Reality Is Only A "Sauron-shape" Of A Person's Consciousness


So great was the horror of his approach that Huan leaped aside. Then Sauron sprang upon Luthien; and she swooned before the menace of the fell spirit in his eyes and the foul vapour of his breath. But even as he came, falling she cast a fold of her dark cloak before his eyes; and he stumbled, for a fleeting drowsiness came upon him. Then Huan sprang. There befell the battle of Huan and Wolf-Sauron, and howls and baying echoed in the hills, and the watchers on the walls of Ered Wethrin across the valley heard it afar and were dismayed. But no wizardry nor spell, neither fang nor venom, nor devil’s art nor beast-strength, could overthrow Huan of Valinor; and he took his foe by the throat and pinned him down. Then Sauron shifted shape, from wolf to serpent, and from monster to his own accustomed form; but he could not elude the grip of Huan without forsaking his body utterly.

-J.R.R. Tolkien, The Simarillion

Existence demonstrates itself and appears only in the form of a person—a first-person subject of experience that can only view itself outwardly in the form of a representative “avatar” that is a visualized, auditorially heard, tactilely felt, etc. body that seems to “cover” and “conceal” the invisible, intangible consciousness of the person. The “avatar” renders the invisible consciousness “visible” to others. The subject’s inner life consists of an ever-changing array of invisible, intangible thoughts and feelings. Surrounding the subject of experience besides that part of its “avatar” appears to visual perception absent a mirror is an ever-changing array of objects that surround and are oriented toward the subject in the form of how each object appears to the subject’s point of view.

Godless death, however (which the author denies but admires as the ultimate logic-tool that fatally punctures belief the brain creates consciousness and belief in the existence of mind-independent, not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of the content of visual perception in the external world), negatively reveals that visual objects, bodies of other persons, and environments perceived by a subject of experience are not things distinct in terms of substance from the subject, but are constructs extending from the subject composed of the subject’s own subjective experience.

Godless death or belief in godless death is the best tool one can use to “demonstrate” the above. If the brain creates consciousness and consciousness ceases to exist at death, the objects, bodies of other persons, and environments a person perceives at the moment one dies ceases to exist because these are experience-composed phantoms generated by the brain and only exist when and while the brain functions. Experienced or perceived objects, bodies of other persons, environments, and events, therefore, are not be one and the same as their purportedly existing external world-dwelling doppelgangers as these do not “come from” the brain as they purportedly exist outside the brain, skull, and perimeter of the body of a brain-containing organism, and as such are unaffected by and do not cease to exist in response to cessation of function of the brain.

Regardless of whether or not one believes the brain creates consciousness, the objects perceived by a person must be entirely fabricated entities made up purely of the subjective experience of the person “perceiving” or experiencing the objects.

What, then, is consciousness, given this conceptual revelation? David J. Chalmers in his paper: Facing Up To The Problem of Consciousness unambiguously defines consciousness as experience (the “hard” problem of consciousness):

The easy problems and the hard problem

There is not just one problem of consciousness. “Consciousness” is an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena. Each of these phenomena needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than others. At the start, it is useful to divide the associated problems of consciousness into “hard” and “easy” problems. The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods.
The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
• the reportability of mental states;
• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
• the focus of attention;
• the deliberate control of behavior;
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

All of these phenomena are associated with the notion of consciousness. For example, one sometimes says that a mental state is conscious when it is verbally reportable, or when it is internally accessible. Sometimes a system is said to be conscious of some information when it has the ability to react on the basis of that information, or, more strongly, when it attends to that information, or when it can integrate that information and exploit it in the sophisticated control of behavior. We sometimes say that an action is conscious precisely when it is deliberate. Often, we say that an organism is conscious as another way of saying that it is awake.

There is no real issue about whether these phenomena can be explained scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. To explain access and reportability, for example, we need only specify the mechanism by which information about internal states is retrieved and made available for verbal report. To explain the integration of information, we need only exhibit mechanisms by which information is brought together and exploited by later processes. For an account of sleep and wakefulness, an appropriate neurophysiological account of the processes responsible for organisms’ contrasting behavior in those states will suffice. In each case, an appropriate cognitive or neurophysiological model can clearly do the explanatory work.

