Rodya,the Superman, Murders for Quantitative Utilitarianism?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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In the context of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov, also known as Rodya, attempts to conflate quantitative utilitarianism with his notion of an “Extraordinary Man,” a superman type figure, a Napoleon, who is not subject or bound by social/moral rules, ethics, and codes of conduct. Such an individual is beyond good and evil, to whom no rules apply. Not exactly Nietzsche’s Overman, though very closely related. Raskolnikov believes this Napoleon-like figure may transgress social mores and ethics toward quantitative utilitarian ends. The extraordinary man is a means toward such ends. I invite you to examine the coherency of such a position, and to explore whether or not any incoherencies, contradictions, and/or hidden premises or implications occur.

The first question to ask is whether or not an individual can act within a society in which his action does not constitute a willing for all. Whether or not an individual that enacts a violation of the social contract negates the violated rule, freeing any and every individual from such rule. If Raskolnikov justifies pre-meditated murder as an action he is free to enact, does this entail that any man within the society that Raskolnikov partakes, has the right to commit the same action?

Raskolnikov believes that what distinguishes the extraordinary man from the ordinary, is the extraordinary man’s ability to execute what is only theoretical for the ordinary. Does it not obviously follow that any man daring enough within society to commit a murder can become an extraordinary man? In which case, no one in the society is safe from being murdered, including the extraordinary man? When Raskolnikov murders, does this not imply that he too, is subject to be on the receiving end of murder? The action as soon as it becomes manifest becomes a principle which Raskolnikov condones for the society in which he partakes.

The next question, if the above is correct, is whether harming one individual for the happiness of one thousand individuals is really quantitatively better. It is obvious that the happiness of one thousand is greater than the happiness of one, however, if in the procurement of that thousand’s happiness it turns out that the individual creates a society that lowers the happiness of all, through the willing of a socially detrimental principle that society abides by (e.g. the allowance of murder), then it follows that quantitatively the action harms the entire society; and of course, All > 1,000 > 1.

Thought Experiment

P1 Quantitative Utilitarianism is the ethical standard of society A.
P2 Rational Egoism is the method that brings about the greatest quantitative good for the greatest number.
These premises are not debatable in the thought experiment

In such a society, to be logically coherent, is the following action in the best interest of individual egos?

Ten men walk down Avenue Z toward a pedestrian. The ten men decide that it is in their interest and happiness to sodomize and rob the pedestrian. The happiness of ten outweigh the unhappiness of one. One of the men knows that the pedestrian has no family and friends, so they know that their actions will indirectly affect no one other than the pedestrian. 10 happy gang rapist/muggers > 1 unhappy victim. Are the actions of the potential gang rapists in the interests of the gang rapists? Do they, ultimately, quantitatively benefit from such action?

I believe the answer is no, because the gang rapists/muggers can become potential victims in the future. On top of which their violence creates indirect effects on the whole public, namely, fear. Forcing victim centers to be established in society A, police stations, and so on–all of which affect the rapists/muggers. The amount of taxes the rapists/muggers pay will increase, so that whatever short-term monetary gains they attain, they lose over the long term.

Is it not obvious that the two positions are incompatible? Incoherent? This is very important as it renders a lot of Dostoevsky’s polemic against the rational egoists of the 1860s obsolete. You may think of Ayn Randian Objectivists very closely related to the rational egoists.

The main questions to think and discuss: Is Rational Egoism compatible with the idea of the Extraordinary Individual? Can an individual will for one without willing for all? Can a rational egoist make an exception of oneself in the society that they partake without causing quantitative harm to oneself and society at large?

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I have a question. Where do you get this stuff? Are these questions spurred by your own private reading, or are you taking some sort of philosophy course?

I wrote that two years ago. Please tell me I was doing philosophy at the university level then. That would stroke my strange little ego to orgasm.

See the vague linkage? It’s there!

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I appreciate your comments and response, thezeus18.

