Reductive Physicalism vs. Non-reductive Physicalism

[Kreator_of_Chaos]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

Reductionism is a philosophical concept regarding the relationship between the parts of an object and the whole.
[edit] Reductive physicalism

The physicalist variation discussed above (Type Physicalism aka Identity Theory) is ontologically reductionist, as it reduces mental states and processes into physical states and processes.

Reductive physicalism is not incompatible with eliminativism - the view that psychological states do not exist at all.

All of these types of reductive physicalism are grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. This is one reason why “physicalism” is often used interchangeably with the word “materialism.” Both terms (in these instances) hold that all organic and inorganic processes can be explained by reference to the laws of nature. The general success of physics in explaining a large range of phenomena in terms of a few of these basic natural laws; such as gravity, electricity, composition of mass, has assisted this belief.[2]
[edit] Non-reductive physicalism

The earliest forms of physicalism, growing historically out of materialism, were reductionist. But after Donald Davidson introduced the concept of supervenience to physicalism, non-reductionist physicalism became more popular.

Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical they are not reducible to physical properties. It asserts that mental states are causally reducible to physical states, which is in opposition to epiphenomenalism, where one or more mental states are not causally reducible to physical states and do not have any influence on physical states.

Donald Davidson proposed anomalous monism as a non-reductive physicalism. Supervenience physicalism (also proposed by Donald Davidson) is a non-reductive physicalism, as mental events supervene (i.e., physical properties are mapped to mental properties) on physical events rather than mental events reducing to physical events. For example if we accept supervenience physicalism, the pain someone would feel if electrocuted would supervene on the firing of their c-fibres. If we accept reductive physicalism, the pain would be those c-fibres firing.

Emergentism is a theory which came to popularity in the early twentieth century. It is a form of non-reductive supervenience, but one where reality is considered to supervene in a manner more akin to layers, rather than patterns within a single layer, as per later physicalism. These layers are said to be genuinely novel from each other (i.e., the psychological vs. the physical), and is thus a type of dualism. Physicalism is essentially monistic.

Epiphenomenalism sees mental states as being the byproducts of brain states, but lacking any causal effects on brain states themselves (some types of epiphenomenalism do allow that some mental states can cause other mental states). It was initially an attempt to solve the problem posed by the question ‘what is the causal factor the brain state or the mental state?’ as this relates to substance dualism, but it is also relevant to the causal significance of qualia; and as such has implications for non-reductionist physicalist theories. According to epiphenomenalism, the brain state is the causal factor.

Nonreductive physicalism has been especially popular among philosophers of biology and some biologists, who argue that all biological facts are fixed by physical facts but that biological properties and regularities supervene on so many multiple realizations of macromolecular arrangements that the biological is not reducible to the physical. Prominent exponents of this view are Philip Kitcher and Elliot Sober. Alexander Rosenberg introduced Davidson’s notion to the debate in 1978 but thereafter argued against nonreductive physicalism in ways similar to Jaegwon Kim’s (see three sections below).

I’m leaning towards Epiphenomenalism. What are your thoughts?

[Jakob]

It seems to me that the only way to make a decision on which approach to value above another is to consider what you want to accomplish with it.

If your interest is in the contents of mental states, then it is most useful to see these mental states as things which stand apart from what may be their neurological ground.

If your interest is to manipulate mental states without respect for their inherent content, then the most successful approach will be to treat them as symptoms of neurological activity. You will lose the value of the content in this way, but you gain some control over the biological effect.

In psychological treatment, the question that is omitted often is “what is reality?” If we see reality as the state of the nervous system, then mental states, thoughts and emotions, are side-effects which by taking on a life of their own are imposing on reality, distracting from it. Some physically oriented philosophies, such as yoga and zen, hold to such views.

If we see reality as the content of the mind and the emotions, then the nervous system is something we can take advantage of, take it to extremes, something which may as well be replaced with artificial materials which may do a better job at sustaining intense and pleasant experience.

It is a crucial choice what we decide to be the most basic reality within our philosophy. Not because it will someday prove true or false, but because it provides the method by which we live our life. It determines the kind of life which will be possible for us.

[Mr_Reasonable]

I think there is a paper that you might enjoy on this subject. It is quite thorough and relatively dense.

It’s called “Reduction of Mind”. I can’t believe it, but I found a copy online.
psych.utoronto.ca/users/spa/ … /Lewis.pdf

This paper may help you to determine more about what your own position is on this subject.

