start out as simple life forms that evolve into life forms with simple nervous systems that eventually contract into central nervous systems that eventually bud into the base of the brain that blossoms into the cortex that allowed us to be the conscious beings we are today. The Will to Power is a residual effect of that process and an expression of the competitive model in which our baser impulses use our higher cognitive functions in their interest. This constitutes the history of Capitalism and is what has brought us to this point thus far.

At the same time, this evolutionary process has always gravitated towards the external. We have, along the way, found ourselves forming groups and finding, increasingly, that it is in our individual interest to look out for the interest of others outside of our immediate circle. This is the cooperative model in which our baser impulses see it in their interest to act in tandem with our higher cognitive functions.

This is what defines the important evolutionary milestone we are at: we can either continue with the competitive model and risk our self destruction as a species through man-made climate change, or we can make the evolutionary jump to the cooperative model and save ourselves.

And this is my main issue with Nietzsche, why I think he is a sacred cow that must be stabbed, and stabbed repeatedly: he is a legacy of the competitive model, an earlier point in our cultural evolution. He writes pretty words that can resonate and seduce those who are as prone to fancy as he was. But those words do nothing for people facing the critical situation we are.

9

“Does our cultural evolution strive to create overmen (ubermenchen?” –Pawel Dudzinsky

The thing to understand about the Overman is that it is a product of fancy, created by a weak and sickly individual that would have died a virgin had it not been for alleged prostitute that allegedly gave him the syphilis that allegedly drove him mad, and it is a notion that has been perpetuated through fancy. Nietzsche, himself, admits to the role that resonance and seduction play in philosophy:

“As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is “being-conscious” OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life.” -Nietzsche, Friedrich (2014-08-26). Beyond Good and Evil (Illustrated) (p. 7). . Kindle Edition.

But this recognition turns on him, later in the book, when he starts going into assertions about how society should exist solely for the furthering of the greatest among us –something that Rand adapted in insidious and despicable ways. What he and Rand basically offer us are idealizations about the way things should be while claiming to have the only true grasp of reality. And they assume that their high-mindedness will somehow convince the slave to accept their place in life. It goes along the same line as the joke about diplomacy: the art of telling someone to go to hell in such a way that they think they’ll actually enjoy the trip.

Still, it does resonate and seduce. This is evident in the fact that a large portion of popular culture centers around the notion of the Overman (that can-do character that can overcome any obstacle that confronts them: Rambo, The Boondock Saints, etc., etc., etc. –that is along with ironically quoted to death: what doesn’t kill me makes me strong. This really got pronounced in the latest version of The Secret Life of Walter Mitty. In Thurber’s short story, the main character starts out as a weak hen-pecked man who compensates through fantasy and ends as weak hen-pecked man who compensates through fantasy. But in the recent movie version (and in a manner that would have caused Rand to wet herself (Mitty ends up actually overcoming his obstacles to actually do something. He became an Overman. In other words, the movie succumbed to corporate values (that propped up by the notion of the Overman (and, in the process, completely failed to actually pay tribute to the classic story that Thurber wrote. In avoiding the theme of fancy in the story, it managed to succumb to fancy.

And we see it all over the boards: these basement Overmen (those who would use fancy titles like “anarcho-capitalism” (who have clearly been watching too much of the TV series House and think that what they have say is so important that we would put up with their obnoxious shit (bullshit even (to get what they have. And, of course, the underlying assumption at work (the appeal of fancy much as it was with Nietzsche (is the individual’s belief that they are somehow up to the bleak and brutal environment they are proposing we should accept.

So we have to ask what Nietzsche thought would happen when his appeal to resonance and seduction stopped resonating and seducing the slaves.

10

If everyone stopped reproducing, it would be like saying no to the whole system.
Not like suicide. Just, not spreading the tainted substances of human life.
This is also not about death, because the most death is caused by the living.
You can’t bleed a rock.
Ya can’t make a super race if there is no super race to begin with.

