You can’t define something as being logically consistent or inconsistent, you determine that by analyzing.
If I understood your correctly, what you’re basically saying is that to achieve a greater good without people getting raped/tortured/murdered in the most brutal ways possible for thousands of years is as impossible for God as making 2+2=5?
I disagree, the former wouldn’t result in any sort of a logical inconsistency and would be perfectly possible to realize if God was omnipotent and omniscient.
It’s possible that humans are incapable of communicating a reason why something is necessary for the greater good, humans aren’t omnipotent and omniscient after all. For an omniscient and omnipotent being there is no excuse for not providing us with reasons that justify evils for the greater good, so if he doesn’t do that the only other option is that there are no such reasons, or that the being isn’t omnipotent and omniscient.
No, not at all, and that’s exactly what I worded my definition carefully, your whole sugar argument is one major strawman.
Sugar doesn’t objectively cause physical and emotional pain like some other substances, it depends on the subject if it’s desirable or not. Some people actually want to be fat and intentionally get so fat that they can’t work so they live off of government money. And sugar (glucose) is a very much needed nutrient for humans.
Remember, omniscient and omnipotent in reality means maximally knowledgeable and powerful, so there literally isn’t anything that a God can’t do that is doable, give me any possible scenario that can take place in our reality and I can give you a solution of how an omniscient and omnipotent God can resolve that scenario without requiring evils.
To call a being that allows Josef Fritzl to rape his children for 24 years an all powerful, all knowing, omnibenevolent being is an abuse of language, there is no possible greater good that requires a maximally powerful and knowledgeable being to allow such horrors to occur, no other person could possibly force and/or blackmail a being of such power and knowledge, no logical inconsistency will be created if that being intervenes and stops Fritzl (or better yet, doesn’t design him in a way that leads to him doing such evils in the first place).
You still haven’t given me an answer as to what you’d do in that example I’ve given, did I assume correctly?
You can make the last statement only if you know what the greatest good is. Otherwise you don’t know.
At any rate, all I have to establish is whether or not it’s a possibility and I don’t even really have to do that. You have to show that it’s logically impossible. But so we have something to discuss and analyze:
Say Y is necessary to achieve the greatest good, and preventing X also prevents Y from being true (i.e. what is required of god to prevent X eliminates the logical possibility of Y, i.e. X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), then for god to prevent X would be a logical inconsistency since an omnibenevolent god will always choose to achieve the greatest good. This greatest good will trump everything else, or god is not omnibenevolent. In this scenario, by allowing X, God is still omnibenevolent because he achieves the greatest good. God is still omniscient and omnipotent by allowing X, because in the same way as god does not make 2+2=5, he does not create the logical inconsistency of both preventing X and at the same time making Y true.
The above scenario is logically possible. This is why I’ve been saying that one of the problems with your argument is that it’s one dimensional. It only considers X which works only if preventing X is equal to the greatest good. This is demonstrated per the following:
As stated previously, If god is omnibenevolent, god will always seek the greatest good above all else. So for example, if preventing X is the greatest good in and of itself, then for god to allow X would be a logical inconsistency, would it not? God would have to prevent X in the same way that god would have to allow 2+2 to always be 4. Otherwise it creates a logical inconsistency. After all this is the basis of your logical proof. Your assumption is that the greatest good is preventing X, and therefore allowing X is a logical inconsistency with one or several of the omni’s. This must be your assumption because of the above example. Your problem is that essentially what you’re claiming is that you know with 100% certainty that “preventing X”= “the greatest good”. For your logical proof “Preventing X” must be equal to “the greatest good” because that is the only situation where you can be sure that the logical inconsistency you are claiming exists (see above scenario). You can’t do that because you don’t know with certainty what the greatest good is. As I pointed out, if X is known and GG the greatest good is unknown, you can’t say anything about their logical relationship, which means you certainly can’t say “preventing X”=GG.
This is an evidential argument. “No excuse” is an opinion statement.
Desirability was no where part of your original definition, not that that works either.
I was referring to table sugar which I should have been more clear on, but let’s go with that.
I may not be able to make a good argument for sugar being evil evidentially, but using your logical argument I can make a pretty strong one.
You are also pointing out, as I was, that sugar can be abused. Does abuse qualify as evil? Or are you saying as long as it’s self abuse, that isn’t evil? What about the emotional pain caused to others if that person dies of a heart attack because they were obese? By your definition what this person is doing is evil anyway, by getting fat and living off the government, are they not? That person is intentionally causing emotional pain to another person who has to pay for it. To the person who has to pay for it there is no obvious greater good. Once again the person’s perspective determines whether or not something is evil by your definition.
