[size=150]wings beat at
invisible walls.
learn to love the bottle[/size]
I found this whilst trawling the net. It’s probably a good note to start on. Not because it connects specifically to the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, in particular, but rather because it is a common theme for many readings of the later Wittgenstein in general.
It is moreover not necessarily trivially true or accurate in its characterization. Therefore it should prove food for thought. I personally equivocate on its validity. In a recent conversation, I was supposed to have imparted to Wittgenstein a sort of covert Hegelianism. In light of more recent reading, I am able to clarify this somewhat, and show perhaps why this description is itself somewhat misleading.
My intuition was rather more banal. Take this passage from the conclusion of Davidson’s On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme:
I think it is the logic of this passage which we need to come to terms with, and keep in mind when reading Wittgenstein. I will also be keeping in mind a satire of Wittgenstein which I read once, where he is given to say;
“I may or may not be a behaviourist in disguise.”
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In any case, one of the things I will look to do with Wittgenstein’s book is place it into conversation with Davidson, amongst others. Without further ado then, here is the first section from the book, which I think we should probably spend 2 or 3 days on, or thereabouts.
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Allow me to take a break from typing for a little while. Then I will come back and post some thoughts, if I can muster anything worthwhile.
“It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.”
May I try at an interpretation? I may… I think that W is trying to say that the same way that the shopkeeper looks up “red” on a table in this scenario is similar to the process of one’s mind. A person “looks up” what certain sounds or images (the letters that spell out red) associate with in his memory banks. The table that the shopkeeper apeals to in this senario is analogous to the associations made from previous experiences that are stored in our memory… Any comments?
I would sooner say, in light of W’s description of the so-called ‘Augustinian picture of language’, that the primary theme of this passage is in the idea that not all words have object-meanings seperate from the ‘context’ in which they are utilized, and that, furthermore, our inclination towards thinking that they do is inspired by our unreflected-upon tendency to view one particular kind of word/meaning, one particular language game, as somehow more fundamental than all the rest, and then set out to reduce the rest to this putatively more fundamental type.
I think he is more concerned, in this particular passage, with focusing on how we conceive of the nature of meaning and the ‘objectification’ of word usage, than with attempting any ‘cognitive’ or ‘behaviouristic’ accounts of actions and intent. Whether he would rule these things out though, I imagine, is a question which we may still consider, and attempt to answer. Yet I am not sure that this is what W is getting at right now.
Actually if I were to venture a response on Wittgenstein’s behalf, I would say that we do not necessarily conjure a little picture in our minds of what ‘red’ is, and then employ it in order to comply with a command or request. If this happens it is not intensional and so belongs on another level of discourse. What W would do is probably stress the contextualisation that takes place when we apply our memory of past instances of our use of ‘red’, to a current situation.
I would though appreciate it if you think there is some significance in this passage which I have missed, and can explain it to me.
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One question which arises though is; what class of words does have object/meanings? Two responses would be;
(1) Names as rigid designators. (Kripke)
(2) None, in the sense that object/meanings are really just relatively more trans-contextual instances of context-dependent cultural-posits. (Probably Quine)
Davidson’s third dogma, as I read it, seems to antagonise against both of these options, in the sense that the ‘object’ is neither rigidly designated as having a necessary identity, nor is it the result of ‘ever renewed realignment of theory to the tribunal of experience’.
Woah… I feel like youve gone far too far James… I dont see any of what youve said in that passage alone… Can you show me the specific process by which you extrapolated those ideas you wrote?
Also, I think W is trying to stress the utility of language here, by the last few sentences:
"“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’? - Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to end somewhere. - But what is the meaning of the word “five”? - No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used.”
I imagine that W will go on to define language in terms of its uses somewhere along the line. Im only guessing, but if I were to continue this I would say something like: “five” means or is defined by how it is used" or something along those lines…
Though can some one explain what you think W means when he says this:
You will understand that, from the part of my response beginning; ‘Actually if I were to venture a respone on W’s behalf…’, I am deliberately seeking to go beyond the ‘limitations’ of this particular passage. It was simply a thought experiment, given that what we are doing is not merely some philological exercise. So long as we are clear as to what we consider to be ‘in the text’, and what not, this to me does not seem like a problem, but rather part of the process, of what we should be aiming at here.
In any case, as for the first part of my response, I maintain that it is ‘in the text’, and quite clearly. The first section of what Wittgenstein writes gives a description of a particular way of conceiving of what he calls the ‘essence’ of language - a conceiving which he imparts to Augustine and which we can therefore call the ‘Augustinian picture of language’.
