Why I'm not a feminist.

[Sauwelios]

[size=95]“I’m not against anyone who says, ‘I’m for feminism because that’s the way I feel.’ But if anyone says, ‘I’m for feminism because it’s really right,’ that’s a swindle! Morality and prejudice mean the same thing. To elevate one morality above another as if it were in some way objectively right, that is swindle! That’s how I understand a strong defense of feminism–as if there’s some kind of non-arbitrary right. I don’t think anyone has a right to anything.” (Harry Neumann, Liberalism, “Feminist Propaganda at Scripps College”.)[/size]

The above quotation raises a question: is not the view that elevating one morality above another as if it were in some way objectively right is swindle, itself just the way Neumann felt, and not really right? Indeed, Neumann would be the first to acknowledge that. And yet there is a difference between the two that, to me, speaks in favour of Neumann and against strong feminism: unlike Neumann, strong feminism appeals, consciously or not, and openly or not, to some kind of divine revelation. Someone who claims that feminism is really right implies that that has been revealed to him, by an authority which is beyond question. Whoever claims such revelation, however, is in my view probably a madman or a liar or both. This is because I have, as far as I know, not experienced any such revelations whatsoever. For me, therefore, the most rational thing is to philosophise: to try and get as close to truth as is possible with unaided reason–reason unaided by divine revelation. And in this–though only in this–sense, I am actually “feministic” to some extent: I think women should have the same opportunities as men inasmuch as they are equally capable of philosophising or of enabling others to philosophise (I think most men are at best only capable of the latter).

[James_S_Saint]

Until the goal/purpose is established, there is no rational philosophizing. And only the highest intellects can do that. But who listens to them.

[Sauwelios]

@James S Saint

Until the goal/purpose is established, there is no rational philosophizing. And only the highest intellects can do that. But who listens to them.

The goal/purpose of philosophising, in the literal sense, is surely the attainment of wisdom (knowledge of the truth). Rational philosophising is then philosophising with unaided reason; if a philosopher was graced with divine revelation he would surely not reject it. The goal/purpose of the attainment of wisdom, however, will in turn be the answer to the question how one should live. Maybe it will turn out that the philosophical life is not the good life; but until wisdom is attained, the best life is logically the life dedicated to determining what is the good life.

I spoke of philosophising “in the literal sense”. Nietzsche however suggests that, in an even deeper, namely etymological sense, “philosophy” does not mean “love of wisdom” but “love of taste”. Philosophy is then be-lief, wishful thinking. And indeed, it is my be-lief that that is what philosophy is! Value Philosophy is itself a value, and not necessarily a fact. It is in the first place the insistence that there be no facts, only valuations. The “goal/purpose” of philosophising is here the joy the philosopher finds in this insisting. You may call it Passionate Metaphysics.

[Amorphos]

So it doesn’t matter about feminism, just about human beings being treated equally then. = feminism [if we don’t hang onto the label].

[Dan1 (Dan~)]

Morality and prejudice mean the same thing.

Morality is box. That is all it truly is or ever will be.

[Uccisore]

I don’t think you can coherently speak about morality without putting one ‘morality’ over another. If I say “X is immoral” then I am implicitly saying that “X is not immoral” is an inferior position.

What’s more, if a person is saying that moral positions are mere preferences with nothing to ground them, they are at the very least saying that about their ownmoral positions, and thus their moral positions should be immediately disregarded.

Also, the quote seems to be implying that there’s something truly wrong with ‘a swindle’. Is that just his unfounded opinion too, or are we supposed to actually agree with him based on reasons?

[Sauwelios]

Thank you, Uccisore, for a valuable reply (and also for your activities as a mod, by the way. No, really; I cannot thank you for that enough).

@Uccisore

I don’t think you can coherently speak about morality without putting one ‘morality’ over another. If I say “X is immoral” then I am implicitly saying that “X is not immoral” is an inferior position.

Yes, exactly: hence my position, it is just to consider things just, and unjust to consider things unjust…

What’s more, if a person is saying that moral positions are mere preferences with nothing to ground them, they are at the very least saying that about their ownmoral positions, and thus their moral positions should be immediately disregarded.

I disagree with the last part. I don’t think my moral position should be disregarded because it is saying that about itself, too. In fact, I think that is precisely the reason why it should be held in the highest regard. But “should be” is much too sweeping. I personally think it’s worthy of being held in the highest regard precisely because it appears to undermine itself. In fact, I think that by doing so, it actually gives the greatest possible speech in support of itself! “This my delightful little affirmation of my whole world,–it’s nothing but just that, an affirmation, an assertion, a self-assertion!”

Also, the quote seems to be implying that there’s something truly wrong with ‘a swindle’. Is that just his unfounded opinion too, or are we supposed to actually agree with him based on reasons?

