Why We Must be Identical to Our Brains

[Poitan]

I’ve thought of an argument which seems to suggest that we must be identical with the thing that produces our consciousness. It is as follows:

1. Particular conscious experiences are bound to the objects which produce them
2. The only way to access particular experiences is to be identical to the object that they are bound to
3. We have access to a particular set of conscious experiences
4. Therefore we are identical to the object these experiences are bound to

My use of the word ‘bound’ is probably vague to some of you. This is because we obviously do not know the precise relationship between experience and producer of experience otherwise the philosophy of mind would be a whole lot easier. So I have used ‘bound’ to designate some form of relationship in which experiences are directly connected to the object which produces them but we don’t precisely know how they are connected, this is so my argument does not rest on any particular theory of mind.

To access a particular conscious experience is to be directly aware of the existence of a given experience. I am not directly aware of the existence of another’s experience since it is their experience but I do have access to my own experience.

The proof of premise 2 can be seen in the fact that there is no conceivable way to access an objects consciousness without being that object. Let us suppose that objects a and b are conscious, how could one observe the other’s experiences? Any device designed to read the mind of the other object would simply be producing stimuli which would still have to be filtered through the mind of a or b. The two objects must be the same.

I have used brain in the title since it seems obvious that the brain is the producer of experience but this argument is also compatible with dualist theories of mind.

[Amorphos]

If God [here used as metaphor] had only access to a brain and human form, would he not still be God?

I agree that linguistic conscious thought and information are derivative in the brain, then that that is that and nothing else. Yet we don’t only have that, there is an experiencing observer, and in physics observing changes the values of the observed. The product of the machine and the content of the TV show are not inherent in the electrical signals and mechanisms of the devices.

Derivative info is being streamed into the conscious sphere, and the perception can be directly driven by causality [e.g. in gut reactions], but it does appear to have a latter faculty of choice via focus. Its kinda like there is a tug of war between causality and the consciousness having possession of the focus of a trained and learned perception. We are designed to give in and e.g. from danger, then when we arrive in safety or to check that, the conscious observer has to kick in. it is after all the brains way of reducing all that complexity into a single utility, even though that has multiple governing factors.

[Antone]

While this is an interesting argument, I think one (or more) of your premises is false–or perhaps just imprecisely stated–which leads to an inaccuracy in your conclusion. In my opinion, this is a problem shared by many of the arguments put forth by even our ‘greatest’ philosophers, so this shouldn’t be taken as too harsh a criticism.

My main problems are with argument (2) and (3); and the word [identical]. I’ll start with identical.

Identical, is a very strong word. The dictionary defines it as 1. the very same. 2. exactly alike or equal to. The problem is that no [two things] are [exactly alike] in the strictest sense. Even the most similar physical things are slightly different, as the molecules that form them will align in slightly different ways–just as no two fingerprints are the same. And even if they were the same in that way, they would necessarily still be different because they would occupy different portions of space. Thus, they are only “alike” because we choose to ignore the ways in which they are different. Similarly, the word [equals] is often taken to mean that two things are exactly the same… but that’s not really the case. [1 + 1 = 2] only means that (for practical purposes) we can treat them as if they are the same thing… but when we look closely, it becomes obvious that the two sides of the equation are different. [1 + 1 = 2] is a conceptual expression. It is not a physical reality of say [2 apples]. As an expression, the phrase [1 + 1] is obviously not the same as the expression [2]. The first requires three words and the second only requires one word. One might argue that both expressions refer to the same physical reality… but reality is conceptually meaningless without the concepts that define it. And both expressions are different ways of conceptually defining those two apples. [2] is like the single set {a-1, a-2} while [1 + 1] is like the two sets {a-1} and {a-2}. Again, a single concept is not the same as two separate and distinct concepts. They may be FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT, but they are not the exact same thing.

I disagree with both premise (2) and (3), when we are thinking in the precise sense of identical as outlined above. And for a philosophical argument of this sort, I believe we must be, if the argument is to have any real validity. Otherwise, the conclusion can accurately be rephrased as:
4a. Therefore we are similar to the object these experiences are bound to
Which weakens the argument considerably. After all, I’m similar to a rock in some ways. Like a stone: 1) I’m made of atoms. 2) those atoms will break down over time and eventually disappear as a singular entity. 3) I can leave the ground at times. 4) If I’m currently in the air, gravity will pull me to the ground. … etc. True, there are far more ways in which I am NOT like a rock. But the word similar always implies a mixed bag… things that are the same and things that are different. While it would appear that the goal of your argument is to imply that the two things are “exactly the same” and do not have such dissimilarities.

Argument (2)… When any two people look at a table, they will see something slightly different. Partly because their senses and brain will (almost certainly) act to create slightly different sensory experiences… but also because (even if they could see exactly the same thing) they are in slightly different positions and thus are seeing the slightly different things in a literal sense. Because the light source is coming from a fixed position, when you move, the reflections of light will change shape and position slightly on any given surface. Similarly, the shape (that we actually see) will change. To represent a square table, an artist must draw something that is not square on his paper. And the shape that he draws must change depending on the perspective of the viewer–if the table is to LOOK square. Since no two people can possibly occupy the same location, they cannot SEE the same shape, when looking at the same table. Thus, the only way to see exactly what [Tim] sees is to be [Tim]. Presumably, this is what you are implying with (2)

The most obvious objection is with (3). While it is true that we have access to a particular set of conscious experiences… it is not true that we have access to the totality of our mental experiences… or, in other words, the totality of the processes that our brain is producing in order to produce in us the experiences that we have. Because our experiences are not [identical] to our brain processes, I do not believe the premises, as stated, lead to the conclusion you wish. It would be a bit like suggesting that what we experience when watching TV is identical to the processes that allow the TV to project it’s picture. The first is obviously dependent on the second, but it is not the same thing as the second.

In the same way, we are dependent on our brains/minds, but “WE” are not identical to our brains/minds.
And we are similar to our brains/minds… but this is very different from being [identical] to our brains/minds. We may be functionally equal to our brains/minds, but only if we ignore the ways in which “WE” are different from our brains.