On the impossibility of knowing a true tenseless fact without omnitemporality

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TIME Q Posted on Equip / Reasonable Faith (also submitted as a question of the week) (Facebook discussion below)

I recently took the Equip course on God‘s relationship to time and eternity. It was a great supplement to Dr. Craig’s recent coverage in the Defenders course over a number of sessions.

A lingering question I have is: How can God know a tenseless 1492 fact that is embedded (timestamped) in time unless that time exists in some sense, and he knows what time it is in that sense, because not only is he immanent in that time, he is omnitemporal (omniimmanent, omnipresent)? Would this be a synthesis of both A and B theories, or would it be a “kind” of (which?) one of those two theories?

Jabberwock

God is supposed to know counterfactuals and they do not ‘exist’ in any sense. So it seems that the issue described is just an instance of a greater question, i.e. how can God know anything without a causal chain shaping his knowledge?

I can see that some things would be able to be known without experience, or a priori, like the fact that opposites cancel each other out, so in order to have a whole you need more than two individuals of the sort that cancel each other out. So this whole must be always existing. However, something in 1492 is embedded in time even if you have gleaned it tenselessly. so that seems to be a synthetic a priori of a coeternal whole, no? And for the record, I do not think this violates free will, if the whole thing is complete on the spur of every moment/choice(s).

On Facebook (Christian Apologetics Alliance)

https://www.facebook.com/groups/caalliance/permalink/4241855109375311

Dave Homiack basically repeated Jabberwock and added in Dr. Craig’s “sin is never vanquished because/and Jesus is still hanging on the cross” critique of B Theory and defense of A Theory.

I reply:

I reply to you at 9:00am Pacific on Sunday, March 16, 2025. Tenselessly true (but actually false) ontologically prior to that moment in time, and only true in a tensed (actual) sense upon the reply’s insantiation within time. It’s like Schrodinger’s cat on Dr. Craig’s view, unless God is omnitemporal… timelessly dead in God’s mind, until finally alive in time. Or??? Do I not have this quite right?

I don’t think it is possible that he knows timestamped facts conceptually sans temporality (for the same reason Dr. Craig doesn’t think God can go back to timelessness), nor perceptually after the fact (he is omniscient—Kant’s original being… intellectual intuition), but rather it is only possible for God to know “in the fact” because (or, “if”) he is omnitemporal. If I am right, God doesn’t need to “fore”know or look ahead (or back)—he is already there (including here). We usually don’t understand this because we don’t understand time. Or God’s presence.

I think the situation is neither A nor B Theory. I am familiar with Dr. Craig’s “sin is never vanquished” argument against B Theory. But, he did point out the absurdity of every time existing at the same time, and it is equally absurd (for the same reason) to say that God forever hangs on the cross. Coeternality (omnitemporality, eternity) is not something we easily grasp, never mind the cross was not a magic trick. It would also be equally absurd to say “sin is never vanquished” or “eternal, unconditional love is never demonstrated” by pointing at every other moment outside the moments of the cross (assuming falsely they are absolutely empty of demonstration) just because a) B Theory fixes them in the timeline, or b) A Theory makes them false outside of now. So I’m thinking C Theory (God’s omnitemporality) resolves this. Plus not framing the cross as a kind of magic trick rather than a Signal from the eternal in language we learned in advance (via the Law & Prophets) so we could decode/understand/receive it when the Message was Sent.

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This is encouraging from the Equip course (section 3, lesson 2), but originally from QoW #450:

“First of all, let’s rid ourselves of the idea that the B-theory of time implies causal determinism and so is incompatible with human freedom. As B-theorist extraordinaire Adolf Grünbaum emphasized long ago, the B-theory does not imply that events which lie in our future are causally determined with respect to antecedent events. Indeed, some such event could be wholly undetermined by antecedent causes. On any standard definition of libertarian freedom, therefore, such an event could be a genuinely free choice.

“…the choice or quantum event is just as changeless and eternal as the 4-D block itself—indeed, they are part of that block—but when you infer that they are “inevitable,” you have made the same mistake as the person who thinks that our future choices are inevitable because God has infallibly foreknown them from eternity past. God’s foreknowledge is thus analogous to the B-theory of time. It is eternal and changeless and in that sense “frozen,” but that does not render the human choices foreknown by God inevitable. For although we cannot (by definition!) change the future, nevertheless we can act in such a way that if we were to act in that way God’s foreknowledge would have been different.”

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Talking to myself, part 3.

