Question for D.

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

Dunamis,

Of course this topic is open to whomever, once the ball gets rolling; however, the first question, or series of them, is posed to Dunamis.

I have been reading your concepts and believe that I understand and agree with your concepts almost to the point where I have nothing to say about them. From my frame of reference it appears that you are proposing a Chomskyesque/cognitive behavioral/phenomenological point of view that indicates reality is due to a semi-shared yet largely idiosyncratic bio-linguistic experience. That’s how I take it and that is what I believe as well.

However, as a person that is interested in philosophies of living, or I suppose ethics, I say—who cares. I don’t say this aggressively, but out of concern for having some set of principles by which to live. So, how do you believe that your much defended ideas could be presented to the “average” man as a guide to living? Can they? Should they? If not then what’s the point?

I ask this question because many of your ideas, and my own, related to the subject leave me rather cold. As I said in another thread, there is a “now” that we all share, but that really seems to be covered by layers of very affective subjectivity created by the human thought process. This stuff seems to be the “heat” of the world.

What are your thoughts?

2

Adler.

Well firstly they are not “Chomskyesque” because they defy the use of essentializing rules, a foundational structure to either knowledge of the world or language use. But the consequence of this is that because there is no referential core “truth” to refer to, no “objective” real, apart from those determined by concensus, one cannot appeal to “authority”, be it “God” or the “material world the way it really is” in order to tell others, or ourselves, what should be done. The consequences of this are that the very act of “knowing”, knowing really anything in the world, including ourselves, is a communal act, that our definitions stem from the confirmation reality of others, and that how we treat others, how we normatively include or exclude, prescribe and compell, determines the foundation of how we describe, how the world will appear to us. There are other aspects of this communality of the epistemic that I am working on tentatively, but these aspects alone bring our focus upon the very human relations we have ourselves, rather than the “out there” and “apparent” world that seems to dominate our lives, a world that is in in the end, ideological.

If none of these - the nature of our communal-concensus sense, the nature of how things “objectively” seem to be - are things that you would care about, I would have to know what are the things you do care about, in order to answer your question.

Dunamis

3

Firstly, I brought up Chomsky not because of his ideas about syntax but because of his general idea that humans are “language” and are driven by an internal language mechanism. These ideas are opposed to the thoughts of behaviorists that believed that language is just the result of a stimulus/response and operant conditioning to sound combinations. Anyway, that’s why I said “esque” because I get the impression that you believe the state of being “human” is in part due to the function of a linguistic biological mechanism. The Helen Keller comments proved this to me.

Additionally, as I think about it you almost have a Buddhist flare, but that’s just a side note.

You: If none of these are things that you would care about, I would have to know what are the things you do care about, in order to answer your question.

Well, I am less concerned about what I care about and more concerned what you care about. My original question relates to the application of your ideas to living. How, for instance, would your philosophy help one conduct themselves in the world or approach a relationship with another? I’m curious if your concepts translate into applied living such as the stoic, Epicurean, or Nietzschian philosophies do, or are they simply epistemological, if “simply” is a righteous word there.

As you said, you are developing your ideas, and if you do not have a ready answer, then that’s understandable. Balthazar Gracian mentioned that one has to beware of showing too much of an unfinished work of art for fear of destroying the mystery behind it.

4

Adler.,

How, for instance, would your philosophy help one conduct themselves in the world or approach a relationship with another? I’m curious if your concepts translate into applied living such as the stoic, Epicurean, or Nietzschian philosophies do, or are they simply epistemological, if “simply” is a righteous word there.

Well in relationship to one another I would privilege a bodily sense of what community between others is. It is the production of a consonant body, both on the interpersonal level, and at the societal level. As a body there is a primary mechanism of assimilation, whereby the “different” is assimilated so as to change the “knowing” subject itself. Following Campanella, one becomes what one knows. In this way learning about the world is an act of intimacy and contact, but understandably there are limits to how and who one is to becomes, without facing a kind of damage. As to the greater narratives of ethical choice, I am moved by Nietzsche freedom of self-creation, but put off by his solitary conception of power as something cut off, in a particular way, from the power of others, with which one always must be in assemblage. The stoic position has great influence in two ways, one in how it manifested itself in the person and the philosophy of Spinoza, who wrote and lived unfathomably close to his ideas, and two in its similarity to Taoism, which more than any other basic description, seems to “get it right” to me. But the influences and models are rather much more diverse than those. The foundational, law-surpassing Christian ethics of Paul, the Immanent sense of Being of Plotinus. It all folds together.

