Evaluation
This next section will exam the S/A theory of knowledge in further depth by applying it to a few of the general critiques of knowledge theories. My arguments may convince mathematicians and scientists, yet there have been bodies of literature throughout epistemology written by valid skeptics that philosophers may attempt to use to poke holes in my argument for knowledge. This is a very short section for now, please feel free to add your own critiques.
First I would like to demonstrate that my argument for knowledge can be tested by its own premises. There is the old question, “How do you know that you know?” The theory of knowledge I have put forth can answer that question, and allows a method of discovering and fixing errors constructed off of its base if found. Second, I shall look at some of the thought experiments in philosophy which have been used to challenge established notions of knowledge, and demonstrate how the A/S distinction within knowledge can answer these challenges.
The first argument for using the analytic/synthetic distinction within knowledge is the fact that it is completely testable by its own methods. The A/S distinction of knowledge has both a synthetic and analytic component. I have introduced the analytic component by explaining what the distinction is, and how its function should occur when used in a synthetic context. Next, I have used the analytic knowledge of the S/A distinction and applied it synthetically to real world claims of knowledge. How do we know the S/A distinction of knowledge works? Because we can go out into the world and necessarily justify its synthetic use. Its simple, if the S/A distinction doesn't work, then it is not necessarily justified and only inductive. Yet the irony is, if it doesn't work, if it cannot be necessarily justified, then in reality, you already agree to some basic portion of the theory. This is not to say the theory is irrefutable, as parts of what I have claimed in conjunction with the S/A distinction, might be found simply inductive, or wrong. Yet, it is up to the readers to point out these flaws after myself, as to my contextual knowledge, much of what I have claimed seems necessarily so.
To demonstrate the use of this theory, I shall put this new theory of knowledge to the test of some of the trickier thought problems within epistemology.
Sure-Fire Match (Skyrms 1967). S strikes a dry Sure-Fire match and is epistemically justified in thinking it will light. Actually the match has an incredibly rare impurity and could not possibly be lit by friction, but it lights anyway because of a freakish burst of Q-radiation from the sky.
This argument needs to be examined from several different angles to fully critique the A/S distinction of knowledge. What is S's evidence that the match will light? S is necessarily justified in believing it is likely that he has a functional match, (perhaps due to knowledge of the percentage of factory defects). Thus, S can never be necessarily justified that the match will always be lit when S strikes it with S's own amount of friction, only necessarily inductively justified in believing the match will light. S may also be assumed to be necessarily justified in believing that when the proper amount of friction strikes a functional match, the match will light. With these assumptions, Q-radiation can now be analyzed.
First, if in the example Q-radiation is not analytically known, then the only way to know that such an occurrence as Q-radiation could happen is if S could observe the synthetic identity and separate it from necessarily being matched to, well, the match. For S to experience the synthetic experience of Q-radiation, an experience S has never had, and separate it from the normal necessarily justified odds of the match lighting when S strikes it, there must be a synthetic experience of the match lighting that can be possibly distinguished from the lighting of a match through friction. As it was synthetically known the match had a high likelihood of lighting when struck, the match lighting up would not look any different to S's eyes (synthetic context). S has no analytic knowledge of Q-radiation, so S is still necessarily justified in their solitary experience that the match lit by friction.
It might be argued here that S does not know (knowledge without a adjective will refer to both analytic and synthetic) that the match was struck by radiation. Yet S synthetically knows the match was not struck by radiation due to S's own synthetic context and analytic knowledge. Synthetic knowledge is the best way a person has of claiming the truth, yet it is not necessarily the truth, or the way something actually is apart from our understanding. It may be the truth that my dog is a disguised alien. Yet, it is impossible for me to synthetically know such a thing, therefore this possibility does not need to worry me until it becomes possible to be synthetically known.
In a second take on Q-radiation, let us say S's knowledge is identical to the above example, with the exception that this time S knows of Q-radiation. S knows freakish bursts of Q-radiation can happen at anytime, and could burst in the exact amount to light a match. There are three possible paths from here. First, the burst of Q-radiation when lighting a match is undetectable, even by instrumental standards. Second, the Q-radiation is detectable, but not within S's synthetic context. Thrid, the Q-radiation is detectable within S's synthetic context.