Also, let’s say I intentionally feed someone lots of table sugar with the intent of killing them with a heart attack. Now this person willing eats the sugar because they want to get fat and live off the government. Now under your definition, am I doing evil? I’m not forcing them to eat it and they have a obvious greater good for themselves, to live off the government. Is the other person doing evil?
But what about the sugar itself? Table sugar (from whatever plant source) is not necessary. All the nutrients needed for humans can come from other plants without the dangers of Table sugar. God is omniscient and therefore knew sugar would be abused causing physical and emotional pain to others. God created the sugar cane and sugar beet plants, therefore at the very least, created the potential for evil. So I say sugar is evil, god should have never created the plants that it is made from.
I’ve met all your definitions of evil, therefore I say table sugar is evil, god shouldn’t have allowed it. A good god doesn’t exist because he intentionally (he knew it would be abused), unnecessarily (with no obvious greater good), hurt others by creating the sugar cane and sugar beet plants.
How about heroin? Does god allowing heroin prove that god doesn’t exist. How about tobacco? How about saturated fats? How about armed robbery? How about petty theft? How about allowing Human choice? Where’s the line? Or is it all or nothing? I’ve already established that what is considered evil can be different from person to person based on their perspective. What level of evil is required to prove that god doesn’t exist? And I can’t get much closer to relevance to your original argument than that.
Define doable. Is 2+2=5 doable or anything else that creates a logical inconsistency doable by an omniscient and omnipotent good god?
That’s also an evidential argument, but a great idea. You start another thread and you describe how you would create a world without evils as you define them and describe what the greatest good would be for your world.
If you were making an evidential argument I would have to. Since it isn’t, I just need to establish that you can’t be 100% certain of your conclusion. I don’t need to defend anything, you do, you made the claim of a logical proof. You made a statement that your logical proof proves that a good theistic god doesn’t exist. It’s up to you to prove it, not for me to disprove anything, or respond to your evidential arguments. You have to account for ALL THE POSSIBLE alternatives that would contradict your conclusion. This is what I have been pointing out. And as I’ve told you all this is fine as an evidential argument, but this is not an evidential argument. Therefore in this case it’s a red herring. Start another thread if you want to make an evidential argument.
Personally, I don’t truly believe evil or good to exist outside of them being just simple labels. Any man who murders intentionally, pleasure, or just to cause pain out of hatred is psychopathic. I believe the term psychopathic could be used instead of “evil”. Most people take “evil” as a literal sense of being real, some even believe it can be manifested into children, etc.
They are labels of which can be used completely out of context. You can call someone psychopathic, but does it really matter if you have nothing to back the claim up? You can call someone evil, over a simple lie, greed, selfish-importance and get away with it. You can even label children as evil for being little snots. But not so much psychopath.
Yeah, and I guess what I’m arguing is that your argument basically becomes a tautology at that point. “If ~(necessarily ~p) then possibly p” is always true. So yeah, it seems we agree- either there is a deductive argument that a good God could’t create the universe as it is, or else possibly He did.
Yeah, I guess I’m just saying that should be reflexive with no argument required. A person who knows he doesn’t have a deductively certain argument against P should thereby know that P is possible without your argument. If it had to be made in this case to make it clear to everybody then ok.
I’d just like to point out that I’ve never heard that ‘acting like God’ all the time is the definition of proper action according to theistic religion. God may be the source of morality, but it’s far more nuanced than just “Do what God would do”, since most religions stress that we really have no idea what He’s doing.
They are merely the positive vs negative concerning Life. The universe itself doesn’t know life of atom, nor does it know good from evil, nor positive from negative. Good and evil are relative terms, relative to life. Positive and negative are relative to an assumed average or chosen baseline.
So basically what you’re saying is that preventing Josef Fritzl abusing his children for 24 years in his basement would create some kind of a logical inconsistency and what, make the fabric of time and space collapse? That an omniscient and omnipotent, also omnibenevolent God is incapable of carrying out this plan without it cause it would create a logical inconsistency? Well, I disagree.
The only possible scenario I can come up with that such a horrible thing would be necessary for the greater good is if somebody was threatening to blow the planet up or some other evil of a similar proportion unless God allowed Fritzl to abuse his children. Problem with that? God is omnipotent and omniscient, nobody can come even close to successfully blackmailing him.
I am literally out of ideas, I have no idea what you’re getting at here, give me ONE scenario in which you think letting children get abused for 20 plus years is for the greater good so I can conceive of what you’re talking about, cause I honestly don’t know.
No, there are 2 conditions that ultimately decide whether a person will do something or not. 1) capability of doing it, 2) the will to do it. Unless both are satisfied, it cannot be done, if both are satisfied, it can be done. So the “no excuse” really refers to a contradiction between how we define God and the reality we observe.
