So your objection is the definition of the term “the greatest good” and how it applies to OOO god, and not that things can be logically exclusive as I have described them? I.e. preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for Z, prevents Z. Do you see this last statement as being logically possible?
Are you trying to troll me? I already said that when it comes to the OOO God I find the sole concept of the greatest good contradictory. So yes, obviously, I think your argument is futile against the OOO god, the greatest, infinite being. The greatest being is the one that decides what prevents what and what causes what. If it doesn’t do it, it’s not the greatest being since it means there’s a higher being than it which limits its actions.
EDIT: To avoid confusing you, I do think your argument is logically impossible (that’s what I meant by futile) in relation to the OOO god.
I’m clarifying my understanding of your position. You didn’t respond to the second part of my question which has nothing to do with a OOO god. “and not that things can be logically exclusive as I have described them? I.e. preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for Z, prevents Z. Do you see this last statement as being logically possible?” It’s a simple question, do you accept that things can be mutually exclusive in this way?
You also seem to be coming from a position of “strict” or “hard” determinism. Is that your position?
As I said, the greatest being decided what prevents what and what causes what. It’s not subject to lack of power or knowledge like humans, it’s not limited, it’s not finite, it’s infinite (you said it).
So your position is “strict” determinism? Yes or no?
You still didn’t answer the question. It has nothing to do with an OOO god. Is this logically possible or not?
It has EVERYTHING to do with the OOO god, or, rather, OOO god has to do with EVERYTHING.
I’ll try to explain once more.
Perhaps you’d have a decent argument if we were talking about humans. Humans are finite, limited, subject to causality of natural laws so it is possible that if a human prevents X it could start a causal chain of events which would eventually prevent Y.
An OOO god on the other hand is infinite, the greatest being, he is the one who determines and knows exactly what will cause what. If he is subject to natural laws and therefore causality the same way humans are it would mean he isn’t infinite and the greatest being conceivable as there is something greater than him which limits him, but nothing can limit and unlimited (infinite) being.
Ok, I understand your position on mutual exclusivity. What I am still unclear on is your position on determinisism. Some strict determinists believe that absolutely everything is determined by cause and effect. They believe that even sentient beings do not make independant choices or decisions, they believe it is all cause and effect activities in the brain and that any “choice” that is perceived is an illusion. All decisions are in effect pre determined by cause and effect. I am unclear based on the domino analagy and other posts you have made whether or not this is your position.
I am still undecided about it. I’d say that if I had to ascribe a label to my current position it would be a deterministically leaning compatibilist. I think that we do make choices, but those choices aren’t free and independent from physical laws.
The problems are that your definitions are based on the assumption of hard determinism which I do not accept for a logical proof. I will get into why hard determinism is unacceptable later in this response. In your definitions and in your posts you have continued to make no distinction between doing and allowing evil, treating them as synonymous until this last post above. But just so we are clear, the following are my definitions in regards to gods nature:
Your definition:
Omnibenevolent – the attribute of not unnecessarily harming others, preventing harm if possible and working to bring peace, harmony and happiness unto others. A being which either creates evil and/or lets evil be without removing it is not omnibenevolent
I pointed out in my first post that I didn’t agree with some of your definitions and this is one of them. You have not proven the second half of the second sentence (bold). You have not proven that currently allowing evil is necessarily in any way in logical conflict with a good god. And I have demonstrated the logical possibility exists that it does not. You must be 100% certain that allowing evil is a conflict, or it does not belong in the definition. It’s what you have to prove.
In addition, the word “unnecessarily” is vague and subjective. I have demonstrated that what is considered necessary can be an opinion based on one’s level of knowledge and understanding. Benevolent means “good” so your definition is rather oddly primarily focused on the opposite of good.
The theist decides on the definitions of what a good god is. You agreed with this, so the following is my definition in regards to gods nature:
By definition a good god does not do evil. (And just so it’s clear, hard or strict determinism is not an acceptable interpretation of this definition unless it is proven to be true in a logical proof)
By definition a good god accomplishes the greatest possible good.
A good god does not do anything that creates a logical inconsistency.