Question to Dr. Craig: What if Kant’s intellectual intuition (original being) is like simultaneous or immediate causation, because omnitemporal, treating every moment, no matter how you slice it, as a beginning/edge, and is neither merely conceptual, nor perceptually after the fact, nor needing to ‘fore’know, because already always (t)here, freely & faithfully sustaining and concurring our free acts—because eternal love is neither eternal, nor love, without a freely chosen, coeternal demonstration?

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Jabberwock replied with this quote, to which I reply below it:

“From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived.”

William Lane Craig – The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology

I replied:

If the universe is a demonstration of eternal love, and God doesn’t have a beginning, and God never came into being, but always is, then the universe always existing coeternally (even though it has a beginning) is what omnitemporality looks like, even if every moment of the timeline is tenselessly a beginning/edge. It may never end if it is a tesselating fractal, though its material may be extinguished & resurrected. But certainly not every moment is happening at the same moment —that would be absurd. However, it is possible to mix moments informationally, or experientially—that is why prophetic vision is possible. But that means that being omnitemporal doesn’t change the fact that the thing started whole—was always premixed. The reason behind that is the same reason he can extinguish everything and start over (resurrect). New Heavens and new Earth. But the logos never passes away (is at every time t— and not in a merely enduring sense, but in the sense that it is the condition for the possibility of endurance.

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Dave Homiack on Facebook, to which I reply below:

“Love is eternally expressed within the triune Godhead, since God is love. Thus, it is not dependent on God having ever created. Since He did create, only in tensed A-theory time can the universe (space-time) be said to have begun to exist, per the second premise of the Kalam argument.”

I replied:

What does eternal mean if there is no time? Why can’t there be a beginning moment just because every moment exists outside of our experience except the current one? In what way can God demonstrate self-sacrificial love to himself “alone” (sans creation)?

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Dave Homiak replied on Facebook, to which my reply is below:

Dave replies:

The usual definition is that the concept of “eternity” refers to a timeless state where God existed, outside of any temporal framework, in a state of perfect, unchanging existence, logically prior to creation of time and the universe. In this context, eternity is not simply an infinite amount of time, but a state of being that has no beginning or end, no “before” or “after” in the way that time has.

To your second question, the B-theory of time posits that all moments in time exist equally, so it doesn’t necessarily have a beginning moment in the way A-theory does. B-theory views time as a static, block-like structure, rather than a flow.

Here are some thoughts on your last question. Prior to creation, the Trinity was engaged in a perfect, eternal relationship of love, where each Person freely chose to love and serve the others. The Trinity demonstrates sacrificial love in that each Person of God is willing to give up their own will and desires for the sake of the others and the glory of God. To say God could not express agape love prior to creation is to make His nature dependent on the necessity of creation.

I reply:

Let me rephrase the question. Dr. Craig seems to paint A theory as God being temporal since the beginning, and B theory as God being timeless (the beginning merely being an edge), but his version of A theory as God being timeless eternity sans creation. Elsewhere, he mentions that the two alternatives of eternity are timelessness and omnitemporality. Which theory does he think omnitemporality belongs to?

Doesn’t a timeless concept of eternity only have meaning if there actually is a temporal framework (a coeternal, created/demonstrated whole) by which to compare it? Wouldn’t “timeless” in that scenario mean “nothing” — not in the sense that Lawrence Krauss means it, but really nothing — and therefore God is not timeless and never was (because God is not nothing)? Rather, God is omnitemporal (granted, Krauss would never allow his nothing to be God). God is omnipotent, not powerless. God is omniscient, not ignorant. God is omnibenevolent, not apathetic. God is omnipresent, not absent. So there can be a beginning moment to the physical, even though it (from omnitemporal eternity—not nothing) began whole (coeternal)—so that every moment is “in a sense” (in God) first, last, and “edge”. This is NOT the same as saying every time exists at the same time—just like saying the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all God/Being is NOT saying all three persons, and everything in reality, fall under monism. Does this have to be a C theory, because it is too different from either A or B?

When you talk about before and after, what do you make of Dr. Craig saying that sans creation God knows tenseless truths even though this includes he can “will” a moment in time like 1492 (again, ontologically prior to creation)? Isn’t that omnitemporal eternity, rather than timeless eternity? Dr. Craig says God can’t go back to being timeless… doesn’t that mean he never was? Dr. Craig doesn’t seem to know whether this is an intrinsic or extrinsic change in God. He reflects both views at various points in the Equip course. I think omnitemporality resolves it (in other words, it was never really a problem, considering God has always been omnitemporal, unchangingly subsuming/concurring, sustaining all change). Like a tessellating fractal.

As for the necessity of creation. If love is not love without demonstration (a tree is known by its fruit), then a demonstration will happen if love is there (sufficient condition), but how it happens has infinite possibilities — as long as they don’t violate treating the other the way you want to be treated (necessary condition), and vice versa — the sum of the law and the prophets. So you see how the master craftsman of creation can bring from his storehouse things old/eternal and things new/evergreen.