I am currently taking a literature course on Dostoevsky, and my professor attempted to connect rational egoism and quantitative utilitarianism, with the idea of the ‘Extraordinary Individual,’ originally taken from Pushkin; the idea is adopted by Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment. I am in disagreement with her position based upon my theoretical evaluation of Raskolnikov’s positions, which I find to be incoherent. I decided to present my view for debate and critical discussion on these forums. It is my hope to clarify and work out any nuances inherent within. Or, if you disagree with my position, to debate. Also, Tz18, I fully agree that quantitative utilitarianism has problems and flaws inherent within; I am not a proponent of it. If anyone likes to open up a side discussion on the flaws within quantitative utilitarianism within this thread, please feel free to do so.

Your position,

, is nearly identical to my own. I argue, however, not that it may simply encourage more, similar events, but that in principle it does not even matter that it may or may not encourage more, similar events, that one is giving the ethical/social right to the other to commit the deed. The deed itself need not even be actualized, Raskolnikov need not even have a finger layed upon him in his whole life, and still he would be in an ideologically incoherent and contradictory, namely, an irrational theoretical position.

My position is that immoral actions, (stealing, murdering), does not benefit “you,” because if you are a part of a society then you are a part of a detrimental/harmful society and you made it so, in principle. Your actions do not benefit you, they harm you because they create the ideologically structured society in which you participate, which, through its structure, is detrimental to every individual withinn such a society. I’m going a bit Kantian and certainly Sartrean here: one is responsible for all. To reiterate my position, one cannot will for oneself without willing for all. That is to say, when one takes an action in society, one grants the other the same sanction/right, in principle.

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Well, that’s all fine and dandy if you believe in absolute rights and principles and stuff, but practically, how does your immoral action translate into immorality for all? You see, while your idea is in principle correct, it’s a lot harder to argue the existence of absolute god-given rights than it is to argue individual pragmatic benefit. I think that’s part of why utilitarianism is such an appealing ethical theory, because, like pragmatism, it cuts out the metaphysical that you can’t convince someone of and replaces it with the very tangible and obvious “happiness”. So I would favor my explanation of morality, even though yours is correct also.

Cool, it’s nice to see that I think the same way as someone.

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Hey thezeus18,

Once again, thank you for your reply. Now, I by no means am arguing for any “god-given” right. To hold my postion one need not believe in absolute rights/principles. I am pointing out the theoretical incoherency, the ethical contradictions, within what Raskolnikov believes is a rational, scientific theory. I am arguing, and correct me if I’m wrong, something along Rousseau’s social contract. What it means to take an action within a society, for the society. How one’s actions inter-relate to the society that one is a part of. This is ethics, not morality. What I do believe–and I do not believe it is metaphysical–but what I do presuppose, is the ability to reason abstractly, which can only be done if logic is a science like mathamatics is a science. This and only this do I assume to make my case.

I would also point out that, “happiness,” is not that tangible, and quite hard to measure and quantify–one of the reasons that I am personally dismissive of quantitative utilitarianism. It seems a bit metaphysical to my eye.

Possible Presupposition in My Previously Stated Position

Quantitative utilitarianism was conflated with Rational Egoism. I am not sure if I was right to do so. Would a rational egoist, or say, a Randian Objectivist, be a proponent of quantitative utilitarianism? Opinions? (I’ve just discovered that I was correct to conflate the two positions.)

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This is definitely what my free-writing consisted of in a short-lived highschool experiment at 14.

The teacher and students were, of course, awed by the sheer fact that I could think at the level I did, but I don’t even hold the position any longer- that of society being necessary or the criminal as ‘bad’.

One of my papers was on how when an item is stolen, it will ultimately effect the business stolen from, and return to your pocket. This is only true in a capitalist setting where employers take their loss out of the employee’s checks. When we are so dependent on one another that the slightest individualistic decision made will effect the group, we are being controlled by moral ethics set in stone for the security of an unmoving, dead body. We become unthinking, unmotivated, and we do only for the system.

I was once an extremist for globalization; now I’m the polar opposite. It’s the curse of not seeing anything small in terms of social affairs.

Mass society is nothing but a safety policy to protect those in fear of what may overcome their will by joining as one for one community against that which threatens their individual lives; this, however, ironically forces them to become weak, weak willed, dependent and so forth on the police state for defense.