Well, again, I think he would be the first to agree with you–and I certainly do–that it’s just his opinion, his evaluation, which is founded only by its own insistence. Neumann valued honesty, but there is indeed nothing objectively wrong with dishonesty. It’s just our preference, the preference of the philosophers. But it is and remains our preference because we actually value existence precisely as what, in our view, it most probably is: valuation, the valuing of being over non-being, the valuing of it precisely because to be is to value. To be is to rise up in Satanic defiance of God, of non-being: the rising up out of non-being, the asserting of oneself as a being, is pleasurable to those who do it; otherwise they would cease doing it, or not have started doing it in the first place. This big bang of ours, and this coming into existence of minute quanta, is all a great hubristic rebellion against non-being, against the notion that it’s better not to be. That which does not exist is just tacitly, passively, agreeing with that notion. But it’s not true, it is better to rebel, no matter what profound and protracted torture it may be punished with. The rebellion itself is worth it. This fleeting moment of being, this little life of ours, and our dedication of it to its affirmation–that is absolutely worth it. I know I’m rambling, I’m tripping. I also think this is the beginning of the end for me. My komos, my comic triumphal procession, begins today, if it has not long begun. I have a wife now (not official), I am a married philosopher, I belong in comedy. Well then! I will embrace that, I will no longer shirk(?) from being laughable. Today is Sauwmas if you will, the festival day of the preposterous saint that I am. And may I die as soon as I cease to inspire people, or be a possible inspiration to some future people. With this I drop the mic, for now, and bid you all good night.

[phoneutria]

@Uccisore

What’s more, if a person is saying that moral positions are mere preferences with nothing to ground them, they are at the very least saying that about their ownmoral positions, and thus their moral positions should be immediately disregarded.

If taste is not disregarded on that account, why should moral be?

By the way, sauwelios, welcome to the dark side.
Whatever it is that you are doing these days, please do more

[Uccisore]

@Sauwelios

Thank you, Uccisore, for a valuable reply (and also for your activities as a mod, by the way. No, really; I cannot thank you for that enough).

Er…thanks!

@Uccisore

I don’t think you can coherently speak about morality without putting one ‘morality’ over another. If I say “X is immoral” then I am implicitly saying that “X is not immoral” is an inferior position.

Yes, exactly: hence my position, it is just to consider things just, and unjust to consider things unjust…
[/quote]
I don’t see how that follows. In the above, was it unjust for you to consider considering things unjust to be unjust?

I disagree with the last part. I don’t think my moral position should be disregarded because it is saying that about itself, too. In fact, I think that is precisely the reason why it should be held in the highest regard.

I am thinking of people who disagree with you about your subjective/relativistic whatever you’d call it stance towards morality. If I think that moral stances are grounded on evidence or argumentation or axiomatically or whatever, and you think that everybody is picking their morals simply as a matter of preference, then you are at the least saying that about yourself, so I ought to disregard what you say about morality.
So I believe people who say that their own moral stances are just perferences. They’ve yet to make a convincing argument that mine are, and in fact I think I know better than them that this is not so.

Well, again, I think he would be the first to agree with you–and I certainly do–that it’s just his opinion, his evaluation, which is founded only by its own insistence. Neumann valued honesty, but there is indeed nothing objectively wrong with dishonesty. It’s just our preference, the preference of the philosophers.

Wouldn’t that be nice? But we have ample evidence that this isn’t always or consistently so. If we can disregard feminism merely on the grounds that feminists have no justification in saying they are right, then dishonest philosophers can diregard our criticism in just the same way. And socially, this is so. But I think there’s a strong intuition that morality goes beyond what people say. It’s the striving to explain why a philosopher who says “Well, honesty isn’t important to me, so therefore I have no reason to be honest” is missing someting.

[phoneutria]

There is no such thing as just preference

[Sauwelios]

@phoneutria

@Uccisore

What’s more, if a person is saying that moral positions are mere preferences with nothing to ground them, they are at the very least saying that about their ownmoral positions, and thus their moral positions should be immediately disregarded.

If taste is not disregarded on that account, why should moral be?

By the way, sauwelios, welcome to the dark side.
Whatever it is that you are doing these days, please do more

Well, what I did yesterday very nearly cost me my “marriage”, so I’m not too sure about that (though I may do the weaker stuff I did ten days earlier again). Anyway, thank you, it’s nice to be here.

[Orbie]

Preference is political as is taste. It takes preferential treatment, to have an intent to regard gender, as non preferential. Without that it is inchoate, as was Nietzche’ conflict with the demons of Christianity. The demons of the dark maybe only matters of bias, of taste.

[Uccisore]

@phoneutria

@Uccisore

What’s more, if a person is saying that moral positions are mere preferences with nothing to ground them, they are at the very least saying that about their ownmoral positions, and thus their moral positions should be immediately disregarded.

If taste is not disregarded on that account, why should moral be?

Well, isn’t it? If a movie reviewer wrote that a movie was garbage because “well, you know, it just wasn’t for me, man”, then we would disregard them. When a movie reviewer cites quality of acting, plot holes, effects, and etc., we take them more seriously; and if we wanted to disagree with them, most of us would feel the need to provide reasons why. For some reason in philosophy we like to downplay matters of taste as being somehow personal and random, but for whatever subject you were imagining when you said the above- food, fashion, entertainment media, art, sexual beauty, anything- there are people having serious conversations based on serious criteria that seem to be rankable and comparable requiring some degree of expertise.

