What makes a thing a specific thing?

I’d like to ask what makes a thing a specific thing such as an elm tree or book. Basically I‘d say we can divide it all into two stages. One is where we “first” identify a thing “to be” a particular thing where it’s own set of rules apply and then another set of rules apply in the second stage where we are trying to specify things as being part of categories we’ve already created such as book.

So let’s take a look at these different stages.
Will start with the first. Will call this the “newthing stage”

(1) Newthing stage.: So how does something become a thing to begin with. What is a thing? What is the common pattern between all things that make them things? When something becomes a thing we must realize it is a thing over other things. That by making it a thing we have divided it from other things. And does this pattern have to be inside the thing, the thing itself, or is it a relationship between things that makes them things. But for the latter to be the case they must be things for them to have such a relationship to begin with so a relationship cannot be what creates things. Unless there is something we could say close to it. That we see a relationship between stuff that are not exactly things yet but become things through that relationship. So what makes things things is it a pattern inside them all or a relationship between “stuff”. When we look at the visual world everything is composed of shape of lines. Our sight, our mind naturally separates things by lines. A specific type of flower will say is made of many parts defined by joining lines. However we have something else going on, called distance. We notice that the flower parts tend to go together with a particular average distance that tends to repeat between them. This whole pattern of the same parts “coming together in the same way” repeats itself in nature. We see many same type of flowers and notice a pattern between them, the pattern of a “specific coming togetherness of parts”. We are also only able to recognize this pattern which is “the thing” the flower because the space around is always changing from one rose say to the next. If it wasn’t we might say the space that doesn’t change is part of the rose if all we’v seen of the rose is it with this space. But there is another factor involved, movement. A rose may move in the wind as whole thing and so we differentiate it from the environment around it. So a thing, a rose say can be defined by it’s specific coming together of parts (parts being defined as connected lines which may repeat in different spaces) and the movement of those parts “together” rather then other parts.

However what w e may realize is movement as a “factor” is of a different category as the factor of coming togetherness of parts as defining a thing as a thing. Why is it different because say you saw an elm tree for the fist time? You would notice a pattern of a certain coming together of parts in a changing environment between elm trees. The tree as a “whole” does not always be seen to move so does that mean that it’s not a specific thing in itself, an elm tree. No that is why movement is a different factor in defining a thing as a thing. Movement can “help” define a thing as a thing but “essentially” what defines a thing as a thing “for the first time” is a pattern of coming together of parts.
But what we realize from this is a thing only becomes a specific thing when we’ve seen it twice. Before that we just see “parts” but the idea of a specific “thing” is not present yet. We see the parts of an elm tree because our sight and mind can see the lines of the elm tree but it only becomes a specific thing, an elm tree once we’ve seen it’s coming together of parts repeat in a changing environment. That is there are two different environments with two elms trees. We see the coming together of these parts, the elms but the “different” environment their in helps us define the elms trees as elms tress.

So this is how we first form our notion of a thing as a specific thing. Through the repetition in nature of coming together of certain parts in different environments. What we can say is repetition is needed before we can form a thing as a “specific” thing. So when I asked is the pattern that defines a thing in the thing or a relationship between things. It is actually indeed both. It is the parts in the elm tree and the repetition of those coming together of parts (a relationship) in different environments.

Now let’s look at the second stage.