11

This is interesting d63, caught it published in another philosophy forum. (By you). Now Adler, the psychologist extends this concept of the overman, as a solution to inferiority, by compensation. The overcompensation creates the superiority complex, as the inferiority complex is under or decomensated. As long as You tie this up with Deleuze’s mirror image, I feel justified to bring in Adler.

Between conflict(competition) and co-operation, there is another dynamic at play, - negotiation.
This threesome, is always present, therefore the dynamic precludes the either/or stage of extreme
reaction to dispar, and as such it affords only an appearance of a historically developed divide. (Between competition and cooperation).

The biological markers are present even in the animal kingdom, and it is like playing a predates, primitive version of game theory. Game theory is merely the reification of certain early behavioral strategies, conducted for maximum gain.

Nietzche should not be stabbed because he pronounced a suppressed will to compete, because, for him, the suppression was , as it turned out through the mouth of Kierkegaard, primarily, a suppression of the will through aesthetic denial.

You may object here, that it was religion which was mostly the summit of of the objevpct of suppression, (and don’t forget, Nietzche was just giving a historical outline of social processes leading to the death of God),his main conflict subsisted in this, that he was compelled to follow this line of reasoning as a foregone conclusion, while his father, having been a minister, shaded his individually traced will, to power.

Kerkegaard’s view of God may be an aesthetic necessity, although he subsumed aesthetics under religious beliefs.

So the most thatcan be said of Nietzche, is, that he saw the aesthetic liberation as a way to augment a long and coming representation, of a buried image, which hid the aesthetic representation of the transcendental ideal. He got that from Scopenhauer’s ‘The World as will and Representation’, and for Niezche, the competitive nature of man had to be timely re-affirmed, not merely negotiated on basis of a perhaps biologically innate co-operation among men. It was of historical succession that he felt the necessity to shift the focus
Toward less co-operation, and more competitiveness.
Co-operation based on images of lesser value were inadequate at the time, to reflect the hidden inner values that were perceived to be repressed, and forgotten on the most part. Nietzche’s effort was more like Kant’s Critique, inasmuch he used Kant’s
trancendental ideal as a basis to offer commentary, the substance of which not many were aware at the time. What was suppressed? The will to power to compete, to represent a hidden almost lost mirror image of the ideal.

12

Always appreciate the bounce, guys. Really impressive stuff, Orbie. Will try to get to this in the next couple of days. But I have been getting a lot of feedback on this topic. Thanks!!!

13

The lies we repose on as truth are just as valuable as the truth itself so long they yield us commensurate pleasure and power.

14

Avoid unholy lies please.

15

You have to ask how much philosophizing Nietzsche would have done with the crack of the master’s whip at his back.
*
And given his disdain for civil society and his glorification of struggle, I suppose we should imagine him living in a cave writing his aphorisms by firelight.

But is that really how it happened?
*
Fancy.
*
But in order to really understand Nietzsche’s disdain for civil society (what he closely associates with the conventional or what he calls ‘mediocre’ (we need only look at the overlap between this disdain and his disdain for women –that is while recognizing the undertone of awe one detects in his rants on their failures. One senses in it resentment: the resentment of a man who did not get to be treated as one of the “in-crowd”. And let’s put in mind here that he chose isolation (what can be more softly put as solitude (in order to pursue what he saw as the greatness in himself. We who are serious about what we do here do as much: sacrifice the common for the sake of something higher.

And many of us (myself included (take this as a kind of blessing (this license to be able to experience things that most people don’t get to (that, consequently, must be taken with a little humility and humbleness and the Promethean vision and heroics of wanting to bring fire to the people –of making their lives, along with yours, a little better. I mean compare this vision to that of considering that blessing as a license to revel in the misery of others.

