What are the arguments against Kant?

Hello,
I just finished Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason today and am very impressed with the philosophy put forth in this work. I now would like to proceed to reading the major arguments against what Kant claimed in this work so if could, please list any.
Thanks.

If you are interested in my initial reaction to the work I will tell you that while I understood the long winded abstruse nature of the argument put forth was necessary it was also tedious, but worth it once the main thesis started to congeal for me. Not an easy work, and I’d hate to recommend it, but it was really an amazing piece to come from a single mind.

…well, there’s the one that says he’s a drunken pissant who’s mind was rarely stable… :laughing:

Sorry, just envying you at the moment. I had Kant down cold at one point (relatively speaking of course), and it’s all rotted away. You might look at PF Strawson for an interesting read on how Kant was made relevant to Analytic philosophy (which tends, of course, to have the most voracious objections about him)… sorry, though, I’m reduced to dropping names.

But nice to see you here again! :slight_smile:

Well, one problem (I wouldn’t call it an argument really) as I see it in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is his distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
Since the majority of our perception of the world comes entirely from experience, then all (or most) knowledge originates a posteriori; and really, there is no true a priori knowledge.
Kant’s definition of what constitutes a priori knowledge (knowledge that is independent from experience) sort of implies to me that all a priori knowledge must have first originated as, or been extracted from, a posteriori knowledge.

Even supposed “a priori knowledge” as simple as 2+2=4 relies on experience. When we think of “2+2=4” our brain unconsciously confirms this knowledge with memories (from math class in school or whenever the individual learned that 2+2=4) which originated through experience. However, over time, the collective memories associated with mathematics have accumulated, and in turn, they have been permanently ingrained and integrated into our mind’s perception of the world - once this integration occurred, it was no longer necessary for our mind to recall specific incidences where 2+2=4, and instead the concept of 2+2=4 (and other mathematics) became an independent mental process which we could apply to anything we needed to.

Hence, a priori knowledge is extracted from a posteriori knowledge.

Now, new problems emerges in Kant’s theories:

  • Since all knowledge originates from experience, and since experience has proven that from time to time it is inaccurate when creating our perception of something, then how can we ever conclude that their exists a true and absolute a priori knowledge? For example, centuries ago, most of humanity was under a firm impression that the world was flat; they would have considered this “a priori knowledge”. They would have thought “certainly their are geographic anomalies in the flatness of the world such as mountains and valleys, but all landscapes as a whole are set on a flat plane”. However, we know this now to be false, we know the Earth is round. But just as people several centuries ago were absolutely certain that the Earth was flat, are there not similar situations in the minds of modern humanity? - Situations where we believe something to be “true a priori knowledge” but due to our limited perception of the world, we are unknowingly wrong.

From that problem, the definition of “a priori” becomes “knowledge which must be true, since the variables involved verify each other”. For example, the statement “All bachelors are unmarried” is a priori knowledge since “being unmarried” is part of what constitutes the definition of a “bachelor”. So, “2+2=4” fits this definition of a priori, since the value of “4” contains within it “2 sets of 2” - “4” is four parts, and “2” is “two parts” - so two groups of two parts would have four parts total.

However, even this definition of a priori will run into problems. It relies heavily on the context in which the knowledge is being stated. For example, we could consider that “Water = H2O, that is, two hydrogen atoms bound to one oxygen atom” is a priori knowledge. However, this relies on context. For if you were to pour a glass of water out of the water faucet, and if you were to check to make sure there were no specs of dirt or any visible debirs of any kind, and claim “There is only H2O in this glass” you would technically be incorrect. There would be other minerals and molecules that are invisible to the human eye within the water, such as fluorine, calcium, and sodium, as well as other microscopic debris (dust particles, bacteria, etc) that you could not see. Therefore, there is a lot more than just H2O in water. Even distilled water still contains some contaminants. So how could we say “Water=H2O” is a priori knowledge? We must rely on the context of the words. Does the context of “water” include everything within the liquid which we consider water? Or does the context of what is considered “water” only include H2O molecules?

