I want to start a discussion on the relation between the rejection of Cartesian dualism and the rejection of metaphysics. Though not everyone will reject either of these, it’s my impression that those who reject metaphysics reject dualism because mind as something apart from the brain has been classified, by Descartes, as a metaphysical entity. Most anti-metaphysicists, in my impression, seem to think that Descartes’ biggest blunder was to separate all things into two mutually exclusive ontological categories - the physical and the metaphysical. My issue with this is that, if this is taken to be Descartes mistake, the solution is not to reject the metaphysical category - that would be to play by the Cartesian rules - effectively keeping the two categories, but saying of one that nothing therein really exists and everything in the other does. No - the solution to the problem, as described above, is to re-merge all physical and metaphysical entities back into one categories (of “things”), and then sift through the myriad of entities therein, keeping some and rejecting others on some completely different basis.
In this way, I think the mind, as a non-physical entity distinct from the physical brain, can be saved from the trash heap. I don’t think we have the same right to dismiss the mind as we do other metaphysical entities. Most metaphysical entities are, in my humble opinion, rejected on the grounds that they cannot be verified except by way of abstract reasoning. Platonism comes to mind as a case in point. Abstract reasoning is not perfect, and therefore most hardnosed anti-metaphysicists demand a rigorous scientific methodology as a substitute. But my position is that the verification of mind, although not possible by any scientific means (I open your cranium and see no mind), is still possible by sheer experiential exposure. That is, I can say I know my mind exists because I feel it! I know I’m sad because I feel sad. I know I’m thinking because I can “see” my thoughts in an introspective sense. This, to me, is a valid form of verification - albeit a private one - but one that saves mind from the metaphysical garbage bin. Yes, I know mind is “non-physical” and I guess this makes it metaphysical, but here I’m using the “metaphysical garbage bin” as a metaphor for those metaphysical entities whose rejection is warranted because of their non-verifiable character (other than abstract reasoning), not simply because they are metaphysical. Mind does not deserve this fate. I have no more reason to reject my internal subjective experiences than I do to reject my more empirical observations of the world. When it comes down to it, both are experiential - why should one reflect real things whereas the other should not?
DISCLAIMER: I don’t mean to stereotype anti-metaphycisists. If the way I’ve depicted the anti-metaphysicist position strikes you as unwarranted insofar as your take on it is concerned, please say so.