Dunamis

5

Dunamis: Well in relationship to one another I would privilege a bodily sense of what community between others is. It is the production of a consonant body, both on the interpersonal level, and at the societal level.

So, are you saying that our physical mechanism for acquiring knowledge is the same, thus we are all in a relationship with others regardless of our perception of reality?

Dunamis It is the production of a consonant body, both on the interpersonal level, and at the societal level.

I understand this to mean that new “knowledge” and experience actual forms a neuro-chemical change that reconfigures your body. So, if one could take a picture of these changes we could see a new person for every new experience or perhaps correlated pictures of people that have had similar experiences.

If I’m on target here your ideas speak volumes about mental health and against much of the current paradigm.

Dunamis Following Campanella, one becomes what one knows. In this way learning about the world is an act of intimacy and contact, but understandably there are limits to how and who one is to becomes, without facing a kind of damage.

I have no idea if you have expanded this thought as of yet, but I think that it would be really worth doing. I think that the idea would be central to a ethic of living. However, since I’m not you I don’t know what that ethic would be.

So, what would you see or define as damage?

On a personal note, I think that if you ever decided to publish a full philosophy, and it was written in accessible terms, you would have both a moving and yet somewhat frightening (to some) work on your hands.

Good stuff.

6

Adler.,

So, are you saying that our physical mechanism for acquiring knowledge is the same, thus we are all in a relationship with others regardless of our perception of reality?

All “knowing” is diasomatic, which is to say that it is a relation of the body to itself, and the body in relation to other bodies, which in the case of sentient beings, is also diasomatic, so yes, regardless of perception, bodies are in relation. This is the difference between “essence” and “relational” thinking.

if one could take a picture of these changes we could see a new person for every new experience or perhaps correlated pictures of people that have had similar experiences.

Interesting metaphor, but there is no such “picture taking”, no set of physical descriptions to which intentional vocabularies will be reduced.

I have no idea if you have expanded this thought as of yet, but I think that it would be really worth doing. I think that the idea would be central to a ethic of living. However, since I’m not you I don’t know what that ethic would be.

This thought is perhaps the core of my philosophical project, though I seldom address it directly, as I am seeking bridges to it from diverse philosophical positions. So far I have found some homologies in the epistemologies of Spinoza, with his theories of adequate ideas, and with Davidson, and his theory of triangulation, anomalous monism and attributed mental predicates. I do think it has far-reaching consequences for living, in the everyday sense.

So, what would you see or define as damage?

Overtly dissonance that leads to the dis-continuity of a body, but the question is so subtle because the identity of a body – as essence – is in conflict with the identity of a body, as relations. The boundaries are fluid and in some sense, there is no such thing as damage if the properly wide enough perspective is taken. The irreparable damage of cocooned cells in a caterpillar’s body, after all do not lead to its death, but its genetically identical, yet phonologically different expression as a butterfly. How much of “damage” is the insightless mourning of caterpillars, and how much the regrettable end of a lifeform?

Thanks for the kind words,

Dunamis

7

Dunamis,
Your general philosophical position seems well-thought out and interesting. You make a few interesting points about the effect of language, social interactions, and our own personal expectations in what we percieve as “knowledge” and “understanding”. However, in a general sense, my question for you is how much of your view can be summarized as a general anti-realist position with respect to most forms of knowledge, with a tinge of philosophical skepticism? I know you go deeper than this, so treat this as a, largely, a superficial question.

~Kevin

8

M.,

I suppose my position generally is epistemologically anti-Realist (if the term can be applied in a non-reflectional view of language) - neo Pragmatic, neo-Darwinian -, within a larger Spinozian monist Immanent conception the Real, based on possibly a Plotinusian reading of gradated Being, at least loosely so those are my parameters.

Dunamis

9

Although it is true that your view concerns not only reality but what we mean by reality, the basis of your view relies upon an innate denial of realism which most would hold as the basic tenet of all strong forms of anti-realism (take solipsism and “strong” scientific empiricism for example). Although your philosophy makes use of the effects our language-based description of reality has upon our perception of that very reality, I would still say your are still strongly an epistemological anti-realist. Thus the note about how we describe that anti-realism is unnecessary to your stance as an anti-realist. However, it is very important to everything else.