Even “2+2=4” relies on context, since really, the problem 2+2=4 is just symbols - seemingly arbitrary patterns on a computer monitor. What if one individual’s definition of “2” was actually our definition of “3” - that is, the individual’s definition of the symbol “2” is “a value of three parts”? In that case, 2+2 would not equal 4, it would equal 6.

Since we obviously must incorporate a slight amount of “lee-way” into our definition of “a priori” to account for varying contexts, then the problem re-emerges: How can there ever be true a priori knowledge?

We can only assume that “true” a priori knowledge exists, and even once we have determined something to be “a priori” knowledge, we must be skeptical of it.

We could say that a priori principles are “Universally Accurate Principles which are Independent of the Human Mind”, and that a Human mind can never truly grasp the awareness of an a priori principle - at most, the human mind can only perceive an imperfect reflection of these principles which are in some way flawed by personal experience.
And even these “Universal Principles” (such as the fundamental forces like gravity, or mathematics and euclidean geometry) are only virtual principles. The principles may change to accommodate for other principles or fluctuations/anomalies within the principle itself. Instead of being “real” and “absolute”, these principles only exist as virtual “tendencies” of how the universe tends to behave. For example, all matter has the general tendency to gravitate towards other matter, but this principle is bent/altered to accommodate for incidences such as the bending of the space/time continuum.

Even the concept of “2+2=4” can not be an absolute principle (even given that the human context is accurate), and only exists as a general tendency. For example: We could say that if you have a group of 2 sheep and a group of 2 pigs, then you have 4 animals altogether. However, what if one of the sheep is pregnant? Then would we count the sheep inside of the womb as additional animals? What constitutes an “animal”? Should we include the parasites that reside within the sheep’s fur? Even if we were to imagine a scenario with minimal variables, such as, “If we have two hydrogen atoms, and two helium atoms, we have four atoms total” this would still encounter logical problems. For example, what constitutes an “atom”? Since a “proton” can be considered an atom by itself (a hydrogen atom is just one proton), then there are actually six atoms total since their are two protons in each Helium atom.
However, due to quantum uncertainty, we can not even determine the accuracy of this simple scenario. Since it takes time for information to travel (information can only travel as fast as the speed of light), then we could never be absolutely certain that there truly exist “4 atoms total” in a grouping of 4 hydrogen atoms. At any given moment, the hydrogen atom could hypothetically bind to another molecule and cease to be a hydrogen atom anymore. If the value of “4 atoms total” implies “4 atoms total within a given perimeter”, then at any moment, another atom could enter the perimeter and there would be 5 atoms instead of 4. Or, at any given moment, one of the hydrogen atoms could decay (although protons are incredibly durable and could be considered indestructible; a proton’s decay has never been observed in any scientific experiment to date; they are estimated to ‘live’ indefinitely or until the destruction of the universe, or after an incredibly long time (something within the ballpark of 10^36 years)). At any given moment, the process of “electron capture” could take place and one of the hydrogen atoms could transform into a neutron.

Therefore, there is no realistic situation where a priori knowledge (even as simple as 2+2=4) can be absolutely true. At most, a priori knowledge only exist as virtual tendencies. Absolute a prior knowledge can only exist as a hypothetical representation within the human mind, and the variables involved can only be relative to other variables within the same representation.

Since theories such as “Quantum uncertainty” were not around when Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason, his conclusions were fairly accurate given the context of 18th century Germany/Prussia. However, they really do not amount to anything more than “There exists knowledge, called a priori, that is independent of experience (which is a posteriori), although what constitutes such knowledge is difficult to grasp and has no practical application other than its recognition”.

I’ll have to refresh my memory of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and then reply, but from what I remember, he spends most of illustrating the distinctions between a priori and a posteriori, only to fail at finding any practical applications for such conclusions. His conclusions rely heavily on context and subjectivity. From what I remember, the only reason he went through the time and effort of illustrating such distinctions was so that he would be better able to disprove his contemporaries. Basically, he created a reference point off of which to base his criticism of others; it is his self-created argumentative tool.
I can’t say this for sure, but I wouldn’t be surprised if he would use his conclusions in an argument much like the ancient Greek sophists would persuade others: “How can you be so sure of something like that? Your evidence relies on personal experience and therefore can not be proven as true.” to the Greek sophist equivalent:
Opponent: claims point A
Sophist: “How can you know for sure?”
Opponent: claims evidence supporting point A
Sophist: “How can you be sure that the evidence is true?”
Opponent: claims evidence supporting the evidence for point A
And the argument continues in the same pattern with the sophist providing possible counter-evidence when possible. Most of the time, it ultimately resulted in the sophist’s opponent having to prove his own existence (or that existence even exists), and the sophist would point out that his opponent can not know anything for certain, and therefore he shouldn’t say his conclusion with such certainty.

