The goal of this topic is to point out that the question «why is there something rather than nothing?» is meaningless.
In his book Atheism, The Case Against God, George H. Smith alleges that:
I disagree with Smith that the universe is a metaphysical primary, because it begs the question, but I propose replacing the universe with reality as the metaphysical primary, for reality seems to be the last level of analysis.
Therefore, to restate the Smith’s point, the reality is the framework within which an explanation of any kind is possible. But it is of no use to try to get an explanation for the framework itself. It has to be assumed at the outset, and thereafter, we can ask some big questions like: is the universe all that exists, or is there anything else? These questions, however metaphysical they appear, stay all the same within the framework of reality.
To ask «why is there something rather than nothing» is like asking: «why some statement cannot be true and false at the same time». Meaningless questions.
I really like your topic. I’m surprised no one has responded yet.
Perhaps, it would be clearer, at least for me, to call Smith’s explanation as cosmological, and yours as ontological. Btw, I agree that reality is one of those metaphysical primaries. There is a difference between the two, as Smith’s explanation implies also, and includes the argument for, the existence of god. Ontology’s reality is more the listing of, or a description of (categories), what we take to be the whole of reality. Sounds reasonable? If not let me know as I am trying also to get a good grasp of these things.
Now, to your assertion that to ask, “Why is there something rather than nothing?†is meaningless—actually, I think, it is not meaningless if we go by your claim (ontologically speaking) that reality is a metaphysical primary. And here’s why: ontologically, it is reasonable to argue that nothingness is part of reality.
I don’t see how these questions impact the notion of God’s existence much: Reality, taken cosmologically or ontologically, would include everything that exists- including God. Now, we may often hear a theist ask “Why does anything exist?”, but in the context of the cosmological argument for God (which this seems to be related to), we’re concerned with why certain things exist- that is, those things we call physical or natural. Looking at the world, it’s obvious that the things we encounter in it- from soda bottles to neutron stars- come into being because of something else, exist for a while, and then decay into some other state. God’s existence becomes a question when we ask “Where does all of that come from?” and we ask the question because of our experience that things come into being for a reason. Whether or not the universe (potentially including God) has always existed seems to be talking around the question.
Sâmkhya is arguing for reality, while Smith is putting forth a cosmological argument about the universe (and everything in it ) and first cause. Ontologically, reality (as conceived scientifically, ordinarily, common sensically, philosophically) is deeply rooted in what we can know such that there could be arguments for or against god, substances, processes, etc. This, in turn, implies that there is a “reacheability” factor involved when we talk about reality. One’s reality may not involved everything that “exists” since some existents may not be perceptible by the human senses, hence may not be objects of thinking. A cosmological argument about the universe presupposes, implies, and provides arguments for god as first cause----an idea that may or may not be part of reality of some entities, i.e. atheists. This is exactly why there are differing views on what constitute reality ontologically: idealism, realism, dualism, internal metaphysics, external metaphysics.
Do things really come into being for a reason? It is a comforting assumption because it allows a causal explanation which includes the possibility of God, but unless we ignore the possibility that there is no ‘reason’ behind beingness, we’re back at square one.
Samkhya,
arendt is quite right. Perceived reality may not be reality. It can only be so if we choose to ignore the limits of our perceptions. That nothing is intelligble without a background of being may be true, but this does not preclude the unintelligble as part of reality. We can make the apriori assumption that ‘all we can sense is all there is’, but as long as there is the possibility of the unintelligble, it is a construct with a foundation of sand.
Coincidentally, a reality that includes the unintelligble also includes the possibility of God. Just not the sort of god we can wrap our minds around.
Well, I ignore the possibility for the same reason that I ignore the possibility that the moon has a caramel center. Do you think there’s a good reason to elevate the possibility that things exist uncaused beyond that sort of ‘possibility’? I mean, a notion isn’t worthy of consideration and stressing over merely by the fact that it isn’t demonstrably impossible, is it?
Anyways, in the end, argument almost never prove “X is true”, they prove “X is true if Y”. If the cosmological argument proves that God exists only for people that believe that things have causes, I would more than happily settle for that.
And as long as all that is can be contained by mind, you’re absolutely right. I was simply suggesting that there may be a portion of reality that’s a bit beyond what the mind can contain.
For all I know, you're right about that: But then, like Wittgenstein said, 'that which we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence'. If the cosmological argument 'only' works on the basis of the things that the human mind can fathom, that's also a concession I'm more than happy to make. :slight_smile:
That’s it in a nutshell. And just by this statement alone, we can think of a few implications: Reality, as we know it, does not equate to “total existence†(as in everything that exists including the universe) as cosmological argument would like to suggest. If we do have access to total existence, we would be god ourselves. Our reality right now is one of spacetime—not everyone existing at present knows everything existing, or that has existed in any given time. Collectively, it is even reasonable to assume that there are things, that are part of all that exist, that none of us have come to know. Notice that ontologists must also rely on their perception, intuition, reflection to come up with a list of what exist and their description. Is it possible that there are things that they themselves have failed to apprehend? By all means.
I suspect this all come’s back to the issue of the ‘ineffable’ universe. Some choose to suspend judgement (for lack of certainty), and become the dreaded, irritating agnostic. Others who cannot function without ‘knowing’ (certainty) choose to ignore the possibility of the ineffable to claim that all is knowable, even if we don’t know it yet.