Nietzsche (despite his greatness (was a miserable, resentful, and vengeful man. And while we can’t dismiss him for letting his baser impulses drive his higher ambitions (we all do so (we still have to keep this in mind when dealing with him. We have to take the pragmatic route of not just considering whether he works (the PT Barnum affect of “something for everyone” assures that he does (but for whom, how, and why he is working.
*
And it is because of Nietzsche’s evolutionary backlash, his appeal to the competitive stage of our mental and cultural evolution (much like that we see on FOX News and in the Republican Party as well as Ayn Rand (that we can find contradictions in his reasoning. For instance, he sets out to free us from the chains of religion and its appeal to afterlives and higher powers. Then he asks us to accept our chains for the sake of the Overman.

He dismisses Spinoza for the Causa Sui (the uncaused cause (of substance and replaces it with the uncaused cause of the Will to Power:

““Will” can naturally only operate on “will”— and not on “matter” (not on “nerves,” for instance): in short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever “effects” are recognized— and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect of will.” -Nietzsche, Friedrich (2014-08-26). Beyond Good and Evil (Illustrated) (p. 39). . Kindle Edition.

Here his appeal to the subjective (resonance and seduction (turns on him in that just because we cannot experience any cause for the will we experience, that doesn’t mean there isn’t one. Here, Science (another of his resentments (proves useful in its successes in explaining causes for that will -think evolutionary psychology here.

And I’m little confused here. Nietzsche shows his disdain for the conventional, then backs his support for the exceptional with this:

“But there is no doubt that for the discovery of certain PORTIONS of truth the wicked and unfortunate are more favourably situated and have a greater likelihood of success; not to speak of the wicked who are happy— a species about whom moralists are silent. Perhaps severity and craft are more favourable conditions for the development of strong, independent spirits and philosophers than the gentle, refined, yielding good-nature, and habit of taking things easily, which are prized, and rightly prized in a learned man.” -Nietzsche, Friedrich (2014-08-26). Beyond Good and Evil (Illustrated) (p. 40). . Kindle Edition.

Really? So the fact that those who achieve CONVENTIONAL success through the Will to Power, and are wicked in that process, is proof positive that we should accept his ethical position? And, because of this, the moralists are wrong?

16

“…and I am a little confused here…”

Need not be d63, for Nietzche came to reflect that, which only artistic vis. Morbid sensibilities could fathom. Incidentally, he shared this dubious trait with Scopenhauer.

I am not surprised of the difficulty beguiling You, and I always like to go to the crux of the dilemma. He did in fact reach contradiction in his morality, as can be seen in the internal conflict he must have had with his father, who I believe wad a minister.

But that is not the reason, of sufficient gradient, for him to realize the point of historical philosophy having reached this would be differential logic.
I alluded to the power of the conflict, as Adler would later realize, in its compensating effects, vis, the simultaneous aberration caused by conflicting logical systems.

Later, after Nietzche, Husserl via Heidegger, tried to reduce both, the ‘eidetic’ and the ‘phenomenological’
So as to assure that the suspension, would, or could, set the stage, for sustaining some measure of transcendental dialectics. This is why Sartre’s disillusionment with dialectical materialism was such a blow to this suspense. (And this was caused by the Soviet intervention into the Hungarian Revolution.)
After this, a man to read, is Lukacs, a Marxist, who is on my to do list, long overdue.

I think the problem of this contradiction is at the heart of all succeeding developments on the continent, which includes Deleuze’s take on the intersection of political and economic values on basic psychological interpretations. Why?

I think the answer lies in that, minus the dialectical basis of these contradictory reactive processes, the reduction did not stop at factored-in in conscious
Material, but sank beneath consciousness, into the realms of sexuality, and it’s related compensatory dynamic. This is why Freud introduced into the Id, the unpopular notion of the economy. Unconscious motives displaced those previously checked by systems of thought, which could analyze on basis of
Direct causal relationships, whereby after a certain point, no such analysis became feasible, except in terms of secondary symbols.