Kant could have saved himself a lot of time by just saying “The world outside of your mind is different from the world you perceive”, but instead, he created a complex system for “verifying knowledge” that was really no different than common sense. In a sense, he attempted to map out the mechanics of “common sense” that could be used as a foundation for all other knowledge.

His “Critique of Pure Reason” is really not as significant as people give it credit for, and Kant’s ethics are by far his most significant contribution to philosophy.

Kant’s style and attitude was “I have to be able to prove my conlcusions with absolute certainty, or else they are nothing at all” - however, since “making conclusions with absolute certainty” isn’t a very realistic task to undertake, the net effect was that it gave his philosophy a dull, monotonous, boring, non-artistic and blunt tone. Since he declared things with such certainty, it would prompt readers who have an inherently rebellious attitude to try and point out flaws in Kant’s works. Since his rhetoric could be considered “bland”, it causes readers (who have a neutral view on Kant) to be bored and their general tendency is to not agree with it. This prompted a lot of criticism from future philosophers (such as Schopenhauer in “The World as Will and Representation” and Nietzsche). Ironically, most of his fans were also his critics.

The exception of course is readers nowadays who have a predisposition to Kant’s philosophy (they have heard good things about it so in turn they expect good things) and they actually want to like it; it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Kant is essentially “put up on a pedestal” by his fans because:
A) It was written a long time ago, so any mistakes the reader’s find in his writing is compensated with the expectation of not being able to understand some of the writing due to an old context.
B) If it was written a long time ago by an old person, it must be true. (This is considered a fallacy since the age of something does not determine its validity).
C) Because he provides “guidelines” for understanding - most of the audience for all philosophy is attracted to writing which provides “guidelines for knowledge”, since this essentially allows for the reader to feel privileged among other people - it is good ego support (and rightly so haha).

German intellectuals accepted Kant’s philosophy by storm, arguably because the stereotypical “German” (especially in the past) has virtues such as pride, and they admire those who boldly display power. In a sense, they had mistaken Kant’s style as a “bold display of power and righteousness”, or at least that is what they perceived it as.
Basically, his work became inadvertently popular.
Is Kant’s work truly as significant as its reputation would lead us to believe? No.
Is it still interesting none-the-less, and a substantial contribution to the history of philosophy? Yes.

The major argument put forth against Kant actually came before Kant. It was made by Hume.

Read Hume, Nietzsche, Russell and Ayer and report back to us.

But you could also read Hegel, to see just how silly German Idealism, and metaphysics in general, in the end, is.

Oh, and BTW, Peachy - great post. Very elegantly done.

Thanks, I’ve been away studying Kant! :wink:

Thanks for the in depth response. I would like to address some of your arguments pertaining to the idea that a priori knowledge is really a result of a posteriori knowledge or experience in general.

I agree that the mathematical example 2+2=4 rests on experience, but I’m not sure that what Kant was trying to explain was that knowing 2+2=4 is a priori because we can abstract it from the armchair, and not have to see 2 rocks roll next to 2 other rocks and think 4. My understanding stems from the book and philosophy in its entirety, it leads one into a process of thinking and the random examples (like the mathematical one he uses 5+7=12) don’t express at all what the totality of the transcendental analytic is getting at.

The best way for me to disagree with your assessment on the 2+2=4 example is by explaining that the concept of there being 2 at all, of anything is itself a priori knowledge. Putting the 2 next to another 2 requires experience, but understanding that there are 2 and understanding that 2 can be manipulated to be put next to another 2 is a priori knowledge.

