Analytic Truth (Continued from S/A Knowledge Part 1 Intro)
So far it has been assumed analytic propositions are true. Recall that we are currently assuming analytic knowledge in a solitary context. As such, truth in analytic propositions means that when I put forth the proposition, “A bachelor is an unmarried man,” I do not need confirmation apart from what has been claimed, to know with certainty that my claim exists without refutation. An analytic proposition is essentially a statement of, “This is that because I make it so”. There is no question as to the confirmation or denial of the subject with the predicate, at least when a person forms such knowledge on their own. A bachelor is an unmarried man, not because I am holding to some standard of truth in my experiences, but because I have chosen to make a bachelor an unmarried man. I have made it true by my own actions.
However, there is an apparent problem with this idea. All of these statements seem like nonsense without an established understanding of the terms involved. Even in an established language such as English, what exactly does an “an unmarried man” refer to? A bachelor? This would seem to mean to have an analytic understanding of “A bachelor is an unmarried man,” one must know, “An unmarried man is a bachelor.” If an analytic proposition is true by definition, how were the truth of the words involved in the analytic proposition shown to be true to begin with?
Within philosophical literature, this idea is called the issue of synonymy. Synonymy was famously explored by W.V. Quine in his “Two Dogma's of Empiricism”. Synonymy is the claim that analytic propositions refer to other analytic propositions infinitely or circularly. “A bachelor is an unmarried man because an unmarried man is a bachelor.” I do not deny that analytic synonymy can occur. However, in my exploration of analytic knowledge, I find analytic knowledge is only as useful as its ability to be used in conjunction with necessary justification. Necessary justification is used to prove knowledge of the synthetic. As analytic knowledge is used as a basis for synthetic knowledge, an identification of an experience, this implies that somewhere within the continued reference of analytic propositions, there must be a reference that is an experience. I will show that analytic synonymy does exist, yet any analytic proposition which is to be used in the process of synthetic knowledge must ultimately rely on a remembered experience. For analytic knowledge to be useful in determining synthetic knowledge, it must be able to be related to the synthetic, or our experiences.
The following example should help clarify. I imagine that I am walking through new lands in a world where sheep have never before been experienced. Suddenly before my eyes I spy this new discrete existence! This existence at first glance is entirely foreign to me, and I have no idea what to call it. I do not synthetically know what it is. From the depths of my mind, I think to call it a “sheep”. I have just formed analytic knowledge.
Later, I encounter a friend and try to tell him about the sheep. “My friend, I saw a sheep in a field today!” My friend enjoys my excitement, but then asks me, “That’s all fine and good, but I don’t know (analytically) what a sheep is! Tell me so that I may better understand!” After my friends reasonable request, I think a minute to myself and state a new set of words which will describe the sheep. “Well my friend, a sheep is an ovis aries. (Latin for sheep)” My friend returns a quizzical stare, as they has no clue what an ovis aries is either. Unfortunately, if my friend later actually did experience what I called a sheep, they would have no way of matching that experience to that analytic term.
The instance in which I claim a sheep is an ovis aries is a perfect example of synonymy. In communicating what my analytic definiendum is, I referred to another definiendum. As my friend does not know what a sheep is besides my reference to its latin term, my friend can only refer back to the latin term's referent in a circular explanation. This gives no value in attempting synthetic knowledge.
However, my act of first naming my experience of the wooly mammal as a sheep, is not synonymous. I took an existence and labeled “‘This’ is a ‘sheep’ because I made it so.” If I wish to synthetically know if something is a sheep from now on, I can synthetically know it to be a sheep by referring back to my memory of the first experience I labeled a sheep.
How do I communicate analytic knowledge to another person who has not experienced that discrete experience? Fortunately, there are two ways which I can communicate what a sheep is to my friend without analytic synonymy. I can either show the experience of the sheep itself, and link that experience to the term, or I must reference other synthetically affirmed definitions in hopes of allowing a familiar recognition.
In the first case, the discrete experience of the sheep strikes me because that particular existence registers in my mind as different from the other existences around it. It may be possible that I at first spy no parts within the existence of the sheep. Perhaps I have poor senses and can only make a vague impression of the whole, yet the whole is still a distinct experience from others around it. The memory of this identity, this experience, is the most basic predicate of an analytic subject. “This is that.” That memory is the essential definiens of the analytic which allows me to attempt a synthetic confirmation of a future existence. I can pass this along to my friend by simply showing them the same experience.
In this case, the identity of “sheep” may be vague. A likening of this is the term “good” in morality. Many people have the memory of an experience that they simply call “good”. It is vague and hard to define, yet it is somehow different from other emotions. Though this form of a definition seems crude, all analytic definitions which are to be used within synthetic justification must have at their base a reference to something which is or has been experienced. Once I showed my friend the sheep, I could then say, “I also call it an ovis aries.” In this a synonym has been established. There are two definiendums, yet one shared definiens between them. Though there may be a shared definiens, this is not an act of a synonym, not synonymy, as the one shared definiens references an experience.
