Ockham's Razor

Would anyone like to discuss their thoughts about the basis of “Ockham’s Razor”? I’ve heard Einstein say that God does not play dice, which certainly is a call for order. But the rule of simplicity seems more to have a Platonic ring to it. Kant and Leibniz both had problems with the principle, and it seems to be to be used like a blank check, as if elements or categories can be lopped off with both impunity and also leaving the sense that one is being “rational” all the same. I am not sure about the rational basis of this. Empirical observation seems to lead to multiplication of categories as one organizes what is perceived. As I mentioned before the purpose to which Ockham put his “razor”, before it was named such, was to divide the world into realms of reason and faith, and to dispel the complexities Aquinas had fashioned in attempting to bridge them. Are there rules for its use? Is there a logical basis for its truth? I find Ockham’s Razor instinctive satisfying, yet question often its claim and its use.

Dunamis

I think it’s given too much credence. It’s become a given. It’s a free pass for sloppy (or incomplete) thinking. “Well, if we use Ockham’s razor…”

I’m not sure what the logical basis is. Somebody smarter than I could probably use Ockham’s razor to dispel Ockham’s razor.

Jerry,

“Somebody smarter than I could probably use Ockham’s razor to dispel Ockham’s razor.”

I like that very much. :slight_smile: It has me chuckling.

Dunamis

Then my work here is done for the night.

In my opinion, I would only use Ockham’s Razor for removing all assumptions. It is a basic example of what “logic” is. It’s as plain and simple as that. :stuck_out_tongue:

Ockham wanted things simple.

To Assume Makes an ‘Ass’ out of ‘u’ and ‘me’

“Assumption is the mother of all mistakes.”

I think of the razor as a method of good housekeeping. It’s all about efficiency.

The razor is only legitimately applied when you are faced with two models that equally account for the same set of data. If one model requires the postulation of extra elements, then you choose the simpler of the two.

I suspect this rule has some basis in our rational faculties. For, if we didn’t have some way of limiting the number of entities we postulated, our minds would be overrun with extraneous ideas.

Thus, I view the Razor as a fundamental component of rational thought in general.

Pragmatist,

“The razor is only legitimately applied when you are faced with two models that equally account for the same set of data.”

How does one measure “equal” accounting? The theory that we are all figments in the mind of God accounts for all data “equal” to any other theory and does so with an absolute minimum number of entities. It seems that the idea of “equal” accounting would be problematic.

Philosophy is not really scientific hypothesizing, where the data set is restricted by experiment and two models are measured against each other. The data set is all of experience. The amount of data one theory explains it seems could not possibly be quantified against the amount another theory explains. Each theory would claim to explain more data. The additional entities are presumed necessary for the additional “data”.

“I suspect this rule has some basis in our rational faculties”

What does this suspicion rest on? Is this just a gut feeling?

Dunamis

I see you’re all talking about me behind my back :laughing:

This is where the principle of Ockham’s Razor comes in handy. However, I dare say it can be used and abused by people with little understanding of it.

Ock.

I’ve used The Razor in debates, but I’m not sure it has any logical validity at all.

Dunamis,

In the case of science, it’s a matter of predictive value; in the case of pure logic, it’s a matter of logical consistency. The Razor can only rightly be applied when you are confronted with two explanatory models of nature, or two sets of axioms from which true statements are to be derived.

In science: if each model makes the same predictions, but one model postulates extraneous entities, then the correct model is the one without the extraneous entities.

In the case of pure logic: if two sets of axioms allow for the derivation of the same set of true propositions, then you should work with the set that has the least number of elements. (In other words, if one of your axioms can be derived from some of your other axioms, then it should not be considered an axiom; and, if one of your axioms cannot lead to any logical derivations, then it should not be considered an axiom).

The theory that we are all figments in the mind of God has no predictive value.

I would slightly adjust your comment by saying that philosophy is not limited to scientific hypothesizing. .

If the predictive value of the model cannot be ascertained, then you cannot rightly apply the Razor.

It follows from an evolutionary perspective on what makes rationality possible.

As I noted, “if we didn’t have some way of limiting the number of entities we postulated, our minds would be overrun with extraneous ideas.” It seems reasonable to suppose that our rational faculties have a built-in mechanism for limiting our tendency to postulate entities. I wouldn’t say there is one specific device, or one part of the brain, that is responsible for this. Rather, I would say that this mechanism is one aspect of what makes rational thought possible in the first place.

Rational thought is born from needs. It is directed and limited by these needs. Indeed, if this wasn’t the case, then rationality would never have evolved to the level at which it is employed today. The postulation of entities is thus limited by the needs, or employers, of rational thought. The necessity of our genes, as well as the necessities of our physiological and cultural circumstances, impose limits on how our rational minds function. The Razor is just a formal way of incorporating this fact into our deliberately rational processes. In other words, we all use the Razor, though most of the time we do it without noticing.

okhams razor in my opionion has great functional uses in discussions of the theories i.e. the philosophy of mind - since the best we can hope to deal with in this subject (specifically caretsian styles) is metaphors and constructs the complicating a model beyond it’s necessity (i.e. confusing further than necessary) is useless and thus okhams razor is valid.