Let me see if I can summarize the view expressed in that sentence. :slight_smile:
Your view, given your strong epistemological anti-realist stance, is that largely “consciousness”, or some related concept, is the only substance that exists. Everything else merely results from our social interactions and descriptions (ie., language) of different aspects of that “consciousness”, including individualism, science, and everything about reality including all the traditional ontological elements. The view that systems of knowledge like science, math, and religious systems, are all purely social constructs based on this “consciousness” monistic entity, is a logical consequence of your philosophy.
But how is all this different from a form of solispsism where you are merely “part” of the solipsist’s “consciousness”?

Also, I have some questions about the use of some of your terms. Forgive me if you have defined your usage elsewhere on ILP.

Neo-darwinism: How are you using this view? This is a purely biological view. One could use natural selection in a philosophical sense, which has gained popularity recently, take Dennet for instance (cite “Darwin’s dangerous idea”), but neo-darwinism contains more than just natural selection. It also contains clearly biological concepts like genetic drift and speciation. How are you using these terms in a philosophical sense? If you are largely refering to natural selection, then how are you using that?

Neo-pragmatisism: How is your view different from regular pragmatisism? Do you take your view from a general neo-pragmatisism movement? I have seen this term used a few times in my travels, but sadly its meaning is always taken for granted.

Spinozian monist Immanent conception the Real: (hah, I wish I could break this into smaller chunks, lol) Spinoza generally held that god was immanent where as you place emphasis on a (or the) “consciousness”. I do not recall you stating this explicitly, but do you mean to say that god is or possesses this “consciousness”, or is a label for the “consciousness”? If it has nothing to do with a god in any traditional sense, then what does it have to do with Spinoza?
By “monist immanent conception”, do you mean to say that the one substance, which I have been refering to as the “consciousness” is “the Real” or “the Real” is contained within this consciousness?

Plotinusian reading: I am not too familiar with Plotinus, so whatever my comments are based on what I get from his wikipedia entry en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plotinus . From what I gather, there seems to be a strong conception of a state/entity (it does not help that the word “being” is used to describe this, lol) that is transcendant, as in above all other things. To me it seems that this is completely logically inconsistent with anything I understood above. Your monist tendencies would have you describe everything as the same thing. How then can something transcend this? If that something is the same thing that everything is then how can that something be everything and possibly transcend itself (everything)? These thoughts are harder to phrase as a “state” as opposed to the “entity” part, but I believe the basic gist will still hold.

gradated Being: Again, wikipedia indicates that this may be a Plotinus concept in the same link. Beyond that I have no idea what this means. Anything that I can think of, does not seem to work with what I understand of your philosophy. Perhaps this indicates, as you will may likely soon note, that I have absolutely misjudged your philosophy.

That’s all I got for tonight. Great talking with you Dunamis. I hope to hear from you soon.

~Kevin

10

m.,

is that largely “consciousness”, or some related concept, is the only substance that exists.

I think I put less emphasis on “consciousness” than you think I do, at least in the way the term is usually used as a kind of mystico-magic spiritual word, that answers all questions. Key is understanding the possibility of pantheism and degrees of panpsychism, and also the prospect of gradations of Being.

How are you using this view?

Language is an evolutionary development, and therefore should be treated morphologically rather than in terms of representational content accuracy.

How is your view different from regular pragmatisism?

It makes the linguistic turn with Wittgenstein (and Kuhn).

Do you take your view from a general neo-pragmatisism movement?

Rorty is the strongest proponent, Dennett’s conceptions of the mind are influential, as are the neo-pragmatist appropriations of Quine and Davidson’s thinking. Habermas is interesting here as well.

Spinoza generally held that god was immanent where as you place emphasis on a (or the) “consciousness”.

For Spinoza God is everything. The total. Every piece of everything. Consciousness, as you refer to it, would only be one aspect of the entire panpsychic whole, which as Campanella suggests is a huge and perfect animal.

By “monist immanent conception”, do you mean to say that the one substance, which I have been refering to as the “consciousness” is “the Real” or “the Real” is contained within this consciousness?

For Spinoza the whole is one substance that expresses itself in two (of an infinite number of) attributes, Idea and Extension, which unfold in parallel.

How then can something transcend this?

From Plotinus I take the possibility of gradations of Being, instead of an uniform “Being” and its antipode “Not Being”. Things in greater connection have greater being, those in less, less. Monism in gradations of Being is something I am exploring.