If these phenomena were all there was to consciousness, then consciousness would not be much of a problem. Although we do not yet have anything close to a complete explanation of these phenomena, we have a clear idea of how we might go about explaining them. This is why I call these problems the easy problems. Of course, “easy” is a relative term. Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of difficult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of “consciousness”, an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as “phenomenal consciousness” and “qualia” are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of “conscious experience” or simply “experience”.

Another useful way to avoid confusion (used by e.g. Newell 1990, Chalmers 1996) is to reserve the term “consciousness” for the phenomena of experience, using the less loaded term “awareness” for the more straightforward phenomena described earlier. If such a convention were widely adopted, communication would be much easier; as things stand, those who talk about “consciousness” are frequently talking past each other.

-David J. Chalmers, Facing Up To The Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995

Chalmer’s assertion that consciousness has a physical (neural) basis ultimately depends upon the existence of not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of every brain that shall ever exist having the power to magically conjure something that does not exist (conscious experience before it is experienced) into existence. One can deny the existence of mind-independent, not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of every brain that shall ever exist and each brain’s magical power to cause non-existent experiences to come into existence without denying Chalmer’s disambiguation of the meaning of consciousness by narrowing the definition of consciousness to experience.

Experience has the tertiary aspects of (1) a central subject of experience (one that experiences), which itself is fundamentally an experience that experiences; (2) that which the subject experiences, and; (3) the fact or act of experiencing and that which is experienced in the moment one experiences that which is actually rather than possibly or potentially experience.

If there are not mind-independent/not-consciousness composed/not-brain created doppelgangers of the content of visual perception in the external world, and there are no particles either of non-conscious matter or consciousness (and as such there is no Atomism or the collocation of existing things from microscopality to macroscopality), given the existence of at least a person there is implication that in the absence of micro-to macro formation of existences, and in the non-existence of the ability of non-existent things to come into existence and vise versa—only persons exist as existence can only take the form of non-collocated, eternal persons.


A person might only logically be described, in Panpsychism and Idealism but specifically in Pantheopsychic Theology, as an invisible, intangible, circumscribed field or blob of subjective experience that invariably shifts shape into the fundamental structures of:

(1) A central subject of experience (the “experiencer” or that which experiences)

(2) That which is experienced by the subject of experience

A person, then, may not be a physical, not-consciousness composed body that contains an immaterial consciousness, but is complete consciousness in the form of a field composed or made up of subjective experience in seven forms.

The field, like Sauron in The Simarillion, constantly shifts shape and assumes arbitrarily existing examples of the seven types or “modes” of consciousness: the five senses plus thought and emotion or VAGOTET:

V=Vision (Visual Perception)
A=Audition (Auditory Perception)
G=Gustation (Gustatory Perception)
O=Olfaction (Olfactory Perception)
T=Taction (Tactile Perception principally in the form of exteroceptive and proprioceptive sensation)

The subject of experience itself in the rubric of VAGOTET is a form of Thought.


If one denies the existence of mind-independent/not-consciousness composed matter (and thereby the existence of mind-independent/not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of the content of visual perception), one is left only with an infinity in which the only thing that exists is consciousness.

If one believes the only thing that exists is consciousness (and further, the only thing that can exist is consciousness), one might instantiate the concept of and make a futile attempt to “imagine” consciousness in non-person form (like, say, one might instantiate the concept of and then go on to attempt to imagine consciousness as microscopic particles of consciousness). Usually, the concept of and “imagination” of non-person consciousness takes the form of and institutes an Atomism that is a mental reflex in the form of a mental insistence on how existence “should be”: complexity inherently requires composition, and composition implies separation of the elements making up composition into disparateness. Disparateness of the elements comprising all compositions (and thereby all complexity) yields the microscopic. All complexities, that is all compositions, begs the separation of the disparate elements making up the composition, with elements of composition experimentally and/or conceptually reduced to intermittent sizes leading to the concept of elemental or microscopic irreducibility or “point-sized existence”.

The mental reflex that insists that compositional entities reduce to “point-sized existence” or at least a certain basic “greater than point-size” microscopic entity (or family of entities) generates an autonomous “logical” narrative in which the composition that is persons (a person as a composition of “Sauron-shape-shifting” examples of the seven types of conscious experience, provided one is not deaf, blind, etc.) must imply a separation of the elements that make up a person, and thereby conceptually reveal the existence of non-person forms of consciousness from which persons originate.