I think the definition of knowledge is problematic because when analyzing Kant one seems to want to offer an ontology to knowledge, but knowledge is not something that seems to be qualified only quantified. We can quantify number but we can not attribute qualities to it until we force it into the world of experience, then it becomes qualitative and quantitative. So knowledge is not out there to be grasped but experienced. Since knowledge is something that tends to be experienced it persuades us to think Kant’s a priori knowledge must be garnered from experience because it is experience. I would rather say that experience realizes knowledge, and the way Kant uses knowledge in reference to a priori knowledge is because we can only express it this way because it came to be in the world of appearances. That might mean that the a priori knowledge rests in the noumenal world, but I don’t know and am not willing to assert that claim.

So take this to the flat world concept you mentioned or the pregnant sheep. The flat world was not the certain knowledge, but the empirical knowledge. Knowing that there is a world which can be experienced and abstracted as flat is the a prioriu knowledge we possess. It becomes less about knowledge and more about how we are fitted with understanding apparatus that can discern reality through reason. Some of this reasoning happens at the level of empirical knowledge (two rocks next to each other is more than one rock alone) and the rest is a priori (there can be two rocks, they can be next to each other, they can be added).

The best example I have heard pits Kant and Hume together at the billiard table. Hume says there is nothing that essentially causes the ball to move that we can know or prove, causality is not on the table. Kant says the first ball moves, then hits the second ball. Then is not on the table either, but where did then come from? It was a judgment from a priori knowledge. That there can be a ball and then, comes from the a priori. So it has nothing to do with decreeing absolute certainty about the world being flat or round, rather that the world is, that it can be, that its this or that quality will manifest from some other a priori knowledge and all be confirmed a posteriori.

It seems as though you are judging the a priori in its a posteriori culmination. I see the a priori as a potential for empirical knowledge. We can not have empirical knowledge without having a priori knowledge first. Neuroscience might have important things to say about this subject, as to what states the brain must be in to complete this a priori to a posteriori circuit, but it would only be descriptive for what the brain must possess to perform such actions. The fact the the brain must be primed in such a way is the fact of a priori knowledge. At least this is what i walked away from Kant thinking.

No, it’s not. There is nothing intuitive about numbers. Maybe you should read Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Just what a number is, is anything but obvious.

Maybe I should, after all that is the point of this thread, but before I do I should say my example was poor. According to the Critique the idea of unity, plurality, and totality are the categories containing a priori knowledge. Discerning between 2 rocks as 2 distinct things in space requires the ability to discern there are 2 rocks in space, lying there on the floor. That these rocks are independent from those other two rocks but create a plurality of 2 rocks plus the other 2 rocks requires the ability to discern between all the rocks and know they will always be 2 rocks, and when I turn around and walk away they persist as 2 rocks. There is no experience that can relate to my brain that when my eye receives light waves these things are not a part of my imagination but out there.

I should not have alluded to the abstract ideal of number and how we use this abstraction to make empirical judgments, but I am wondering how we could come to the knowledge of infinite numbers without ever counting all of them in experience, or how we come to the notion of two distinct rocks that make a pair.

Another analogy is the idea of having a court case where all we have is a collection of time elapsed photos where a man carries a gas can into a warehouse, pours it on the floor, lights a match, walks away from a small flame, a large flame ensues, and finally a blaze rages and firemen come. We can look at the photos and make an inference that the man started a fire but we can never know that he did. The interesting part of this story as that we can make the inference at all. This analogy shows our minds are active and not passive, if it were passive we would only report a set of images meaning nothing. While the man may not have actually set the fair the images still mean something.

If meaning comes from experience then how could the first meaning have been meaningful at all? If our minds are passive we should be walking about paying no attention to causal connections that have no empirical relations, but this is not the case. For any initial event to be meaningful a mind would need to be active in the process with certain a priori concepts. So in the mathematical example it would seem that for any person in history who came to the conclusion that 2 rocks can be added, they first had to understand that two rocks can be a something in space independent of each other, independent of the other two rocks and independent of my inner thoughts about what I am seeing.

Wow! You have succeeded where I have failed :smiley:

The major one I know is that he defined the thing-in-itself as inconceivable yet in proposing its existence, it seems necessary to conceive it.