 I do not mean to extend this line of reductive argument haphazardly, except to draw some kind of continuum from Nietzche all the way through and beyond existentialism.  What happened with Deleuze, was the realization of overlap between the forces of the positioning of an ideal overman into the de-transvaluated sensibility of the 'sensible' .  This overlap, related to very strong socially motivated processes, whereby basic psychological processes of projection and introjection became powerless to check.  Therefore, The Will, to power  was meant as a socio-psychological  way out of this contradictory state of affairs.  It's sorry time has come, whereupon intelligent but devious men like AHitler, could foresee the social forces'  garnered utilization merging  into a newly grown paradigms  of incredible mythical power.

Nietzsche was more a seer, then a philosopher, he did not cause the eruption of the darkest forces , only used the Wagnerian symbols, and extended the basic failure of mass identification at a time of gross contradiction. Descartes’ Evil Genius, had really a large part to play in refining unresolved psychological doubts.

Forgive this long narrative, hoping it will help to give some reason into the doubt entertained , talked about, above.

17

Always appreciate your responses Orbie, even if they’re not always easy to decode and respond to. It’s like your always running behind your mind trying to capture the the knowledge that is bouncing around in there. But I think I have caught enough for a rhizome tomorrow. Today I have another rhizome I have to address.

Always a pleasure jamming with you, d…

18

“But this recognition turns on him, later in the book, when he starts going into assertions about how society should exist solely for the furthering of the greatest among us –something that Rand adapted in insidious and despicable ways. What he and Rand basically offer us are idealizations about the way things should be while claiming to have the only true grasp of reality. And they assume that their high-mindedness will somehow convince the slave to accept their place in life. It goes along the same line as the joke about diplomacy: the art of telling someone to go to hell in such a way that they think they’ll actually enjoy the trip.”

At the same time, neither Nietzsche’s nor Rand’s resentment is totally beyond our sympathy or understanding. And the creatively and intellectually curious should get this more than anyone. We all know how our process is perpetually haunted by pressures from the petty and mundane. We all know what it is like to feel a certain socially induced guilt about pursuing something more than most people get to experience at the neglect of the needs of those close to us, those who continue to love us despite that.

We, for instance, are perfectly capable of sympathizing with (and feeling the resentment of (Rand’s rejection of the of term “selfish” in that it is too often thrown at individuals such as us for the sake of getting us to abandon our own projects to serve the projects that the accuser selfishly wants us to serve. We get the connotations of disdain involved in Nietzsche’s distinction between himself, and others like him, and the mediocre. Anyone one of us who has watched the movie Amadeus gets it. But these are people we love and care about. And without that love, we have little to drive our art. And why such a hostile term as “mediocre” when “conventional” would work just as well?

I, of course, use the seemingly hostile terms of “the petty and mundane”. But this is aimed at the same petty and mundane matters that conventional people are dealing with. And given that, can you really blame the conventional for not wanting to take on the complication of reaching beyond convention, for wanting to focus all their resources on the conventional so that they can achieve at least a minimum of comfort in it? And if they are a problem to us (that is given their occasional appreciation of our attempt (couldn’t that be more about a cluelessness about what it requires than some kind of hostility towards us?

And this is the main problem with Nietzsche, Rand, and their blind followers: they treat it like war. They turn philosophy into a paranoid/fascist center and fantasy in which they alone are fighting for what is right in a world gone wrong. While rejecting Christ’s compassion, they indulge in the Christ complex of considering themselves as the only one that sees. They, focused as they are on the notion of the lone genius (Nietzsche’s Zarathustra for instance (fail to see themselves as a node in a complex of communication. While focusing on the virtuoso pianist, they fail to see the role the audience is playing in the experience. They act as if greatness could somehow exist in a vacuum.

So: nonsense or not?

19

“Always appreciate your responses Orbie, even if they’re not always easy to decode and respond to. It’s like you’re always running behind your mind trying to capture the knowledge that is bouncing around in there. But I think I have caught enough for a rhizome tomorrow. Today I have another rhizome I have to address.