The theme is to do with the extent to which language is taught ostensively.
We do not learn language exclusively by pointing to the objects which words refer to, and then, solely based on this, learning to “express our desires”. You are quite right that Wittgenstein will later claim that ‘the meaning of a word is in its use’. This is in section 43.
But let’s stick to section one for the moment.
The example of the shopkeeper indicates that not every word necessarily has meaning solely by virtue of its relation to some object. ‘Apple’ points to an object; however the shopkeeper does not point to ‘a five’, but rather uses ‘five’ to quantify ‘apple’. The entire context, in which the shopkeeper receives the slip of paper with the words on it, defines the meaning they shall have. Some words are explained by pointing to the bearer, Wittgenstein says, but others having their meaning by virtue of their use. Not every word can be explained by pointing to some object.
Faced with the words ‘five’ ‘red’ and ‘apples’, the shopkeeper makes the first two apply to the last. We do not say ‘apple(s) five(s)’ or ‘apple(s) red(s)’ but ‘five apples’ and ‘red apples’. If the meaning is not always correlated with some object, then there must be different kinds, or categories, of word.
The idea that every word has a meaning which is its object is disputed here. Wittgenstein says this is only true of names, which is one category of word. The use of ‘red’ and ‘five’ in the example indicates that they do not function in this way, and so belong to different categories.
‘Red’ functions differently to ‘five’; this is shown in that, with our five apples, we can say ‘red’, but not ‘five’, of each individually.
The important passage is this;
In any case, this is my reading of this passage. I apologise if I am going beyond the limits of what you consider to be ‘justifiable’ interpretation. Because I have already read a large portion of this book, it is difficult for me to judge and distinguish between levels of intertextual contextualisation.
The thought crossed my mind as I typed. Though as you say the context here has determined that ‘five’ and ‘red’ are not to function as objects. The context will indeed be ‘everything’, yet what we mean when we say ‘context’ itself is not some infinitesimal point; it is a more complicated and more inclusive boundary. Wittgenstein may have been a ‘closet deconstructionist’ - in fact I have seen books expounding this idea - though I have not read them. A more interesting (and related) question, for me, is whether Wittgenstein adhered to Davidson’s third dogma or not. (as I mentioned in brief above)
Actually an even more interesting idea - though it is less relevant here - is how many deconstructionists adhere to this dogma, implicitly.
I’d say Wittgenstein became a deconstructionist as he progressed. His earlier work in places resembles and even once or twice references Saussure’s linguistics. Derrida does in one interview refer to Wittgenstein as the ‘first deconstructionist’.
At this early stage in the text I think Wittgenstein is simply questionning the Augustinian model of language, questionning whether it is valid to view all language how one views simple names. The passage James highlighted as imporant,
demonstrates that Wittgenstein’s concern with the Augustinian model is that we might assume all words share some inherent status as names, as signifiers in the most basic and literal sense, and that language encompasses so much more than this.
The following passage:
demonstrates that the utterance itself (in this case written) “five red apples” does not itself suffice for meaning to be adequately conveyed, for the aim to be achieved, for the use to be successful. This lack of being complete implies the need for something else, implies the deconstruction, the deferral onto something other that Imp mentioned.
I would say that Wittgenstein, and most deconstructionists, would adhere to the first part of the dogma, that the object is not rigidly designated as having a necessary identity, with few difficulties or questions. That the object is not the result of ever-evolving theory is a more difficult question. It would make of the ‘ever renewed realingment of theory to the tribunal of experience’ the context on which the ‘object’ would depend, would it not?
Thanks for the response. The info on Wittgenstein and deconstruction was illuminating.
I will assume that you mean Davidson’s third dogma, though I did not say that ‘adherence’ to the dogma was literally synonymous with denying ‘that the object is rigidly designated’ etc etc. The dogma is the scheme/content distinction. My point was that it, at least in Davidson’s own view, it seems to agitate against Quine himself, for not correctly appropriating the consequences of his own arguments in Two Dogmas.
It is this section from my original Davidson quote which is most important;
This is the theme which I will be pursuing as we go through PI.