(2) Evolution of definition stage: This is where we encounter different books say but we categorize them all as books. The question is not what then at this stage makes a book a book as that would be specific to the book but rather what is the process that is the evolution of the definition of book. And is this evolution the same for all things. Or if not does it repeat at all.
Let’s look at it this way we see a common pattern between two books say. Then we see a third book we assume the third is a book either because it shares a set of patterns with the first or second or at least one of them. (Though it lacks some of their patterns). But what if say you find a fourth book and the only pattern that exits there is one that only exists in the third book and not the first or second. Could we call that a book. Because the pattern it shares is so far from anything which we originally called books. Is it that we can we go further and say there are different rules that apply to different things when trying to see if something falls within that category of a thing. But for this to be the case we would have to identify it as a particular thing to begin with. But this is possible as how we come to define another thing to what it is, is determined by what we first see as that thing and that process of rules does not apply to the first thing because it is the first thing. Which I have already said in talking about the first stage. Wittgenstein proposed the family idea when talking about games. That there is different repeating sets of patterns that games share but no common essence between them. But the question I ask here is how does this process come about after all we cant talk about there being different sets of patterns that repeat themselves “in games” until we know what “games” are, that is the “process” that makes them games. It is the process that is essential. Perhaps in this process even if a “repetition”( set of characteristics as a part) only is in common with the third book say it is considered to be a part of “a book” as it repeats later in a fourth or fifth book that shares a repetition with either the first or second. However if the fifth books only part contained a repetition of the third and not the first and second. Then it wouldn’t be considered a book. Though its other part might be a repetition of the fourth book that was with the first and second book part it’s not a book as it fundamentally has nothing of the first and second book. So what I am saying is for a book to be a book it must have at least one part that is a repetition with either the first and second book. And this is a pattern in the process of evolution if the definition of all things. That this pattern repeats itself in all evolutions of definitions. That we can apply it to all things. This would be slightly contrary to what Wittgenstein says as it would imply an essence, that though the all the parts as a whole in things change from one book to the next say to be a book at least one of the parts must be of the first or second book.
That there is an essence within the flux.

You’ve got a faucet. You weld it to a pipe, and the pipe to an entire houseful of plumbing. It’s still a faucet. Because we say so.

And here’s the problem with your argument - this isn’t the case. There is no essence that forces anyone thinking correctly to agree that “thing” 5 is a book and not a booklet, a pamphlet, a .pdf file or whatever. It’s a bit book-like, so if you want to talk about it you refer to it as a book. Then if someone asks how thick its spine is you explaing that it’s not actually a book-book, and your language goes into more detail.

It’s not slightly contrary, it’s a flat-out repudiation. Since you bring Wittgenstein up, though, take his example - “game”. What’s the essence of chess, football, solitaire, mind games, ring-a-roses, the game of life/love/politics, game theory…?

Well that’s got an easiness to it. What we say is remember when I said the thing, the coming together of parts must be seen to happen in “different environments”. Since the faucet is generally seen in different environments and not generally with an attachment to a whole household of plumbing. We assume that that coming together of parts is the faucet and not it and the household of pluming.

But let’s look at an elephant say as a comparison. We see an elephant’s leg always attached to an elephant’s body in different elephants so we assume the entire elephant is a thing.

However what if you “never” saw a dismembered leg say from something. Would that leg be a thing? This suggests that something does not have to be detached on it’s own to be a thing. But what is necessary is that all its parts are connected to be a thing. We would not call a leg which is split in two for the first time not knowing it was once together a leg, that is a thing.

If we look at a leg there is no “clear” line that goes around the top of the leg to separate it form the rest of the body so we can identify it as a leg, a separate thing. However even if we’ve never had seen a leg on it’s own we can still draw a line around the top of the leg with our imagination. But we must remember what makes a leg a thing is the fact that all its parts are connected. We cannot have disconnected parts being a thing which we’ve never seen connected before.

Only_ Humean I’ll reply to you when I get back since I’m going to town now. So be ready :smiley:

Agreed - there is no clear line. It’s a separate thing if we call it a separate thing. “Thing” is a function of language - of naming. That’s all it is.

Things - pipes, faucets, teflon tape, pipe brackets, valves, stems, plumbing systems - they’re all things. Or not. It’s up to us.