Let us say a burst of Q-radiation when lighting a match has been laboratory tested, and no discernible visual difference can be found in the effects or after effects of the match lighting by Q-radiation with any means of current detection. In this case, it is impossible for S to synthetically know that any match S strikes has necessarily been lit by friction, as it is impossible to ever distinguish between a match lit by friction and a match lit by Q-radiation. The only thing S can do is use necessary justified induction. It is synthetically known that bursts of Q radiation are incredibly rare (within the original example), let alone even rarer that such a burst would happen to happen while a match was being struck. Further, it is also rare that an impurity in the match would prevent it from being lit by friction. Though S may not have the exact odds, S can have necessary justification that normally, when S lights a match through friction, it is by friction that it lights, and not Q-radiation. In this case we could say S has a necessary justified induction that the match was lit by friction, yet could never have a necessary justification that it was lit by friction.
The same outcome occurs if S is solitary and the experience of Q-radiation is out of S's analytic context. Let us say that S does not know of Q-radiation, but this time, a Q-radiation burst and a lighted match are discernible if one has been trained to see it. S lights the match, and knows within his context the match was lit by friction. However, if another person , perhaps a Q-radiation expert, was with S, the expert could experience the difference in the way the match was lit. Thus the synthetic context of the two begin to merge. If S decides to join the synthetic and analytic context of the expert, S cannot be necessarily justified, and perhaps not even necessarily inductively justified that the match was lit by friction. Yet what if the expert cannot convince S that S's match was lit by Q-radiation? Let us say the expert cannot necessarily justify within S's solitary synthetic context that the match was lit by Q-radiation. In this case, the competition in S's mind is S's inductive assertion versus someone else's inductive assertion. What should S do?
If S is trying to find out what can be synthetically known in the situation, S must compare the two inductive arguments and see which inductive argument has a greater necessary justification behind it. Let us say S does not know the person next to him is a Q-radiation expert, and has never heard of such a thing. S cannot necessarily justify that the person next to them is a Q-radiation expert, so must make an inductive decision. A Q-radiation expert SEEMS likely, but as S has never had any experience with such a thing, to S it seems far more unlikely. Further, S is already necessarily justified in their inductive belief that Q-radiation would not normally light a match. S may inductively assume that the person next to them is pulling their leg, and within S's analytic and synthetic context, to not trust the claimed Q-radiation expert may be the best necessary justified inductive decision.
Of course, if S knows the person next to S IS a radiation expert, and S is necessarily inductively justified in thinking experts usually know what they are talking about in their field, then though it is unlikely within S's current knowledge that Q-radiation could occur, the fact that an expert in Q-radiation believes this rare instance has occurred may tip the scales in favor of believing the expert. At this point however, the clear distinctions of what is a necessarily inductively justified belief becomes blurred for S. It may be that the person is a Q-radiation expert, but they don't have their glasses on and mistook the experience. Or the expert could be a trusted friend and S knows the expert is very good at his work. There are tons of considerations to think about, and a keen mind tries to work them out in the most efficient yet effective manner. There is probably a mathematical way of working out which belief S should take to have the highest likelihood of being correct within each instance, yet we are not computers with unlimited time. Thus a decision or indecision must be made, and only a long calculated outside look could determine whether it was the best decision at the time.
Finally, there is the possibility that S has the synthetic context to discover that the match was lit by Q-radiation, but perhaps S was looking elsewhere at the time. The initial burst would be blue, then die down to a normal match fire. Of course, is S was looking away, does this mean it was truly out of S's synthetic context at the time? Should synthetic context be the potential of discovery based on the actions at one time, or the potential of having the tools of discovery, even though one's situation would make it impossible? I will put propose that synthetic context is what one experiences at the moment. Potential synthetic context is what one could potentially experience. Thus a blind person and a person with sight would lack the synthetic context of not seeing a wall if they were turned away, yet the blind person lacks the potential synthetic context to see the wall if they turn their head around.
Of course, do you agree with this definition? Essentially I am asking what the analytic knowledge synthetic context should be. Should there be another label? Should there be an endless debate in how determinists and free will thinkers think the word should be used? Perhaps there is no one right way, but perhaps there IS a way that allows the majority of the people to use the term to understand and manipulate reality better. For now I will purposefully establish the analytic knowledge of synthetic context as a debatable term for the community at large to discuss, though I will personally use it as a means of describing a person's possible means of experience at the time.