I came up with a loophole to this a while back. It depends on a couple things: 1) that Kant’s meaning be taken to apply only within the context of the model he constructs, and 2) that concepts don’t have to be duplicates (as it were) of that which they are concepts of; they do have to match their referents in some way, of course, but being a mental “copy” is not the only way. I would propose a sort of key-and-lock notion of matching here.

The innate will to live - our drive for food, sex, and homeostasis.

In our search for those 3 things, all other meanings are extracted

definitions are never experienced

the naming of objects is after the appearance

-Imp

Well, they are because he says they are. But we mustn’t confuse the way the human mind is prone to analyse the world with actual knowledge of that world.

But this is not knowledge - it’s the scale within which our sense operate. And it’s not always such an easy question.

But we don’t have this knowledge. Infinity is just an abstraction. It’s not so simple a notion as you seem to portray it. I think my suggested reading will show this.

Sure. But this may not be true. It does allow us to hunt and gather, however. Our adaptation to our environment allows the species to persist. Our senses, and our inferences don’t have to be 100% accurate - they have to be good enough. People are convicted of crimes wrongly. But not so often that we lose faith in our sense or our criminal justice system.

But you’re talking about an ability, and not about content. We are, most of us, born with the innate ability to talk. But no one who is left to fend for themselves would come up with the English language.

The need for meaning is not the same thing as knowledge. We need meaning to survive. None of this leads where Kant takes us, however.

Sure. We separate the world into objects and events. Objects are very longlasting events. Read Hume. Where does one event begin and another end? Where we say it does. Which works. For us. It’s how we think. It doesn’t have to be what is.

This is a big problem with cause and effect. Read Hume. And Nietzsche. I don’t think you can get the whole picture until you read Hume.

Faust is dead right about Hume (the spark that ignited Kant, or however he put it).

Regarding knowledge and experience, though, isn’t Kant himself quite clear from the start (i.e. the first sentence of the introduction), that all knowledge starts with experience? The a priori distinction is not one of consecutive temporal order, but of universalizability. Ok, gotta stop there. My brain hurts.

Here’s the problem - Kant didn’t properly distinguish facts from statements of fact. Analytical “knowledge” is entirely dependent upon statements about reality, and not about reality itself. Thus, “This is a number” is a statement, but that statement need have no bearing upon reality. It’s a number because we say it’s a number.

Same with “This is a rock”. In other words, when is a rock a rock, and not a pebble? When is a pebble a pebble, and not a grain of sand? When is a grain of sand a grain of sand, and not certain molecules that happen to coincide in time and space? If we cleave a rock in two, do we have two rocks, or two pieces of the same rock?

Logic is of statements only.

To mistake it for a process that has anything to do with the world-at-large is the single greatest mistake that logicians have made. And it is still made today. A priori “knowledge” is knowledge about human language, and about nothing else. It’s universal to a language system, which is not very universal at all.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but doesn’t the fact that a mathematical equation like (say) 289 + 837 = 1126 tells us that if we had 289 rocks (or chairs, or apples, or hammers, etc.) and added them to 837 rocks, we’d have 1126 rocks in total? The mental tools we would use to derive 1126 from the addends are the a priori tools Kant talked about, and so long as we relied solely on these tools, we say that the knowledge thus derived (that 289 rocks added to 837 rocks gives us 1126 rocks) is a priori knowledge - no? And if this is so, then isn’t it true that a priori knowledge can tell us things about the world?

It can’t tell us that the rocks exist, or that they are rocks.

I think it’s difficult to appreciate the problem until you have tried to define “number”.

Does it need to? What it tells us is that if we had 289 and 837 of anything, we’d have 1126 of them. Note that it is also a conditional statement (if we had so many and so much…) so I don’t think it needs to tell us whether or not the objects being added up actually exist. To verify their existence (and what precisely they are) requires a posteriori knowledge, of course, as does the fact that there are 289 and 837 of them, but given those facts, adding them to find that there are 1126 in total is a matter of a priori reasoning - and I would think it works quite reliably.