When I mean essence I don’t mean an essence where everything outside the essence though which is still within the bounds of a book is not part of the book or has no relevance to the book. Such outside things '“help” in believing something is a book but are not essential to though I think that’s not the right word. It’s undeniable that books change from one appearance to the next but there must be an essence that repeats. We don’t categorize books by a process where the rules of application in categorizing for that specific change from one moment/example to the next. Certainly that can be proposed but that would indeed suggest humans have an irrational method of categorization if you look at it from the perspective of true hitting the mark definition rather then use. That is perhaps that method is right from the perspective we can put that way of categorizing to a use. But we must realize although that when we can use different things and for this reason we’ve categorized them as a common thing our decision to categorize comes from the belief that there is something in common between them all, thus they have a “common use”. We don’t categorize a dog, a plant, a toy, and the sun as part of the same category as theirs nothing in common between them “that” gives them a common use. It could be this commen-ess that is the essence I’ve been speaking of with different things. Its true say all games are different but perhaps there are more discreet patterns underneath the differences. But then if this were the case would they be unrecognizable and if so then that would means we would have difficulty categorizing them based on these patterns. It would simply be impossible. Perhaps the only way this idea of the discreet patterns can work is if we could recognize them but emotionally were more fine tuned to the differences and so do not have an “intense” awareness of the patterns. Let’s look for essences within things. Takes games in all games from what I’m aware there is winning and losing. Though the method of these games changes from one game to the next there is still this essence. Perhaps we do not see this essence easily because it is abstract, by that I mean there are different ways of winning and losing. Games always also require one player. So perhaps essence is not the right word since there’s more than one in something and their two different to put together, perhaps to difficult to put together as the repeat in different things without each other. Perhaps necessities are the better word. That each specific thing has necessities for it to be that particular thing. Correct me if I am wrong but this would be contrary to Wittigstein theory as Wittigstein assumes no pattern between all things which are a specific thing. He only assumes rules of categorization that change from one experience( of a specific thing) to the next. Or take a doll a doll must have eyes otherwise it would never be considered a doll. So are these necessities what appear in the first and second example of the specific thing. As I was saying. Well not everything is going to repeat in other examples from the first and second there on. So their not all necessities. But that does not mean that the necessities must not come from the first and second. I think someone would find it very strange if something that kept repeating itself in all future examples were not in the first and second example. They would find it “unnatural”. So we can say the necessities must come from the first and second example.

Yes, we categorise and create them, according to utility. What’s “true hitting the mark definition”? You seem to be suggesting that the words are out there and we somehow manage to rationally discover them.

Some things are a bit book-like, in some senses of the general concept of “book”; some things fit completely in the concept. But these concepts aren’t atomic truths; at some point, someone invented a book and decided it needed a name. Similar things were also called books. People need to communicate with each other and, unlike pure logic, we think in more complex terms than “equals” and “not equals” - “is a lot like”, “is a bit like”, “is like in some respects”. You could call this irrational, if you’re a hardline logical positivist.

Well, we sometimes do have difficulty categorising things, most especially when we try to logically systematise them. Look at the difficulties of biological classification. There are different ways of classifying plants animals, none incorrect, just different utilities.

Also in day to day life. But difficult as it may be to say whether some things are more “books” or “pamphlets”, we have a flexible language that allows us to go into specifics and explain. And we construct a description, we don’t discover it. And it’s certainly not impossible.

Not ring-a-roses. A lot of games that small children play are co-operative.

The key to Wittgenstein’s approach is “family resemblance”. Resemblance, not identity - A resembles B, C and D, while E resembles B and D and F resembles C.

Also, he never talks of personal experience, but the communal/social rules of language. We can’t communicate anything that isn’t shared.

So you have a chocolate cake, a carrot cake, a battenburg… if all the rest of the cakes you came across had jam in them, swiss rolls and victoria sponges, that would be unnatural? I think your definition of cake would expand to accept things that are treated as cakes.

Well in relation to those cakes. Have a remember how I suggested the patterns may be discreet. For exp one of the necessities here is that a cake must be edible. Another might be that it must have flour in it. These are thing we see when we first see cakes. But I’d like to propose something new. Perhaps there are different degrees of necessities. For exp a proper cake must always have the necessity of being edible. But is there another necessity of a lesser degree of necessity. Such as a cake must be used for special occasions. This is not a necessity that appears all the time but does appear a great deal in different examples of cakes. So there are different degrees of necessity. The biggest necessities, the ones that happen all the time in the specific thing could be said to be it’s essence. But I find that a very misleading word. Rather I would simply say they are the biggest necessities.

As for Wittgenstein he’s family resemblance theory does not account from what I’m aware of the process of how this happens. There has to be rules to how it happens and in my first post I try to show this process. The process isn’t so simple as simply naming things books and they became books. As before those particular books were named books "someone had to name them” for the first time books like the very first book. And they had to apply rules to this decision.
This person was not just copying language he learned he had to choose the word for that specific thing because no one had named it or told him before.

