Plato's Phaedrus

[emackenzie]

Hello everyone,

I am currently reading Plato’s Phraedrus and am stuck on Socrates’ first speech. In his first speech, he discusses that every possesses two governing principles: the first being that a desire for pleasure is natural; the second being an acquired opinion that causes one to aspire after the best. My question is, what exactly is this opinion; of what is it an opinion?

[Only_Humean]

@emackenzie

Hello everyone,

I am currently reading Plato’s Phraedrus and am stuck on Socrates’ first speech. In his first speech, he discusses that every possesses two governing principles: the first being that a desire for pleasure is natural; the second being an acquired opinion that causes one to aspire after the best. My question is, what exactly is this opinion; of what is it an opinion?

Is that your question, or your professor’s question?

He discusses that every what possesses two governing principles?

[The_Artful_Pauper]

@emackenzie

Hello everyone,

I am currently reading Plato’s Phraedrus and am stuck on Socrates’ first speech. In his first speech, he discusses that every possesses two governing principles: the first being that a desire for pleasure is natural; the second being an acquired opinion that causes one to aspire after the best. My question is, what exactly is this opinion; of what is it an opinion?

So the quote in question takes place between 237d,e-238a

My translation (I don’t read Greek) puts it this way:

We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our acquired judgement that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the others. Now when judgement is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called ‘being in your right might’; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as ‘outrageousness*’.

*the word original Greek word here is hubris, which can mean also mean arrogance or denote behaviour lacking in control which leads one to vice.

I would interpret what your translation calls “acquired opinion” and this one calls “acquired judgement” to mean the understanding one forms through experience (though there is nothing here which indicates that the “judgements” or “opinions” cannot be acquired from contact with others) which aids in acting “wisely”.

I would tentatively define what is wise (particularly in this context) as procuring and/or increasing what is best and avoiding and/or diminishing what is bad.

As to “what is good or best?” and “what is bad?”, those are good questions.

[emackenzie]

Thank you for the response. I have another questioning pertaining to the same dialogue. I am not certain if I am referencing this correctly, but the passage seems to come around line 264. Here is the passage:

“Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?”

What exactly does he mean by saying Lysias began his treatise at the end? Does he mean that he is began with his conclusion(s), rather than his definitions and premises; which means that he supposes a definition of love that he never states?

[The_Artful_Pauper]

@emackenzie

Thank you for the response. I have another questioning pertaining to the same dialogue. I am not certain if I am referencing this correctly, but the passage seems to come around line 264. Here is the passage:

“Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?”

What exactly does he mean by saying Lysias began his treatise at the end? Does he mean that he is began with his conclusion(s), rather than his definitions and premises; which means that he supposes a definition of love that he never states?

I didn’t notice your post earlier. I think I see why you are having some trouble interpreting the dialogue. Are you using an online text, or just a copy of the Jowett translation? In either case, the translation is not very good and I think would make interpretation difficult even for myself. I first tried to use the online version to check what you were saying (too lazy to get my own) but I found it quite muddled.

Socrates’ words in my own version go like this:

“He certainly seems a long way from doing what we wanted. He doesn’t even start from the beginning but from the end, making his speech swim upstream on its back. His first words are what a lover would say to his boy as he was concluding his speech. Am I wrong, Phaedrus, dear heart?”

…

The beginning of the speech Phaedrus reads goes like this:

“You understand my situation: I’ve told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out. In any case, I don’t think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don’t happen to be in love with you. A man in love will wish he had not done you any favors, once his desire dies down—”

…

It also helps to take into consideration the beginning of the dialogue when the speech in question is first mentioned, around 227c:

Phaedrus: In fact, Socrates, you’re just the right person to hear the speech that occupied us, since in a roundabout way, it was about love. It is aimed at seducing a beautiful boy, but the speaker is not in love with him—this is actually what is so clever and elegant about it: Lysias argues that it is better to give your favors to someone who does not love you than to someone who does.

Socrates: What a wonderful man! I wish he would write that you should give your favors to a poor rather than a rich man, to an older rather than to a younger one— that is, to someone like me and most other people: then his speeches would be really sophisticated, and they’d contribute to the public good besides! In any case, I am so eager to hear it that I would follow you even if you were walking all the way to Megara, as Herodicus recommends, to touch the wall and come back again.

…

So now that I have a better grasp of what is going on, when Socrates says (in this translation) “His first words are what a lover would say to his boy as he was concluding his speech.” He means that the opening sentence of Lysias’ speech as related by Phaedrus (You understand my situation: I’ve told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out.) should be the words the true lover concludes his speech with.

Socrates is implying that Lysias doesn’t know what he’s talking about and doesn’t know what a true lover is. Socrates was skeptical of the speech even before he heard it, and only after hearing of it. When he said at the beginning,

“What a wonderful man! I wish he would write that you should give your favors to a poor rather than a rich man, to an older rather than to a younger one— that is, to someone like me and most other people: then his speeches would be really sophisticated.”

He is making a joke. He is saying that Lysias sounds like a sophist, spinning words for advantage to make the untrue sound true.

I would have to read on to tell, but it seems to me like Socrates doesn’t agree that a true lover would (in the words of the speech) “wish he had not done you any favors, once his desire dies down”, but would instead desire to reconcile himself with his love. Hence, " You understand my situation: I’ve told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out." should be the concluding words of the real lover, because the true lover would seek reconciliation, rather than just become disillusioned and resentful of the favors he had provided for his lover while they were happy together.