God is omnipotent(meaning that he can do everything that is meaningful, everything that is possible, everything that makes any sense at all)
God is omniscient
God is omnipresent
My definitions stand unless you can show a logical inconsistency in them.
This is true ONLY if hard or strict determinism is known to be true. Since hard determinism is an unproven theory, it may not be true, and therefore doesn’t provide for the 100% certainty that is required for a logical proof. Therefore all references to god doing/causing evil in any definitions and any assumptions made based on strict determinism undermine the logical proof. And theists most definitely do not accept hard determinism.
For all other positions concerning determinism and freedom of choice, the strongest statement that could be made is that a good god created the possibility for any given event. For example, if I buy a car for some good purpose, and someone steals the car and uses it to rob banks, I created the possibility of the car being stolen to rob banks by buying the car, but I am in no way responsible for robbing banks because I bought the car. They could have chosen not to steal the car and not to rob banks. 100% of the responsibility lies with the person who stole the car.
I’m not overly fond of analogies, but using your domino analogy (and under the assumption that hard determination is false), if a sentient being in any way changes or interferes with the path of the domino’s, then that person is 100% responsible for the consequences of the new path. Also, as long as the initial chosen path of the domino’s was all “good”, then the interference with the domino’s path is what caused any resulting “evil” and so any sentient being that changes the path of the domino’s is the direct cause of the resulting “evil”.
No it just means by definition that there is a lesser good(s). The “best” or “greatest” anything is merely a judgment or a statistical measurement of what is the best among members of a certain group based on some defined criteria. Once the criteria are established, the greatest good follows by definition from that criteria. The level of evil may increase, decrease or stay the same with some lesser good. A good god determines what criteria is used to determine what the greatest good is and preventing any level of evil may or not be one of the criteria. Preventing evil would only necessarily be a criteria if preventing evil IS the greatest good, or if there are multiple possible ways to achieve the greatest good and one way has less evil as a result.
Since the greatest good and the criteria that determines the greatest good are unknown, no determination can be made. Your statement above is once again making statements about the logical relationship between two things where one is known (evil) and the other is unknown (greatest good). This is logically impossible.
For example it can be known that creating nothing results in no evil since no evil is possible. Is creating nothing the greatest good? If something rather than nothing is one of the criteria for the greatest good, then by definition it is not the greatest good. If no evil is one of the criteria for the greatest good, then creating nothing is a possibility for the greatest good. But it’s impossible to know if this is the greatest good because one must know what all the criteria are for determining what the greatest good is first.
Finally to summarize, a good god decides what the criteria is for the greatest possible good and the greatest good follows by necessity from that criteria. Once again, a good god will accomplish the maximum good, not necessarily minimize the amount of X allowed. You can only be certain that there is a logical consistency if “preventing X” is equal to the “greatest good”, which you cannot be certain is the case.
No, first off, short of proving that hard determinism is true, god is not doing evil. So your statement that god is achieving good by doing evil is at best unproven, making it useless in a logical proof. You have not proven that god has done anything evil so god HAS done exclusively good until proven otherwise. Therefore god has achieved good by doing exclusively good.
Secondly, by definition god doesn’t do anything that results in logical inconsistencies.
Therefore as long as god accomplishes the greatest good without doing evil himself, or doing something that results in logical inconsistencies, he can do it any way he wants, including allowing X and it doesn’t in any way impinge on his omnipotence. The greatest good is the greatest good and it trumps everything else.
The following scenario remains logically possible:
- A good god is not good if he doesn’t achieve the greatest possible good by definition.
- It is logically possible that preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for the greatest good, prevents the greatest possible good. (see definition on god not doing anything that is logically inconsistent)
- Therefore, god by allowing X is still good, omnipotent, and omniscient.
You have yet to establish why it’s logically necessary to prevent X if the result of allowing X results in a greater good. Power restrained is not the same as not having the capability. So based on the above, you have not demonstrated that god is incapable of doing anything.
You keep using the word “implies”, possible implications don’t help you at all. I can argue possibilities you can’t. Your argument requires certainty. You have to be certain.
You failed to prove that god is incapable. But regardless of that, this argument is faulty even for a finite being. I can have the power to do something, and for other reasons choose not to exercise that power.