You should understand that these are not positions I hold, but vectors of thought I argue from and towards, weaving from these truths as I understand them. I sense their unity, but I am also exploring their unity as I am able to discover it. The result is a series of nested, yet still inter-related arguments, of which each rests within larger perspectives or understandings. All still in process. There are of course other vectors as well, political, psychoanalytic, biological. It really hard to generalize because it is just a series of ideas coming into contact with each other and producing a point of view each time a question is asked, and then answered. It is never answered in my mind in exactly the same way twice.

Dunamis

11

Hmm, I will have to ponder over your reply later. One thing I did notice is that the hue of solipsism remains (because of your stated monistic and anti-realistic tendencies, amongst other things); although now the hue is a sophisticated form of solipsism devoid of any mystical tendencies. Can you please directly address how your view differs from merely being a convoluted form of solipsism?

thanks~
~Kevin

12

I see no solipsism at all. In fact the connectivity required by Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language, and the fluctuation of self-defining borders in Spinoza pretty much makes solipsism a definitional impossibility. There is no “self” other than the construction of relations.

As to being “convoluted”, does this just mean you don’t understand me? Or that you think you do understand me, but my thoughts don’t correspond close enough to “standardized” solipsism, or whatever solipsism would be non-convoluted in your view? What is a “hue” of solipsism?

Dunamis

13

Hah, no, sorry. I was trying to contrast with an extreme view of solipsism. No insult was intended. What I asked for is what I asked for, and that was for you to contrast against a convoluted form of solipsism. I think you have at least begun doing that in your reply. I will have to read it in more depth later to make an accurate assessment and reply.

~Kevin

14

Hey D,

The other day I was in the bookstore looking for Dennett, as you have mentioned him before. I found several of his books and began glancing through Consciousness Explained and it appeared to be close to the heart of his core ideas. Is it?

Also, do you recommend reading it, or what. Personally, I was surprised by the book as his style seems to favor humor as a means of teaching. I think that that’s great for such a complex topic.

What are your thoughts.

15

Adl.

Consciousness Explained is probably the best core of his thinking. Dennett is one of the foremost philosophers of the Mind, and has the added dimension of actually being involved in AI research, rather than just philosophizing like the rest of us.

Dunamis

16

I didn’t know about the AI research. My guess about AI is that what needs to be done is to created a simulated thought process, which would mostly consist of heuristics and if/then statements, by that’s just me. I belive that AI research that has the thing trying to “learn” is not going to go anywhere.

As I said, he seems like a guy that trys to make the subject fun, at least in that book, and you have to admire that. It looks like good stuff.

17

Adl,

As I said, he seems like a guy that trys to make the subject fun, at least in that book, and you have to admire that. It looks like good stuff.

I am often disappointed in the depth of his thinking, because that is the stuff I usually like, the interpenetration of conceptual linkages. He rather provides excellent metaphors, new ways of conceiving of things in ways one might never have thought of in this way. Very compelling experiments in thought. He is a kind of horizontal thinker, excellent for putting things in a new light.

Dunamis

18

I am often disappointed in the depth of his thinking, because that is the stuff I usually like, the interpenetration of conceptual linkages.

That’s why I wanted to ask you about that specific book. It seemed so light-hearted that I wanted to make sure that it was worth reading. However, I didn’t want to discounted just for that reason. If I were to write a book on some subject you can bet that there would be much goofiness in it to counter the seriousness. Anyway, I plan on picking it up this week.

19

Adl,

As long as you don’t ask too much from it, it will be all right. I take from Dennett a general metaphor of the mind, and some of the points he has made in his essays. I think his co-editor on Minds-Eye, Douglas Hofstadter was a more interesting thinker, as he showed in Gödel, Escher, Bach. I do know that the poster “pragmatist” seemed to find Consciousness Explained very interesting, and in fact recommended it often, and he’s not so flighty a thinker.

Dunamis

20

Adl,

Thanks for stirring me up on Dennett, because sometimes I forget him and he falls to the wayside. Here is an on-line source for the Center for Cognitive Studies position papers and such, which may contain more meaty stuff - for instance I just printed out his “Who’s of First?: Heterophenomenology Explained”, which seems rather interesting, and something I’d like to read. Anyway something here might give you a taste of his thinking without having to spend on a book.

ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incpages/publctns.shtml

Dunamis