One may be punished for the crime he has committed by death penalty, but this doesn’t make it anymore ‘moral’. In a society, the common good of the people is in order, and by popular vote the man who steps outside the line, and rebels in any sense will be eliminated and regarded as harmful to the ‘peace’…RIP.

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I don’t understand, are you criticizing society in favor of individual hunter-gatherers, or are you only criticizing society as it exists now?

And how did you know I was 14 when I wrote that?

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Your points of view sound remarkably similar to Kant’s categorical imperative…

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In essence it’s a categorical imperative with selfishness behind it.

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ok, i was just thinking there was an aspect to it I wasn’t seeing… there are some very good points made here that help clarify the categorical imperative because in it’s original language, it’s fairly difficult to comprehend the full implications of it

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Yes wvuphilmaj7, I mentioned I was going slightly Kantian (though, not completely). thezeus18’s charaterization of my position is fair. I would only phrase it a bit more specifically: selfishness is the motivation behind utilizing the categorical imperative as a means toward quantative utilitarian ends.

My main thesis against Raskolnikov’s position is that, in a purely rational society that seeks utilitarian ends, the catergorical impertative necessarly applies to action, in terms of what rights an individual in the society has or does not have when one adopts the social contract. If any priniple or right, such as the right to murder, the right to freedom of speech, is granted to one member of such a society, to be wholly rational, every member of the society recieves the said right. Nuanced exceptions are to be made of course, such as, any individual in a certain social position such as a judge, may have rights that other citizens do not have (e.g. imposing jail sentences on other members of society which takes away many of the imposed upon individual’s rights). A judge clearly has extra powers than the ordinary citizen, but still maintains rational coherency because if the judge were to switch places with the defendent for the same offense that the defendent committed, then the said judge will also be subject to the law and the same punishment as the defendent.

Hi Echo,

One of your objections is directly against Rousseau’s social contract,

This is Roussaeu’s social contract, in a nutshell.

This is also very close to Raskolnikov’s motivation for his theory on the ‘Extraordinary Man’ – the man that takes action into his own hands, the strong man who can overstep social and moral boundaries. If I characterize your position correctly, you are arguing for Raskolnikov, for the freedom of the individual to stand up against the will of the whole (social boundaries; e.g., do not murder), so that the individual can be strong rather than weak. I would like to understand how you define strength and weakness? What values do you place on strength and weakness?

Is the strength of an individual will that crosses social boundaries against the collective will, e.g., murder, more valuable than peace?

In your estimation, would a state of anarchy, where the strongest wills dominate the weakest – allowing for the strongest of the strong to flourish (while awknowledging that it is only one particular kind of strength) – , be better than a socially ordered, peaceful society?

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Hello, dear friends.
I want to say that, one and all, you are yourselves irredeemable murderers of the old hag. That is not to say that you have gone and done it, that would mean thinking too highly of you without information and details about each. Rather, you are murderers by metaphorical proxy.

To have murdered the contents of Dostoevsky’s book with your rational analysis of “what would be better” and what moreover “would be best”, to have started arguing among yourselves about policy, instead of conscience, about social contracts, instead of the immutable dictates of the inner laws of the human being - is that not “murder one”?

Friends, why are you taking positions and striking poses? Only one thing truly matters. What would you have done? If nothing, then the entire matter does not concern you. It is time. It is a good day to cease our murdering of “old hag” Sophia with the contemptible churn-and-turn contraptions of human rational thinking. For all their outward finery, they truly are no finer than a rusty hatchet - you can convince yourself of this more fully on your own time, with independent investigation.

I have unfortunately read that sickly book you are now discussing, and I praise it for DEPTH, indeed we are to be certain of it, that no Categorical Imperative was involved or harmed in the making of this book. Kant was simply not to be found there, in much the same way that deft demonstrations of long division or feats of account balancing will not usually be found in a heartfelt loveletter.

