Well let’s look at this way. For a thing to be a thing it must have something in common with other things say ignoring family resemblance between all things as a way of defining them. But all things are different so how do we define them as things. Perhaps they are things simply because they can be perceived or imagined. Some things are imagined and are still things. They are still brain activity. But to be perceived or imagined those things must be sound or image or smell, taste or touch. Therefore perhaps you could define things as what “can” be perceived by the senses. The problem with this is it excludes things that are just as likely to exist but can’t be perceived by humans. But are idea of things will never have to deal with such things. Therefore what use is there in categorizing them in the category of things? Perhaps there are things that can be imagined but not in the way they actually are. This way of “our” imagining them would perhaps allow us to imagine their use or consequences they have of their existence but not the “actual” way they are. We could not imagine beyond their consequences or use of such thing. So these could be categorized as things but not things that cannot be imagined in any way at all. Such things that could be imagined in a different way. How would we know their different from the real way their imagined if we cant imagine them? By seeing the flaws or “inaccuracy” in how we imagine them describes their function or use. But as I said there is no use in trying to imagine what can be a thing outside what can be perceived or imagined. This suggests our idea of a thing comes from being able to use such things because we can perceive or imagine them. There are of course things we imagine and perceive which we don’t use but it is that we can “only” be able to “use” a thing if we can imagine or perceive it, if its is “a thing” So we could simply define a thing as something that is only in the state of having the “potential” to be used as it can be perceived or imagined. But the ways things can be perceived or imagined vary so much. So when you say all things can be studied with the same knowledge we have to ask with “what” knowledge they can be studied. We cant say accurately that a thing can be studied with A, B, C when only A and B are needed. The likely ness of all things being studied with the “exact” same knowledge is very unlikely as their all different. If that was the case we would probably be born with that knowledge as we wouldn’t need any other knowledge. It’s true that there might be a similarity perhaps in the “structure” of knowledge used to study all things but the A, B, C‘s of what are used to study different things will vary greatly. I think what your saying comes from the misunderstanding that there is something in common between all things and to understand the thing we need only understand that thing that’s in common. There is something in common between all things that is they have a structure we can perceive but it’ is not the commonness of this “layer” of understanding we have that helps us understand and study each thing but the other “layer” of differences each thing has.
We cannot even be sure of the properties since we see them from such POVs as scientific realism and pragmatic necessity. IMHO, all we can know of anything other than ourselves is our interpretation of what it does.
Being a “thing” subjects them to our study, so yes all “things” are potentially knowable (or at least can bear an epistemic relation to our experiences with them). In fact, even that which is not a “thing” - for example, justice - is made subject to our contemplation by being conceptualized as a “thing” - i.e. as the object of our contemplation.
I’m not sure what you mean by the same knowledge - do you mean that all things, no matter their differences, have in store for us the same lessons to learn?
Not sure how the education system ties into the above.
It is my belief that an experience becomes a thing for us after the mind has found ways to parse the experience out from other experiences - that is, it identifies reasonably well defined boundaries between it and all other experiences - and then extracts it out at those boundaries such that a foreground/background relation is established between the extracted experience and all those left within the fray. It then imbues the new foreground experience with a singular and constant identity - a rock, a chair, an animal, etc. - and with this newly acquired identity it is then what we call a “thing”.
Interesting take. What impression do you get from my take in this question - that is, the question of how we tend to imagine unsensible or intangible things as, well, “things”? For example, read my response to stellamonika, the one about how we mold non-things like justice into things, abstract perhaps, at least in our minds.
I believe we do this because there is indeed a use towards which such thing-molding is put - namely, to make them into the objects - that is, the targets - of our contemplation so that we get a handle on them - which is to say, they thereby become subject to being understood, being analyzed, being explored in different and novel ways, and ultimate yeilding conclusions that are themselves useful (perhaps indirectly) in pragmatic or social ways.