If it is the case that S has the means of experiencing the Q-radiation within the time frame that the effects can be seen, and S does not utilize such possible means of experience, S cannot be necessarily justified that the match was lit by friction, though S may still be necessarily inductively justified that the likelihood of the match being lit by Q-radiation is a freakishly low likelihood. And finally, if S has the means to experience and differentiate Q-radiation from friction lighting a match within the time frame, and does so successfully; if they can necessarily be justified that the Q-radiation occurred, then they are necessarily justified that the match was lit by Q-radiation.
After that analysis, you may need a breather. I know I do. As such, we're going to go back to the argument that started this whole adventure in the first place, The Gettier problem. If you will recall, we examined Gettier's second example, S claimed that either Jones owned a Ford or Brown was in Barcelona. Though S was inductively justified in believing Jones owned a Ford, Jones didn't own a Ford, and Brown was actually in Barcelona; even though S had no justification for Brown being there. Under the S/A distinction of knowledge, would S have necessary justification in claiming, “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona”?
S could not have necessary justification that Brown was not in Barcelona. S has no evidence or properties of Brown's location, therefore has no synthetic means of claiming such. The claim, “Brown is in Barcelona (now)” is a purely synthetic claim without any experience to show it to be so, or not be so. Though it may actually be true that Brown is in Barcelona, S could never have necessary justification for such a claim, as S has no experience that could be matched to the definitions involved with the claim.
In regards to Jones owning a Ford, S most certainly does not have synthetic knowledge of this, yet it could be argued that S has necessary justified inductive synthetic knowledge of Jones owning a Ford. S may have necessary justification in believing that when most people drive the same type of car everyday, they own it. Further, S may have necessary justification that most people do not alter the Ford, Mercury, or whatever logo on their car to fool other people. This could include any other necessary justification that would make the odds of a refutation of Jones owning a Ford moot. Yet still, S could at most have necessary justification in inductively believing that Jone's owned a Ford. This does not guarantee synthetic knowledge, only the probability of synthetic knowledge. Combining S's lack of synthetic knowledge of Jones owning a Ford and Brown's location, S never could claim synthetic knowledge of the either/or of Jones or Brown. Therefore the Gettier argument does not refute the S/A distinction of knowledge.
Conclusion
The introduction of a synthetic/analytic distinction within knowledge, as well as necessary justification, gives a means of finally understanding how we know. Yes, it may be the case that synthetic knowledge is not necessarily what is true, but whoever claimed knowledge did not have its limits? Unfortunately we are limited by our analytic knowledge, as well as our ability to experience the world. Synthetic knowledge is simply a way to make the best sense of the world given what we experience. Many times it works, many times it doesn't. However, when it does work, we receive the likes of mathematics and science into our social synthetic and analytic knowledge. The times it hasn't worked are simply because of our limitations in analytic understanding, and/or experience. But more importantly, each time a claim to knowledge does not work, someone can come along and demonstrate why the claim to knowledge does not work.
Every claim to synthetic knowledge is possible to challenge, though that challenge may not be successful. Knowledge comes at a the expense of effort and keen insight. Thus knowledge, a certainty which allows a firm confirmation or refutation of a belief, can be had. The S/A distinction of knowledge both fulfills and gives a logic guide to appropriate mathematics and scientific method. I think it has unconsciously been practiced as such for years, it is simply that the method was not able to be analytically broken down. There was synthetic practice, yet no definition. But where does the S/A distinction leave philosophy? If it is correct, epistemology will no longer be one of justification, but necessary justification. What can be known and not known will be open to the community as a whole as it prods and pokes to ensure that someone's claim to synthetic knowledge is necessarily so. Grand analytic proposals may still be propositioned forth, yet only those proposals which have necessary justification in synthetic action will be viable. Those parts of the proposals which are wrong should be weeded out and thrown away; to be looked at only in idle time for pleasure as philosophy surges forth in its quest for new knowledge and discoveries.
Philosophy is the “love of wisdom”, and with a spelled out knowledge, philosophy's task seems clear at hand. We are to take the situations of everyday, the unvoiced synthetic experiences and put words to them. We are to look at a system which everyone experiences, yet no one understands, and give an analytic definition to the experience which can have necessary justification, or necessary justified induction. Philosophy is the producer of the hypothesis, and science is its tester. With this evolution of philosophy, the difference between science and philosophy begins to blur, as one field cannot do without the other. Will philosophy as a pure armchair practice eventually die? Perhaps, or perhaps it shall simply adapt and fall into science. Regardless, the groundwork of knowledge has been set, now further groundworks can begin.
Thanks again for reading!