It was desperation that drove our hero Raskolnikov to do as he did, to invent impossible theories about “Napoleon”, who “has the right” etc.; it was his agitated rational mind that launched him toward his foul misdeeds, but how soon it crumbled once faced with real action! Imagine this with me, review your text. It was barely an instant, but what an instant! His hand felt how a hatchet stuck through a still-living human skull makes that characteristic, ridiculous wet pop. There was some blood, we can imagine that, and perhaps the faint butcherhouse smell. Innumerable tiny details of the scene burned themselves permanently into his mind at that instant, when he truly did he knew-not-what.

The resulting sickness, the animalistic state he plunged into, was his punishment for the Sin of Rationalism. Rationalism betrayed Raskolnikov, as it will also betray each of you. His deed was simply incompatible with everything he grew up, with and into. Raskolnikov was no longer a man; he split apart, and the part of him previously ordained into being by social contract, itself contracted injuries incompatible with survival. Raskolnikov the social entity was utterly destroyed. What good is it to discuss corpses? If that was the end of it, the book would have been perverse trash, nothing more. But it was not the end of it, you remember, don’t you?

That was he, but what will be your punishment, murderers? I may, perhaps, have once overheard just the rifting thing for you:

Everyone knows that Buddhism condemns murder. This seems natural and acceptable, because few have gone far enough to press and investigate why. So, why?

They make a face: “because it is vulgar”.

What!? Wait, but what about… quantitative… you understand, and utilitarianism too, what about soldiers, in the field? Defending the country? Freedom?

The face grows blank and disinterested: “That is EVEN MORE VULGAR.”

Yours for putting a speedy end to “old hags” being murdered everywhere,
-WL

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Hey WL,

Thank you for your insightful and penetrating comments, and welcome to the forums. Your insight that we are murderers by proxy is an astute observation, and I agree. My professor, Dr. Teikmanis, offered the same observation in class. She presented the notion that the readers of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, are implicated in Raskolnikov’s crime, not only through rational argumentation as you point out, but simply through the very act of reading the text. I agree to the extent that the reader is implicated in the crime (not in the 1st degree as you point out, but 3rd or something like it) if they accept Raskolnikov’s reasons for the crime (and I confess that I was guilty in my first reading of the text at sixteen).

It should be acknowledged that Raskolnikov does not believe he is committing a “crime,” a “murder,” but believes he is fulfilling an abstract principle much like the Unibomber who also kills for a theory, according to professor Teikmanis. This may be argued for the first murder, that of the old crone, but certainly not of Lizaveta, whom he murders out of some cowardly fear of getting caught - in order to save his own skin.

Ah, but see, that is what Raskolnikov argues. His theory about the ‘Extraordinary Man’ states that such an individual has the right to overcome his or her own conscience; a man like Newton or Napoleon have the right to breach social boundaries, not, he argues, out of whim, but if and only if, they face obstacles which hinder their bringing about utilitarian benefit to humanity. He acknowledges that all great men will feel great sorrow for such circumstances, but conscience should not hinder their actions as they stand in the way of “progress.” Raskolnikov questions the inner laws of human beings, and as we know, Dostoevsky goes to great length to show just how subject Raskolnikov is to these laws, and through Porfiry Petrovich, the detective that inspired Columbo according to Dr. Teikmanis, Dostoevsky is able to unravel Raskolnikov’s calculated razor-sharp rational facade.

Though Raskolnikov will come to acknowledge that he is not a Superman, what superman would kill an old, defenseless crone?, he will question his theory. Which, even due to Raskolnikov’s failure, does not remain un-refuted. Napoleon brought about chaos and destruction to all of Europe, countless people were killed and families torn apart, but he also brought about the modern university, social mobility, and the destruction of the feudal system. That’s progress with a catastrophic price in human blood. According to Raskolnikov, Napoleon’s conscience should not be troubled, those “people,” the “herd,” the “ordinary,” stood in the way of progress.