A person denying the existence of non-person consciousness, however, can argue the mental reflex to disintegrate the macroscopic into the microscopic is an act of the imagination that cannot truthfully reveal a logical and metaphysical necessity of the existence of the microscopic. The baseline of existence is anyone’s guess (save the existence of subjective experience in seven forms in the composition of persons), and existence may indeed be so strange that, like the quark that cannot exist in isolation but must always be combined in composition with other quarks through the insistence of the strong force, the seven forms of consciousness (or six if one is deaf or blind, etc.) are psychical “quarks” always bound though an unknown “gluon” into persons, and have been (and is) connected for eternity.

There is, perhaps, a “just so-ness” in which persons, the “atom” of Existence, has for “sub-atomic” elements the seven types or mode of conscious experience, but these elements just exist only in composite form and there has never been a time when the elements just existed in disparate, isolated form. In other words, a person and the fact that only persons and not microscopic particles or fragments of persons exist in the external world is simply a matter of persons being that which just is, and it is this basic, fundamental property of existence that forms the second form of the only magic that exists (the first form is introduced below): the magic of “just so” existence: the absurdity and randomness of things that just are, for absolutely no reason save that that which just is happened to be the “lottery winner” over every other state of affairs that might have existed in its place.

Thus it is within the realm of logical and metaphysical possibility, logical and metaphysical possibility implied by the only type of existence that demonstrates it exists, that given the existence of persons, only persons exist, and persons cannot be disintegrated into fragments or particles of consciousness. The field of subjective experience that is the subject of experience and the things the subject experiences, that are members of the set of things formed by the substance of subjective experience limited to a circumscribed extent, is indestructible in the sense that the field just is, and cannot exist as anything but a field of shifting consciousness.

(Author’s note: This form of indestructible personhood is of use to and favorable to the Christian doctrine of Universalism, in which the wicked are not removed from existence [as consciousness is indestructible] but are “killed” or “put to death” through transformation of personhood or mentality. This is interesting, as there is room in Pantheopsychic thought for a Pre-Mortalism that includes the wicked as “angels” that “have lost their first estate” not through defiant choice but through their immersion in the phase-state of God-mind that yielded the Crucified Man and the Sacrificial Dream, in which the wicked, through no choice of their own, were robbed of their former innocence and cathartic love of God and given the roles of the tormentors and murderers of Christ. Cosmic amnesiacs held hostage by the Crucifixion? Something to consider as a viable alternative to the Darwinian tragedy of Fundamentalist Eternal Damnation or Annihilism.)


Then Sauron shifted shape, from wolf to serpent,
and from monster to his own accustomed form…


(1) Only consciousness exists

(2) Consciousness only exists and has only existed in the complex form of persons rather than disintegrated, non-person form

(3) Objects, bodies of other persons, and environments experienced by a person are not objective things unto themselves but are “clay figurines” formed from the field of subjective experience making up the central subject of experience and the “figurines” the subject experiences around itself in the form of objects, bodies of other persons, and environments composed of the subjective experience that comprises the subject and the field:

Worlds do not exist as non-person objects in a non-person consciousness or not-consciousness composed space, but are illusory environments and objects composed of the subjective experience of the field of consciousness that shapes itself into a first-person subject of experience and the objects and events surrounding the subject, that are composed of the subjective experience making up the field.

A world or universe, then, in this most radical form of Panpsychism forming the basis of Pantheopsychism and Pantheopsychic Christianity, is only a construct of a field, composed of subjective experience, that contorts itself into objects, bodies of other persons, and environments surrounding a subject of experience. The field invariably consists of the structural components of (i) a subject of experience, (ii) objects surrounding the subject (including bodies or representative “avatars” of the consciousness of other persons), and (iii) a primary environment that surrounds the subject of experience that contains all secondary, circumscribed objects momentarily appearing in the “scene” the field creates of the subject and that which the subject experiences at the current time.

The world one inhabits, then, is only the “Sauron-shape” one’s subjective experience shapes itself into at any moment in time. In terms of non-visual perception, the way objects surrounding oneself feels is ultimately only the experience the subject experiences when touching the object. The object has no objective “feel” of its own independent of the subject.

