Honestly, that’s being too charitable. It’s more like a post-hoc rationalization for a character flaw.
I hope I don’t give the impression that I’m anti-intuition. Intuition is good and useful and often reliable. But it’s not magic, it’s often wrong too, and there are patterns in where and how it fails.
Hang on now. I started this thread in response to someone correcting me when I mentioned ghosts in a different context (delusions in the context of borderline personality disorders). The title is combative out of context, but it’s directly responsive to the post linked in the OP:
I just think the “ghosts exist”/“there are no ghosts” disagreement is worth debating.
The explanation for how this particular belief is bad is speculative, but the motivation is more presumptive than speculative: “false beliefs are bad” is a reasonable presumption. I can think of hypothetical cases where believing falsehoods is better than believing the truth, but they are the exception.
This is an interesting (but speculative!) claim. If true, I agree it would weigh against making skeptical arguments like those made against ball lightning and rogue waves.
What’s the general statement of the claim? Something like: “Strong skeptical arguments against extremely rare phenomena will slow the discovery of those phenomena.”
There are definitely contexts in which I would phrase it that way – I’m pretty blunt, but I’m not entirely without social graces, especially IRL. But in this context, stating it that way feels disingenuous. My actual claim really is stronger than that.
Humility cuts both ways. I have my conclusions and other people have theirs, and to the extent those conclusions are incompatible, someone is right and someone else is wrong. We should all have the humility to acknowledge it could be us. But that’s a general acknowledgement and not specific to any claim. It would be misleading to include it selectively, and cumbersome to repeat it each time we make any knowledge claim.
As strong as my claim is, this overstates it. I’m not dismissing claimed experiences, because they are important and they have to be explained. And I’m not mind-reading because I’m not able to say in any specific case which of the handful of quirks of human cognition is at work in your experience. Rather, in general, experience is not infallible, our perceptions are not infallible, and the ways our cognition is fallible sufficiently explain ghost experiences.
It’s no more dismissal and mind-reading than it is to explain how a street magician does a trick, or that lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are actually the same size. In those cases, I’m also saying that what someone sees is not an objectively correct description of the world. It’s false nuance to say “I don’t have enough reason to believe that the street magician pulled a pen out of his nose”: he didn’t, but we can explain why it looked like he did.
I’m not opposed to a middle ground of uncertainty in general, I just don’t think it’s warranted here. Pluralism demands tolerance for differences in values or opinions or tastes, but liberalism depends on a shared reality. Where, as here, there is actually a truth of the matter, where we know someone is actually mistaken, pluralism is the wrong approach.
So why do you accept this for “Y description of light-emitting or reflecting object” and not “Y description of sound-emitting or reflecting object” or “Y description of EMF-emitting or distorting object” or “Y description of heat-emitting or absorbing object” or “Y description of kinetic force-exerting object”?
It works in science too. The Michelson-Morley experiment really did disprove the existence of luminiferous ether. From the thing claimed to exist, they derived an expectation of what we should see if the thing exists, and then looked where we should expect to see it. They did not see what we should expect to see if the thing exists, and concluded it does not exist.
We can re-run the experiment. We can use improved mechanisms to increase precision and tighten confidence. We can come up with other things that have some of the properties of the luminiferous ether. But that experiment disproves enough of the claim that, whatever is left, it isn’t the thing claimed. Falsifying enough of the claim is effectively falsifying the claim.
I understand both of these sentiments. It’s covering a lot of ground, but I don’t think there’s a way to isolate any of the threads. And I like how they all work together.
I think it might be the same, but I’m not sure I’ve understood you.
I will say that I am open to the possibility that there are multiple descriptions of the world that appear to be distinct and contradictory, but which capture how the world works equally well. However, in that case I would expect the contradictions to be illusory, and the descriptions to be isomorphic to one another in the limit (though now that I write that out I worry that it’s just a tautology).