To question Raskolnikov’s theory, to question Rodya’s logic, this man of “science,” is to take the detective’s side and not to implicate ourselves. So I question the veracity and coherency of Rodya’s ideas. To argue that rational thinking is to blame for the murder, as you propose WL, “It is a good day to cease our murdering of “old hag” Sophia with the contemptible churn-and-turn contraptions of human rational thinking.”, is an error. It is missing the point (technically); a logical fallacy. You argue that because reason is flawed, all reason is guilty. Roday’s reason is broken, so away with reason. Rodya murders because of theoretical mechanics, so down with the machine! It is like saying, “Crimes of theft and robbery have been increasing at an alarming rate lately. The conclusion is obvious: We must reinstate the death penalty immediately.” which misses the point (Hurley, Concise intro to Logic). It is the same fallacy as saying, “Abuse of the welfare system is rampant nowadays. Our only alternative is to abolish the system altogether.”, also missing the point (Hurley, Concise intro to Logic).

Yes, reason is flawed, but we should not conclude to abolish it, but to supplement it, develop it (and logic as a science is continually under development), refine it so that not only is it a hatchet, but also a scalpel as the political lingo of our times reverberates.

Yes, once again I agree WL, Kant was not to be found. Raskolnikov’s reason is crude, undeveloped to the end, even by Dostoevsky’s own admission in a letter to his brother. Dostoevsky wrote that Rodya was a student with undeveloped ideas, lost and confused. Agreed. What I am doing here is now taking apart his crudely developed ideas with the eye of a philosopher. Let us together untangle the crass calculations of our poor student, Rodya. Dostoevsky argues through Crime and Punishment against utilitarianism, in particular, quantitative utilitarianism, but the idea is in the head of an undeveloped, student, not Mill or Kant. How would an authentic rationalist view Raskolnikov’s position?

You write, “and the part of him previously ordained into being by social contract, itself contracted injuries incompatible with survival.” absolutely right! This is my argument my friend, his action as well as his theory is a rationally deranged, incoherent, and yes, vulgar monster.

I really admire your effort, passion, and rational, Wl.

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Two things,

First: Underground man, please be careful with the dashes! I don’t know how it looks on anyone else’s screen, but on mine it causes side-scrolling. And side-scrolling often makes it very hard to read a post :frowning:

As for the question posed in the OP, I think that the libertarian critique of the difference principle (“justice as fairness”) would apply. Nozick argued that it is only the risk adverse that would embrace the difference principle, whereas risk seeking individuals would have no complaints with it.

Likewise, risk adverse people would decry the extraordinary individual using rational egoism as their justification. However, risk seeking people would have no problems justifying the extraordinary individual using rational egoism as their justification. To get around this, and thereby justify the same position you have reached, Rawls argued for the establishment of an overlapping consensus between reasonable individuals. But in so doing here merely defined the problem away as opposed to actually addressing it, at least IMHO.

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Thank you for the input Xunzian,

Dashes – duley noted! My apologies.

Can you point me in the right direction to Nozick’s theory on the risk adverse/risk seeking dichotomy, (I do hope it is an essay and not in the depths of a major work), and likewise, to Rawls’s response, either online or in text - academic journals are fine, too; I would greatly appreciate it. I am already a fan of Rawls, but I will try to keep an open eye, and your opinion in mind.

Incidently, I find your alias intriguing, do you mind sharing what it means?

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Nozick’s position is detailed in “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, while Rawls rebuts him in “Political Liberalism”, which is just an update of “Theory of Justice”. Unfortunately, those are larger works; however, they are both old enough that plenty of reviews, essays, and synopses are available. That is certainly how I got my information of them! But I can’t recall what I read. I’m sure some googling or a quick trip to a resource like JSTOR (or possibly Smears, the JSTOR of ILP) would get you the info you need. If that doesn’t work, PM me your email since I have access to academic subscriptions at work and I can probably find a few essays on the subject for you, though I don’t have access to lot of philosophy/political/economic articles.

As for my own personal opinion on the subject, well, given the constraints of the thread I can’t express it. So I won’t recommend rounding out articles about those two texts with some on Sandel’s “Liberalism and the Limits of Justice”. :wink:

My alias is a portmanteau of “Xunzi” (sometimes spelled Hsun Tzu), an early Confucian thinker whom I held in very high regard when I joined ILP and the suffix “-ian”, as in “of, relating to, or resembling”. Thanks for asking. You are rocking the big D with yours, right?

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Hello.

Am I missing something, or does your objection to our application of rationality to morality take the form of an appeal to our rationality?