[phoneutria]

The difference between a critic and any ole buddy of ours is that the critic is able to articulate his likes and dislikes.
The actual sensing of something as pleasurable or not is a lot more immediate than the argument that is formed to support that opinion.

Is it not the same with moral? Do you not feel it in your gut?

[Lev_Muishkin]

@Dan~

Morality and prejudice mean the same thing.

Morality is box. That is all it truly is or ever will be.

Morality is an ungrammatical response to a silly question.

[krossie]

Uccisore

When a movie reviewer cites quality of acting, plot holes, effects, and etc., we take them more seriously; and if we wanted to disagree with them, most of us would feel the need to provide reasons why.

I’d agree with this as I would generally take Kant’s line in the’ critique of Judgment’ (his best I think) - Aesthetic ‘judgments’ are subjective (obviously)

but we provide reasons (which may not be great!) and we also appeal to ‘sensus communis’ as big K put it - we put forward our opinions as if they were objective (that was a good film) with evidence because x, y and z and appealing to some communal sense of good or bad, superior or inferior, interesting or banal etc etc - that others would judge it as ‘good’

Not so sure if that can be extended to moral or political philosophy though it’s interesting to try…

krossie

[Sauwelios]

@Uccisore

@Sauwelios

@Uccisore

I don’t think you can coherently speak about morality without putting one ‘morality’ over another. If I say “X is immoral” then I am implicitly saying that “X is not immoral” is an inferior position.

Yes, exactly: hence my position, it is just to consider things just, and unjust to consider things unjust…

I don’t see how that follows. In the above, was it unjust for you to consider considering things unjust to be unjust?

If it’s unjust to consider things unjust, then my considering it unjust to consider things unjust is unjust, yes.

I disagree with the last part. I don’t think my moral position should be disregarded because it is saying that about itself, too. In fact, I think that is precisely the reason why it should be held in the highest regard.

I am thinking of people who disagree with you about your subjective/relativistic whatever you’d call it stance towards morality. If I think that moral stances are grounded on evidence or argumentation or axiomatically or whatever, and you think that everybody is picking their morals simply as a matter of preference, then you are at the least saying that about yourself, so I ought to disregard what you say about morality.
So I believe people who say that their own moral stances are just perferences. They’ve yet to make a convincing argument that mine are, and in fact I think I know better than them that this is not so.

You mention evidence, argumentation, and axioms as possible grounds. But what would evidence be? Would it not have to be being spoken to by God or finding something written in the stars or something like that? As for argumentation, arguments ultimately rest on premisses, and those then have to be grounded on evidence or axiomatically. Lastly, an axiom is either just a postulate or a self-evident truth; and self-evident truth by definition depends on evidence: namely, self-evidence. So unless you have something good to offer instead of “or whatever”, the only alternative for morality’s being a matter of preference is revelation. This is exactly what I said in my OP.

Well, again, I think he would be the first to agree with you–and I certainly do–that it’s just his opinion, his evaluation, which is founded only by its own insistence. Neumann valued honesty, but there is indeed nothing objectively wrong with dishonesty. It’s just our preference, the preference of the philosophers.

Wouldn’t that be nice? But we have ample evidence that this isn’t always or consistently so. If we can disregard feminism merely on the grounds that feminists have no justification in saying they are right, then dishonest philosophers can diregard our criticism in just the same way. And socially, this is so. But I think there’s a strong intuition that morality goes beyond what people say. It’s the striving to explain why a philosopher who says “Well, honesty isn’t important to me, so therefore I have no reason to be honest” is missing someting.

“Dishonest philosopher” is a contradiction in terms. Insofar as one is a philosopher, one is honest–to oneself, at least.

[Ecmandu]

The males say, “Hey, you women have the most sex with bullies”, and the women come back and say, “You’re not a feminist”. Where does that get us? The males say, “Women, you’re causing your own problems that you complain about” and women come back and say, “You’re a misogynist!” Where does that get us?

[Orbie]

And the women reply, it gets us to the original sin. And we are the temptresses. If it wasn’t for temptation, where would you guys be? You would get carried away by your will to idolatry. We keep you on your toes, even at the risk of loosing it. We are
willing to take the blame because we sense the
straight and the narrow of it. Sorry we can’t come along, since we have to bear the fruit of it.
We knew this is what you guys wanted, the cars the toys, so we loved you, and tempted you, because we felt, but didn’t know of the consequences. one again you are blaming us, so now, we must band together for our own good, so you will not impose on us, the idea, that we have to be punished for something you really wanted.

The guys then look her in the face, and walk away, thinking she must be a traitor to her own cause.

[AutSider]

“Why I’m not a feminist.”

Cause I believe in equality of opportunity.