[size=150]The Ãœbermensch is no longer human.[/size]
I have always thought this was the single most telling refutation that whitelotus offered on this forum. However, it also strikes me as problematic. At the time, it perplexed me that someone as well read as hermes the thrice great should have failed to understand it. Instead he dismisses the statement with these words;
Perhaps he failed to see the provenance of the statement. Let’s take a closer look.
…
The Ãœbermensch is no longer human.
This statement opens up a particular view of Nietzsche, but also acts as a sort of ‘master key’ in unlocking several other important themes. I want to dwell on the exact meaning intended with this assertion, and contrast it with some interpretations given to it - which I consider to be incorrect.
The first such reading of this statement was originally given as such;
This is not at all what it means. Part of what it is intended to say is that the goal of humanity is now dictated by technology, and that humanism is dead.
Another, somewhat better reading of the statement then, interprets it to mean this;
I think this has caught an element of truth. However there is a double play on the tense employed in the statement; the Ãœbermensch, it says, is no longer human. However, it is not simply the case that, something which was once human, is now something which is not human. First of all, the Ãœbermensch has not yet existed. Second, Nietzsche does not usually take on any humanistic assumptions without placing them immediately under erasure.
(I actually think that the greatest ambiguity in this quote is that Nietzsche did take on certain humanistic assumptions, and that this is precisely what rendered him ultimately incapable of ‘escaping’ metaphysics. What makes this fact so problematic is that, when this quote is taken up by whitelotus, he drops the humanistic pretensions whilst allowing them to shine through in the quote, under an erasure of sorts, for rhetorical effect. So there is a double sense in which Gamer is both right and wrong here.)
Or else, if and where he does (which is uncertain), whitelotus is clear to state his disagreement, as in here (to give a specific example);
Pertaining to the bracketed paragraph above, there is an open question as to whether this constitutes a critical weakness in whitelotus’ reading. This is not a question which I am able to resolve at this time.
A key binary in metaphysics is that between the human and the ‘inhuman’. What is incorrect in Gamer’s interpretation* is that it imagines there was once something called the ‘human’, which is now not human, i.e. ‘cyborg’. The correct response to this is that, under this definition, the human being was always a cyborg to begin with.
*of whitelotus; perhaps not of Nietzsche
This is an understandable misreading, admittedly; if whitelotus had been writing about the ‘human’, then it might even be warranted to assert that he was assuming implicitly the very same, fragile distinction between man and machine, human and technology.
However I do not think that this was the case. Whitelotus was speaking about the Ãœbermensch. This is something different.
Such a statement stands in need of clarification. According to whitelotus, whose position I am now trying to establish, the ‘human’ was a sort of imperative. I intend for the ‘was’ in this sentence to stand out. It is not a timeless statement that I am paraphrasing, but something particular to a certain epoch. That is why the statement…;
The Ãœbermensch is no longer human.
…is bound to cause confusion. One asks, if the human was never not a cyborg, then in what sense do we say that the Ãœbermensch is no longer human? Was he not, also, always already a human/cyborg?
The kind of thinking which allows these ambiguities to shine through in a statement, parenthically, is that which has also given rise, in thinkers like Heidegger and Derrida, to all those awkward uses of the phrase ‘always already’. If you have ever wondered what is the provenance of such terminology, it is perhaps easiest to gain an understanding of it if we continue on with our example.
There is, or rather was, something ‘real’ or ‘true’ - in the now problematic metaphysical dichotomies which have structured the way we have understood ourselves across the ages. For Heidegger, this indicated particular and epochal manifestations of a changing relation of man to being - a fact which he focused on in increasing manner as he embarked on his deconstruction of ‘being’ itself - a deconstruction which was itself later deconstructed by Derrida (of which I elaborate below.)
…
The Ãœbermensch is no longer human.
Let’s try to keep this statement in view.
I offer the following to clarify the situation. For whitelotus, the ‘human’ was an imperative. What is different now is that man stands in the age of technology. Whitelotus is reading Nietzsche through Heideggerian eyes - and contrary to what Impenitent once remarked to me, the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche is not made ‘incorrect’ or ‘irrelevant’ by something called a ‘deconstruction’ of Heidegger, supposedly undertaken by Derrida. There is some truth here, but it is not enough, on balance, to save Nietzsche from Heidegger. We must remember these words from Derrida himself;
Whitelotus writes, attempting to explicate his own statement;
For whitelotus, I imagine - and this not an indubitable reading - there is no human/inhuman distinction, and the force of taking up a Nietzsche quote which may assume such a distinction, lies probably in rhetorical or polemical concerns. Whatever is the case, it is crucial to remember that, when the Ãœbermensch ceases to be human, it does not therein become ‘inhuman’. What is intended is a leap right out of such a humanistic, metaphysical distinction. Perhaps this was also Nietzsche’s intention as well. When I say that it is taken up in ‘rhetorical’ concerns, I mean that the manner of conveying the idea, and the language used, are arranged towards the audience, and this dictates what ‘voice’ is taken up. What is being searched for, to paraphrase Nietzsche, are the ‘ears capable of hearing this truth’.
…
The Ãœbermensch is no longer human.
What can we say then, to summarise this statement?
We are no longer able, in our present age, to put forth our goal using the humanistic presuppositions of metaphysics. What it says, more accurately, is that we - man - no longer posit our own goal; the trajectory of the ‘human race’ now becomes something which is not human or inhuman.
What then does it become? Nietzsche wrote, we remember, that “man is something which should be overcome”. Is this a battle cry against humanism? I am not certain of the answer to this question.
If there is anyone who sees things clearer, and can offer any useful thoughts on any aspect of this post, I would be much obliged.
Regards,
James
Sunset, Mont Blanc - by Wenzel Hablik, from the cover of Thus Spoke Zarathustra