The field of experience that is the true form of a person contorts itself into the subject of experience (or the subject of experience is a constant or enduring contortion of the field that needs no renewing or repetition, which questions the existence of sleep) and contorts itself around the subject into the objects and environments the subject experiences. It is logically and metaphysically possible (simply on the basis that there is no logical or metaphysical necessity for the opposite condition) that the only things that exist are “floating” fields or “blobs” of ever-shifting subjective experience (with a subject of experience or tabula rasa as the nucleus) forming themselves into the invariant structures of subjects, inner experiences of subjects, and “outer” experienced objects, environments, and events surrounding and presenting themselves before the subject.


The litany of conscious experiences from birth to death, birth to eternity, or eternity to eternity consists not of the same experience frozen and unchanging before the subject of experience, but is fundamentally a sequence or series of experiences that differ in a flow from relative similarity to complete, unrelated distinction.

In the belief the brain creates consciousness, the difference between an experience and its different but relatively similar or completely dissimilar and unrelated successor is caused either by change in the function of the same neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) responsible for a given experience, or cessation of function of that neural circuit followed by function of a different circuit that gives rise to the next experience.

In Panpsychic (or even Idealistic) belief in non-person forms of consciousness, such as the Atomism inherent in particle of consciousness (reduced either to phenomenal “Planck-size” or irreducible minimal states of every conscious experience that shall or can exist), change from one experience to another in the chain of experiences from birth to death, birth to eternity, or eternity to eternity is a matter of turnover of consciousness-particles forming a particular entity, the psychic particles responsible for the immediate future experience of the person necessarily existing in proximity to the particles making up the “now”-experience of the person, the particles in proximity by the luckiest chance being just those particles that form immediate future experience that refers to (is different but relatively similar to) the particles that form that which one experiences “now”.


If there is non-existence of not-consciousness or not-subjective experience, and if there is non-existence of fragments or particles of every experience that shall or can exist floating in a mental aether waiting in lucky proximity with other particles to form every person that shall or can exist, and barring any other conceivable form of collocation of a person and experience of a person from invisible processes and entities that themselves are not whole persons but are conceivably or conceptually responsible for coming together from separation and disparity and forming the complex structure of a person there remains only the magic (in terms of explanation if not literal magic) of Transformysticism: the inexplicable change or transformation of one experience into another independent of chance in arrangement of particles of consciousness or change in neural processing of a brain.

In Transformysticism, a given conscious experience simply stops being that experience just becomes another. There exists nothing outside the person that enters the field of subjective experience that is a person to remove previous experience and replace it with experience “from outside”: a given experience within the field simply stops existing in the form of x and begins to exist in the form of y. That which exists simply stops existing as it was and starts existing as something else without the necessity of having to cease to exist with something completely different coming into existence form former non-existence.

Transformysticism is highly counterintuitive, of course. One can argue that creation ex nihilo of consciousness by the brain is more counterintuitive that Transformysticism and is arguably less rational (despite its unthinking famousness), given creation ex nihilo’s process of something not existing coming into existence and something existing going completely out of existence. Transformysticism is more “tidy” in that experiences (at least the experiences of Man in Pantheopsychism) do indeed cease to exist when no longer experienced but ceases to exist only in the sense of becoming something else as opposed to the conceptual process of something completely ceasing to exist another existence having to be brought into existence form non-existence.


Existence (in Transformysticism) does not go out of existence: existence, like Sauron in The Simarillion, simply changes its appearance or changes how it exists. The “wolf”, “serpent”, “monster”, and “own accustomed forms” that emerge are random but fortuitously referencing and similar existences that are a part of (I suspect) a repertoire in which existence can only assume a limited number and type of form.


Transformysticism, admittedly, is magic—but it is a magic that is arguably more simple and rational (?) than the magic of something that does not exist coming into existence independent of reliance and formation of pre-existing entity and material, or something that exists going altogether out of existence. Transformysticism involves something that goes out of existence or ceases to exist, but it ceases to exist by becoming something differing or completely different. A conscious experience merely shape-shifts into another conscious experience. Existence exists as one thing, then simply exists as something else.

This seamless (though inscrutable and inexplicable) transition of one experience into another is simpler (in terms of concept if not imagination, though actual experience of change of experience seems to more obviously demonstrate Transformysticism than ex nihilo emergence of consciousness) than the concept of conscious experience completely ceasing to exist requiring the next experience (something separate and existentially unrelated to the disappearing experience) to be conjured from non-existence.