So the three options are:
- I am incapable of doing it. (by definition this does not apply to an omnipotent being)
- Something greater than me is preventing me. (by definition this does not apply to an omnipotent being)
- I have the power to do it, I just choose not to exercise that power, believing that not exercising that power is the best option.
The last option is the only one that also applies to god.
And regards to allowing pain and suffering, I have many, many times had the power to prevent something that my children wanted to do, that I knew would cause pain and suffering to them, others, and myself, but chose not to prevent it because I also knew that allowing it was the best way for them to learn an invaluable lesson, build their character, and therefore benefit them for the rest of their lives.
God can choose to not use his power without contradiction just as I can and have done, and by definition god doesn’t do anything that is logically inconsistent (see scenario above). So god can limit himself any way he sees fit to as long as the greatest good is accomplished.
First, I’ve explained why god is not doing evil. Secondly, this is a logical argument, that’s why I gave you a logical argument in response. You obviously understand the logic or you wouldn’t have responded as follows:
It also applies to god when there are things that are mutually exclusive because by definition god does not do anything that is logically inconsistent.
And I have now explained why god is not doing evil, and why he is not being forced to do anything, so therefore there is no inconsistency.
Show-Me I apologize for not replying to your post sooner. I was busy with college and didn’t have time to get into anything more than short exchanges about casual subjects. Perhaps I should have informed you right away, but at first I thought it will be just for a few days but days became weeks.
I will have time for further discussion now, so if you want to continue let me know.
Otherwise, I’ll just let the thread die in peace unless somebody else comes along.
I know what you mean about time, my available time seems to run in spurts and sometimes I can’t keep up either. I will leave it totally up to you as to whether want to continue.
Acknowledging that natural laws exist and that your mind is limited and bound by natural laws like everything else is acknowledging there is no “free” will in any practical sense of the word, but just because there is no “free” will doesn’t mean there is no will.
I put forward my argument why believing in God necessarily entails belief in determinism in this thread: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=187374
What it boils down to is this: God is the greatest being, greatest being is that which determines, causes everything else but itself is uncaused and undetermined by anything, otherwise it wouldn’t be the greatest being. If God is the one who created natural laws and determined how atoms interact with one another, how chemical reactions occur, if he is the one who therefore determined the design of our brains and DNA he is the one who ultimately caused all human behavior. Therefore, when us humans are judging anything, we’re judging God himself through his creation - it follows that God is an ultimate nihilist with no regard for propagating either good or evil in the classical Christian sense of the words, he causes and allows both without intervention.
Usually when Christian use the term “free will” as a defense against the Problem of Evil, what they mean is “freedom from being obstructed in acting by God”, but God isn’t a separate being like a lion or another human, he is supposedly the one who created the conditions in which we live in and designed us to the last atom - that’s why it doesn’t make sense to say we are free from being obstructed in action by God, because, as my argument above demonstrates, God is precisely the one who determined what our actions will be and what they won’t be - determining somebody means obstructing him from all other actions but the determined one.
The only question remains - How should we call the being which causes and allows both, good and evil? Traditionally it’s accepted that being good means doing only good things and maybe minor evils such as theft, but it has never been accepted to call a genocidal maniac who caused the torture, rape and murder of billions good despite of how many good he otherwise did as far as I know.
Oh, and second half of the sentence is merely a deduction that follows from the first part.
I assume your definitions rest on the premise that there is such a thing as free will for humans, but, as I said, I disagree with that. The only one who can possess free will is God himself. As I argued above, the will of humans is determined by God.
I don’t think you understood the analogy. The human in this analogy symbolizes God and the dominoes symbolize other sentient beings. This again is related to my argument for determinism above.
God being incapable is the only explanation for why he didn’t intervene which preserves any notion of moraliy and good and evil.
If you say that God is capable, morally perfect and yet he didn’t intervene when something like rape of a child happens it follows that if I want to be closer to moral perfection I shouldn’t intervene and help a child either if I’m capable, just like God, which makes absolutely no sense in light of any moral system on earth, it’s the exact opposite, inverse of what the majority of us actually deem as moral and immoral.
