Sortal Universal and perception

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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A sortal universal is a specific type of universals that satisfy some criteria:
-Provides a criterion to individuate and count the particulars
-Provides a criterion of identity to the particulars

In general, the sortal universal provides the correct answer for the question “what is it?”. Moreover, is a sortal universal that substitutes X in the sentence “There are n X’s”, where n is a number. The sortal universal is represented in the language through count nouns.

Examples of sortals are: person, dog, chair, star,…

The universals that are represented with mass nouns, in general, are not sortals. Example: water, gold, clay, etc. The sentence “there are 5 gold´s here” not make sense. But, the expression “amount of clay” represents a sortal, because it satisfies the criteria above.

The very generic terms as “thing” are not sortals. Considering a scenario with a table and 2 bottles, the question “how many things are there?” don´t have a defined answer, because a table have 4 legs, the bottles have labels, etc…Moreover, there are 1000 (or more) parts of table, four half bottles…All these things are “things”.

Ok…

My main question here is “There is a connection between the sortal universal and the things that i can perceive?”. The particulars of all the sortal universal can be perceived (visualized, for example)? Or on the converse, all objects that i can visualize must be necessarily a particular of a sortal universal?

A reference to understand the notion of sortal:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals/

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However you break up your perceptions into meaningful parts/pieces will tend to reveal how you make use of universals, how you understand them (of course it goes the other way, too). There is no definite formula. How many things are there? As many (and as little) as you need there to be, as you want there to be. Is there a connection between these universals and the things you perceive? Well, why do we have ‘universals’ as a notion at all? Because we classify and simplify our world, we differentiate perceptions and categorize them based on some standards of comparison or contrast. This typically happens automatically/unconsciously, but we can enter the process somewhat when we like, and consciously rearrange these categories. We usually don’t, however - unless you’re into say, philosophy, where thinking about thinking is a common thing for you.

Do you need universals to perceive? Probably. How could you perceive something without prior universal categories? Can we really ‘see’ an entirely individual thing? Perhaps, but it’s probably rare. Sure, we can sense and encounter without universals. Immediate sense data is the substance of perception, its basic component, but of course the overarching elements of perceptibility and the categories under which we construct perceptions are just as vital. A tribal man from the remote jungles of Brazil can’t make sense of seeing a computer - he will just see a sort of rock-thing with some paint on it. He lacks the universal categories with which we ourselves comprehend (create) the perception ‘computer’.

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“Things” aren’t sortals. Thus… there’s no connection between a sortal and “things” perceived. Easy :slight_smile:

Seriously? The whole notion is flawed. Sortals are defined by our language and our minds, they aren’t out there waiting to be discovered. Proof: I have five coins in my pocket (sortals), I have some money in my pocket (not sortal), I have 85 cents in my pocket (…?) - they’re all describing exactly the same state of affairs depending on how I choose to phrase it. You even allude to this in your post - clay is not-sortal, an amount of clay is sortal.

It’s a linguistics question. Is a count noun necessarily a perceivable object? No. I have five insurance policies, seven broken dreams and probably something of the order of 10^27 electrons in my body. None of which are individually sensually perceivable. If sortals are only count nouns that are perceivable objects, then the question is does the word have a connection with what it indicates, and the answer is yes. Otherwise language wouldn’t work.

Apologies if I’ve otherwise missed an important point.

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You are saying that sortal is transcendentally real, that is, that our sense pick up a distorted subjective idea of what things are like in themselves. But then what things are in themselves cannot be described independently of our sensory description. So skepticism of objects falls.

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This is my position…I do not assume universals that exists independently of our minds.

In your vision, “there are five red things”, “there are five red objects” and “there are five apples” are sentences that describe exactly the same state of affairs? They are equivalent sentences?

“dream” is a good example of a count noun, that represents something that cannot be perceived. But, the opposed question still open. All that can be perceptually individuated and recognized is associated with a sortal concept, represented with a count noun?

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I do not assume sortals as transcendentally real entities.I think that sortals are in our minds and i am focused in understand this connection between language, conceptual knowledge and perception. There is a connection?

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In your vision, “there are five red things”, “there are five red objects” and “there are five apples” are sentences that describe exactly the same state of affairs? They are equivalent sentences?
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Assuming one is actually referring to the same five red apples (say, in answer to “what’s in the bowl?”), I’d say they all (describe) (exactly the same state of affairs) - I wouldn’t say they all (describe exactly) (the same state of affairs). “Pi is a little over 3”, “pi is 3.14”, “pi is 3.1415926535897932384626433832795028841971693” also all describe the same thing to varying degrees of exactitude.

The examples I gave translate some part of reality to a cognitive description. If they’re translating exactly the same part of reality in different ways, then that is what I mean by describing the same state of affairs. I’d gather that you’d disagree: I’m not sure how equivalent sentences have to be in order to be equivalent.

Not “is”, for sure, but I think “can be”. Insofar as perceptions are discrete events that can be characterised, I’m not sure how it could be otherwise.

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