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Hey fellas,

Thanks for the info Xunzian, I’ll check it out when I have some free time (I have access to JSTOR, so no troubles). Early confusion thinker? Nice, I’ve always admired confusion philosophy for its emphasis on the community (even though my most heavy influence has been by the existentialists which, well . . . you know). I’ll have to read up on Hsun Tzu sometime.

Yes, from D . . . almost five years ago . . . I’ve since evolved a tremendous deal, heh. Almost ironic that my latest paper, which was on Notes, brazenlly rips apart The Underground Man philosophically and psychologically. Luckily it was a starting point, rather than an end point, as The Underground Man’s tragic case is.

Zeus, you got it pal, I also pointed this out to WL just one post above, albeit in a much more lengthy manner. Those Russian writers sure have rubbed off on me! :wink:

Currently I’m putting energy into a self-refutation, will see if it will work out or not for me. Maybe Nozick will help - something I’ll be very unhappy about. But intellectual honesty first!

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I hope that was good natured ribbing, mixing the ‘c’ and the ‘s’. I know, it is tempting and I’ve made the same joke before. If you dig Existentialists, skip Xunzi and go to Tu Weiming. Not only is Tu Weiming still alive, but he also fuses Confucianism with Kierkegaardian Existentialism. When he isn’t being too hokey, he is really excellent. Or Ames and Hall, they are half-alive and more on the Wallen-every-post-modernist-ever end of things. Fuckers.

But the Rawls/Nozick/Sandel angle should keep you busy for now. I’d be curious to see what you think of them. Don’t get me wrong, ancient chinese philosophy is the bees knees, but I think it is better that people outside those traditions focus on the here-and-now (as opposed to the future :teasing-neener:). My guess is that you’ll stay in the Rawls camp (nothing wrong with that, two of those thinkers are pretty awesome and Rawls is one of them), though I would be curious as to what your opinion was on the Overlapping Consensus.

Here is a bit on the Original Position that Rawls talks about. It deals with the OC a little. What I’m curious about is, do you think he is cheating by defining his position as the one held by reasonable people (so those like Nozick are, de facto unreasonable) or do you think it is reasonable to say that people like Nozick are, in fact, unreasonable?

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The poor student Raskolnikov blossomed into quite the swan, quite the schmetterlinge more toward the end of the famous story so insistently foisted upon undergrounders and undergraduates in apparent hopes of morally vaccinating them against blossoming out of social contract the way Raskolnikov did. Unfortunately for these public service plans, ruminating in any depth upon the details of this particular transformation of criminal into saint, one begins to to suspect that “the transfiguration” was not fused into the text for the sake of a tidy happy end alone. It is ONLY through the ultimate transgression against the social animal in him, that Raskolnikov’s transfiguration became faintly possible.

“…so we must go together, by the same path! Let us go!” (“Crime and Punishment”, Raskolnikov)

The transfiguration occured when instead of indulging the faculty of reason, Rodion Raskolnikov gradually began to function as a man of conscience. It is shown for all to see, how little this remarkable “newborn” faculty of his has to do with anything rational or utilitarian. Such genuinely functioning conscience is no longer based on fear or calculation, is not rooted in public mores, and now emerges as the seemingly paradoxical, but indestructible alloy - immoralized conscience.

It is quite a conductive material, this improbable alloy: sometimes it conducts one directly to the circuit of being where absolute truth is available without intermediary.

“But that is the beginning of the new story, the story of the gradual renewal of a man, of his gradual regeneration, of his slow progress from one world to another, of how he learned to know a hitherto undreamed of reality.” (ibid.)

So you see, I do not call for the extirpation of reason, my fellow murderers. What sense in that, if reason may be all you have. If you must move on crutches, then do so; I merely point out the direction less travelled (due to the attendant doltish prejudice), and attempt to artificially excite your locomotion nerves. A philosopher possessed only of reason is a cripple - an excellent bore. It is a more complex alchemical combination that produces the astounding, godlike beast, whom I sometimes call simply the cognizant man.

Anticipating your demand for rational definition of the proposed phenomenon, I give you a typical sign:
This cognizant man is no longer “we”.

-WL