Is it the characteristic of a GOOD being to let innocents suffer at the hands of rapists and murderers by giving rapists and murderers freedom to act instead of preventing them doing evils? If so, then it means that all humans should strive to act more like God and never intervene to help anybody in need.
Whether God can choose to not use his power without contradiction depends on the circumstances. If he is defined as benevolent and being benevolent means using your power when you can to help others, then God not using his power is in contradiction with the attribute of benevolence, in other words it means that God can not at the same time:
- Not use his power to help others
- Be benevolent
Aka, one of these two have to be removed from the concept of a God for him to remain logically consistent (possible).
By saying it also applies to god like it does to humans you’re conceding that God is subject to causality in the same way humans are, aka that natural laws weren’t created by God, that they ontologically PRECEDE God and that natural laws created and determined God, not the other way around, so in other words, what you call God is not the greatest being possible and not omnipotent and omniscient.
All of your above argument is dependent on you being able to prove that determinism is true in regards to the human mind and consciousness, and therefore thoughts and decisions made by sentient beings are 100% predetermined by cause and effect. It’s up to you to prove this, not for me to prove that it’s not. I’m guessing the other thread is the proper forum for discussing that.
Making 2+2 = 5 is a logical mistake in the same way that doing two things at the same time that are logically mutually exclusive is a logical mistake. By definition, God does not make mistakes, therefore God does not do things that are mutually exclusive or do things that are logically inconsistent such as making 2+2=5. This is no different than saying God does not do evil because it creates a logical inconsistency based on how God is defined. This does not make God any less omnipotent because he doesn’t do evil, it makes God logically rational and consistent. Indeed, your argument is based on this very idea that God can’t do evil or he isn’t benevolent (i.e. a logical inconsistency based on how God is defined).
Therefore God is omnipotent and omniscient.
Not ALL of my argument is dependent on determinism. Nothing in the following 2 of my response to you is in contradiction with free will:
I am interested what your responses to bolded parts are because you defined god as good, but you haven’t defined good, and I’m trying to figure out what it means to be good according to you. Also, I probably should have said this before, but my argument relies on the assumption of objective morality, and since I’ve noticed that many theists ascribe to objectivist morality I thought it wouldn’t be much of an issue most of the time, but I’ve noticed that you have an oddly relativist approach so I’ll point out right now that if you truly don’t think there is an objective morality then yes, this proof against good isn’t deductive but inductive in nature.
I’m not talking about logic, but natural laws. There is nothing necessarily logically inconsistent about breaking natural laws - superheroes break natural laws all the time in their imaginary worlds.
To reiterate - natural laws affect us humans and determine/obstruct as causally, such as that if a human prevents X it would start a chain of events that would prevent Z - quite possible that it happens to humans, humans are limited by natural laws. However, if casuality of natural laws can determine and obstruct GOD, then it means that they ontologically precede God, that they weren’t created by God but the other way around, and that God isn’t the greatest being, but natural laws are.
No, it’s not the only explanation. I’ve given an example of such a scenario.
It depends not on the circumstances but on what the greatest good is. Anything that is mutually exclusive to achieving the greatest possible good is subordinate to the greatest possible good by definition.
This is a false dichotomy. I disagree with your new definition of benevolent as being “using your power when you can to help others”. I can give you many examples where not using one’s power and authority IS the most benevolent thing to do. My definition of benevolence is that “god accomplishes the greatest possible good”. Therefore, It is a possibility that god is capable of preventing X but chooses not to in order to accomplish the greatest possible good, and therefore god is limiting himself without contradiction.
Scenario Summary
A good god is not good if he doesn’t achieve the greatest possible good by definition.
It is logically possible that preventing X, prevents Y (X and Y are logically mutually exclusive), and Y being necessary for the greatest good, prevents the greatest possible good.
Therefore, god by allowing X is still good, omnipotent, and omniscient.
Evil in this world is a given that I’m not arguing, so what is evil, or levels of evil are not relevant. It’s not that I am a relativist in regard to morality, it’s that your above argument in bold is not relative to your proof. Your proof is really based on the underlying assumption that no evil is the greatest possible good, and therefore god shouldn’t do or allow any evil, including jay walking because if he is omnipotent he can prevent jay walking. Your proof is not really based on objective morality but on mutual exclusivity based on the definitions of a good god. Your argument above in bold, is a strong inductive argument, but in regards to your proof, is not relevant. You’ve got two different arguments going on at the same time, one a logical proof, one an inductive argument on objective morality.
