Even that supposes a seperation- just the kind that I'm talking about. In the model you describe above, "I" (which you seperate from the gut) would wait for those signals from the gut, and then I would [i] choose [/i] to either obey my gut or else not (Surely you've gone against your gut instinct, and regretted it later, haven't you?). Either way, choice can't be described as 'waiting for my brain to make me do stuff', at least, not the way I experience it.
I do my thinking. My brain is what I use to do it, no doubt.
That 'I' word is your whole problem. Illusion. In order for your theory to work it has to revolve around the idea that something we seem to experience nearly every waking moment of our lives is, in fact, an illusion. I can only speak for myself, but the 'illusion' of free will is no more or less strong than the 'illusion' of causation, or the 'illusion' that if a is taller than b, and b is taller than c, then a is taller than c. You can compose an argument for determinism as strong as you wish, and I can get an equally powerful counter-argument by playing a game of checkers.
Simply put, your whole theory involves one of the most basic things to human experience being an illusion. You make the same mistake Berkeley did- you try to tell people that everything they know is a lie, and then you wonder why it isn't obvious to everyone. It doesn't make you wrong, it just means you have a nearly insurmountable burden of proof.
It is no doubt difficult to explain where free will comes from, but the determinist doesn't get away from that- they just have the job of explaining where the [i]appearence[/i] of free will comes from. Why do we seem to be conscious beings?