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Jabberwock replied on the Reasonable Faith forum, to which I reply below each of his:

Jabberwock

I would say omnitemporality seriously undercuts the Kalam – if time can be past-infinite, why not the universe?

I reply:

@Jabberwock because it is empirically evident that the physical began. There are many arguments to support this. The most recent one I’ve heard is the Borde Guth Vilenkin theorem.

Jabberwock replied:

No, it is not ’empirically evident’, as cosmologists do not consider the matter settled. Even twenty years ago, when BGV was formulated, Guth has disagreed with Vilenkin about its implications. However, if we are talking about cosmology, the ovewhelming majority of scientists agree that time is a feature OF the tempospatial universe. They do not propose a metaphysical timeline completely separated from the physical reality, so if you accept the reasoning, you must both accept that the universe had a beginning and that time itself had a beginning.

Finally, an omnitemporal being entails the B-theory of time, which, as Craig wrote above, is incompatible with the Kalam.

I replied:

@Jabberwock considering the empirical evidence contributing to current inflationary model of the universe’s expansion, according to the Bord Guth Vilenkin theorem, the physical universe cannot be past eternal. Even in a cyclic model. I don’t know if omnitemporality works with B theory, or if a C theory is required. however, I do know that the theory is compatible with the kalam, if you let go of the one argument (that you can’t build an infinite by adding to it) supporting the second premise (the universe began to exist). There are others. And actually, that argument also supports B theory, because it means the only way you’re gonna have an infinite, is if it starts out (always is) whole. I appreciate your attempting to articulate your perspective, and also appreciate that it has helped me articulate mine.

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Jabberwock replies:

Now, I am not sure what you mean by ‘omnitemporal’. Is your definition similar to this one:
The Trinity Foundation - The Omnitemporality of God(section: Omnitemporality defined)?

And no, Kalam is not compatible with the B-theory, as Craig himself has written in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, from which I have quoted above) – it has nothing to do with the infinity. On B-theory the timeblock has a ‘beginning’ the way the tape measure has a beginning – it does not ‘come into being’.

I reply:

@Jabberwock I like the definition of omnitemporary at that website. It uses the language of Parmenides. To put it another way, Omnitemporality is like the golden rule of Time. The golden rule transcends all cultures because it is the eternal root that is true, good, and beautiful in every culture—the Trinity being the whole, and Christ being its fullest demonstration. It is true essentially/eternally beyond/before/after the demonstration in time, but true in time eternally because eternally subsumed in omnitemporality. The universe began to exist in time with the first moment, but is essentially eternal as a whole (it began complete). As I said above … every moment is in a sense first, last, and “edge” from the perspective of omnitemporality — which is not the same as saying every moment exists in the same moment.

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Jabberwock replied, and my replies are below each of his:

Jabberwock replies:

If you agree with the definition, then your view supports eternalism and not presentism (which is required, as Craig wrote, for Kalam). If the timeblock is essentially eternal, then it is, as Craig points out, meaningless to state that the universe ‘came into being’. The tape measure does not ‘come into being’ at its beginning, it is simply a dimensional edge/direction.

I replied:

@Jabberwock I think it’s probably both, but eternalism is God’s being, whereas presentism is ours in God’s. So there IS a beginning to the physical—but ontologically prior to (before/after) that the omnitemporal is essential (not present to us). The temporal becomes in the sense of an act(action) in which we are all participating, to which we are witness, although not all of us know it yet (revelation of the unchanging essence or nature of God.

Jabberwock replied:

It cannot be both, it is logically contradictory, as both options concern the ontic status of time.

I replied:

How is it a contradiction that there is both a dot (many) and a line (one)? That we can only see (be shown) one at a time (unless he shows us more) doesn’t limit God against seeing/being present in all of them. Why would being completely without them make more sense than being completely within them, and them in God? We’re talking time, not merely the physical sequence, which is not completely sequential, because prophecy is impossible unless information out of sequence is part of the whole.

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I really like Dr. Craig’s recent, relevant videos, and may start a new blog post or line of questioning that shows how it is C Theory, and if he still has any loose ends that need tying up… particularly in the first one, if not tied up in the second. It captures my attention how previous to these videos (all throughout the years, including the recently published Equip course), Dr. Craig would’ve said he was contradicting himself… to say that God is both omnitemporal within creation, and the Trinity is timeless sans creation. But he’s right. …because it’s not a contradiction that a timeless God subsumes all of creation… like the necessary world subsumes all possible worlds. …or is it? What do you think?

And:

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