Quite simply, if there are no mind independent doppelgangers of the content of visual perception the “wolf”, “serpent”, “monster” and “own accustomed forms” that are the content of one’s consciousness within the “blob” of experience that is one’s true form are entirely arbitrary. One’s existence, then, just consists of the happenstance visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, tactile, cognitive, and emotional experiences that happen to exist within the field of one’s consciousness.

Even if there are mind-independent doppelgangers of the content of visual perception the objects, environments, and events in the external world are themselves arbitrarily existing entities that exist simply by chance. The sub-atomic particles of the Standard Model of Physics and all exotic deviations in terms of lepton, electrons, quarks, gluons and the like exist simply by chance. No matter what constitutes reality, the existence of that which constitutes reality arbitrarily and randomly exists.


For those believing in the existence of the Judeo-Christian God, the mind of God in terms of its content and the personality and morality of God are entirely arbitrary existences. If God is good, God is good for ultimately no other reason than that out of any other psychological manner in which God could have existed, by sheer chance God happens to be good. In terms of God’s will, whatever God desires or purposes to do is, in the end, the particular arbitrarily and randomly existing “Sauron-shape” assumed by the subjective experience making up his consciousness. God, then, is ultimately a product of the arbitrary nature of the psychological state his particular subjective experience or field of subjective experience can assume. What the God-field can assume is, in the end, a matter of what happens by chance to exist in his mind as part of the types and number of things that exist and can exist in the Transformystic Repertoire.


Consensus Reality is often used as “proof” of the existence of mind-independent doppelgangers of the content of visual perception in the external world. Simply put, Consensus Reality is the mimicry of the content of visual perception reported between two or more conscious beings. For example, two individuals stand before a McDonald’s restaurant: given the non-existence of inter-subjectivity (two individual’s sharing the same conscious experience), as the content of visual perception of one person is invisible and inaccessible to the other, verbal report of the content of one’s visible perception is necessary. The existence of Consensus Reality depends upon and is verified by both individuals verbally reporting observance of the same visual object, environment, and event.

The power of conviction of the existence of Consensus Reality is expanded when one considers mimicry of visual perception of, say, hundreds or thousands of individuals, such as the probable visual mimicry of every person attending a football game or rock concert.

There is, unless telepathy exists, no Consensus Reality of non-visual perception: non-visual perceptions are entirely private and unique between individuals, with the inner world of one person inaccessible to and never the same as that experienced by another. Thus, in the belief that conscious experience mimics the content of the external world, visual perception is the only modality of consciousness that “depicts” and “mimics” the content of the external world.

The brain’s ex nihilo creation of visual perception, however, walks in the bar and shoots the rationality of causal or apparitional relation between visually perceived objects and events and purportedly existing external objects and events right between the eyes. Godless death, the belief in cessation of the existence of consciousness in response to the gradual or immediate cessation of function of the brain does not exist in a vacuum: if the content of visual perception of a person that suddenly dies ceases to exist, the cessation of existence of content of visual perception implies the opposite of cessation of existence of content of visual perception: the state or condition of a visual perception that does not exist coming into existence without construction from the material substance of anything in infinity existing while the visual perception was non-existent.

If visual perception or visually experienced or “perceived” objects and events are things that come into existence after having not existed at all, they are not one and the same as and cannot have derived from external objects and events. Any “resemblance” (which is entirely imaginary) between visual objects and events and external objects and events (that are entirely imaginary) must be entirely coincidental.

If visible objects and events are not external objects and events and do not derive their existence from external objects and events or material making up external objects and events (as visible objects and events are magically conjured into existence from non-existence by the brain), Consensus Reality, despite the probable fact two or more conscious beings mimic content of visual perception, the mimicry is and cannot be evidence of the existence of external doppelgangers of the content of visual perception. Remarkably, the mimicry of visual perception between two or more beings must itself be entirely coincidental as visual perceptions and their content are magically conjured into existence from prior non-existence.


If there are no mind-independent doppelgangers of the content of visual perception and subjective experience in the form of persons is the only thing that exists, Consensus Reality is purely a matter of the arbitrary, chance state of affairs of the consciousness-fields that are persons “Sauron-shaping” themselves into identical objects, environments, bodies of other persons and events surrounding the subject of experience in each field, albeit the objects etc. appearing before each subject in each field are formed by the field in the form of how each object, etc. appears to each subject’s individual and unique perspective or point of view.