[Bluff]

Interesting subject - I’ve been reading wiki for the last few days. I’m drawn to the ideas of reductionism and eliminativism, but that’s probably because I have more confusion than clarity at the moment. I couldn’t manage that paper Smears, page 4 - 5 just turned into gibberish. I also tried to raise issues in another thread but as you can see I can barely articulate the problem let alone receive a response.

[JohnJones]

@Kreator of Chaos

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

Reductionism is a philosophical concept regarding the relationship between the parts of an object and the whole.
[edit] Reductive physicalism

The physicalist variation discussed above (Type Physicalism aka Identity Theory) is ontologically reductionist, as it reduces mental states and processes into physical states and processes.

Reductive physicalism is not incompatible with eliminativism - the view that psychological states do not exist at all.

All of these types of reductive physicalism are grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. This is one reason why “physicalism” is often used interchangeably with the word “materialism.” Both terms (in these instances) hold that all organic and inorganic processes can be explained by reference to the laws of nature. The general success of physics in explaining a large range of phenomena in terms of a few of these basic natural laws; such as gravity, electricity, composition of mass, has assisted this belief.[2]
[edit] Non-reductive physicalism

The earliest forms of physicalism, growing historically out of materialism, were reductionist. But after Donald Davidson introduced the concept of supervenience to physicalism, non-reductionist physicalism became more popular.

Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical they are not reducible to physical properties. It asserts that mental states are causally reducible to physical states, which is in opposition to epiphenomenalism, where one or more mental states are not causally reducible to physical states and do not have any influence on physical states.

Donald Davidson proposed anomalous monism as a non-reductive physicalism. Supervenience physicalism (also proposed by Donald Davidson) is a non-reductive physicalism, as mental events supervene (i.e., physical properties are mapped to mental properties) on physical events rather than mental events reducing to physical events. For example if we accept supervenience physicalism, the pain someone would feel if electrocuted would supervene on the firing of their c-fibres. If we accept reductive physicalism, the pain would be those c-fibres firing.

Emergentism is a theory which came to popularity in the early twentieth century. It is a form of non-reductive supervenience, but one where reality is considered to supervene in a manner more akin to layers, rather than patterns within a single layer, as per later physicalism. These layers are said to be genuinely novel from each other (i.e., the psychological vs. the physical), and is thus a type of dualism. Physicalism is essentially monistic.

Epiphenomenalism sees mental states as being the byproducts of brain states, but lacking any causal effects on brain states themselves (some types of epiphenomenalism do allow that some mental states can cause other mental states). It was initially an attempt to solve the problem posed by the question ‘what is the causal factor the brain state or the mental state?’ as this relates to substance dualism, but it is also relevant to the causal significance of qualia; and as such has implications for non-reductionist physicalist theories. According to epiphenomenalism, the brain state is the causal factor.

Nonreductive physicalism has been especially popular among philosophers of biology and some biologists, who argue that all biological facts are fixed by physical facts but that biological properties and regularities supervene on so many multiple realizations of macromolecular arrangements that the biological is not reducible to the physical. Prominent exponents of this view are Philip Kitcher and Elliot Sober. Alexander Rosenberg introduced Davidson’s notion to the debate in 1978 but thereafter argued against nonreductive physicalism in ways similar to Jaegwon Kim’s (see three sections below).

I’m leaning towards Epiphenomenalism. What are your thoughts?

Donald Davidson is an idiot magician. So he wants to hide the fact he has fooled us into thinking that supervenience is at least SOME sort of interaction or causal factor, even if it isn’t physical.

[Kreator_of_Chaos]

@Smears

I think there is a paper that you might enjoy on this subject. It is quite thorough and relatively dense.

It’s called “Reduction of Mind”. I can’t believe it, but I found a copy online.
psych.utoronto.ca/users/spa/ … /Lewis.pdf

This paper may help you to determine more about what your own position is on this subject.

I finally got around to reading it, and I can only say that I understood the first few pages. I believe in Supervenience Physicalism at the very least, although I cleared that up in my head more through Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy than that article.

[gib]

Non-reductive physicalism sounds like dualism in disguise. In what way is the mind still physical if it doesn’t reduce to the physical processes of the brain?