I am not entirely sure what you are saying here. So you will forgive me if my response is misdirected. It is this; 'no, it would not. Not necessarily, in any case. The coherence of the notion of the ‘tribunal of experience’ is precisely what is here in question. I joke to myself that Davidson has fixed the incomplete Aufhebung of Quine’s argument against analyticity. That is the sense in which Dunamis earlier said that I had read Wittgenstein as a kind of Hegelian. He’s not, though. What I meant was that he begins a certain movement without properly finishing it. In any case, it was only a conjecture in the dark. The relation between Davidson and Quine though is perhaps a little clearer. Davidson seems to call Quine out on retaining the notion of ‘experience’ even though, after dissolving the distinction which gave birth to it (analytic/synthetic), it was no longer, as a concept, ‘complete’/‘coherent’. Like Mozart’s 24th without the awesome allegretto.
There was a medieval motto, Unum nomen, unum nominatum" “For every name, a thing named”. It seems to be this motto that lurks behind Augustine’s theory of language. And it is exactly this, that Wittgenstein is attacking. The theory is that all words are names, and there is something that every name names. Furthermore, the meaning of every word (or name) is what that word (name) names.
Not all words are names. Only nouns or noun phrases are names. For instance, the word, “although” is not a name. It is not even a noun or a noun phrase. The word, “although” has of course meaning, but since it is not a name, its meaning cannot be what it names. So no theory of meaning can take the Augustinian form of the meaning of a word is what the word names.
In the second place, even in the case of names, there are names that do not name anything, since what they are supposed to name does not exist. Thus, the term “unicorn” is a noun. But there are no unicorns.
1 and 2 lead to the famous distinction made by the German logician and philosopher between meaning and reference, “Sinn and Bedeutung”. Meaning (Sinn) is not reference (Bedeutung). For, to recapitulate. There are meaningful terms which are non-referential. (“Although”) And, even referential terms fail to refer. (“Unicorn”)
Hence, a theory of meaning separate from a theory of reference is called for. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein proposed the “use” theory of meaning. Namely, the meaning of a term lies in its use in the language.
I think you are exactly right in your reading of the passage. The idea of the look-up-able, kept and defining standard (example) which cannot be used to measure itself, (how long is the standard metre in Paris?), I believe is central to Wittgenstein’s move. [Edit: yet I should also say that Wittgenstein is pointing to aspect of language use that goes beyond such strict example using, which he developes into the concept of the “game”.] I as yet do not have my copy so I can’t really comment further, as I would like to approach this slowly. I’ll have to step in later.
It is interesting as well, because R.T.'s exemplification bears much resemblance to Searle’s Chinese Room Experiment.
So can keep my eye on your main Davidson point in my reading, are you saying that Wittgenstein and Davidson are in tension here in terms of scheme, or in some consonance?
Actually the statement about the meter ruler has been contested in two ways; one, it has been argued that Wittgenstein was not asserting the statement in question; and two, that if he was he would have been wrong.
Have a look at this if you like for an (critical) overview of the second view, which belongs to Kripke;
I am starting with ‘tension’ - we will see how strong a hypothesis this is.
I might see how you mean this, but perhaps you could be more exact, so that I might examine it more closely. In what way do you see that Wittgenstein is advocating a scheme/content foundation, if indeed the language games are all translatable into one another (a pre-requisite for Davidson), and seemingly historically contingent? If these are questions are premature for your point, they can wait till further in the reading. But if you have a very clear idea of Wittgenstein’s “scheme”, let me know so that I can watch out for it.
Have a look at this if you like for an (critical) overview of the second view, which belongs to Kripke;
a). This is not really the point to start arguing the Paris metre question.
b). If you are going to use Kripke’s widely acknowledged (mal)appropriation of Wittgenstein throughout this thread, I’m not sure I can discuss things in too much depth, because I do not follow what I can tell of Kripke’s “interpretation”.
c). The distinction between signification and exemplification I think is rather well founded in terms of Wittgenstein’s established method of reasoning. I think this distinction follows him all the way from the Tractatus.
Sorry nothing clear as yet - I was orienting more to the haiku at the beginning of this thread than anything specific in PI. I will be searching for an equivalent to ‘experience’ - any non-linguistic equivalent to Davidson’s single conceptual scheme which would ground, or could ground, any form of conceptual relativity. The idea has been in my head since I just read Davidson’s paper last night, and it gave me some new words to articulare my ‘Hegelianism’ thesis, vis-a-vis Wittgenstein.
Actually the interesting thing is that Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein here is contested in such a way that Wittgenstein’s original intention now moves into line with Kripke’s ‘misinterpretation’ - i.e. Wittgenstein is held to argue what Kripke argues against Wittgenstein, and so the end up saying the same thing, though for different reasons.
But no, I am not able to apply a ‘Kripkean’ reading of the book, as Kripke does not analyse the whole book, and what he does analyse, I am not sufficiently familiar with.
