Precisely, that particular idea was the standard upon which the sub-ideas were founded . Wittgenstein , in some minds was more of an innovator in that regard. , inasmuch , as some non English speakers were able to overcome the transition from primary , to secondarily derived languages.
In particular, his blue and brown books defer to the use of designated color, to set the framework within which the identification of ideas can be established .
Between identity, which he supposed on tautology, and resemblance - the bridge opens the floodgates to subsequent meanings.
Carleas wrote,
“don’t think an express definition would add much precision. In any case, the implied definition was sufficiently precise to be used in some intelligent thinking (which is not to say that one cannot intelligently respond by criticizing the implied definition; intelligent thinking does not entail reaching the correct conclusion).”
{Here is Wittgenstein’s analysis of the difference between ostensive ( express) and implicit structural development of meaning } :
“While Wittgenstein in The Blue Book is not dogmatic nor systematic, he does provide arguments that point toward a more self-critical view of language. For example, he does not think that “understanding” and “explaining” are necessarily related. He suggests that when humans are learning a language-game they are actually being trained to understand it. He writes: “If we are taught the meaning of the word ‘yellow’ by being given some sort of ostensive definition [in this case, ostensive means something like “denoting a way of defining by direct demonstration, e.g., by pointing”] (a rule of the usage of the word) this teaching can be looked at in two different ways: (a) The teaching is a drill. This drill causes us to associate a yellow image, yellow things, with the word ‘yellow.’ Thus when I gave the order ‘Choose a yellow ball from this bag’ the word ‘yellow’ might have brought up a yellow image, or a feeling of recognition when the person’s eye fell on the yellow ball. The drill of teaching could in this case be said to have built up a psychical mechanism. This, however, would only be a hypothesis or else a metaphor. We could compare teaching with installing an electric connection between a switch and a bulb. The parallel to the connection going wrong or breaking down would then be what we call forgetting the explanation, or the meaning, of the word…[I]t is the hypothesis that the process of teaching should be needed in order to bring about these effects. It is conceivable, in this sense, that all the processes of understanding, obeying, etc., should have happened without the person ever having been taught the language; (b) The teaching may have supplied us with a rule which is itself involved in the processes of understanding, obeying, etc.: ‘involved,’ however, meaning that the expression of this rule forms part of these processes…”[3] As the citation suggests, Wittgenstein views understanding a language-game as being mostly concerned with training (which he calls “drill[ing]” in the above citation). Having said that, Wittgenstein is not one to believe that even understanding a language-game can be reduced to one process; like the plethora of language-games available to human beings, there are also plethora of “understandings.” For example, the “understanding” of a language may come about by the “drilling” of the association between the word “yellow” and a yellow-patch; or it may involve learning rules, like rules used in the game of chess. Moreover, Wittgenstein doesn’t think that humans use language mechanically, as if following a calculus. He writes in The Blue Book, “[I]n general we don’t use language according to strict rules–it hasn’t been taught us by means of strict rules, either.”[4] Wittgenstein clarifies the problem of communicating using a human language when he discusses learning a language by “ostensive defining.” For example, if one wanted to teach someone that a pencil was called a “pencil” and pointed to a pencil and said, “pencil,” how does the listener know that what one is trying to convey is that the thing in front of me (e.g., the entire pencil) is called a “pencil”? Isn’t it possible that the listener would associate “pencil” with “wood”? Maybe the listener would associate the word “pencil” with “round” instead (as pencils are, usually, in fact, round!). Wittgenstein writes regarding several possible “interpretations” which may arise after such a lesson. The student may interpret your pointing at a pencil and saying “pencil” to mean the following: (1) This is a pencil; (2) This is round; (3) This is wood; (4) This is one; (5) This is hard, etc., etc.[5]”
{In other words, assuming the implication that fair communication is satisfied by the sufficiently grounded hypothesis of most everyone agreeing to the objective validity of meaning, by denoting it expressly, or ostensively, that learning may be forgotten .
An analogy of proving the quadratic equation may only be required primarily , initially, under the hypothesis, that once its proven , ( generally for one’s self), that should SIIGNIFY proof enough, or, fall into the obsessions constant reproof. Hence, fall into the artful application of math as a metaphor.
The triviality of this demonstration I regret, in addition to the incompleteness of the analogy. However, this triviality can be demonstrated in the rigors associated with ‘high technology’ where , for instance, how many can be counted on to understand the evolution of the simplest computer from ground up? The usages of the sophisticated languages has evolved with an overwhelming specificity from the days of Russell/Wittgenstein\Ayer.
The point being , that the remarkable behavioristic model may not be capable to stretch beyond certain levels of mechanical understanding , as subsumed by what the Blue Book signifies. IBM chess machines can defeat chess masters, as they can’t ‘understand’ the deeper layers of learned moves.Deep Blue’s win demonstrated as such.
The criticality of this stage of learning, may arrive to a point of evolving sets of more and more general foundations of the primal language.
In addition, the this trend will subsumed more ground, as less and less generally formal basis becomes inaccessible. Therefore the hypothesis is surely , and paradoxically turn toward the use of meaning as metaphor.}