In the same manner there is no consensus reality between non-visual perceptions, there is no consensus reality between the visual perspectives of conscious beings: two people standing in the same area may experience identical visual fields, but the objects, etc. in each field will appear to one person in the form of how the objects, etc. appear to that individual; the manner in which the objects, etc. appear to the first individual will not be identical to how the objects appear to or are oriented toward the accompanying person or any other person in the totality of infinity.


If the external world consists of circumscribed (having a limited extent or definite perimeter beyond which lies everything that is not the consciousness of a person) consciousness-fields that shape themselves into subjects of experience and the objects, environments, etc. surrounding and appearing before the subject, and these are identical to the objects, environments, etc. surrounding and appearing before the subjects of other consciousness-fields, the identicalness of content between subjects being the means by which consciousness-fields depict locality and proximity— in the absence of mind-independent (or consciousness-field independent) doppelgangers of the content of visual perception, field-contents between field-subjects are randomly and arbitrarily existing entities as they are externally uncaused and unrelated, the identicalness of their content being a matter or sheer coincidence.

But the probable non-existence of mind-independent, not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of the content of visual perception does not negate, in principle, the existence of some form of the Process of Perception.

If the external world does not consist only of floating, circumscribed person-fields that by mere coincidence share visual content, the sharing of visual content marking locality and proximity between person-fields (death, given in this propositional world things do not come into and go out of existence, is Psytransformystic alteration of the content of a person-field into a new series of perceived objects and personal identity), just as in the classical Process of Perception content of consciousness is a matter of subjective experience in the modality of vision “mimicking” the “appearance” of external objects and events, if one is willing to believe in creation ex nihilo another can propose a psychical Process of Perception in which the content of consciousness of human beings is supplied by an external Mind rather than external Objects and Events.


Existence only appears as the “finished product” of a first-person subject of experience and everything the subject experiences. Anything that is not the first-person subject of experience and that which the subject experiences is—naturally—non-empirical.

The definition of empirical for those that might debate the above:

em•pir•i•cal /əmˈpirik(ə)l/

  1. based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic.

One’s own consciousness, with one’s first-person subject of experience and the things that appear before one and that exist within one in terms of the inaccessible, private aspects of consciousness experience only by and within oneself, are the only things in infinity that are empirical.

This means, of course, that the fictional, purportedly existing not-you-experienced versions of objects, bodies of other persons, and environments are non-empirical.

If one reduces the external world to that which is empirical one arrives at solipsism. In denial of solipsism, therefore, one must allow the non-empirical and do so logically (basing that which exists outside the self as something having the same properties as the self) in the form of the external world consisting only of persons as opposed to objects and events in non-physical space. If one holds or concedes that one’s body is a construct of one’s consciousness rather than an external object not composed of one’s (or anyone’s) consciousness, one arrives at the conclusion that one’s body does not objectively exist: the only thing that objectively exists is subjective experience that assumes the form of one’s perception of one’s body.

If one’s objective body does not exist as one’s body exists only in the form of a construct composed of subjective experience, one is actually and essentially only a field of subjective experience that “Sauron-shape shifts” into the “wolf’, “serpent”, and “monster” of one’s vision of a body, the objects surrounding the body, and the events that occur to or in the vicinity of the first-person subject of experience. These are ultimately permutations of the overall circumscribed field, as non-person/non-person experienced objects and events may not exist.

At least, this is the actual nature of the world if Panpsychism is true and importantly, if Pantheopsychism is true. A theory of Pantheopsychism, however, must move from the elementary of circumscribed fields of experience shape-shifting into arbitrary, randomly existing examples of VAGOTET toward a new form of the Process of Perception dispensing with the existence of mind-independent, not-consciousness composed doppelgangers of the content of visual perception if the only thing that exists are persons.

To avoid the concept that persons and the content of their consciousness are self-contained apparitions of the subjective experience that comprises a person for the sake of a Judeo-Christian Theology based in Panpsychism and Idealism, there must be a Process of Perception in which the content of the minds of fields of consciousness and the particular forms the content shape-shifts into at any given moment, must be percepts derived from the distal object of the content of the mind of God in one of three states of consciousness. A forthcoming paper continues the “science” of Pantheopsychism in regard to Pantheopsychic Perception.