In the second case, many times communication of what a definition is does not involve actually showing the existence it is based on. Though I may show my friend that specific sheep, if another similar animal was seen, I may call that a sheep as well. Whether I wish the term sheep to be vague or reference that particular existence is completely up to myself. I can determine the sheep as a vague classification of existence by experiencing and labeling many other identities within the sheep in familiar vague terms. There is a head, legs, and tail, all limbs which my friend and I have experienced before. Yet still, without being able to reference something unique within the identity of the sheep, I would have a difficult time classifying the identity as being separate from other familiar knowledge of existences. Thus if I could give my friend familiar descriptions which they have already had an experience of, yet describe them in tandem in a way that is unique to that of the experience of a sheep, my friend might be able to have a vague understanding of a sheep.
Though some of the definitions which describe the properties of the sheep may rely on other terms, eventually, in the chain of reliant terms, any definition which is to be used for synthetic purposes must inevitably rely on a memory of an experience. If it does not, it is a definiendum without a definiens which one can experience. Such analytic knowledge cannot be used in necessary justification, and cannot be a means to understanding, or challenging, synthetic knowledge.
Of course it may be argued that my friend really wouldn't know what an analytic sheep was until he actually experienced one. Yes, I agree, he may not know what an analytic sheep was, according to my established experience, until he had actually encountered one. Yet if I described the identities within the sheep in enough of a unique way as to set the sheep apart from all other existences my friend could experience, my friend would only need to experience the identity with the description at hand to synthetically know it as a sheep. Yet perhaps not. Now that we have examined analytic knowledge and what it entails up to this point, the examination of the possible critiques to claimed synthetic knowledge can begin.
Challenges to claimed synthetic knowledge
Under the claimed system of knowledge I have so far established, there are four main challenges one can attempt against someone's claim to synthetic knowledge. They are, an analytic challenge that is not based on an experience, an analytic challenge that claims it is based upon an experience, an experience that cannot be matched to any analytic knowledge, and an experience that is correctly matched to analytic knowledge.
The first examined challenge to necessary justification is an analytic proposition which lacks an experience. Synonymy is one example of this instance, yet an invention of experience may be another. An example of this is an evil demon. It has been claimed within philosophy that an evil demon could be controlling our every action. If this is the case, what is the definiens of an “evil demon”? What does it look like? What would it be to experience an evil demon? As there is no definiens based on experience, using the challenge of an evil demon for synthetic knowledge is mere noise. As there is nothing to possibly experience within the definiendum, there is no way one could necessarily justify its use in synthetic claims. If our analytic knowledge is not something we can possibly experience, then we cannot synthetically know it. Though such an analytic claim may be an attempt to refute synthetic knowledge, it does not belong on the playing field. If there is no experience behind analytic knowledge, how can we possibly match such knowledge to an identity? .
Of course, the mind may very well invent an analytic term with an experience that might exist in reality. I can claim an evil demon looks like a cartoon I draw on paper. I can further give it imaginary powers. Yet these imaginary definiens must themselves be based on outside experience if they are claimed to apply to outside experience. The definiens of the evil demon has no basis on perceived experiences, so therefore cannot be used as a claim to outside perceived experiences. I can synthetically justify an imaginary experience as an evil demon, yet the definiens of the evil demon already entails that it is experienced within the mind, and is an invented term.
What if someone does give a challenging definiendum with a definins which is possible to experience apart from the imagination, yet the person claiming said knowledge does not synthetically know the result? Such analytic knowledge must be confirmed by an actual experience. A good example of this is Fake Barn Country. Henry is looking at a (real) barn, and has impeccable visual and other evidence that it is a barn. He is not gettiered; his justification is sound in every way. However, in the neighborhood there are a number of fake, papiere-mache barns, any of which would have fooled Henry into thinking it was a barn. (Lycan)
In the example above, if Henry does not know about the possibility of papiere-mache barns, then Henry does not have any such analytic knowledge of papiere-mache barns. As such, Henry is necessarily justified in believing his observation is a barn. None of his experiences of the barn could allow him to match the identity to any other analytic definition known to him, and further, any other possible experience of the barn would not contradict Henry's synthetic claim of it being a barn. A person who is necessarily justified in believing a synthetic proposition does not need to counter every single false claim that could be brought forth. A person with claimed synthetic knowledge simply needs to ensure that their claim is necessarily justified in the face of the analytic knowledge they have. I am sure there are many people in the world who have not thought of the evil demon argument, but that does not nullify their synthetic knowledge of the world as is. One does not need to challenge one's claimed synthetic knowledge to every possible false counter claim out there.
What becomes more important to our purposes, is if Henry is told by a friend who believes there were papiere-mache barns in the area at the time of his original experience, and questions whether Henry could distinguish between the two. To further show Henry that papeire-mache barns are real, the friend shows Henry a paperire-mache barn just down the road. Henry can't tell the difference until he gets quite close. With this, Henry has new analytic knowledge which he could match his experience of the “barn” to. Once new analytic information based upon an actual experience comes into play, it then becomes something which is possible to match one’s experience to.