Anyway, I’ve always questioned the assumption that the direction of reduction from bigger to smaller things is the only game in town. Why shouldn’t smaller things reduce to bigger things? I mean, sure, we get a sense that a phenomenon has been explained when we understand it in terms of its smaller components and how the latter come together to bring about the phenomenon in question, but we seldom remember that these smaller components never exist in a vacuum. They are always part of a larger environment, the ultimate environment being the universe itself. In other words, the components themselves couldn’t exist if it weren’t for the larger universe that houses them. So you need the universe itself to (ultimately) explain anything. So could the universe count as the ultimate ‘basis’ for everything, and the act of analyzing and picking it apart into its components a manner of “building it up” into a more complex structure?

[Kreator_of_Chaos]

@gib

Non-reductive physicalism sounds like dualism in disguise. In what way is the mind still physical if it doesn’t reduce to the physical processes of the brain?

Anyway, I’ve always questioned the assumption that the direction of reduction from bigger to smaller things is the only game in town. Why shouldn’t smaller things reduce to bigger things? I mean, sure, we get a sense that a phenomenon has been explained when we understand it in terms of its smaller components and how the latter come together to bring about the phenomenon in question, but we seldom remember that these smaller components never exist in a vacuum. They are always part of a larger environment, the ultimate environment being the universe itself. In other words, the components themselves couldn’t exist if it weren’t for the larger universe that houses them. So you need the universe itself to (ultimately) explain anything. So could the universe count as the ultimate ‘basis’ for everything, and the act of analyzing and picking it apart into its components a manner of “building it up” into a more complex structure?

Supervenience is a concept with broad applicability throughout philosophy that has particular importance with regards to physicalism. It describes the relationship between the fundamental objects of physical reality and those of everyday experience as well as those of a more abstract social nature[citation needed]. Subtle differences in the interpretation of the supervenience concept underscore different schools of thought within physicalism[citation needed].

Supervenience can be seen as the relationship between a higher level and lower level of existence where the higher level is dependent on the lower level. One level supervenes on another when there can only be a change at the higher level if there is also a change at the lower level. (e.g., a set of properties A supervenes upon a set of properties B when there cannot be an A difference without a B difference). The debate about this notion as regards physicalism is to what extent mental phenomena exist independently of their (supposed) fundamental lowest level - the physical.

Supervenience establishes such a relationship between the mental and the physical, that any change in the mental is caused by a change in the physical. Just as a shadow is dependent upon the position of the object causing it, is the mental dependent upon the physical. Physicalism thus implies (through modal realism)[citation needed] that:

No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.

The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:

No two beings, or things could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.

Another description of supervenience does away with levels altogether and rather pictures reality as a matrix or mosaic, upon which we imply different patterns (the old levels) but emphasising that all patterns are variations of the same implicit reality.[citation needed]

However, supervenience alone is not sufficient to establish the basis of physicalism. It is possible that mental or other non-physical states supervene upon the physical. As this allows for the possibility that the mind is causally inefficacious and only contingently related to the physical, supervenience physicalism is compatible with epiphenomenalism. However, when supervenience physicalism and token physicalism[clarification needed] are combined, minimal physicalism is met, as will be detailed in the following sections.

[gib]

What are you trying to say, Kreator?

[Kreator_of_Chaos]

@gib

What are you trying to say, Kreator?

Just explaining why Non-reductive (supervenience) Physicalism isn’t the same as dualism.

[lao_wai]

What seems to hang people up is the fact that our subjective experience of those objective brain-functions assumes, as someone well said, an “imposing reality of its own.” Why can’t we bring in a little of Schopenhaur’s dualism (The World As Will and Representation) and affirm at once the objective reality of Representation (brain states, etc.) and the subjective reality of the Will (thoughts, emotions, etc.)? Schopenhaur would ride in here and say that what disgusts you people with reductionism is that it upsets what you essentially are, i.e., a will-to-live, a driving forces that wants and needs, that experiences itself as the end-all-be-all of existence, the meaning of life: in Biblical language, “the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.”

Couldn’t that do something to reconcile the situation?

[gib]

@Kreator of Chaos

@gib

What are you trying to say, Kreator?

Just explaining why Non-reductive (supervenience) Physicalism isn’t the same as dualism.

I didn’t quite get it then. I got how ‘supervenience’ is defined, and that “No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.” but all that tells me is that the brain and the mind can’t function independently of each other, not that they aren’t two different things.