That is why I have addressed the assumption that no evil is the greatest possible good. God doing evil of any kind by definition makes your conclusion true, they are by definition mutually exclusive. However as I have pointed out, god allowing evil does not necessarily make your conclusion true, because the logical possibility exists of something better being achieved by allowing X, because Y is necessary to achieve this greater good, and preventing X, prevents Y. If this is the case then particular evils or levels of evil are not relevant, accomplishing the greatest good trumps everything else.
Agreed, but nothing I brought up has anything to do with God not violating natural laws, it had to do with God not doing things that were illogical.
I’m not talking about God not violating natural laws, I’m talking about God not doing things that are illogical. Violating natural laws is not a mistake, making 2+2=5 is a logical error, a mistake. 2+2=4 is true regardless of natural laws and in every universe possible. Things that are mutually exclusive are the same way. As a matter of fact some mathematical proofs establish mutual exclusivity to prove the equation. A good God does not do evil ever, at any time or in any universe, because it’s mutually exclusive per the definition of a good God. Isn’t that the basis of your poof, that it’s illogical for a good God to do evil, it’s illogical because it’s mutually exclusive? Your argument on determinism is also an argument based on mutual exclusivity. One can’t be free to choose and not free to choose at the same time, always and everywhere, and regardless of natural laws.
That example doesn’t apply to God. There is no such thing as God being stopped to do X if he did Y as it would imply God (or, more accurately, what you call God) is limited by natural laws as much as humans are, which would consequently mean he isn’t the creator, omnipotent, omniscient and, consequently, not God.
I think you still don’t understand my point.
I’ll give you a very specific example. If God doesn’t intervene when Josef Fritzl rapes his children for 20 years in his basement and you call such a being who doesn’t intervene good, saying that he did it for “the greatest good”, do you at least realize that goes against every moral system on earth? If God is to serve as the perfect example of somebody doing the greatest good, it would mean that if there was a human who knew what Josef Fritzl was doing and didn’t report him, that human also did the good thing, in fact, not only the good thing, but the greatest good, and that if a person reported and tried to put a stop to Fritzl that person would be less good than the person who didn’t do it. According to you, if humans are to look up to God as a moral guide they aren’t allowed to judge anything as evil because God allows everything and he is the perfect, infallible standard of good.
Basically what you’re advocating, whether you’re aware of it or not, is sort of a theistic moral nihilism, where everything is permitted.
If you truly hold that the bolded part is true, can you please provide me with at least one example of where God preventing X would prevent the thing required for greatest good, Y? I disagree with that premise since I can’t think of a single situation when God himself would be limited like a normal human would be.
Not really. I conceded that humans, who are imperfect, have to sometimes do things which would otherwise be deemed as evil if they weren’t for the greater good, such as pulling out a rotten teeth and causing child pain in order to avoid causing the child greater pain.
But something like that only applies to humans - God could have designed nature differently and in such a way for teeth not to get rotten so that they would never cause pain to a child. God isn’t limited like a human is. God to this world is what humans are to the imaginary worlds they create, except that God is much more intelligent, powerful and superior to humans in every way, so if he realizes his imaginary world and he is perfect, there should be no mistakes in his world either.
Exclusivity when it comes to definitions of moral terms can only exist if morality itself is objective, otherwise there would be no objective basis upon which to exclude and it would all come down to induction.
And I am pointed out to you the problem with this kind of reasoning in my Fritzl example.
Another interesting thought - if laws of logic ultimately limit God, then God again isn’t omnipotent, omniscient and infinite, the greatest being - he is constrained by laws of logic, which are then the greatest being, the ultimate abstract principles which govern all which exist and doesn’t exist.
Before I can respond to the rest of your post, I need to know what your position is on the following question and why:
Can a good god do evil? Why or why not?
If a god does evil then he is not good, but evil. Calling a god that does evil “good” would therefore be outright false.
Can an evil god do good? Why or why not?