Prismatics: The fact is, Kant failed to make the claim of differentiating metaphysics and ontology from science and mathematics from an a priori synthetic mode of apprehension, because a posteriori, it has been shown that the claim was invalid entirely. Not that he didn’t make the claim, but it has been shown to be invalid. The good corresponding to the illusionary aspect , in Your example is , as he describes it, and that is why on basis of his moral tenacity, he came up with the idea of the categorical imperative. That stands, but again can not stand on principle, his use of noumena, in stead, becomes the principle based on the idea, that well, i know it can not be derived, however it should be. The illusion has to be sustained for the sake of morality as a whole. The same can be said for his a-priori application toward science and mathematics. That he treats ontology differently, has future implications, that he did not see at the time. These implications are basically posed in the question, ‘Are a-priori synthetic truths possible?’ Can a sphere be red and green all over? I think this was the basic counter argument posed, to desribe the logical inconsistency.
So it is not that he tried to exclude ontology from epistomology, he did, and his asseetion to this effect is desribed well, but the fact that after the fact, his effot failed to make his case. Therefore, he really did sew up ontology as an inaccessible truth, however he had to reduce it to noumena and that test became known as the categorical imperative. That failed, it has been shown to be a fallacy, a fallacy figurativaly desribed as the illusion analogy.The good cannot be derived for Kant, on that ground. There ought to be a basic unity between the ground (the good) and the a-priori synthetic, and he can not demonstrate it. The whole idea of a synthesis, then is groundless. This is the charge against Hegel, and consequently
Marx. The synthesis has no ground. This seed was planted by Kant.
Kant did sew up metaphysics, and metaphysics became devoid of it’s reason, (hence his critique against it), but to most thinkers, his attempt failed.
You equivicate what Kant states as Your view. There is nothing wrong with that, except, as relates to the forum’s claim, that there are no a priori truths, You are actually sayng, there are not, because Kant said so. The question really is, is there any way the naturalistic fallacy may become an overstatement, where the is-ought controversy may be settled?
(Where the existence before essence problem can be in part settled?) And i think so. Will have to look to G.E. Moore’s original comment on the naturalistic fallacy it’s self to see, whether extreme moral ‘oughts’ can override the facts of the logical inconsistency.
If so, then Kant’s moral judgements of the illusionary good, may carry over to, and synthesize some claims toward some aspects that show utility in assigning an a-priori synthetic truth to science and math.
For instance, Eintein sent a letter to Franklin Roosevelt, signed by several researchers into the question of the advisability to develop the atomic bomb. Here, the extreme nature of the immediate good, (of ending the war, and cutting down on allied casualties) would not be trumped by the long term value of it). Here the long term goal , of securing a long term world peace, credible and predictable enough, based on enough facts, to synthesize a well predicted outcome, based on an a-priori presentation? Can this presentation be re-presented in that future date as credible a posteriori? Will posterity be able to come up with a likewise agreement? Here the ramifications are still being debated, therefore the answer is yet not yet available. This is why i interpret Your stance, as not wrong, but from my point of view, insufficient, because of it’s interpretation, at least from the way i understand it, using Kant, as it was the last word on the question, : Is there such a thing as a-priori truth:
The implication of Your stand,(remeber You said Your and Kant’s) is not yet a forseeable conclusion. It is not wrong, but it is not yet true, even in the illusion of the good in the desert analogy.
I do not think that Kant was justified in sewing up metaphysics, and then declaring the a priori synthetic as justified in terms of math and science, a priori, and that issue is still on the table. Logically, it doesent work, and a look into G.E. Moore will help to clear up the matter.