As for discovering words. Yes I do think we discover words. I don’t think their self existent or written into the universe but I do think there are rules to how we discover new words and so our naming them is inevitable.

As for ring a ring a rosy being cooperative. Perhaps it works like this. You have some big necessities that keep repeating in all you examples. You find another example where “one” say of those necessities repeats. This opens up a whole new category such as cooperative games. So we could say the necessity in we see in winning/losing games that we also see in ring a ring that lead us to believe it was game is “playing”. Another necessity. Now a whole new category of games is opened up. All the co-operative ones that have one of the necessities “playing”. This is a category because it repeats (is a category) and make co-operative a lesser/smaller necessity. So a new lesser necessity is created for games. “co-operative”. It is a lesser necessity as it does not repeat in “all” games. Not only are new necessities gained but there are also conversions taking place in relation to necessities. That is necessities becoming lesser necessities. The necessity wining and losing becomes a lesser necessity as we now know it does not take place in all games but only in some of them. Bigger/higher necessities cannot be gained later on in the process unless we simply haven’t recognized them which can happen. So far this is how I see the “process” works of how we define things as being part of particular category or specific thing.

supplythenavy.com/kryu03.html
:wink:

There are lots of cakes without flour in them. And, say, fishcakes? Where did the rational human mind see something essentially cakelike? It’s edible. Urinal cakes aren’t. Neither need flour. My point is, there’s no essence. Essence is “is/is not”, words are built up with “is/resembles”

My point is (and remains) that for a great many words there are no great necessities that apply to all of the examples.

Naming something doesn’t change it at all, it changes us.

And naming the first thing isn’t the relevant point here - it’s naming all of the things after that. If someone shows you a new invention, called a fleeb - the next time you see something that does the same thing, you might call it a fleeb. Or if you see something that looks similar, you might suspect it’s a fleeb, and see if it does the same thing. Describe it as fleeb-like. However, the key point is that there’s nothing anchoring this definition. Look at etymology, in depth - words change, concepts drift, according to what is required by the society they are used in.

Take diploma - it meant a folded piece of paper. In the C17th it became an official academic document. Then came diplomacy, the knowledge of international documents (charters, treaties), and then diplomatic - having the characteristics of one involved in international law - tactful, adroit and so forth. There is no ‘essence of folded paper’ in describing your friend’s answer as “diplomatic” when you ask him what he thinks of your new girlfriend. It’s moved, mutated, the word has no demarcated essence outside of which it is meaningless.

That’s just a circular definition. What’s the essence of “playing”? Games. It’s a syntactic rule, not a philosophical one.

Then how is it necessary? Some games are co-operative, some are competitive, some are wholly non-consensual.

The Image of Thought

That should clear up a lot of the confusion here. Also, please note that it cuts off briefly in that Google preview, you’ll have to go get the text if you want to read it in full.

What makes a thing specific is its arrangement. That’s all.

There is no specifc things in my opinion, as a whole, where does a tree begin? well it takes a seed, soil, water, light, which then requires the sun which requires this etc etc, everything can be linked into a chain of dependencey it us as humans that disect, name and project ourselves onto other things, including humans, two people meet, There is a “i” and “you” but neither of the two are independent of the field of energy allowing the so called meeting to take place, the moment we have a thought and project that thought outward to a percieved object the totality dissapears and a so called specific thing comes to be, in my mind no- thing has any kind of independent inherent specific nature other then what we all give it.

What makes a thing a specific thing is it’s unique position in space and time, combined with, as Faust stated, our agreement that a particular label applies to it.

A specific purpose makes a thing a specific thing.

Purpose can not exist without intent.

Intent can not exist without will.

Will can not exist without mind.

Ergo, God makes things specific things. :banana-dance:

Really, I think you were okay until this.

The ‘will’ to survive seems to be innate without whatever one considers ’mind’ to be. ’Mind’ is indispensable for dealings in our world of ideas and concepts if that is what you wish to use your thinking for. The extent to which the brain and thought are used for the assurance of keeping the body alive is small compared to the use of them for speculations about things, things that are indeed extraneous to basic needs of survival.

I think it is clear that in order to desire you need something to desire with.

But it doesn’t have to be a mind.

What mindless thing wants?