Someone said I should make a topic, how about this one. Let’s try to refute something from Kant.
In a nutshell, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism says (imo no one really knows what Kant meant exactly, not even Kant, I interpret him like this): We only have access to the phenomena, the objects we experience conform to our mode of cognition. Space, time, causality and so on are features of the phenomena. We can’t know the noumena beyond the phenomena, even talking about noumena and about ‘beyond’ are nonsensical.
We take the leap of faith by assuming that there are other conscious beings, and they construct their phenomena the same way we do. We are essentially solipsistic, but we never admit this, we always pretend that we aren’t.
Indirect Realism (monistic variant, preferably within the nondual philosophical framework) says, or at least some version of it says: Yes, what we experience is a construct, and that construct is at least in part shaped by our cognitive faculties. But there may be an objective reality beyond this construct, and we may be able to infer some things about it, from within the construct.
Modern science and modern psychology are arguably aligned with Indirect Realism of course, but I wanted to highlight the problem of certainty.
Kant is certain that we can’t know anything about what’s beyond appearances. Even thinking that there could be an unknowable objective reality, is nonsensical.
An indirect realist however may say that well, there could actually be an objective reality, it’s just that we can’t infer anything about it. Or that there is an objective reality and we can infer say 1% of its features. Or some other percentage. We don’t know how much, but it’s not zero. So an indirect realist isn’t certain that we can’t know anything about what’s beyond appearances.
So where does Kant’s certainty come from? Imo he just made it up. There is no absolute certainty anywhere in philosophy. The one who uses such certainty, is in error.