If one can no longer necessarily only match an experience to one particular non-synonymous bit of analytic knowledge, then one is not necessarily justified anymore. As Henry’s new analytic information about papiere-mache barns could just as easily be a match to what he identified as a regular barn at a distance, Henry must investigate further until he can continue to necessarily justify whether it was a papiere mache barn, or a wooden barn he saw that day.
Before encountering such new analytic information, Henry is necessarily justified that he saw a barn. The experience Henry had of the barn could only be necessarily matched to his analytic knowledge, and at the same time, any further experience of the barn would not have contradicted this. It would seem at first then that the less analytic knowledge one had, the more one could be necessarily justified in their synthetic knowledge. There are of course two problems with this. The first is this is solitary knowledge, and ignores the possibility of social knowledge. This differentiation of knowledge will be addressed later in the “Context” chapter. Second, and more pertinent to the current line of thought, one may have a difficult time being necessarily justified in differentiating experiences.
This brings us to another challenge to claimed necessary justification, a discrete experience without any analytic knowledge to match it to. We’ll look at Fake Barn Country again, but this time with a twist. Let us say that Henry’s experience of the large shed-like building can only be matched to that of a barn. However, Henry thinks it looks a little different from other barns. To explore further, he drives to the barn and touches it. Henry's tactile experience of the “barn” reveals it to not be made out of what can be identified as wood, but something different. The barn is made out of papiere-mache, but Henry has no analytic knowledge of what papiere-mache is.
Does Henry synthetically know the experience is a barn? Yes, no matter the material, it is a barn, as the material does not factor into Henry's definition of a barn. But is Henry necessarily justified in believing that it is a wooden barn? For the sake of avoiding an absurdity in the thought experiment, let’s pretend that this papiere-mache involves no wood products. What then is he to do when he feels this substance unlike the definition of wood?
Whenever a synthetic experience without analytic knowledge revokes one’s claimed synthetic knowledge, either two things happen. One either includes the new experience under one’s analytic knowledge one necessarily matched to, (the existence of papiere-mache is now classified under “wood”) or one must invent a new definition to meet this new experience. Either way, at the moment when this new existence is discovered, one cannot claim synthetic knowledge until one of the two actions occurs.
This being the case, Henry could include this new substance into his analytic knowledge of “wood”. The problem with this is, the properties of this new substance and Henry's current definition of wood are very different. Though both substances may have been used to make a barn, when it rains, the papiere-mache won't have a chance against lumber. Including papiere-mache under “wood” would make the term less distinct. A less distinct term makes it more difficult to discriminate amongst the several experiences of the world, especially if one wishes to communicate with someone else. If we included papier-mache as being wood, how much would be left out of communication if I stated, “I saw a wood barn in a rain storm yesterday.”?
The other option for Henry is to create a new and distinct term for this new substance. The advantage of this is both for his ease in discrimination, and for ease of communication. As wood and papiere-mache are very distinct, Henry can look at papiere-mache and try to find new ways to use it. In conversation, if someone else knows what papiere-mache is, Henry can state, “I saw a papiere-mache barn in a rainstorm yesterday,” and this imply a different state of the barn then if it were wood.
Regardless of which method Henry takes, he would have to note an experience which was different from that of his normal definition of wood. At that moment, Henry could no longer be necessarily justified in believing the barn was made out of wood, and can only have a new justified true belief if he includes that new experience as a new definition of wood, or creates a whole new discriminate term.
The fourth basic counter to necessary justification is a discrete experience which can be matched analytically. Let’s pretend I am chatting in a party and point out to a woman named Mary I have just met, “Steve over there is a bachelor,” She smiles at me and says, “Actually, Steve WAS a bachelor. We said our marriage vows five minutes ago in front of his mechanic friend, Bob,” If her claim is necessarily justified, her analytic and discrete experiences match up, then my claim to synthetic knowledge was false.
Of course, I can just imagine some readers thinking, “This woman’s claim that she is married isn’t correct! Simply saying wedding vows in a back room in front of a mechanic doesn’t make you married.” This brings up an interesting point. What is her definition of married versus your definition of married? So far the talk of knowledge has been solitary. Yet what happens when multiple people are thrown into the fray? Maybe this woman is justified in believing she is married within her own context, but Steve thought the marriage vows were just being playful. All of this comes under the heading of one word, “context”. This is the next step in fleshing out the synthetic/analytic theory of knowledge..
Further, what if Mary, Steve and Bob are playing a practical joke on me? What if all I have to go on is trust? In this case it seems I am out of the realm of necessary justified true belief. Does this mean I cannot know anything? After the examination of context, I will delve into the realm of induction. With an understanding of necessary justified true belief, this enables a construction of a necessarily justified inductive belief. Once this is understood, the synthetic/analytic method of knowledge shall be complete, and we will be able to explore its uses from math to science, and even identity.
(Continued in S/A Knowledge Part 3 Context)