But in science I think it is almost a tautology the simplecest soloution may always be the best, but in many respects you may as well be saying the best soloution is the best.

Indeed, I hate it when some fanatic over-zealous religious nut whose sole existence it seems is to denounce science in any event that it contradicts religion to use the razor against that which it came from.

I’d say one of the most recent popular use would have been in Carl Sagan’s “Contact” - the movie adaptation that is, where the razor is brought up a couple of times in a supportive manner, and then James Woods uses it at the end in a contradictory manner.

Pragmatist,

“If the predictive value of the model cannot be ascertained, then you cannot rightly apply the Razor.”

With this I wholly agree. Since hard science and pure logic do not define the boundaries of philosophical representation, Ockham’s razor seems to me to be wrongly applied in the majority of cases. Most often it is applied on occasions where non-predictive descriptions are undertaken, and directed specifically to those entities that seek to describe the ineffable. What should be stated in argument is, “This is a predictive model, and so since I have another model of prediction of greater simplicity, I invoke Ockham’s razor.” The truth though this would only be of force where predictive models predict the same results. Any variation in predicted results could simply be judged by the accuracy of the prediction, leaving Ockham’s razor behind. All this I accept.

Unfortunately, the great preponderance of philosophy is not in the prediction business. Plato’s theory of forms, Valentinus’s gnostic dualism, even though ancient, still stand as representations, untouched by Ockham’s razor, it would seem.

Dunamis

Or vice-verse.

Yuxia,

“okhams razor in my opionion has great functional uses in discussions of the theories i.e. the philosophy of mind - since the best we can hope to deal with in this subject (specifically caretsian styles) is metaphors and constructs the complicating a model beyond it’s necessity (i.e. confusing further than necessary) is useless and thus okhams razor is valid.”

But as someone who holds close to logic, what in your mind is the logical foundation of this validity?

“But in science I think it is almost a tautology the simplecest soloution may always be the best, but in many respects you may as well be saying the best soloution is the best.”

I like this very much, because in fact this is what is really being argued when Ockham’s Razor is invoked. No theory should be more complicated than necessary to explain what it explains. But each theory is as complicated as its explanation requires. Each element of complexity explains a distinction seen. What really is being said is, “my theory is better than your theory”…a worthy claim, but not usually considered an argument of any force.

Dunamis

I can’t really comment on how often Ockham’s Razor is incorrectly applied, except to say that I’m not surprised to hear that there are many who use it in error.

I’m not sure that is so, but if it is, then I agree that it is most unfortunate.

Perhaps. I’m guessing you are reacting to some specific arguments where philosophers have tried to use the Razor to discount these ideas. While I’m not sure what those arguments may have been, I have a guess. I’ll use Plato as an example, since I’m more familiar with his writings.

What I suspect is that some people have constructed predictive models of the universe which incorporate Plato’s notion of Forms. Once the model has been constructed, it can easily be knocked down by comparing it to what is essentially the same model, just without the notion of Forms. For, the theory of Forms has no predictive value in and of itself, and thus cannot be said to add predictive value to any scientific theory.

In this view, we don’t need Plato’s theory of Forms. It doesn’t help us explain rationality, language, or existence in general. So, we can rationally discount it when formulating predictive models.

Perhaps some believe that Plato’s theory of Forms does help explain some aspect of experience. If this is so, then they should be able to relate the theory to models of experience which have predictive value. I suspect you may disagree with this point, Dunamis, and claim that there are valid explanations that are not in the least bit scientific. Yes?

plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/

Hmmm…do say. Hence therefore the stupidity in using it!

Ken,

I don’t read arguments by link.

Dunamis

Does logic ever create a value judgment? I doubt it. Logical justifications for value judgments come after the fact. Deciding on the value of something is an intuitive action.

What makes simplicity better than complexity? Who would disagree with the idea that the world is more of a complex system then a simple system? Simple explanations have limited applications.

Why bother making things simple? It is our own biological limitations that influence our attraction to simplicity?

For one, our attention span is limited. We can only focus for a limited amount of time. We can only remember so much. The most compact your transmission of information is useful to compensate for this deficiency.

Time is another of our limitation. It is a limited resource. We cannot stand around all day listening to an explanation. So brevity is beneficial because the speaker avoids taking up too much of our valuable time.

We have reached a sort of plateau for brevity, the sound bite. This is the quickest and most focused delivery of information that can be instantly distributed to the masses. Everyone who speaks in public must guard whatever they say more carefully than ever before. The smallest slip of the tongue can be recreated endlessly.

An effort must be made to resist the temptation of brevity.