Indeed, it is difficult. I know you’re fond of Russell and I’m guessing you subscribe to his definition (they denote classes), but whether a clear definition comes readily to mind or not isn’t so relavant to me. I’d be comfortable treating numbers as fundamental/irreducible cognitive elements that elude definition as much as (say) the experience of red, or sound, or pain. So I’m not sure where we get the idea of ‘number’ from - maybe its through experience (a posteriori), maybe its innate and independent from experience (a priori) - but it’s neither here nor there when it comes to how we reason our way to conclusions like 1126 being the quantity that 289 and 837 add up to.

But we could have an equal number of…nothing at all. Numbers are not a part of the phenomenal world.

So we agree. But how does this qualify as knowledge? Knowledge of what? Of numbers themselves. But numbers themselves are abstractions. And Kant believed that abstractions really truly exist. Or his categorical imperative means nothing. Which is what it means…nothing at all. Or his concept of Duty means nothing. Which is what it means.

But I think you have to allow for the very special place that Kant gives to reason. Or should I say Reason. It all sounds so innocuous in your mouth, gib. And it is. But you are merely describing a human talent. A way we think. Not what we think about. Knowledge is content - it’s not the process.

Well, no. Not his basic definition of “number”. But it is enough for my point that we see how difficult it is to define number - it’s not necessary that we accept Russell’s definition.

Apples and oranges. We experience pain, but we don’t experience numbers. That is central to my point.

Again to my point - we reason - that is a function of our brain structure, and not a function of that which we experience. Those rocks are supposed by us to be outside us. Our brain’s pathways are inside us.

There is a sense in which Kant tries to synthesize the two. It’s at that point that he becomes incoherent. That’s when his commentators start to scratch their heads, to give “generous” readings, to give alternate meanings - when they throw their hands in the air, in other words.

It strikes me, Gib, that what you’re talking about is synthetic rather than prior knowledge (or rather understanding, to be more faithful to the language of the First Critique) - and that kind of understanding still requires experience in order to be realised.

The problem is that Kant provided a general rather than a genetic account of reason and in his effort to get underneath the faculties to find their “condition of possibility” ends up elevating the subject to a universal form (although the Third Critique hints at a more nuanced analysis). Nevertheless, in that way he opens up paths for others to follow.

Faust, I’d be interested to know what account you’d give of our relationship with “reality” (feel free to point me in the direction of a previous thread if it’s easier and I promise to go quietly).

That’s it, right there, matty.

And as I said, that path culminates in Hegel. Or should have.

My account is that it’s what we generally think it is, before we overthink it. Sans God, that is.

We experience reality through our senses, and analyse the data with our brains. I think the rock is there. I think the idea of the thing-in-itself is incoherent. I think coherence itself is something we “do” and not something that “is”.

What’s really there?

The rock.

But whats really really there?

The rock.

But what’s really really really there?

I don’t know.

And neither does anyone else.

I take knowledge to be whatever gets me home safely at night.

I’m not sure that answers your question. Does it?

This innate will to live seems synonymous with a priori knowledge to me. The fact that there is something innate, as in “will” or the apparatus for reason to function initially “a priori knowledge” tells the same story.

In regards to the rest of the responses, I see the argument laid forth but I think the argument is directed at Kant’s overall work, but I was hoping to limit criticism to The Critique of Pure Reason exclusively. I don’t buy the categorical imperative myself and would hate to be assumed as defending it, but the fact remains that the critique of pure reason does expose something suspicious , that being everything we experience must be accessed through our reason, so how does this reasoning faculty work in times where experience could never have given us preparation? Defining number isn’t going to answer all the questions because the argument for a priori knowledge isn’t limited to number.

If we can reduce everything to sub atomic particles then it will stand to show that everything must be composed of these things, albeit in different configurations. To come to the understanding that everything is composed of the same material is a priori, and categorizing dogs as dogs is known a posteriori. We understand these things(atomic materials) a priori because we acknowledge them in space. This would suggest that every elemental particle be it quark or zuark adheres to some fundamental principle. As everything is made of these things everything would respond to their environment equally with the a priori knowledge of “interact in space/time to animate”.

Not everything will animate similarly because of the obvious difference in configuration. But those that are configured the same will animate similarly, like humans for example. I’m not suggesting everything must have a cause, but I am suggesting that everything composed of the same elementary particles should have a similar if not equal process or formula to how they animate themselves to exist in the empirical world.