My argument is deductive, either you make a valid one or an invalid one. Valid arguments with true premises are sound.
Since your sugar argument is unrelated to our “main” topic of discussion, I don’t feel obliged to answer it until you answer my example.
It’s fun though, even if you proved me wrong in the debate I could still just say “Oh well, we may not be deductively certain God is evil, but according to inductive reasoning he is at least as evil as Hitler”, so I got that going for me, which is nice
Good and evil simply mean desirable and undesirable, respectively. They’re words we use to express approval or disapproval. And yeah, I pretty much agree with you on that.
Exactly, they never explicitly say that, do they? However, they do say he’s the standard of good and perfect, so according to that we should be as much like him as we can in order to be good. We may not know what he is doing (if he exists), but we sure as hell know what he isn’t doing.
My example is still left unanswered. And no wonder, it’s a dead end, none of the possible outcomes work for theists. If they help the child, they’re acting differently from God so either 1) they’re being good and morally superior to god by acting different from him or 2) they’re being evil intentionally by acting differently from God and saving the child when he wouldn’t.
Or they can stay consistent and say they’d let the child get abused… not much of an option, since doing that in a debate on morality is like exposing your anus in prison.
This isn’t about specific examples, it’s about logical possibility. Specific examples are for evidential arguments. The only thing that matters for the purposes of disproving your logical proof is whether it’s logically possible. And in this case, the only requirement is that the possibility exists that there are 2 or more things that are mutually exclusive, that could have the relationship as defined. You need to point out that it’s not logically possible as described.
Where in the definition of a good god does it say that he has to tell you everything he is doing and why? Your logical argument was never that a good god doesn’t exist because he doesn’t tell you everything you want to know. Since there is no logical necessity, there is no logical contradiction here.
It was the exact same argument you were making, just from the other end of the spectrum. And yes, it was an evidential argument as was yours. I pointed that out to you several times, so now we are agreeing that both are unrelated to your logical proof. As your proof is stated, and if it were true, then absolutely anything that would qualify as evil according to your definition, would prove god doesn’t exist regardless of how terrible or how trivial it might seem. So what specifically X is, is completely irrelevant to your proof as long as it meets your definition of evil.
Well that would be a debate on an evidential basis which would have entirely different rules. In any case, debating in any form sharpens one’s argument regardless of the outcome.
As I said, I can’t conceive a single scenario in which the previously mentioned evils would be necessary for an OOO god. I don’t see how it’s logically impossible for God to achieve his greater good without causing and allowing evils, as you claim.
If you propose there is such a scenario in which an OOO god would require the brutal assault and rape of children for 20+ years and it would be justified, I’m sure you have at least one example in mind you can present, right? I mean, if you claim it’s logically possible, you SHOULD be able to conceive of at least one scenario where that’s the case. If you can’t, then I know you’re being insincere.
Those who have to do lesser evils for greater good have to inform others why they do the lesser evils.
But since God is omnipotent and omniscient, his plan shouldn’t require lesser evils, as he would be able to avoid them.
Only if informing them IS a part of that greater good. The fact that you think that it always would be, merely expresses your ignorance on what it takes for “the greater good”, which I am certain you can’t even define, much less assess.
… again, merely your own naivety speaking as if you were the infinitely wise one.
Actually, I found a flaw in my own argument that I knew was there for some time but couldn’t point it out. See, the term “greater good” only makes sense for humans and possibly humanoid alien beings (if they exist), since they are limited in their physical and mental capacities so they aren’t always able to reach good by doing just good.
For an OOO God on the other hand it makes no sense to say he seeks “greatest good” because it would imply that he is unable to do good without doing lesser evils, that he is incapable and finite, like us. This brings me to your second question.
Make up your mind. You switch between an impotent, weak god unable to accomplish good without doing evil to a supposedly INFINITE god (which I understand as ooo) when it fits you.
You can “win” the debate and prove me wrong just by staying consistent and answer this one question correctly:
Well that’s why I asked the questions, because I suspected that you were attempting to renege on previously agreed upon definitions. In a debate on a theistic god, the theist gets to define god, otherwise it is just a straw man argument. So the below definition stands:
By definition a good god accomplishes the greatest possible good.
You also agreed to this, per your following quote:
Also, I pointed out in my very first post that there were problems with some of your definitions:
The second sentence in this definition is what you have to prove, it doesn’t belong in the definition. And, the first sentence doesn’t in any way conflict with the definition that I have been using and how I am using “the greatest good”.
Up until your last post, you have used and accepted this definition:
So as the one arguing the theist side, you cannot change this definition as I have defined it.
