[Note II. I just had the insight that HumAnIze is at least divided between the moral will to intellectual probity and the will to security (not to mention the natural desire for truth, of course). He believes truth is better than illusion (which already implies belief in a self and a connected good). This is the direct reason for my finally posting all this.]
“Philosophy”! 
None of this is philosophy; it’s just politics. It’s not even philosophic politics. You guys don’t even know what philosophic politics is, because you haven’t seriously asked the question—which occupied me for well over ten years—why philosophy should become political… For it’s not politics which may become philosophic, but philosophy which may become political. “Political philosophy”!
Originally, to be sure, it was politics which became philosophic—“transcended” itself into philosophy. But this does not mean politics became political philosophy, but that it became natural philosophy. And it’s only natural philosophy which can become political philosophy: namely, when it learns it has not truly transcended politics—in other words, when it learns it has not truly exited the cave…
“Wisdom is an idol of the cave.” (Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, p. 179.)
In this sense, wisdom is indeed received wisdom (as in Kabbalah)… The very idea(l) of wisdom is received—not from Gods but from one’s fellow mere mortals. Understanding this is what makes one a philosopher proper (eigentliche Philosoph, “genuine philosopher”), i.e. a political philosopher. And if one then arrives at an ontology, the only thing preserving one’s status as a philosopher is the understanding that it’s a speleontology: to the philosopher who has “returned” to his cave and seriously examined it, it really appears to be part of a boundless cave supersystem (and to have countless subsystems)—but still only appears that way, “thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern.”
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Now when Jakob asks, “Does western philosophy thus[!] turn out to be irrelevant, futile, impotent?”, he’s assuming philosophic politics should serve a purpose beyond philosophy: that it should “resurrect the west”, or rule out or at least postpone “the death of humanity”, or “prepar[e] for a renaissance, a birth of a superior human consciousness”, etc. The truth, however, is that, even if it does such things, it ultimately does so for the purpose of understanding. If not, it’s not philosophic!
[Note. It does not suffice, as Lampert says, to take “action on behalf of the human in its highest reach, its reach for understanding.” For this is “driven by love of the human”. But ‘the human’ is like Odysseus’s ‘lies like the truth’: “the nature of the individual is to be understood as the individual nature”. This is also why understanding requires eternal rather than merely historical recurrence.]
This is not to say philosophy’s end is extrinsic to itself. Understanding occurs precisely in the practice(!) of philosophic politics itself!
“Only a being—God—whose end is intrinsic to its action could act without acting for an end distinct from the action itself.” (Jaffa, “Neumann or Nihilism”.)
Arthur Melzer: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing
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Anyway… With the said preserved status as a philosopher, we’re back at this post:
Why did Spinoza need “to refute the possibility of revelation by means of a comprehensive system that would leave no room for an unfathomable God”? Why couldn’t he just “live the dialectical tension between […] the devotion to the beautiful and the knowledge of our needy nature, which allows this devotion to be good for us”? Precisely because of the then-regnant idea of an unfathomable God, of course! Because of that, Spinoza could not be a Platonian, but had to be a Machiavellian.
But Machiavellian philosophy’s attempt to refute the possibility of revelation was a failure, and its will to security, to secure reason against revelation, had to make way for the moral will to intellectual probity; Machiavellian philosophy had to make way for Nietzscheist philosophy (cf. Gay Science 344). But it seems Heidegger, whose thought constitutes the hard center of that philosophy, was unaware of philosophic esotericism (cf. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, page 7). As such, he seems to have identified with the outer or lower aspect of cruelty toward oneself (cf. BGE 30 and 225).
“Surely our probity must not be permitted to become the ground or object of our pride, for this would lead us back to moralism (and to theism).
[…We must] realize the fact that egoism [—which is fundamental—] is will to power and hence includes cruelty which, as cruelty directed toward oneself, is effective in intellectual probity, in ‘the intellectual conscience’.” (“Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”.)
Heidegger, it would seem, was still proud of his probity… But it’s not in the pride of suffering cruelty, but in the joy of inflicting it that the delusion of Thelema can securely meet the Truth of Athelema.—I cut short my last post, which originally continued and ended as follows:
‘Now in order to understand my own personal solution, you first have to know my own personal understanding of the problem. The problem is the uncertainty, if not the denial, of the will. And to me “free will” is a tautology: the will is the feeling of freedom, power, agency. But what if it’s only a feeling, and there is in reality no such thing? My solution is that the will is preserved in the teeth of the insight into its (possible, if not probable) non-existence, in the form of the will to precisely that insight. For the will to that insight precedes that insight—if not chronologically, then at least logically: without that will, in oneself or others, the insight naturally fades away. The will, albeit itself only an irrational impulse, is yet experienced as free.’
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The will to insight into the truth of Athelema cannot be a will to security, for the truth is no better than illusion (though also no worse). So if love must be under will, the “natural” love of truth must then be under the moral will to intellectual probity. Yet this “moral” will itself contains immorality or amorality: the inner or higher aspect of cruelty toward oneself (not even to mention the “immorality” of pride…).
But if the truth is no worse (and no better) than illusion, how can the will to intellectual probity contain cruelty? What’s cruel, then, about driving toward the truth? The whole point is that the will is delusional. But if this is so, can’t it be a will to security after all? The fact that the truth is no better and no worse than illusion itself belongs to the “cruel” nature of truth.
And I’m not talking about the first time one has the said insight. What I’m talking about is when one already knows it’s most probably true. This already eliminates the “natural” desire for truth: there is no lover (no self) and no worthy belovèd (good)—in fact, the most worthy belovèd would be the will!
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It makes sense that HumAnIze should say, “at least I have sex and my whiskey bottles to give some meanings back.” Sexuality and intoxication. Leaves out the "rock ‘n’ roll"¹, though—which also makes perfect sense. You guys are still “moral”, i.e. resentful (just look at the context in which he said that). In fact, unless it’s understood as the reciprocal form of self-lightening, VO might also be called PO, Politics Ontology:
“Politics always is serious and potentially, if not actually, tragic. The main political passion, moral indignation, the hatred of enemies and craving for vengeance against them, springs from the political faith that one has or needs common goods without which life is not worth living. Hatred and desire for revenge is the natural reaction against enemies, whoever threatens one’s common or political good.” (Neumann, “Politics or Nothing!”)
My speleontology should rather be called NO, of course:
‘Love is itself an empty heart, or—’
‘“Or an empty pussy” is what I didn’t say. 
That is, I meant love as (Platonic) eros. Thus that Kali-yantra (“maternal ouroboros”) is basically a yoni-symbol. I don’t celebrate Christmas, but I did have a fitting insight on Christmas Day, namely that Dionysos and Ariadne (the philosopher and the Goddess) are to replace Jesus/Isa and Yahweh/Allah (the prophet and God), with the maternal recurrence replacing the Creation-Last Judgment timeline. I’m talking about the true politicization (religionization) of philosophy, the turning of the Question into the Answer…’
(Written right around Christmas 2022.)
“[T]he nature of nature is universal process, a becoming that is an internal drive to fulfill itself whose product is an internal drive to fulfill itself.” (How Socrates Became Socrates, page 190.)
¹ “The states in which we infuse a transfiguration and a fullness into things and poetize about them until they reflect back our fullness and joy in life: […] Three elements principally: sexuality, intoxication, cruelty—all belonging to the oldest festal joys of mankind, all also preponderat[ing] in the early ‘artist’.” (Will to Power # 801, Kaufmann ed.)
RUDRA (SG) Rudrapatni (OFFICIAL LYRICS VIDEO)