Always a pleasure jamming with you, d…” –from a discourse with Orbie in Nietzsche Studies on ILP: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=188729

First of all, Orbie, I apologize for repeating what we already know and making it seem a little less “personal”. But I’m always working across multiple boards with limited time. And it is a lot easier if I am setting up for cross-pollination from the start. I humbly ask that you look at it as a kind of pastiche or collage in which I juxtapose quotes I admire from others and myself while blending in my thoughts at any given time. You might think of it as a kind photo album that captures what is worth keeping. It’s the rhizomatic method as I see it.

That said, having read your responses several times now, I now realize that some of my confusion comes out your use of terms. For instance, you say:

“Nietzsche should not be stabbed because he pronounced a suppressed will to compete, because, for him, the suppression was , as it turned out through the mouth of Kierkegaard, primarily, a suppression of the will through aesthetic denial.

You may object here, that it was religion which was mostly the summit of of the objevpct of suppression, (and don’t forget, Nietzsche was just giving a historical outline of social processes leading to the death of God),his main conflict subsisted in this, that he was compelled to follow this line of reasoning as a foregone conclusion, while his father, having been a minister, shaded his individually traced will, to power.

Kierkegaard’s view of God may be an aesthetic necessity, although he subsumed aesthetics under religious beliefs. “

You tend to use the word “aesthetic” here a lot. But I think what you actually meant (given that you brought Kierkegaard into it (is “ascetic”. Therefore, I would translate your quote to:

“Nietzsche should not be stabbed because he pronounced a suppressed will to compete. This is because, for him, the suppression was, as it turned out through the mouth of Kierkegaard, primarily a suppression of the will through ascetic denial.

You may object here, but it was at a time when religion was at the summit of its suppression, (and don’t forget, Nietzsche was just giving a historical outline of social processes leading to the death of God). His main conflict consisted of this. He was, therefore, compelled to follow this line of reasoning as a foregone conclusion, while his father, having been a minister, influenced his individual embrace of the will to power.

Kierkegaard’s view of God may be an ascetic necessity, although he founded those ascetics on religious beliefs. “

Of course, the risk involved in such translations (as it is with my German jam-mate Harald (is that I will write myself into it. But it’s what I have to do in order to be able to respond. But I cannot encourage you enough to correct any mistakes I might be making in those translations.

But enough of the preliminaries and explanations. Let’s get to what we are here for: discourse:

“Nietzsche should not be stabbed because he pronounced a suppressed will to compete. This is because, for him, the suppression was, as it turned out through the mouth of Kierkegaard, primarily a suppression of the will through ascetic denial.”

You’re right. There is that common connection between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in the ascetic –that is even though neither read nor knew about the other. And that connection is something to be explored to reveal some of the subtleties involved in Nietzsche’s position.

For instance, we find, yet again, another contradiction in Nietzsche’s point in that he embraced the ascetic while embracing the will to power which, to him, can only be expressed socially. Think, for instance: his distinction between slave and morality. While Kierkegaard embraced the ascetic to become the perfect Christian, Nietzsche embraced it to become the perfect/greatest philosopher. As you point out:

“You may object here, but it was at a time when religion was at the summit of its suppression, (and don’t forget, Nietzsche was just giving a historical outline of social processes leading to the death of God). His main conflict consisted of this. He was, therefore, compelled to follow this line of reasoning as a foregone conclusion, while his father, having been a minister, influenced his individual embrace of the will to power.”

I would argue that it was a time when society (and its social and political systems (was reacting to the atrocities committed by religion (the inquisitions were over by then (and, consequently, rejecting it wholesale. Like most great minds, Nietzsche was basically riding the wave that was in front of and around him. Still, the sting of those atrocities was still fresh. And in this sense, you put him in a proper historical context. And I agree that Nietzsche put a lot into giving us a historical outline for it all. That is one of those things you don’t catch until a second reading –much as I found out with mine. And I agree with the Oedipal dynamic at work with his father.

But, once again, we see Nietzsche’s embrace of the subjective aspect of philosophy turning on him. We are given perfect license to accept or reject his assertions concerning the master and slave moralities and the silly notion that society exists to prop up its greatest. As is the case with Rand, we are perfectly free to see it for what it is: fancy; little more.