No there are two options so it doesn’t imply any such thing. The two options are:
He is incapable of preventing X.
He is capable of preventing X but chooses not to in order to accomplish the greatest possible good (and I gave you a logical scenario that demonstrates this is possible, see following summary).
Scenario Summary
By definition, a good god is not good if he doesn’t accomplish the greatest possible good.
It is logically possible that preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for the greatest good, prevents the greatest possible good.
Therefore, god by allowing X is still good, omnipotent, and omniscient.
You need to prove that #2 is logically impossible.
And for the umpteenth time, god is not doing X, he is allowing X.
The point of debating some subject is to hopefully arrive at some truth, and I believe that it’s up to you to prove your case is true. As for consistency, it’s your definitions and interpretations that are all over the map (see above your quotes). My position hasn’t changed at all. As a matter of fact, I’m guessing that my position has remained consistent longer than you’ve been alive. And actually my position has been around way longer than I’ve been alive. There’s nothing new to it at all. And as I and others have pointed out, most professional philosophers (including atheists), dismissed your argument long ago. And for the umpteenth + 1 time, god is not doing evil.
I gave you a logical scenario which you have yet to point out why it’s logically impossible. It’s either logically possible or it’s not, that’s all that’s necessary, because if it’s logically possible, then your logical proof is false. Which I believe is the whole point of a debate on a logical proof. You need to show it’s logically impossible. Anything else is extraneous. It was never necessary for me to provide anything, the burden of proof was on you to demonstrate that you could be 100% certain that there were no other possible alternatives. And the only way you can do this is to prove that “preventing X” is equal to the “greatest possible good”. As I’ve said repeatedly, if you want to debate this on an evidential basis, start another thread.
So the answer to the two questions I asked are “Yes” by definition a good god will always accomplish the greatest possible good, and logically, a finite being cannot know with certainty what the greatest possible good is.
Therefore, as I pointed out, the only situation where you can be 100% certain that a logical inconsistency exists as claimed in your proof is for “Preventing X” to be equal to “the greatest possible good”. You can’t do that because you don’t know with certainty what “the greatest possible good” is. If X is known and “the greatest possible good” is unknown, you can’t say anything about their logical relationship, which means you can’t say “preventing X”= “the greatest possible good”.
Woah, woah, woah. What are your definitions of good and evil? How can a being that creates (causes) and/or allows evil be called good? Doesn’t fit my definition of good, since evil is opposite of good the way I see it, and I see it as a sort of a spectrum with some black, white and grey area.
If your definition of good includes a being that does evil then we REALLY have to regress to basic definitions so we can properly understand each other.
First of all, greatest good implies lesser evil being done because any other course of action would lead to greater evils. The sole concept of greatest good implies that the person is INCAPABLE of achieving good by doing exclusively good and has to resort to achieving good by doing something which could otherwise be called evil.
That is why the concept of greater good doesn’t make sense if you’re talking about an “infinite”, aka an omnipotent and omniscient being, because if a being is incapable of something it means there’s something greater than that being which is inhibiting it, and I think we agreed God is the maximally great being so there is nothing that inhibits God by definition.
You didn’t give me a scenario, you gave me a logical argument. I asked for a specific scenario, a possible real life sequence of events in which an omnipotent, omniscient God would have to do evil to achieve good. You claim it’s logically possible, so I request one simple scenario because I honestly can’t conceive what you’re talking about, it’s as if you asked me to imagine a square circle. I can’t conceive it. I explained above why I find the idea of an OOO god being forced to do evil for greater good is inconsistent.
Theists generally think that God is the prime mover, first cause, whatever you want to call it. So essentially he caused every event that ever has and ever will happen according to theism. That may seem abstract, so I’ll link this video as an analogy:
Of course there are differences between that guy who started the domino sequence and God but I think you get the general idea. The guy that caused the first domino to fall also caused the fall of the last one 5 minutes after.
I’ll think for myself if you don’t mind, and I’ll stay by my argument as long as I think it’s sound, and I still do. Admittedly, criticism does make me rethink and revise certain parts of my argument, but the core of it I think remains unchallenged.
Before I answer the rest of your last post, you have not responded as to whether or not the following is logically possible:
It is logically possible that preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for the greatest good, prevents the greatest possible good.
Logically possible or not? And if not where specifically is the logical inconsistency?
I explained why I think concept of the “greatest good” can’t apply to the OOO god, so I disagree with the premise that an OOO god is required to do minor evils for the greatest good.
If God is the greatest being, infinite, he would be capable of achieving good without doing minor evils. If he is incapable of that it means there is something greater than him that prevents him, therefore he is not infinite and not the greatest being.
